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The study focuses on the north and south Sudan conflict and seeks to investigate 
the continuing threats to a return to war between the two parties since the 2005 
Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and after the independence of 
South Sudan. The study critically analyses the CPA and investigates the dilemmas 
faced by the two Sudans and examines the conflict resolution/transformation 
process. This thesis relies on data generated from key informant interviews and 
archival data as primary sources; complemented by secondary sources of data 
obtained from books, journals, research documents and relevant literature on the 
area. 
The study analyses the background of the north-south Sudan conflict, analysis of the 
CPA, implications of the negotiation, mediation and the implementation processes of 
the CPA and the referendum, post-referendum, the post-independence issues and 
the conflict resolution efforts. These are discussed in order to find the reasons as to 
why the CPA emerged as it did and its effectiveness. The study uses the concept of 
the conflict resolution/transformation approaches and their methods (mediation, 
negotiation and peacebuilding), the Galtung ABC theory and the Liberal peace 
theory as tools to guide the study in order to measure the data collected from the 
field. 
The results of the analysis suggest that history, the mediation and the negotiation 
process viewed to have been narrow and non-inclusive, the content of the CPA itself, 
the problems of the previous processes before the referendum, the referendum of 
Southern Sudan and the Abyei referendum failure provided the basis of the origins of 
the post-referendum and the post-independence issues. These issues are 
responsible for the dilemmas faced by the two states and eventually the tensions 
and the threats to a return to war which exist up to the present.  All these issues lie 
at the heart of the difficulties of the conflict resolution process and the relationship 
problem of North and South Sudan.  However, the 2005 CPA had partial success in 
that it achieved partial negative peace which in turn led to the separation of north 
and south Sudan. 
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Chapter 1 
1.0 Introduction and background 
1. 1 Introduction 
The study focuses on the Sudan and South Sudan conflict. It seeks to investigate the 
continuing tensions and threats to a return to war between the two regions/parties 
since the 2005 Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and after the 
independence of South Sudan. 
Such a status quo is a threat to peace and security in the two states, the 
neighbouring countries as part of a region and the world as a whole. The study in 
this regard wishes to critically analyse the CPA and explore the dilemmas that 
were/are being faced by the now separate two Sudans with a view to eventually 
reflect on the mitigation, management and the resolution of the conflict. 
1.2 Research location 
The location of the study is the old Sudan and the locations of the present day two 
Sudans. Sudan was bordered by Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, the Central African 
Republic, Chad, Libya and an 853 km (530 miles) coastline bordering the Red Sea. It 
had an area of 1,886,068 km2 (728,215 sq mi) and was located between latitudes 8° 
and 23°N (Ibbotson and Lovell-Hoare, 2012:2&3). The locations of the two Sudans 
essentially remain in the same area however with boundary changes whereby Sudan 
is now bordered by Egypt, Libya, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Central African Republic (CAR) 
and Chad while South Sudan is bordered by CAR, Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (See maps 1.1 &1.2). 
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Figures: 1.1&1.2. Map of old Sudan and map of North and South Sudan                                                                          
      
 
Source: Google maps: Available at:https://www.google.uk (Accessed 15 
May 2014) 
1.3. Background of the study 
The study focuses on the peace process, which was undertaken to manage the 
northern-southern Sudan conflict (and not other internal conflicts such as Darfur and 
others in the country) with a view to find a possible resolve to the conflict. The study 
also focuses on the relations of the two states after the separation of southern 
Sudan.  The conflict is believed to have been one of the legacies of the early history 
of the state which in turn had created the north-south divide.  
According to Deng (1995:63-66), the causes of the conflict include religious and 
cultural persecutions, poor economic conditions, historical differences between 
northern and southern Sudan and misguided and discriminative social and economic 
programmes mostly against the south. These aspects generally made the people of 
northern and southern Sudan to be ethnically divided. Ethnicity is perceived as group 
identity, based on common cultural affiliation and a belief in a shared ancestry and a 
common future (Cheeseman et al., 2015:95).  The perception in this regard is that 
the southerners started considering the option of separation as part of their righto 
self-determination. Self-determination is conceptualized later in this study. These 
factors generally led to the first and the second north-south Sudan civil wars from 
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1955 to 1972 and from 1983 to 20051. The core concerns by the southerners during 
the two civil wars and what the CPA was meant to address were; the question of 
national identity, the socio-economic and political gap between the centre and 
periphery and the constant threat of Arabisation and Islamisation by the Northern 
elite (Raftopoulos and Alexander, 2006:25 &26). These aspects enhanced a division 
which in turn formed  battle lines in the civil wars that raged on and off for almost half 
a century and  proxy conflicts with Uganda, Chad, Ethiopia, Eritrea and CAR. The 
divide referred the north as Arab and Moslem and the south as African and Christian 
or with traditional African beliefs.   
The civil wars which took place from 1955 to 1972 and 1983 to 2005 and which still 
linger in some cases had/have devastating implications on Sudan as a country, now 
the two countries of Sudan and South Sudan and the horn of Africa as a region. It 
was through these implications that initiatives were/are taken to manage and resolve 
the conflict as part of the peace process. During the course of the peace process, 
the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement had brought negative peace for about eleven 
years while the CPA partially ended the conflict although there still are significant 
problems (Natsios, 2012:163).  
In a related development in accordance with the CPA arrangements, South Sudan 
separated through a referendum from Sudan and became independent on 9 July 
2011 as part of the right to self-determination outcome (Copnall, 2014:4) However, 
Sudan before as one state and now as two states after the separation of southern 
Sudan faced/face a number of dilemmas including the question of the right to self-
determination.   
Self-determination has been and is a contested concept internationally. The claim  of 
the right to self-determination by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army 
(SPLM/A), an organization whose position seemed not really clear on it and its 
inclusion in the CPA during the negotiations with the north which also had problems 
                                                          
1
 A 1955 mutiny of Southern soldiers in the Equatorial Corps at Torit is usually considered the start of the first 
civil war. The cause of the mutiny was dissatisfaction with the decolonization process, in which Southerners 
believed they were losing out as it was widely expected that Northerners would install themselves as rulers of 
the South. The mutiny of the 105
th
 Battalion at Bor Garrison on 16 May 1983, due to governments 
mismanagement of the southerners in the military led by Kerubino Bol, followed later by the abrogation of the 
1972 Addis Ababa agreement whereby Islamic Sharia law was introduced in the South and the region being 
divide into three regions are seen mostly to have triggered the second civil war. 
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with it,  presented a complex turn in the context of politics and International Relations 
(IR)2.   
The United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) now African Union (AU) 
through their United Nations General Assembly Declaration on Decolonisation (1960) and 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981) limited self-determination to 
ending colonial rule and assumed that civic territorial nationalism would underpin allegiance 
to the new states (Lesch, 1998:13). The separation of southern Sudan from Sudan in this 
regard can be viewed to have taken place against a background of limitations by these 
important organisations. Governments and the international community have often had 
apprehensions with entities with aspirations to separate from their states for fear of more 
conflicts through a contagion effect.  
The limitation in the context of the UN, is grounded from Article 1(2) of the UN Charter which 
states that the purpose of the UN Charter is: "To develop friendly relations among nations 
based on the respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples’, and 
to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace and includes the 
protection of the territoriality issue to avoid unnecessary conflicts”3. The territoriality issue 
was included because it was deemed that if the situation was left open, it would inevitably 
lead to more conflicts and independence movements in many states.   
In the context of the OAU now AU, it was viewed that many of the borders were 
widely recognised as arbitrary, as they had separated families and tribes and joined 
others. This was perceived to have created potential for secession/partition. For 
these reasons, African leaders adopted Resolution 16 at the first ordinary summit of 
the OAU in July 1964 whereby all the member states declared and pledged to 
respect the borders that existed when they had achieved national independence 
(Thomson, 2010:47). The reasoning behind the resolution was to avoid opening a 
                                                          
2
 The Southerners in the first civil war fought for the South’s autonomy, in the second the SPLM/A claimed an 
ideological affiliation to free the entire Sudan through a concept it called the ‘new Sudan, but later after the 
split of SPLM/A Nasri from the SPLM/A Mainstream, competition from the Nasir faction strengthened the 
separatists’ position within the SPLM/A. John Garang found himself in a contradictory position of needing to 
champion the self- determination option of separation in order to compete with the Nasir faction for support 
among Southerners, while simultaneously denouncing separatism in order to maintain co-operation with the 
National Democratic Alliance (NDA). Likewise North Sudan initially totally rejected the demand of the right to 
self-determination for the South but later in the process began to accept it.   
3
 United Nations (1945), Charter of the United Nations, 1 UNTS XVI, Available at: 
http://www.unwebsite.com/charter  [accessed  20 November 2013]. 
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Pandora’s Box of efforts by the continent’s ethnic minorities to redraw Africa’s 
borders which they feared would be highly destabilising.  
This position suggests that the UN and OAU/AU condemns separation/secession 
attempts on the grounds that they can encourage other disaffected communities in 
other states to break away. Interestingly, the separation of north and south Sudan 
was internationally recognised despite the presence of the limitations. This means 
that even if it was accepted, it was not expected and as such it was a sui generis 
occurrence as a general overview of studies of peace processes show that power 
sharing has been a prominent aspect of most recent African peace settlements. This 
translates that separation solutions in most peace processes are considered 
unthinkable (Katanga in the Democratic Republic of the Cong (DRC), Biafra in 
Nigeria and Somaliland in Somalia, among others are examples) (Mehler, 2008:17).  
The question is why are there still tensions and threats to a return to war between 
Sudan and South Sudan even after the separation of the two countries as provided 
for in the CPA, which was a legitimate agreement providing for the right to self-
determination through a referendum. One reason is that the agreement may not 
have addressed some challenges faced by the parties to the conflict. Copnall 
(2015:1) in supporting this position states that Sudan and South Sudan are joined by 
more than a name and their people will have no choice but to write a joint narrative 
for many years to come. There are many more areas in which the parties to the 
conflict before the separation and even after the separation faced/face dilemmas. 
This situation makes the case to be unique. It is this uniqueness that sets the stage 
for the study to be undertaken. 
1.4 The genesis of the study 
My interest in this study area stems from my background in which I studied global 
security at a Masters’ Degree level and later as a University lecturer in Peace studies 
at Mzuzu University in Malawi. Through these activities, I became very familiar with 
conflict resolution. I was further encouraged in the discipline through workshops 
organized by an American organization called African Centre for Strategic Studies 
which partners with my University.  
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During the workshops, African conflicts were given a very detailed coverage and 
time and again group work involved trying to discuss possible solutions to such 
conflicts and sometimes analyzing peace processes of countries whose conflicts had 
been resolved. Through these interactions, I became familiar with the conflicts in the 
horn of Africa (Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea) at the time and the case 
studies of the peace agreements in the peace processes of South Africa, Angola, 
Namibia, Mozambique, Sudan and other countries in the world.  
I however came to learn during the workshops that the Sudan case was unique in 
the sense that it took a very long time, had complex causes and goals and a 
dramatic end although problems still linger in the states that came to be created after 
a peace agreement. My concern has been the absence of complete peace between 
Sudan and South Sudan which had and has implications on the security of the 
country/countries, the region and Africa as a continent.   
I also noted that the agreement came to be known as a Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) and not just a peace agreement and as such questions like ‘why 
was it called comprehensive, how was it arrived it and what had determined it came 
to my mind. These factors attracted my interest to undertake this study with a view to 
have a clear understanding on these aspects. My view has been that through the 
study, I can be able to enhance my academic status and at the same time be able to 
contribute to knowledge on the literature of ending civil wars/conflict through the 
analysis of the CPA and the dilemmas which were/are faced by Sudan initially and 
now the two Sudans. It is then against this background that my PhD journey was 
conceived. 
1.5 Aim and objectives of the research 
The study seeks to investigate why there have been tensions and threats to a return 
to war between Sudan and South Sudan since the CPA and even after the 
independence of South Sudan as its aim. 
1.5.1 Objectives of the study 
The objectives of the study with focus to support the aim are as follows; 
 To establish the factors that influenced the conflict parties in north and south 
Sudan to engage in negotiation to arrive at the 2005 Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement. 
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 To investigate how the mediation and negotiation of the 2005 CPA of Sudan 
were conducted to end the conflict with a view to resolve it. 
 To investigate reasons as to why the right to self-determination for southern 
Sudan was included in the CPA despite its being viewed with ambivalence in 
the international community. 
 To find out why some issues remained unresolved and others untouched 
during the mediation/negotiation of the CPA. 
 To explore if the 2005 Sudan CPA was indeed comprehensive and why some 
of its protocols were problematic in the context of peace for the conflicting 
parties. 
 To establish how the agreement was implemented, supervised and 
monitored, why some of the protocols remained unimplemented up until the 
end of the interim period of the CPA and the implications thereafter.  
 To investigate the issues which emerged after the referendum and the 
independence of South Sudan and why they have been difficult to resolve? 
1.6 Statement of the problem 
The mediation/negotiation process between the National Congress Party (NCP) 
representing the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLM/A) representing southern Sudan mediated by the Inter-
Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) supported by the TROIKA countries 
resulted in the 2005 CPA which included six protocols and two annexures4. The 
hallmark of the agreement was the right to self-determination which was contained in 
the Machakos protocol which gave the southern Sudan the right to self-determination 
whereby it could opt either to separate from Sudan or remain united with it but 
emphasised to the parties to make unity attractive especially on the part of southern 
Sudan (Young, 2012:93). 
                                                          
4
 Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is a regional organisation which initially comprised 
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda and now South Sudan after it separated from 
Sudan and became independent. It was created in 1996 to supersede the Inter-governmental Authority on 
Drought and Development (IGADD) which was founded in 1986. Initially was concerned with issues of drought 
and development but due to circumstances was taken on board to mediate the North-South Sudan conflict. 
The TROIKA countries include (United States of America (USA, United Kingdom, Norway and Italy) which were 
supporting the IGAD financially and logistically during the mediation of the North-South Sudan conflict (Young, 
2012:83).  
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Likewise the agreement required to be implemented during the interim period. 
Brosche (2007:8) states that the milestones set (border demarcation, census and 
elections) to be met in the course of the implementation brought about new problems 
but despite the problems, the referendum took place and the south overwhelmingly 
voted to separate. This scenario implies that the separation was de jure as it was 
legally and internationally recognised.  
The South Sudan eventually attained independence on 9 July 2011. Despite having 
reached an agreement to manage the conflict and eventually try to resolve it through 
the activities lined up in it, after the south became a separate state through the 
legally sanctioned referendum, tensions and threats to a return to war still exist 
between the two states. The Abyei and the Heglig attacks by the two parties among 
several issues are cases in point. According to Copnall (2014:229), north Sudan 
before the and after the referendum did invade the Abyei area despite being a 
contested area and jointly administered by the two area/states. The scenario during 
the second incident it is noted was only settled after the intervention of the UN by 
deploying a peacekeeping force. Likewise South Sudan after its independence 
invaded the North and occupied Heglig (Panthou) area and only withdrew after 
international pressure.    
These incidents imply that the two areas initially as one state and later as two states 
faced and are facing dilemmas and significant problems which require resolving. 
1.7. Key research questions 
Drawing upon the background of the study, this thesis is based on the answering of 
the following research questions: 
1.7.1. Central research question 
Why has there been continuing tensions and threats to a return to war between 
Sudan and South Sudan since the CPA and even after the independence of the 
later? 
1.7.2. Secondary research questions 
The secondary research questions are as follows; 
 What were the causes of the north-south Sudan conflict?  
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 What factors influenced the conflict parties in north and south Sudan to 
engage in negotiation to arrive at the 2005 Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement? 
 How were the mediation and the negotiation for the 2005 CPA of Sudan 
conducted to resolve the conflict and achieve peace? 
 Why was the right to self-determination for South Sudan included as part 
of one of the CPA protocols despite its being viewed with ambivalence in 
the international community? 
 Why did some issues remain unresolved during the mediated negotiation 
of the CPA? 
 Why was the 2005 Sudan CPA and some of its protocols problematic in 
the context of peace for the conflicting parties? 
 Why did some of the protocols remain unimplemented up until the end of 
the interim period of the CPA and what were the implications of this after 
southern Sudan opted to separate from the north through a referendum? 
 What issues had emerged after the referendum and the independence of 
South Sudan and why they have been difficult to resolve?  
1.8 Literature review 
A Literature review was undertaken in the study to complement the fieldwork efforts. 
Literature review is the comprehensive study and interpretation of literature that 
relates to a particular topic (Aveyard, 2014:2). In order to satisfy this position, an 
intensive literature review was carried out with the purpose to precisely cover 
literature related to my research topic and to identify the gap/s if any within the 
literature that this study might contribute. 
Literature review in this regard was also used to identify potential sources of 
secondary data, which included books, journals articles, periodicals, masters’ theses 
and doctoral dissertations. In this respect I covered three aspects of literature 
(highlighted in chapter 2) literature related to theoretical concepts of conflict 
resolution approaches and methods, literature related to peace agreements and 
literature related to self-determination and its options of power sharing (unity) and 
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separation with focus on the CPA and the relationship of North and South Sudan 
after the separation of the South Sudan. 
1.9 The theoretical framework 
The study is guided by the Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory and the Liberal 
peace theory as conflict resolution theories to represent conflict resolution as the 
dominant position of the study.   
1.9.1 Galtung’s ABC theory 
Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory is an influential model of conflict that 
encompasses both symmetric and asymmetric conflicts (1996:72). The theory 
perceives conflict as a triangle with contradiction (C), attitude (A) and behaviour (B) 
at its vertices (Galtung, 1996:72). (See figure 1.3).                                                                                                                        
Figure 1.3 Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle  
                                        (C) Contradiction                                                
                                        
                                                                                           
                
         (A) Attitude                                                (B) Behaviour 
Source: Galtung, J. (1996). Peace by peaceful means: peace and conflict, 
development and civilization. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute (PRIO).  
In the theory, contradiction refers to the underlying conflict situation which includes 
the actual or perceived incompatibility of goals between the conflict parties. In a 
symmetric conflict, the contradiction is defined by the parties, their interests and the 
clash of interests between them while in an asymmetric conflict; contradiction is 
defined by the parties, their relationship and the conflict of interests inherent in the 
relationship.  
Attitude includes the parties’ perceptions and misperceptions of each other and of 
themselves. These can be positive or negative, but in violent conflicts parties tend to 
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develop demeaning stereotypes of the other and attitudes are often influenced by 
emotions such as fear, anger, bitterness and hatred (Ramsbotham et al., 2011:8). 
This suggests that attitude covers emotive (feeling), cognitive (belief) and conative 
(desire, will) elements.  
Behaviour as the third element on the triangle involves aspects of cooperation or 
coercion and gestures signifying conciliation or hostility. According to Fisher et al,. 
(2000:25) violent conflict behaviour is characterized by threats, coercion and 
destructive attacks. This position implies that behaviour in this case is a critical factor 
in the context of cooperation or hostility. 
According to Galtung (1996:73) all the three components have to be present 
together in a full conflict and that a conflict structure without conflictual attitudes or 
behaviour is a latent (or structural) one. This position suggests that conflict is a 
dynamic process in which structure, attitudes and behaviour constantly change and 
influence one another. As dynamics develop, conflict is manifested as the parties’ 
interests clash or the relationship they are in become oppressive. 
It is noted in this context that each of the features triggering a conflict (attitudes, 
behaviours and contradictions) can also serve as possible gateways to influence the 
conflict peacefully and work towards a resolution. Similarly it can be argued that 
each of these elements influence one another. While attitudes influence both 
behaviours and contradictions, the opposite can occur, with behaviours and 
contradictions affecting attitudes, and also each other. Because of the 
interconnectedness among these three aspects of conflict, it is important to address 
each one in order to reach a sustainable solution. Addressing attitudes is important 
as it helps people to become aware of and better understand the contradictions. The 
more profoundly a contradiction is understood, the easier it is to come up with 
creative solutions to overcome it. Addressing both attitudes and contradictions, in 
turn, influences changing behaviours and behaviours also affect attitudes. 
In order then for the conflict to be resolved, a set of dynamic changes need to take 
place that can mean de-escalation of the conflict behaviour, a change in attitudes 
and a transformation of the relationships or clashing interests which are at the centre 
of the conflict structure (contradictions) (Ramsbotham, et al., 2011:11). Such a 
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dynamic can only be attained through the use of the conflict resolution methods like 
negotiation, mediation and peacebuilding among others. This translates that if a 
conflict has to be resolved; behaviour has to no longer be violent, attitudes no longer 
to be hostile and the structure of the conflict to be changed. 
1.9.2 The Liberal peace theory  
The liberal peace theory in this study is used alongside the Galtung’s ABC conflict 
triangle theory. Liberal peacebuilding is the dominant form of contemporary 
peacebuilding that places emphasis on establishing liberal values such as the 
protection of individual rights, rule of law, a free market economy, democracy as well 
as building a liberal state in war-torn societies (Francis, 2012:42). MacGinty 
(2010:391) likewise perceives liberal peace as the dominant form of peacemaking 
and peacebuilding favoured by leading states, international organizations and 
international financial institutions.  
Liberal peace theory generally derives from the concept of liberalism in international 
relations and includes democracy, economic interdependence, and international 
institutions and international law as its most important pillars5. It should then be 
noted that Liberal peace theory in this case is not actually a theory but generally 
strands of practice from an amalgamation of various disciplines which include 
politics, development, economics and international law used as a basis to advance 
the peace agenda in states emerging from conflicts and even to prevent emergence 
of conflicts in stable states. The strands of these disciplines include; democracy, 
human rights, rule of law and neo-liberal economics among others. 
Individuals in a democracy are happy with the absence of war and as such would 
never go to war with each other, economic interdependence creates favourable 
conditions for international cooperation among governments and peoples through 
the use of market economies which thrive on free trade and promotes peace other 
than conflict while international organizations and international law are important for 
the regulation of international interdependence and thus ensures good relationships 
                                                          
5
 Liberalism suggests that economic interdependence creates favourable conditions for international 
cooperation among governments and peoples; since their destiny is common, as it is defined from several 
mutual economic and political problems, states – as rational entities – realize that international cooperation is 
necessary for the management of their common fate. 
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among states. Paris (2004:41) as a notion or what is termed as Liberal peace thesis 
states that democratic forms of government are more peaceful both in their internal 
politics and in their international relations than other forms of government. 
In this context, the liberal peace thesis views political and economic liberalization as 
democratic forms of effective antidotes to violent conflicts. Thus, promotion of human 
rights, democracy, elections, constitutionalism, rule of law, property rights, good 
governance, and neo-liberal economics have become part and parcel of the 
international peacebuilding strategy to achieve a liberal peace status (Barnnett et al., 
2007:35).  
Paris (1994:42) states that the international dimension of the liberal peace thesis in 
relation to the relationship between liberalism  and interstate conflict has a general 
consensus that market democracies rarely go to war against one another and 
likewise several analyses of civil violence similarly conclude that market 
democracies  are less prone to intrastate disturbances.  
The perception against this background is that political and economic liberalisation 
would appear to be a sensible and promising strategy for consolidating domestic 
peace in states that are just emerging from civil wars. Through the activities of 
peacebuilding with focus on the liberal peace model, countries emerging from civil 
wars can attain the same status. Sriram (2000:21) in this regard states that, the 
presumption is usually that the ideal outcome of peacebuilding as a conflict 
resolution method after armed conflict is a liberal capitalist state. 
This position suggests that whereas Liberal peace focuses on building a liberal state 
through democratisation, free market economy and international law and institutions, 
peacebuilding with its activities which include security, political, economic and social 
activities and reconciliation and justice parameters as agendas for peace assists 
states emerging from civil wars to achieve the Libel peace model status.  
Peacebuilding in this regard is generically understood as external interventions that 
are intended to reduce the risk of states to erupt into or return to war6. The approach 
                                                          
6
 UN, Agenda for Peace, Report of the Secretary-General, para. 21. Available at 
http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/. Likewise peacebuilding is now viewed as a concept which 
should include an international and a local dimension in order for it to work well. 
14 
 
to peacebuilding in this case is grounded in the concept of “Liberal peace” which 
derives from a long tradition of Western liberal theory and practice.  It is then against 
this background that the Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory and the Liberal peace 
theory with its link to peacebuilding are being used to guide the study concerning the 
trials of a CPA: an investigation into the dilemmas faced/being by Sudan and South 
Sudan. The two theories in this regard are applied in chapter 2 in relation to conflict 
resolution/peace processes in general, and in the remaining chapters in relation to 
the Sudan conflict. 
1.10 Conceptual framework 
The concepts of conflict resolution, peace agreements and self-determination and its 
options of power sharing and separation will be conceptualised. Chapter 2 refers in 
this regard. 
1.11 Research design and methodology 
The study adopts a flexible design approach. A research design is a plan, structure 
and strategy of investigation so conceived as to obtain answers to research 
questions or problems. Robson (2011:131) states that fundamental characteristics of 
a flexible design approach to research includes an evolving design, the presentation 
of multiple realities, the researcher as an instrument of data collection, a focus on the 
participants’ views and showing of a rigorous approach to data collection, data 
analysis and report writing whereby the researcher has the responsibility of verifying 
the accuracy of the accounts given. It is due to these beneficial characteristics that 
the design is used to guide the study.  
The study is qualitative in nature with an intrinsic case study methodology. Lapan et 
al. (2012:69) states that an appropriate evaluation to the methodology is necessary 
prior to starting research. Methodology in this regard refers to the choices we make 
about cases to study, methods of data gathering and forms of data analysis in 
planning and executing research study (Silverman, 2005:109). 
According to Lapan et al. (2012:246) an intrinsic case study is used to solely 
understand a specific case. The study uses the 2005 Sudan CPA process and the 
relationship of Sudan and South Sudan after the independence of the south covering 
the period 2002 up to 2013 as a case solely to develop an in-depth understanding 
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about it by using the data collected through primary (interviews and archival) and 
secondary (documents) sources.  
In support, Bromley (1990:87) states that a case study is a systematic inquiry into an 
event or set or related events which aim to describe and explain the phenomenon of 
interest. The case study approach allows making in-depth investigation to gain 
valuable and unique insights, as it focuses on relationships and processes within 
social settings which tend to be interrelated (Denscombe, 2003:32).  
Various qualitative methods of data collection and analysis in this study are 
employed based on the advantages provided by the intrinsic case study approach. 
Due to the complexity of the social phenomena, the use of different collection 
methods in social research is a very helpful way to better understand that complexity 
(Greene, 2007:45). 
In terms of the philosophical stance, the study embraces social constructionism 
ontology and a critical theory epistemology. The social constructionism ontological 
perspective, translates that reality will be crafted from the claims and the 
assumptions of the respondents. 
From an epistemological point of view this study is guided by critical theory (CT). 
According to Miller and Brewer, (2003:94) epistemology is the study of knowledge. It 
is argued that the term is concerned with the nature of knowledge and justification, 
how we know what we know hence, epistemology focuses on the means for 
acquiring knowledge and how it could be possible to make a distinction between 
truths and fallacy (Greetham, 2006:45-62).  
Critical realism tradition posits that CT takes a middle position between empiricists 
who view reality as independent from the mind (materialism) and idealists who argue 
that reality is a creation of mind. For critical theorists reason is the highest potential 
of human beings and that it is possible to use it to criticize and change the nature of 
the existing societies (Blaikie, 1993:52). Critical Theory has a narrow and a broad 
meaning in philosophy and in the history of the social sciences (Horkheimer, 1972: 
246). In both the broad and the narrow senses, however, a critical theory provides 
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the descriptive and normative bases for social inquiry aimed at decreasing 
domination and increasing freedom in all their forms.  
This position suggests that CT explains what is wrong with current social reality, 
identifies the actors to change it, and provides both clear norms for criticism and 
achievable practical goals for social transformation. Any truly critical theory of society 
in this regard has as its object human beings as producers of their own historical 
form of life” (Horkeimer 1993, 21). 
The theorists in this regard argue that social scientists need to be critical in order to 
be able to understand social phenomena. In order to uncover social behaviour, 
therefore, factors such as power relations, unseen cultural aspects and political 
agendas have to be taken into consideration (Thomson, 2000:14). Socio-economic 
and political aspects of a phenomenon do not appear overnight, they evolve and 
develop over time. This necessitates historical analysis for better understanding of 
the evolution of a social phenomenon. Critical theorists frequently rely on historical, 
ethnographic research and case studies and in this case, this study is no different.  
CT asserts that social research will always be influenced by values; it is not possible 
to accomplish value-free social research. The argument of CT, in this respect is that 
research is a political activity, working either for or against the status quo (Miller and 
Brewer, 2003:60). This is a direct translation that CT sheds light on how ideology, 
systems and structures can influence freedom of human beings and shape reality 
and at the same time provides an advantage of reflexivity as a process of self-
reflection. 
The perception in using the indicated ontological and epistemological approaches is 
the understanding that the combined use of the primary (Interviews and archival 
records) and secondary (Documents) data collection methods assist in bringing the 
aspect of rigour in the collected data. 
1.11.1 Sampling strategy and the site of the study 
Sampling is the process of selecting individuals or groups from a population of 
interest whilst a sampling strategy is the plan set forth to ensure that the sample to 
be used in a research study represents the population from which the sample is 
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drawn (Kumar, 2011:193). The study used the non-probability sampling approach 
which involves the selection of elements based on assumptions regarding the 
population of interest as a basis for selection (Bowling, 2002:209). This translates 
that the samples were selected based on my judgement as a researcher. This gave 
me an advantage to choose samples with appropriate knowledge on the study. In 
this case, those who took part in the mediations/negotiations and the implementation 
of the CPA and those who had expert knowledge and assisted the participants were 
considered for selection to take part in the study.  
Purposive sampling and snowball sampling techniques were employed to identify the 
right research participants for the study. The purposive sampling technique was 
employed in order to identify key informants. Lapan et al. (2012) defines purposive 
sampling as the seeking out of participants who have in-depth knowledge on the 
proposed study and the people so chosen as informants. According to Stake 
(1995:27), an informant is someone who knows a lot about a case and is willing to 
chat. The key informants identified were then used as initial contacts for the 
snowballing sampling exercise.  
Ritchie and Lewis (2003:35) define snowballing as a method used to trace people 
not known to the researcher but introduced by the informants who may recommend 
the researcher to them. Snowballing in this context was used as a platform to trace 
any other relevant stakeholders who possessed useful and relevant information on 
the study and willing to share it. This was done in all the sites in which fieldwork was 
carried out. 
In spite of the usefulness and the relevance of the information which can be provided 
by these informants, the technique has some disadvantages that this study had to 
consider. Kumar (2005: 247) observes that if the participants chosen at the first 
stage have any biases, the study may also be biased. In respect of this factor, during 
the fieldwork I tried my best to be careful on the recruitment of the gatekeepers in 
order to ensure that the selection of the respondents was based on possession of 
knowledge biased or not which was valuable to the study. My sample mainly 
included the local actors (Northern and southern Sudanese) and external actors 
(those from other countries) who either took part in the negotiations/mediation of the 
CPA or had expert knowledge concerning the study especially those that had been 
used as technical experts by the concerned parties. 
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The study sites for the research were UK, Sudan, South Sudan and Kenya. Sudan 
and South Sudan were selected as the conflict countries where most of those who 
took part in the peace process live. The selection of Kenya as site was based on the 
fact that it was the host for the whole IGAD mediation/negotiation process of the 
CPA and that most of the secretariat’s staff had come from there. The UK was 
chosen because it was one of the countries in the Troika (Other members were 
United States, Norway and Italy) which was involved with supporting IGAD with the 
mediation/negotiation process of the CPA, has a large community of Sudanese 
academicians and experts who had provided expert guidance to those who were 
involved with the Sudan CPA and have experience concerning the relationship 
initially of Sudan and southern Sudan and later between Sudan and South Sudan. 
This choice came in as well as a result of the researcher studying in UK.  
Where possible though, other members who formed the Troika were also sought to 
take part in the study especially those that live in the suggested study sites or who 
could be communicated to through other means like Skype. The researcher could 
not travel to North Sudan due to travel restrictions. In order to avoid imbalance in-
terms of the information to be collected from North Sudan, the use of North 
Sudanese who took part in the process or provided expert knowledge to the 
participants and are now living either in the UK, Kenya or South Sudan or at some 
point travelled to any of the study sites especially UK was maximized. 
1.11.2 Sampling frame 
The sample frame for the study included the leadership of the combatants during the 
conflict from northern and southern Sudan, senior politicians from the two regions 
during the period in question, IGAD staff, members of the diplomatic corps from 
countries which were involved at the time, members of the Troika (USA, UK, Norway 
and Italy); IGAD Partners Forum members; OAU/AU staff, UN staff who were 
involved as observers and experts with knowledge on the study area. 
1.11.3 Recruitment (Gatekeeper and respondents). 
The sample was recruited mainly through gate keepers. I solicited assistance from 
academics specializing or specialized in Sudan and others who knew about Sudan 
and South Sudan and the CPA process to assist with the recruitment task. 
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Dr Abdelwahab El Effendi, a northern Sudanese currently working with the University 
of East London, Mr. Daniel Large, a British currently working at the School of 
Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London and Father Martin Otchaya a 
Catholic church priest from South Sudan currently studying here at University of 
Bradford assisted with the leads I could contact.  
Father Martin at the time was about to travel to South Sudan for a holiday and 
volunteered to travel together with me in the case of South Sudan. While in South 
Sudan, he assisted me by introducing me to the people I had earmarked in my 
purposive sampling who also later assisted with the snowballing exercise. 
In the case of Kenya, I used my own previous acquaintances to come up with those I 
could contact through e-mails, letters and phones. General Lazarus Sumbeyiwo who 
was the special envoy of the IGAD and the Kenyan Ambassador for peace during 
the mediation/negotiation process of the 2005 Sudan CPA who lives in Kenya 
accepted to be a respondent in the study and to assist me with the snowballing 
exercise. Through him as well, I was able to get connected to some of the Troika 
members after he had talked to them about me and my study. Some were met 
personally here in the UK while others who live in other parts of the world were 
interviewed via the skype communication facility.  
In the case of Sudan, I used my affiliation with the Saint Anthony College, at Oxford 
University which has a Sudan and South Sudan research centre where many 
scholars and experts from the two countries come to make research presentations. 
Through interactions with some of them, I got connected to some figures who either 
took part in the CPA process or provided some technical advice to those who were 
involved with the process whenever they were in this country (UK).   
Respondents were categorized as local (those from northern Sudan and southern 
Sudan), international (those who came from other countries) and experts (local or 
international) in order to be in line with those mentioned to have been involved with 
the CPA process directly and indirectly.  
1.11.4. Data sources and collection methods 
The Data for the study was collected from primary and secondary sources and 
generated from specially targeted individuals and materials. Primary data was 
collected through in-depth key informant interviews and reviews of archival materials 
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while the secondary data was collected through reviews of earlier research, mass 
media (secondary analysis) (Corbetta, 2003:64).  
1.11.4.1 Interviews 
The study used the in-depth interview approach with key informants targeted as the 
agents to provide the data. The advantage of in-depth interviews is that they provide 
an opportunity for detailed investigation of each person’s personal perspective, in-
depth understanding of the personal context within which the research phenomenon 
is located and very detailed subject coverage (Ritchie and Lewis, 2011:35). This 
translates that the technique allows the interviewer to control the process and the 
overall direction of the interview but at the same time allows the interviewee enough 
freedom to respond to the questions, hence my choice of the method in this study.  
Key informants such as senior diplomats, top ranking government officials, senior 
political party cadres and experts are usually influential, prominent, and/or well-
informed individuals in organizations or communities (Gubrium and Holstein, 
2001:45).  Advantages of using these cadres include valuable information being 
gained because of the positions they hold in social, political and financial, or 
administrative realms, provision and gaining of important information due to their 
familiarity with policies of organizations or institutions being studied and the histories, 
legal, financial structures and plans from a particular perspective (Marshall and 
Rossman, 1999:82). A balance between the advantages and the disadvantages 
guided me to have a clear understanding of the use of informants in a study. 
The fieldwork covered a period of an intensive four months (Kenya and South Sudan 
for three months and one month in UK). In the study, thirty (30) respondents were 
targeted to take part but had prepared to continue with the collection exercise until a 
saturation point was reached. Lincoln and Guba (1985:93) define saturation as the 
continuation in the search for data until the evidence becomes redundant with no 
new information coming. At the end of the whole exercise however, the researcher 
only managed to interact with 24 respondents (see table 1.1). 
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Table 1.1: Participants in the study 
 Sudan South Sudan IGAD The TROIKA 
Participants 5 7 4 2 
Experts 1 2 3 - 
 
Source: Self made 
Before commencement of interviews, participants were provided with a participant 
information sheet which had details about the study and after their familiarisation 
with the details, they were provided with a written consent form (See appendices 1 
and 2). (A further account on this aspect will be provided below on the ethical 
considerations sub section). 
The interviews were administered through a semi-structured interview protocol; each 
interview lasted for a period of between forty five minutes and one hour (See 
appendix 3). This depended on the time the interviewees had allowed me to have 
with them and the depth of their reactions. The questions were mostly tailored with 
focus to generate rich data to address the research questions to a reasonable depth. 
The view in the context for using the interview approach was that it has been 
evidenced that the approach generates data about participants’ feelings, opinion and 
emotions that cannot easily be observed or generated using a structured approach 
(Creswell, 2007:107).  
1.11.4.2 Public records and archival documents 
In this method public records which include archive records and reports were 
reviewed. Public records include government documents and information or 
reproduced sources and archival documents that are made available to the public 
(Kumar, 2011:139). Archival documents are private documents usually accessible 
only through archives or specialized libraries that hold and preserve historical 
materials (Lapan et al., 2012:151). Access to these resources involved me visiting 
archives here in the UK and in South Sudan. The researcher, however, used the 
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archive at the University of Durham extensively which has a huge Sudan/South 
Sudan collection section in this regard.  
1.11.4.3 Secondary Sources  
Secondary sources were used to collect secondary data. In this method, earlier 
research, personal records and mass media which include reports published in 
newspapers, magazines and on the Internet, books, published debates and 
pamphlets were maximized (Kumar, 2011:163). The researcher also used the 
Internet extensively in the case of secondary analysis and likewise earlier research 
in the form of textbooks, journal articles, dissertations, discussion papers and 
working papers mostly from the University of Bradford library and its net.  
1.11.5 Data analysis and interpretation 
Data analysis is the process of piecing together data, of making the invisible obvious, 
of recognizing significance from insignificance, of linking seemingly unrelated facts 
logically, of fitting categories one with another and attributing consequence to 
antecedents (Creswell, 2007:163). Robson (2011:467) states that the case study 
approach does not call for a particular approach of qualitative data analysis.  
Data for this study however, was analyzed using the thematic coding approach 
which includes data reduction, data display, conclusion drawing and verification 
(Miles and Humberman, 1994:10-12).  Data reduction in this case is the process of 
sorting out key words through a coding process, themes or responses whereas 
further reduction of data is the presentation and visualising process which is meant 
to present the in-depth picture of the case using narratives, tables, figures and 
diagrams referred to as data display aimed at making the data to be more 
understandable (Creswell, 2007:163).  
All the interviews in the field were recorded but were also complemented with notes, 
mostly on points that were critical for the study. In this regard, the analysis process 
started with listening to all the recordings and reading the notes that were taken in 
the field after arriving from the field. This exercise produced transcripts for all the 
interviews which were carried out in the field. The transcribing process took me four 
months to complete.  
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The researcher then reviewed the transcripts and labelled them in order to flag 
specific observations and wrote comments related to each interview separately as 
part of data management. At this stage, the researcher created and organised files 
for the data; read the transcripts one by one once more and made notes in order to 
form the initial codes.   
The next stage involved coding and the development of categories. This is a sorting 
out process which involves comparing, contrasting and combining data (Robson, 
2011:468). This was done by describing the cases and their contexts and classifying 
them in order to establish themes or patterns.  
The researcher used an excel programme to create tables and diagrams following 
manual counting to identify some interrelated factors, their relationships and their 
frequencies. This process was directed by the research questions. My focus at this 
stage was to identify and select the issues and categories which appeared relevant 
to each question or group of questions and put them together. After completing the 
coding and the development of categories, the researcher drafted an initial summary 
of findings which was shared with my supervisor in order to have his initial comments 
before proceeding with the analysis. 
From the categories phase, the researcher then started observing patterns and 
trends, and making further categories. This helped me to establish some meanings 
and associated terms and to start drawing initial conclusions based on the display of 
the data that was done in the earlier stage in order to generate meaning. Robson, 
(2011:473-485) states that data display is a tactic for drawing meanings and making 
verifications by going back to the original sources of data in order to ensure that 
meanings and conclusions drawn do not contradict with the data. In my case, 
reference to my recordings or comparing sources was done to satisfy this step.  
1.11.6 Reliability and validity 
Reliability is the judgement that an instrument is consistent (Kumar, 2011:181). 
Hammersley, (1992a:67), however, defines reliability as the degree of consistency 
with which instances are assigned to the same category by different observers or by 
the same observer on different occasion. A simple translation would be the extent to 
which a study would give consistent conclusions if carried out by the same person or 
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different researchers more than once with the same people under similar standard 
conditions (Kumar, 2011:396). 
The simple nature of the design of my interview questions which were open-ended, 
clarity of their meanings and a logical arrangement of flow presented a best 
reflection of reliability. The purpose was to make it easier for the respondents to 
understand and likewise through the simple open ended questions be able to obtain 
accurate and more reliable data. Such an objective was made possible due to the 
adoption of certain additional measures, such as pre-testing of questions and 
applying probing and prompting where necessary for further clarification of issues. A 
consistent standard method of asking questions though with slight differences due to 
prompts and probing were very useful in the context of cross-checking the data.  
In order to get the best out of the data, the researcher used the triangulation 
approach. The aim in this regard was to ensure that there was agreement of 
evidence from the data which had been collected using the methods used (George 
and Bennett, 2005:99). When the researcher obtains similar findings from multiple 
sources using various methods, the information is considered more trustworthy. 
1.11.6.1 Validity 
Validity is the judgement that an instrument is measuring what it is supposed to 
measure (Kumar, 2011:178). Bryman (2001:156) in supporting this position states 
that validity relates to the effectiveness and accuracy of the measuring tools. Validity 
in this regard, it can be noted is used to ensure that the methods and techniques 
used to generate data for research are genuine and suitable to achieve the purpose. 
As asserted by Lapan et al., (2012:256), it is essential that a firm and vigorous link is 
maintained between the ideas and the reality of the social phenomenon on the 
ground. In this study, the data analysis process used served to ensure the validity of 
the data through the cross checking process. 
1.12 Limitations of the study 
The people who took part in the mediation/negotiation activities came from a number 
of countries (USA, UK, Norway, Italy and Kenya among others) and even those from 
South Sudan come from places far away from the capital (Juba). These were difficult 
to locate and in some cases even when they were available, reaching them had 
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added financial and security implications specifically those located in remote areas. 
Due to these factors some cadres who had important information could not be 
accessed. Most of the people who took part in the mediation/negotiation of the CPA 
are now senior officials in the governments of North and South Sudan. Due to their 
status, it was and still is a problem to get access to them which in essence means 
that some important data could not be collected.  
In the case of the Sudan and South Sudan respondents, most of them are senior 
security and political figures and in most instances especially those from Sudan used 
Arabic language which I did and do not understand. At times due to their status 
refused to take part in the study. In the circumstances, whereby some accepted to 
take part, security was used as a shield for them not to discuss some issues while 
the use of the Arabic language limited me to probe more on important issues in the 
case of the Sudan respondents. Due to these two factors some information could not 
be obtained.  
1.13 Ethical considerations 
The conduct of the study involved interacting with people in many institutions within 
and outside the UK and acting in accordance with the best practice of research of 
the University of Bradford. In relation to social research, ethics refer to the moral 
deliberation, choice and accountability on the part of researchers throughout the 
research process (Comstock, 2013:10). Ethical rules in research differ from one 
research to another depending on the adopted methodological approach. However, 
there is a common agreement among researchers that ethical responsibility 
represents an integral part that should be appropriately incorporated in the research 
topic, design and plan (Oliver, 2010:10). The ethical considerations in this study are 
divided into those which took place before the study, during the study and after the 
study.  
The activities before the study included the preparation of a proposal and after its’ 
vetting by the school, submitting to the ethical committee of the University for 
Authority and clearance for the study to be undertaken. A request was also made to 
the University during the period to provide me with a letter of authorization for 
clearance to gain access to institutions (archives and specially designated research 
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centres) where I could find research materials within the UK and even abroad where 
necessary.   
During the field work period, the principles of voluntary participation (Self- 
determination and autonomy), consent, privacy (anonymity and confidentiality) and 
doing no harm and beneficence were adhered to. Consent was sought from the 
participants before any interviews to ensure voluntary participation. In this case a 
written consent form was presented to the potential respondent/s and administered 
before the interviews (see appendix 2). Throughout the duration of the field work, 
reasonably informed consent level was applied in order to recruit and retain the 
respondents. In this case, the researcher made decisions on the amount of 
information which had to be provided to the participants.    
The participants were informed of the known risks attached to the research and if 
they opted not to be involved, were allowed to withdraw and were not victimized. 
Similarly during the interviews, the respondents were allowed to withdraw from the 
study and no questions were asked. In terms of privacy, (protection of participants 
from being identified in publications) information was collected using the principle of 
confidentiality. Confidentiality is not limited to the statement of assurance but it 
includes the concrete steps that are taken to ensure that measures will be genuinely 
maintained and the information so provided will not fall into the wrong hands (Oliver, 
2003:78). Confidentiality was used for most of the data which was collected while 
anonymity was used for participants who had requested for it. In the case of 
confidentiality, the participants’ names and other identifiers were recorded on the 
data collection sheets, tapes or other records but no participant would be named or 
otherwise identified in publications which include talks, papers, posters, photographs 
or any other publically disseminated material.  
In terms of the security for the data, while in the field it was stored temporarily in a 
memory stick but after the fieldwork at the University of Bradford, it was kept in my 
laptop which was secured with a safe password. In the context of the anonymity 
status, answers which could easily be attributed to a particular participant were 
paraphrased and any other details that might identify personalities were coded (see 
appendix 4). Other than me, only my supervisor could access the data. The 
information was kept by me for the whole duration of the PhD research project 
(2013-2015).  
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The research ensured that the “no harm principle” was adhered to by putting in place 
protective measures to protect the participants from any harm that could result or 
emerge from the study and ensuring that if any would occur, the risk would be 
minimal (Comstock, 2013:96).  
Participants may not feel comfortable to talk about certain issues or may be willing to 
talk but not in front of other people (Israel and Hay, 2006:2). In this study I repeatedly 
reminded those who voluntarily engaged in discussing sensitive issues about their 
right to stop talking and/or rephrase their information or withdraw the information 
provided in full or part, if they so wished. 
The ethical issues after the study mostly focus on the responsible dissemination of 
the work and its findings and scholarly issues specifically in the areas of honesty, 
reliability and validity. In this regard, the work will be submitted to the University of 
Bradford for assessment purposes and once successful; will be released into the 
public domain through publishing, conference presentations or press interviews after 
appropriate consultations. Data for the study will be kept for a period but after 
sometime will be destroyed after consultations and permission from the respondents. 
All the ethical activities that is, before, during and after the study were/will be done in 
order to adhere to best academic practice. 
1.14 Research contribution 
The study interacted with a great deal of content in the form of information that was 
generated from the research respondents, archival data and literature which was 
used to provide the basis of the study. The  CPA case is recent and that apart from 
the historical narratives which cover the period up to 2011, not much has been 
covered about the activities which took place after 2011 and in-depth analyses of the 
CPA process itself in the context of conflict resolution. Johnson, 2011, Natsios, 2012, 
Young, 2012 and Copnall, 2014 are among the few authors that cover some material 
concerning the CPA process including the referendum, the post-referendum and 
post-independence issues.  
The status of the relationship between Sudan and South Sudan initially as one state 
was usually very hostile but after the CPA it was assumed that it would improve 
especially after the guns had become silent on the battlefield (Johnson, 2011:173-
174). South Sudan separated from Sudan after a referendum but even after its 
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independence there are still significant tensions and threats to a return to war by the 
now two separate states which is viewed as a threat to peace and security between 
the two states, the region and the world as a whole.  
Young (2012:133) however, in view of the relations of Sudan and South Sudan 
before and after the separation, states that the CPA was a little more than an 
extended ceasefire. This was a way of indicating that the CPA was problematic. This 
claim originated from the situation that while the CPA was in place, Sudan and South 
Sudan still fought each other and that even after separation there were still issues 
which took the two countries back to war and even now threaten the same. This 
translates that the CPA transited with problems during its mediation, negotiation and 
the interim period up to the point when South Sudan separated from Sudan and 
became independent.  
Given this status quo, the traumatic emergence of the right to self-determination is 
linked to the absence of key peace consolidating factors in the CPA or further that 
the tension and partial ownership of the CPA led to this absence and indeed the 
general partial failure of the separation option. Crucially the tense formation and the 
troubled implementation of the CPA (which were characterized by many dilemmas 
which were faced by both parties) in regards to the relationship initially of Sudan as 
one country and now between the two separate Sudans plays out a great deal in the 
current status of their relations. Against this background, the attitudes of the conflict 
parties were/are still hostile, behaviour still violent and the conflict structure not 
changed as is perceived in the Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory.  
Likewise, positive peace initially in one Sudan and later the two Sudans was/is 
absent. This implies that Liberal peace as advanced in the Liberal peace theory 
could not and has not been realized in the perspectives of one Sudan or the two 
separated Sudans. Due to this scenario, the CPA was challenged, the parties faced 
dilemmas and in turn tensions and threats to a return to war are prevalent. 
The relationship of north and south Sudan in regards to the tensions and the threats 
to a return to war even after South Sudan became independent should then be 
perceived in a wider context. The untouched and unresolved issues in relation to the 
content of the CPA, the post-referendum issues and the post- independence issues 
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specifically based on how the CPA was mediated, negotiated and implemented 
should be seen as the basis of the status quo at the time and even now. As earlier 
articulated, the CPA is a current case, and as such not many in-depth studies have 
been carried out about it. This scenario makes this study to be unique. This is 
particularly in terms of the ways of achieving sustainable peace in the context of 
conflict resolution. The concepts and the frameworks used to advance the case of 
the CPA makes significant contributions empirically and theoretically.  
Empirically, the data was collected through primary sources (interviews and archival 
documents) which brought out opinions, interpretations and experiences of the 
various interlocutors and archival details which are not available elsewhere 
complemented by the available recent literature in the context of conflict resolution. 
These aspects resulted in the formulation of my conclusion. The theoretical 
contribution emerges from the use of the lens of the Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle 
theory and the Liberal peace theory as important conflict resolution/transformation 
theories using the Sudan conflict as a basis. The theories in turn are used in my 
findings to see if they are useful in resolving conflicts and understanding peace 
processes. 
1.15 Structure of the thesis 
This research consists of seven chapters. Chapter one concerns itself with the 
“research introduction and background. The issues in it include the research area, 
genesis of the research, research problem, research questions, aims and objectives, 
research design and methodology, theoretical framework, conceptual framework 
study limitations and finally the research contribution with focus on the 2005 Sudan 
CPA and the dilemmas faced by north and south Sudan.  
Chapter two covers the literature review which focuses on the conceptualisation of 
conflict resolution, conceptualisation of peace agreements and the conceptualisation 
of self-determination and its options of separation and power sharing. The aim is to 
bring out the literature available in the outlined areas with focus on the 2005 Sudan 
CPA and the dilemmas faced by Sudan and South Sudan. 
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Chapter three discusses the historical perspective of the Sudan with focus on the 
scenarios which caused the conflict and factors that eventually led to the split of the 
country to become Sudan and South Sudan. 
Chapter four discusses the analysis of the CPA in the context of conflict resolution. 
The chapter aims at providing a general overview of the 2005 Sudan CPA and the 
activities as related to conflict resolution. 
Chapter five discusses the implications of the mediation, negotiation and the 
implementation as part of the post conflict peacebuilding part of the CPA. The 
purpose is to bring out an understanding of the issues which emerged from the 
mentioned processes in relation to conflict resolution.  
Chapter six discusses the referendum, the post-referendum issues, the post-
independence issues and the AUHIP conflict resolution efforts. It aims at bringing out 
an understanding of the issues that emerged and the reasons why the issues 
were/are difficult to resolve and the conflict resolution efforts attempted and in place. 
Chapter Seven offers an overall conclusion of the thesis and particularly sheds light 
to the extent to which the thesis was able to address the main research questions. 
Included in it are the highlights of the summary of the conclusions, the theoretical 
consequences and a suggested area for further research.  
The next chapter discusses the literature review of the concerned areas of the study. 
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Chapter 2 
2.0 Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
The world for some time has been witnessing and is still witnessing conflicts either 
between states (interstate) or within them (intrastate) usually with very devastating 
implications which mostly involve loss of life, property and retardation of social and 
economic development. In recent decades, however, conflict has shifted from 
interstate conflicts and is more on the side of intrastate conflicts. Conflict is healthy in 
some circumstances but the violence that comes with it, is what is problematic (Fish 
et al., 2000:4). Several factors cause conflicts and that as the conflict turns violent 
the effects require mitigating, managing and resolving as without such actions the 
world would not be a better place. Conflict resolution through its approaches and 
methods whose outcomes can be peace agreements provides a basis from which 
conflicts can be resolved in order to attain sustainable peace.  
The aim of this chapter is to review the literature on conflict resolution/conflict 
transformation, peace agreements and self-determination with its options of power 
sharing and separation as an outcome of the methods of conflict resolution in order 
to have a clear understanding about them and later use their applicability in the 
study. 
The basis of the argument is grounded on why there are tensions and threats to a 
return to war/conflict between the parties to a conflict after an agreement supposedly 
authored to end a war and eventually to resolve the conflict. This scenario is based 
on the north and south Sudan conflict which had/has been going on for a long time.  
Considering the facts that the two states were at some point one country, that there 
are several commonalities between them (trans-border population, other southerners 
still in the Sudan and other northerners still in the South Sudan and an economic 
lifeline based on the oil resource (oil in the south and infrastructure for transporting it 
to the markets in the north), one would only wonder why there should be problems 
between the two states. The areas in their existence earlier as one state and later as 
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separate states faced and are still facing dilemmas on these issues which in turn 
retard the achievement of peace between them.   
Against this background, this chapter covers the conceptualisation of conflict 
resolution with focus on its approaches and methods, conceptualisation of peace 
agreements, conceptualisation of self-determination and its options of power sharing 
and separation and finally a conclusion. 
 2.2 Conflict resolution conceptualised 
Human history is full of stories of violent conflicts whose implications have been and 
are usually devastating. Bercovitch and Jackson (2012:20) define conflict as a 
perception of incompatibility between two or more actors and the range of behaviour 
associated with such perception. Ramsbotham et al. (2011:30), however, perceive 
conflict as the pursuit of incompatible goals by two different groups and emphasises 
its usage to apply to any political conflict whether it be pursued by peaceful means or 
by the use of force.7 
Whatever is the case, the incompatibility aspect is what is problematic especially if it 
leads to violence. Galtung, (1996:69) defines violence as avoidable impairment of 
fundamental human needs. Violence consists of actions, words , attitudes, structures 
or systems that cause physical, psychological, social or environmental damage and 
/or prevent people from reaching their human potential (Fisher et al., 2000:4). 
According to Galtung (1996:40-42) violence is categorised as structural, cultural and 
direct.8 (See figure 2.1). 
 
 
 
                                                          
7
 Violent or deadly conflict is similar to armed conflict but also includes one-sided violence (such as genocide) 
against unarmed civilians (Ramsbotham et al., 2011:31). 
8
 Cultural violence is defined as aspects of culture that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural 
violence, structural violence as a form of violence that is embedded in systems that prioritise certain groups, 
classes, genders, nationalities among others over others in terms of goods, resources, or opportunities while 
direct violence is defined as violence in its physical form such as murder, torture, rape, beatings or sexual 
violence (Galtung, 1969: 167-191). 
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Figure 2.1 Galtung model of violence 
                                              Structural violence 
 
 
                      Cultural violence                         Direct Violence    
Source: Galtung, J. (1996:40).  
Conflict takes place either between states or within states but in recent decades, the 
nature of conflict has shifted away from the inter-state premise to that of intra-state 
whereby the proliferation of ethnic, religious, cultural and resource driven conflicts 
have become the major threats of international peace and security (Cheeseman et 
al., 2015:165). The North and South Sudan scenario is, however, unique in that both 
the interstate and the intrastate conflict dimensions are at play between them.9 
Intrastate conflict is characterised by people being killed, displaced internally or 
forced to become refugees in other countries, economic growth and development 
being reduced, democracy stifled, conflict spreading into neighbouring countries and 
due to the conditions of conflict, the countries getting trapped in a cycle of violence 
that is usually difficult to break (Anola, 2009:339-340). Interstate conflict is 
characterised by huge losses of personnel on the battle front, civilians being killed or 
displaced and posing a threat to regional and international peace and security (Ibid: 
341). The prevalence and persistence of large scale conflict retards political and 
economic development and as such should not be left to prevail.   
Since conflict may be inevitable, incompatible demands and claims which may be 
made by one party in a conflict can be met with refusal, counter claims or denial by 
another party, and given that violent conflict is very destructive and expensive in 
terms of human lives and material resources, conflict requires to be prevented, 
                                                          
9
 Sudan  supports factions in South Sudan to fight the government while South Sudan supports the Darfur 
rebel movements and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement- North (SPLM-N)  under the umbrella term 
‘the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) to fight the Sudan Government at the intrastate level while the 
tensions/threats to a return to war between Sudan and the South Sudan conflict  is an interstate war  status  
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managed and resolved in order to achieve peace. Non-resolution can, at the very 
least, be dysfunctional for the system within which it occurs.  
Anderson (2004:101) defines peace as a condition in which individuals, families, 
groups, communities and/or nations experience low levels of violence and engage in 
mutually harmonious relationships. Galtung, (1996:9) taking it further views peace as 
the absence/reduction of violence of all kinds or non-violent creative conflict 
transformation. Definitions of peace from whatever source reflect several 
characteristics which include a condition or state of something that can be 
experienced depending on a context. The Galtung’s conflict triangle models of 
violence and peace in this regard provide a simple representation of the violence-
peace nexus (See figure 2.2). 
Figure 2.2 The Galtung’s conflict triangle models of violence and peace. 
 
         Structural violence                                                  Peacebuilding    
               
                                     
 
Cultural violence     Direct violence                          Peacemaking      Peacekeeping             
 
Source: Galtung, J. (1996:31). 
According to the model, direct violence can be ended by changing conflict behaviour 
through peacekeeping, structural violence by removing structural contradictions and 
injustices through peacebuilding and cultural violence by changing attitudes through 
peacemaking. (See figure 2.2).  Galtung (1996:31-33) asserts that the cessation of 
direct violence (absence of violence) amounts to negative peace and the overcoming 
of structural and cultural violence as positive peace.10 Such scenarios can only be 
                                                          
10
 Negative peace refers to the absence of direct physical, verbal or psychological violence thus it is 
characterised by the absence of direct violence and preventing war. Positive peace is defined as social justice, 
the removal of all forms of structural and cultural violence, the elimination of social impediments to full 
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reached through initially the settlement and management of the conflict and later 
resolution through appropriate methods.  
Ramsbotham et al. (2011:31) defines conflict settlement as the reaching of an 
agreement between the parties to settle a political conflict, so forestalling or ending 
an armed conflict. Fisher et al. (2000:7) view settlement as the reaching of 
agreement between the parties through negotiation and bargaining or in other words 
a settlement is a peace agreement. Conflict settlement aims at ending violent 
behaviour but the problem with it is that whilst guns become silent, conflict attitudes 
and the underlying structural contradictions may not have been addressed.  
However, conflict prevention is an important aspect of conflict resolution. Fisher et al. 
(2000:7) perceives conflict prevention as intentional use of various policy tools and 
instruments in order to prevent a violent conflict from emerging or escalating. 
Conflict management, however, is defined as the limitation, mitigation and 
containment of conflict rather than the durable elimination of the causes of conflict 
(Ramsbotham et al., 2011:31). Typical conflict management strategies in this case 
include the use of military force for deterrence or peace-keeping and ceasefires 
(Jeong 2010:27).11 
This status quo translates that Conflict management refers to actions taken to 
mitigate or contain ongoing violent conflict and limiting the scale of destruction and 
suffering in order to avoid spill over potential into other areas. Settlements (like the 
Sudan CPA) and conflict management fall in the category of negative peace 
(Galtung, 1996:67).    
Conflict once managed requires resolving through a conflict resolution process if at 
all the attitudes and the underlying structural contradictions have to be addressed. 
Bercovitch and Jackson (2012:1) define conflict resolution as a range of formal and 
informal activities undertaken by parties to a conflict or outsiders designed to limit 
and reduce the level of violence in conflict and to achieve some understanding on 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
human self-realisation, ecological balance and the meeting of basic human needs (Bercovitch and Jackson, 
2012:170). 
11
 Peacekeeping may involve separating the conflict parties from each other so that they do not keep inflicting 
harm on each other while ceasefires, sometimes referred to as truces are suspension of active hostilities. 
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the key issues in conflict, a political agreement or a jointly acceptable decision on 
future interactions and distribution of resources. 
Miall (2004:3-4) views conflict resolution as addressing  causes of conflict and 
seeking to build new and lasting relationships between hostile parties by helping 
them to explore, analyse, question and re-frame their positions and interests in order 
to move the conflicting parties from the destructive patterns of zero-sum  conflict to 
positive –sum (win-win) constructive outcome. Ramsbotham et al. (2011:31), views 
conflict resolution as a comprehensive term which implies that the deep rooted 
sources of conflict are addressed and transformed12.  
Lederach (2003:14) considers conflict transformation as the longer-term and deeper 
structural dimensions of conflict resolution which aims at transforming a conflict from 
violence and destruction into a constructive force which produces social change, 
progressively removing or at least reducing the conditions from which conflict and 
violence originated. This approach adopts facilitated meetings at which parties in 
conflict explore each other’s perspectives and world views in order to alter the 
disputants’ negative stereotypes of each other.  According to Omeje (2008:70), 
conflict resolution is mostly suitable to address open conflicts whereas conflict 
transformation is suitable to address both open and latent conflicts (see figure 2.3).  
                                                          
12
 Such a scenario would imply that behaviour is no longer violent, attitudes are no longer hostile and the 
structure of the conflict changed. 
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Figure 2.3 Responses to conflict: the maze of terminology  
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Source: Fisher et al. (2000:7). 
An analysis of the definitions shows that conflict resolution is about accepting a 
conflict, recognising that there are ways out of it and engaging in some tacit or 
explicit coordination without which none of its goals can be achieved. Jeong (2010:9) 
states that conflict resolution is supposed in this case to explore opportunities for 
forging new relationships by facilitating peaceful change and reconciliation. Conflict 
resolution should be perceived as a process that if successful, may help parties in 
conflict achieve a new and better modus vivendi. Conflict resolution and its deeper 
level, conflict transformation in this case create conditions for negative and positive 
peace (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2012:170). 
2.2.1 Conflict resolution approaches 
Conflict resolution is a very important undertaking in societies/states that are in 
conflict. Generally conflicts are said to be resolved when a discernible outcome has 
been reached, conflict behaviour terminates and a satisfactory distribution of values 
and resources has been agreed upon (Anola, 2009:340). The north-south Sudan 
conflict required meeting these stated requirements to qualify as resolved and for the 
dilemmas that the parties were facing to be cleared. 
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Resolution of conflict in the international system is done following particular 
approaches depending on the prevailing norms and the nature of conflict at a 
particular time. Bercovitch and Jackson (2012:20) state that the approaches to 
conflict resolution can be classified in terms of the participants in the process 
(unilateral, bilateral or multilateral) or in terms of the modality utilised (violent or non-
violent). 
There are western approaches which currently dominate the international system 
and indigenous approaches which are unique to particular states/societies. MacGinty 
(2008:121) clarifies on the use of the terms ‘indigenous and traditional’ and states 
that although used interchangeably, the terms have overlapping but not precisely 
similar meanings and states that traditional denotes a practice or a norm that has a 
heritage of considerable duration while indigenous suggests that an activity or a 
norm is locally inspired. 
The western conflict resolution approaches include the traditional and the 21st 
Century (multidimensional) approaches and methods as the main categories 
(Bercovitch and Jackson, 2012:6-7). Richmond (2002:9-11) on the same in his 
version  includes  first generation, second generation and third generation premises 
as the main categories, Ramsbotham et al., (2011:36-62) although in a historical 
form includes; the first generation 1918-1945 (precursor), the second generation, 
1945-1965 (foundations), the third generation, 1965-1985 (consolidation), the fourth 
generation, 1985-2005 (reconstruction) and the fifth generation, 2006 up to the 
present as the main categories and likewise Omeje (2008:75) has traditional 
(indigenous) and modern premises in the African context as the main categories. 
The changing nature of conflict in the international system has necessitated the 
emergence of dynamics that in turn have forced the development of new approaches 
in the area of resolving conflicts and a paradigm shift in the perception of conflict 
settlement,  management, resolution and transformation. In regards to the different 
approaches as perceived by the different scholars, the second and third generations 
and the fourth and fifth generations represent the 21st Century approaches as most 
of the developments being advanced took place during the century while all the 
others belong to the traditional state-centric category in the western context 
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(Richmond, 2002:9-11 and Ramsbotham et al, 2011:36),. The African context can 
best be viewed as was articulated by Omeje, 2008. 
2.2.1.1 The traditional/First generation approach 
The concepts of the generations and traditional parameters before the 21st Century 
in conflict resolution seem to have a common grounding and approach. Richmond 
(2002:9) states that traditional peacemaking and peacekeeping are described in the 
typology put forward as first generation defined by the norms of state interaction and 
international law. According to realpolitik approaches, conflict is ameliorated at state 
level by negotiation and tactical bargaining or coercive third party intervention and 
therefore dependent on the state centric framework of international relations which 
are subject to security dilemma, managed through the balance of power mechanism 
or in its neo-liberal form pacified by the spread of capitalist democracy and the 
intervention of international institutions. 
Bercovitch and Jackson (2012:6) state that the traditional conflict resolution 
approach is a state-centric Westphalian system whose goal is to resolve conflict so 
as to protect order and security and by reinforcing the ability of states to pursue their 
own interests. The approaches by the scholars although given differing labels mean 
one and the same thing and that mechanisms associated with the approaches in this 
category were derived from the traditions, norms, and the culture of western 
diplomacy as it evolved since the Treaty of Westphalia, which favoured stylised and 
formal communication between sovereign representatives, militaries and diplomats 
as the traditional tools of conflict management.  
Additionally, in the approaches, the traditional tools of conflict management revolved 
around legal methods, peacekeeping, mediation and negotiation frameworks and the 
incorporation of actors defined in terms of either states or insurgents. Thus, state 
behaviour was dictated by state interests, meaning that conflict between states was 
intrinsically a conflict of interest and thus defined as zero-sum.  
Cheeseman et al.,(2015:2002), argue that  coming from  this background, states 
alone or by entering into alliances sought to prevent or mitigate violence  by using 
threats of armed force in the form of deterrence, coercive diplomacy and /or  
defensive alliances. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is a case in point 
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in this regard and functions as a procedural means to manage international disputes 
and to increase the effectiveness of diplomacy. Such organisations are bound by the 
framework of international law within a system where civil conflict and political 
violence is the responsibility of the states and not subject to international supervision 
and intervention.13 
This position translates that within the state-centric system of the first generation/ 
traditional approaches, the UN did not intervene in intrastate conflicts unless they 
became internationalised due to the principles of self-rule and territorial integrity 
which underlined the Westphalian system. The system favoured negotiations 
between the disputing parties to settle their conflict and to maintain the status quo. 
The intrastate conflicts which usually involve non-state actors were considered as a 
threat to the status quo in the system that privileged the state above all else because 
in most occasions conflict involved issues of self-determination and recognition of a 
particular ethnic identity. 
Considering what is perceived to be the content of the traditional approaches by the 
quoted scholars, guided by the western realist/positivist hegemonic discourse, the 
approaches did not and cannot resolve intrastate conflict by maintaining the territorial 
integrity of the status quo and that the approaches only enabled a binary 
understanding of the parties to conflict which perceives belligerents through the 
western stereotypes. This was the case in Sudan before the separation of South 
Sudan. Despite several attempts by the state to resolve the conflict, attitudes, 
behaviour and the conflict as perceived in the Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory 
could not change and likewise Liberal peace could not be realised as the structures 
to support it were absent.  
2.2.1.2 The 21st Century multi-dimensional approaches 
The 21st Century approaches and methods (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2012:3), 
second and third generations (Richmond, 2002:9-12), fourth, fifth and sixth 
generations (Ramsbotham, 2011:36) can best be categorised for ease of reference 
as the 21st Century multi-dimensional approaches of conflict resolution. With the 
                                                          
13
 In accordance with the perspective, military personnel were used in peacekeeping, observation, policing and 
humanitarian roles to provide a stable environment for negotiation and mediation and consent of the 
disputants was regarded as a critical requirement. 
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prevalence of intrastate wars based on identity issues rather than territorial ones at 
the end of the Cold War, the traditional approach to conflict resolution became 
ineffective (Ramsbotham et al., 2011:56). The state of affairs at this point required a 
change in the approach to conflict resolution in order to be in line with developments 
as the traditional approaches were viewed and described as mono-dimensional and 
narrowly defined.  
Fundamental changes in the nature of the international system in this regard with 
respect to traditional approaches to conflict resolution which sought to preserve the 
status quo of states required to usher in a new thinking. In response to the scenario, 
scholars started to focus on various approaches previously neglected such as track 
II diplomacy, problem solving workshops, peacebuilding and conflict prevention 
measures (Hartzell and Rothchild, 2001:184-185). Sambanis and Doyle (2000:780), 
state that it is increasingly being recognised that the combination of conflict 
resolution efforts at both official and non-official levels is important as it is a potential 
for combining new approaches with traditional mechanisms where appropriate. 
The establishment of just and democratic political orders, the resuscitation of failing 
or collapsed states, the promotion of human rights, the creation of emancipatory 
political structures, reconciliation and truth commissions, international tribunals, 
preventive diplomacy and early warning systems  serve as important goals and tools 
which can assist to address the  new forms of  conflict. 
Bercovitch and Jackson (2012:10) on the same state that the new approaches to 
conflict resolution are becoming increasingly multi-dimensional that is including UN 
peace operations, regional organisations, global, regional and local Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Thus, the new approaches to conflict 
resolution have evolved at the global, regional and local levels and that they are 
designed to produce inclusive structures and long term settlements of conflict.  
The objective of the modern conflict resolution approach and methods in this case 
can be alleged to be the rebuilding of societies (not just states) via both top down 
high level and bottom up grassroots methods. The understanding behind the 
venturing into the new approaches may have emerged due to the shortcomings of 
the traditional methods and thus their focus is more emphatically on resolving deep 
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seated and structural issues with the involvement of many non-official actors as well 
as official ones.  
In supporting this position, Kelman (1998:191) states that the new set of approaches 
to conflict resolution emerged partly as a reaction to the balance of power conflict 
management techniques which were associated with positivist/realist approaches 
that had dominated the pre and Cold War eras. The approach is  mismatched with 
the new developments of the nature of conflict and the actors involved and as such 
required overhauling to meet the new challenges. 
Richmond (2002:79) argues that conflict is a dynamic process in which structure, 
attitudes and behaviour shift constantly in the context of each other, in which 
disputants’ interests come into conflict and their relationship becomes oppressive 
which in turn may also draw other parties. The group of approaches in the 21st 
Century context examines the root causes of conflict based on human nature, 
behaviour and social structures in order to accommodate the dynamic process, 
context of structure, attitudes and behaviour which constantly keep shifting 
(Bercovitch and Jackson, 2012:9). 
An analysis of all the contributions on the aspects of the 21st Century methods, 
(preventive diplomacy, humanitarian intervention, regional task sharing, non-official 
diplomacy and peacebuilding) appear to be the most appropriate as vehicles for 
effective conflict resolution in the now most dynamic international system. 
The translation of the scenario in this regard is then that the new approaches adopt a 
more intersubjective view of conflict including politics in particular with respect to 
representation and identity. Additionally, the perspective indicated by the new 
approaches reveal that their goal is not just the cessation of violent behaviour but the 
establishment of new forms of interactions that can reflect the basic tenets of justice, 
human needs, legitimacy and equality.  
Richmond (2002: 78) differentiates explicitly between the traditional and the new 
approaches by stating that the distinction between the first and the second sets rests 
on two different views of what constitutes peace. Sambanis and Doyle (2000:782-
785) state that the future of conflict resolution depends on the use of new forms of 
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addressing conflict and sustaining peace that have not been traditionally associated 
with conflict solution and further argues that an inclusive definition of conflict 
resolution allows for a wider variety of actors to be involved which in the traditional 
approach context is neglected. This position is a direct translation that the old 
approaches of conflict resolution were exclusive in nature and as such could not 
really assist to resolve the underlying roots of conflict. 
Thus, the crucial development in the post-Cold War era has been the expansion of 
the political and non-political actors who deal with conflict and its resolution among 
them International Organisations (IGOs), women, the civil society and the media. 
Miall et al., (1999:61) state that the inclusion of all parties affected by conflict 
including women is imperative if a true understanding of the roots of conflict is to be 
achieved, if obstacles to peace processes are to be removed and insights into 
alternative methods of peacemaking are to be gained. 
Women and men experience conflict differently, face death differently and are 
tortured and abused in different ways for may be biological, social or psychological 
reasons. While more men get killed in combat, women among other things 
experience slavery, rape, forced pregnancies and deliberate infection of HIV/AIDS or 
sexually transmitted infections (STIs) as a weapon of war (Morris, 1996:653). 
This suggests that the inclusion of all sectors of the society in the peacemaking and 
peacebuilding efforts as part of the conflict resolution process furthers the 
development of innovative, viable solutions and the establishment of sustainable 
peace.14 The context of the emergence of the 21st Century approaches to conflict 
resolution in this regard translate to efforts being made to achieve better outcomes 
from conflict situations.  
This is justified from the facts that the modern approaches of conflict resolution 
recognises the importance and potential of local actors, the different ways war is 
experienced by men and women and the need for both official and non-official 
channels of communication. Applying a relevant conflict resolution approach is also 
                                                          
14
 Sustainable peace is a process of the creation of a proactive process that is capable of regenerating itself 
overtime (Lederach, 1997:75). 
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significant to the difficulty of the UN implied by the principles of state sovereignty as 
was perceived in the Cold War era. 
The downside of the 21st Century approaches, however, is that they tend to reflect 
more about western thought and values while assuming that they are universal and 
likewise fails to provide an interface between the state-centric dimension and the 
non-state centric dimension (Richmond, 2002:126). Traditional approaches to an 
extent still have a part to play in the case of interstate wars. The Sudan and the 
South Sudan scenario which has two faces of conflict (interstate and intrastate 
dimensions) present a case in point. In both cases of the inter-state and intrastate 
perspectives in view of conflict resolution, attitudes and behaviour of the parties 
require to change in order for the conflict to be transformed as is advanced in the 
Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory. In the context of the intrastate perspective, 
peacebuilding activities require to be undertaken in order to attain liberal peace as is 
advanced in the liberal peace theory.     
2.2.3 Indigenous/traditional approaches (the African scenario) 
Africa has been subjected to a multiplicity of armed conflicts in most instances 
especially after the post-colonial era resulting in it being labelled as the most 
turbulent and poorest region in the world. Egwu (2007:406), notes that at the end of 
the Cold War Africa witnessed an accentuation of the incidents of intra-state wars 
horizontally between different socio-ethnic and cultural aggregates within nation 
groups who felt/feel excluded and marginalised from existing power on the one hand 
and the central authority on the other and of course inter-state wars. This situation 
has, at times, made intra-state wars to degenerate into inter-state wars.15 The Sudan 
and South Sudan and the Eritrea and Ethiopia scenarios are cases in point.  
Such conflicts require managing, mitigating, settling and if possible resolving and 
transforming. Dating from pre-colonial antiquity, various African societies have had 
their own traditional/customary approaches and methods of conflict prevention, 
management and resolution which were embedded in the people’s cosmology and 
                                                          
15
 Many conflicts that manifest as internal revolts/civil wars inadvertently spread to other neighbouring 
countries or ended up provoking some form of intervention or complicity from neighbouring states and ethnic 
nationalities across international borders. The Tuareg rebellion in the Sahel region, conflicts in the Mano River 
basin and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are some cases in point (Omeje, 2008:68). 
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culture with a profound religious culture (Omeje, 2008:88). Prior to western contact, 
African traditional religious practices and Islam largely shaped the culture of conflict 
resolution and its methods.  
 The incorporation of Africa into the global system through western colonialism has 
had sweeping effects on the nature of conflicts as well as the traditional approaches 
and methods of conflict resolution (Francis, 2008:88). The result of this shift is that 
the traditional African approach has been significantly diluted to the extent that some 
of the related methods have either been displaced or significantly transformed by the 
countervailing imperatives of the western civilisation. What has then transpired due 
to these developments is that Africa now has two dimensions of conflict resolution 
approaches which namely are modern based on the western model and 
indigenous/traditional based on cultural practices. 
Murithi (2008:16) states that externally driven international efforts to resolve conflicts 
in Africa are often faced with the limitation that the local parties are sometimes 
unwilling or unable to relate to such initiatives. Francis (2008:16) in supporting this 
position states that often times official high level diplomacy (which is a western 
approach) tends to focus on promoting dialogue between the leaders of the warring 
parties based on the assumption that they are the legitimate representatives of the 
people which at times may be erroneous. Darby and MacGinty (2008:121) support 
this position and state that indigenous conflict resolution involve consensus decision 
making, a restoration of the human/resource ecological balance and compensation 
or gift exchange designed by respected elders input to ensure reciprocal and 
ongoing harmonious relations between the groups with trust and reconciliation as the 
pillars of the process.16  
The traditional approaches to conflict resolution in Africa are more inclusive and 
community based and as such are endowed with valuable insights that can inform 
the rebuilding of social trust and the restoration of the conditions for communal 
coexistence which in turn provides a good basis for conflict resolution. 
                                                          
16
 Examples in this regard include the Mato Oput in northern Uganda, Kgotla in Botswana and the Ubuntu 
system which is practiced by many communities in East and Southern Africa among others. 
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The indigenous approaches are not without shortfalls. The shortfalls in this regard 
include; the socio-cultural environment upon which they depend may be swept away 
by civil war and broader global social change to the extent that they can longer 
operate, the tendency of some methods to stamp on social activism and innovation, 
reinforcing existing power holders and conservative practices,  open only to men or 
emphasis on social conformity and the importance of power remaining in the hands 
of the chiefly classes and functioning only at the very low level which thus restricts 
their national relevance.17 
In view of these limitations, the indigenous approaches to conflict resolution in Africa 
do not work well at the civil level since for them to be effective require a number of 
precipitants including a secure environment and community acceptance. The 
indigenous conflict resolution approaches in Africa cannot terminate violence in the 
long term, have a limited sphere of applicability, are only geared towards the 
preservation of the old good order, may contradict universal standards of human 
rights and are open to abuse. However, their importance lie in how they aid to 
achieve peace through forgiveness, healing, reconciliation and restorative justice 
(Murithi, 2008:16). In this context, they can be able to contribute to peacebuilding 
activities if hybridised with western models in the areas of interdependence and rule 
of law which eventually can lead to the attainment of liberal peace as advanced in 
the Liberal peace theory.  
2.2.3.1 Modern conflict resolution approach in the African context 
The modern conflict resolution approach in Africa should basically be perceived as 
that practiced in the international system since most of the countries had been 
colonised by western countries who use the approach. Olowu (1994:6), however, 
argues that due to the nature and character of the African state which basically is 
premised on the legacy of the colonial state, conflict prevention, settlement, 
management and resolution have been problematic.18  
                                                          
17
 Darby and MacGinty, 2008:122. 
18
 Legacy of the colonial state in Africa is perceived as the weak, vertical and horizontal integration of the 
African state, the dominance of power rather than authority and the low level of government accountability. 
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Most recent conflicts in Africa have been insurgencies and civil wars whereby 
contestation of territorial and juridical sovereignty mostly takes the form of separatist 
campaigns (Omeje, 2008:75). Most of the major conflicts in Africa are state centred, 
implying that the conflicts tend to challenge the sovereignty of the state (in both 
territorial and juridical terms) or the legal and the moral authority of the governments 
in power caused by the legacies of the colonial state which then require managing 
and resolving.19 The Sudan and the South Sudan case before their separation is a 
model case on this aspect. 
Management approaches in these conflicts have involved either conflict control 
through military reprisal, elite co-optation and the use of Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) coupled with the use of eminent persons who use a mix of 
diplomacy tracks on the part of conflict resolution (Francis, 2008:81).  
The practice of trying to control conflict through military reprisals and suppression 
has at most times always accentuated conflict as most African opposition groups 
have increasingly proved defiant to the state’s intimidation and authoritarian control 
especially when the protests are informed by legitimate grievances and acts of 
injustice on the part of principal state officials (Omeje:2008:82). This suggests that 
the trend of using military reprisals to oppress the opposition is not a good conflict 
management method if at all conflict has to be resolved.20 In such cases the 
attitudes, behaviour and the conflict itself do not change and as such conflict 
resolution and later transformation cannot be achieved. 
Elite co-optation is a method of conflict regulation and settlement that many neo-
patrimonial states in Africa use effectively to weaken opposition and rebuild a form of 
consensus aimed at more or less preserving and perpetuating the status quo 
(Omeje, 2008:75).21 Elite co-optation is an externality of the intolerance of the 
opposition and it is not always born out of a spirit of conciliation and consensus. 
                                                          
19
 The causes of conflict are generally related to poor economic performance and underdevelopment, 
prebendal corruption, bad governance, political exclusion and marginalisation (imagined or real). 
20
 The handling of internal conflicts by governments employing military reprisals in Senegal, Cameroun, Algeria 
and Nigeria are cases in point. They all failed and only exacerbated the conflicts.  
21
 Neopatrimonialism refers to the coexistence and interaction of formal and informal institutions or a 
widespread informal behaviour within a formal polity such as a modern state. In other words, it is a concept 
that systematically includes both formal and informal institutions (Cheeseman et al.2015:59). 
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Largely, however, the approach as an instrument of elite politics cannot address the 
legitimate needs and grievances of the masses (Francis, 2008:80). The results of 
such actions have at times been the presence of protracted and intractable conflicts 
in the states involved with the practice. The north-south Sudan conflict to an extent 
can be perceived in this light regarding some of the dilemmas that the conflict parties 
faced/are facing. 
The use of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) is a third party intervention 
approach which is used to manage and resolve conflicts against a background of the 
debates on the roles of local, national and international actors in conflict resolution 
and post conflict strategies. Nhema and Zeleza (2008:3) state that there is a new 
realisation in Africa that while the role of external actors is indeed laudable, Africa 
will have to rely increasingly on its own framework of its sub-regional groupings-the 
RECs.  
The use of RECs with IGAD and its role in the Sudan conflict as a case in point may 
have gained ground from this background and a stance by the African states to have 
African solutions to African problems. Ideological and structural inadequacies within 
the RECs, financial constraints, lack of will and political commitment on the part of 
the states, external dependence (especially in terms of logistical resources) setback 
the well-articulated objectives of the RECs and their capacity in handling conflict 
resolution processes (Nhema, 2008:5). This position weakens the positive 
perception of the use of the RECs as part of conflict resolution in Africa. 
The intervention methods used by the RECs are varied and mixed and range from 
negotiation, arbitration to mediation, peacekeeping, humanitarian support, 
peacebuilding and preventive diplomacy. The choice of a method or methods is 
important if conflict has to at all be resolved (Francis, 2008:81). Factors that could 
positively or negatively affect the outcome of conflict resolution include; nature of the 
conflict and how well the intervener understands it, the motive and credibility of the 
intervener/s and their/its acceptability to the conflicting parties, the timing and 
suitability of the intervention methods and the role of other third party agents and 
how an intervener relates to them. 
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Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory posits that attitudes need not to be hostile, 
behaviour not violent and the conflict/contradictions need to be transformed to a level 
of accommodation, only then can conflict be considered to be resolved. Sudan 
before the separation of South Sudan lacked a status quo of this kind and this may 
explain the dilemmas these two parties faced in regard to conflict resolution in the 
African modern perspective. The failure initially by Sudan as one country and later as 
two separate states to achieve peace relate to failure to transform the conflict as is 
advanced in the Liberal peace theory in the context of Liberal peace and likewise in 
the case of the Galtun’s ABC conflict triangle theory. 
2.2.4 Negotiation in conflict resolution 
Negotiation is one of the methods of conflict resolution that aims at stopping violence 
and reaching an agreement through a joint decision-making process by parties 
involved in a conflict. Ramsbotham et al. (2011:187) state that negotiations have a 
fundamental importance in conflict resolution, most specifically in peace processes 
because they are the basic means by which parties search for peaceful settlements 
and aim to resolve their differences. 
Bercovitch and Jackson (2012:20) define negotiation as any form of verbal or non-
verbal communication, direct or indirect whereby parties to a conflict of interest 
discuss, without resort to arbitration or other judicial processes, the form of any joint 
action which they might take to manage a dispute between them. Ury (1993) 
however, alleges that negotiation is a process in which parties to a dispute discuss 
possible outcomes directly with each other while Ramsbotham et al. (2011:32) 
perceive it as a process whereby parties seek to settle or resolve their conflict.  
Negotiation has many definitions but the bottom line is that negotiation is about two 
opposing parties sitting down together at a table to find a possible solution to their 
problem/s. Negotiation is also very important in that it sparks the initiation of peace 
processes/agreements. The negotiation of the CPA between the GOS and the 
SPLM/A provides a good example in this case. Parties come together in a voluntary 
process to manage their conflict and that the voluntary nature of the process implies 
that the actors may choose whether to enter into such a process to manage their 
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conflict or whether to accept or reject any potential solutions that may emerge from 
the process.  
Negotiation is a conflict resolution mechanism which is anchored in the perception of 
those involved and that a negotiation relationship involves attempts to influence each 
other’s perception and evaluation of the situation by using a wide variety of non-
violent informational strategies.22 It is a process whereby an exchange of 
concessions is regarded as common even when the parties’ preferences have not 
been completely satisfied.  
Negotiations do not take place in a vacuum and as such its core elements include 
the parties, the issues and the context (Reimann, 2004:3). Parties in a conflict may 
refer to individuals, groups, organisations, nations or other systems that are 
represented in the process. The issues inform about what the conflict is about and 
how close or far removed the parties’ positions are (they are not fixed or immutable 
and can be negotiated singly, sequentially or linked together in a package of some 
sort) while the context refers to the environment in which the conflict and the 
subsequent negotiation process takes place (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2012:22-23). 
The parties’ part is important in regards to who should be represented at the 
negotiating table as part of the inclusion and exclusion criteria. The dilemmas that 
were/are faced by the parties in the north-south Sudan conflict involved these 
aspects which in due course affected negative peace and positive peace as 
advanced in Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory and the Liberal peace theory. 
According to Lanz (2010:275) the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion of entities in 
peace negotiations are based on the factor of practical requirements of the peace 
process  which addresses the question –‘does the participation of a given actor 
augment a chance of reaching a sustainable peace settlement?’ and the factor of 
normative dimension of international mediation which addresses the question of - ‘is 
the participation of a given actor consistent with the values of international mediators 
and sponsors of the peace negotiations?’ (See table 2.1). The dynamics of inclusion 
and exclusion in negotiations thus result from the interplay between these two 
factors. 
                                                          
22
 This may involve making demands, threats, concessions and promises (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2012:21). 
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Table 2.1: Factors of inclusion and exclusion in peace mediation /negotiations 
 Factors of inclusion  Factors of exclusion 
International norms  -Democratic peace: 
include broad segments of 
society so as to foster 
democratic culture. 
 
-Peaceful civil society: 
include civil society actors 
so as to build popular 
support for peace. 
  
-Global justice: exclude 
alleged perpetrators of 
mass atrocities to ensure 
their accountability. 
 
-War on terror: exclude 
terrorist groups as a 
means of de-legitimization  
Practical requirements  -Realpolitik: include the 
most powerful military 
actors who could 
undermine peace. 
 
-Implementation 
perspective: Include non-
military actors whose 
support is crucial to 
consolidate peace in the 
long run. 
  
-Keep it simple: exclude 
actors that unnecessarily 
complicate peace 
negotiations. 
 
-Spoilers: exclude 
intransigent hardliners 
who seek to undermine a 
peace process.  
 
Source: Lanz, D. (2010:282).  
  
The most comfortable situation for mediators is when practical requirements and 
international norms are mutually reinforcing. 
Stedman, (1996:341-342) states that for negotiation/s to take place, certain 
conditions also termed as pre-conditions must be available and that these might 
include; a low or decreasing probability of attaining conflict goals through violent 
struggle or withdrawals, a decreasing value of conflict goals relative to the direct cost 
of pursuing those goals and relative to other goals, a set of common or compatible 
interests between the parties or at least the possibility of settlement offering mutual 
advantage over the continued conflict and the flexibility by each leadership to 
consider negotiation.  
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Negotiations in most cases emerge from specific situations and that the core 
elements and the pre-conditions are important in order for negotiation as a method of 
conflict resolution to take place. Research indicates that the GOS and the SPLM/A 
had realised that the conflict between them could not be ended with a military victory 
by either side as war fatigue had become evident on both sides (Iyob and 
Khadiyagala, 2006:119-121). Hence the two parties decided to accept negotiation 
with a view to end their conflict which in essence was a direct confirmation of the 
importance of the core elements/pre-conditions for negotiations to take place.  
Scholars involved in the discipline of negotiation differ in their approaches to the 
negotiation process but along the way converge on the processes and the 
articulation of the required outcomes. Ury (1993:24) includes  interest based,  rights 
based and power based approaches to focus on the intended outcomes, Druckman 
(1977:45), includes puzzle solving, bargaining game, organisational management 
and diplomatic politics, Raifa (1982:12) includes symmetry and asymmetry 
prescriptions while Zartman (1982:53) includes  concession exchange, behavioural 
and integrative approaches. Katz and Lawyer (1985:27) on the same, includes 
contending, withdrawal, yielding, problem solving and compromising against the 
lines of concern for others and concern for self.  
Ramsbotham et al. (2011:38) however, categorise the negotiation approaches as 
either integrative or distributive. The integrative approach (positive sum) uses the 
objective criteria, aspires to create conditions of mutual gain, and emphasizes the 
importance of exchanging information between parties and group problem-solving 
(Lewicki et al., 2003:5).  
The distributive approach, also known as “zero-sum”, competitive, or “win-lose” 
strategies is based on a competitive view of negotiations and as such is  designed to 
secure the biggest slice possible of the proverbial pie for one side while leaving the 
other side with the smallest helping possible (Ibid:5). The various approaches to 
negotiation that is the integrative and the distributive approaches include most of the 
other approaches in them although the integrative approach is preferable since it 
involves a problem solving approach which also includes sharing of information by 
the parties. 
53 
 
However, integrative solutions are difficult to achieve in both inter-state and 
intrastate conflicts (Zartman, 1995b:74). The problem in this scenario may come 
from a lack of understanding by the conflicting parties who sometimes utilises the 
syndrome of ‘them and us’. It becomes problematic to reconcile such groups and is a 
point which needs careful attention in negotiation. However, negotiations can use the 
approaches either separately or at times a combination of both but care has to be 
taken as the aim is to find an outcome which can be satisfying to both the conflicting 
parties (Ramsbotham, et al. 2011:187). Self-determination with its options of either 
unity or separation in the case of north and south Sudan provides a good example of 
an outcome from a negotiation process that used a combination of these 
approaches. 
In negotiation, one should to understand that the negotiation can sometimes be 
hindered to produce a negotiated solution or a political agreement by barriers. 
Jeong, (2010:161) noted that obstacles to negotiation include emotional rage and 
cognitive rigidity while Bercovitch and Jackson (2011:28-29) include the aspects of 
structural, strategic, psychological, institutional and cultural as barriers. Along with 
these barriers, the issue of situations conducive for negotiations arises.  
Other scholars have argued that the process of negotiation itself is at most times 
frequently accompanied by a suspension of hostilities in a form of a ceasefire while 
in certain circumstances the same ceasefire would also be regarded as a barrier 
(Zartman and Rasmussen, 2001:24). Darby and Mac Ginty (2008:64), however 
argue that it is also possible to present the process of negotiation not as separate 
from coercion but as an integral part of it. It is important to identify the different 
barriers that can impede a negotiation process in order to avoid failure of reaching 
an agreement from the process. The parties of the northern-southern Sudan conflict 
had a lot of differences which in this case can be referred to as barriers which 
require/d removing in order for the negotiation process to succeed. These also fall 
into the categories of the dilemmas that the two parties faced in the peace process 
which later fostered tensions and threats to a return to war even after the separation 
of South Sudan. 
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2.2.5 Mediation in conflict resolution 
Conflict resolution attempts to involve different kinds of agencies (International 
organisations (IOs), states, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and 
individuals), address different groups (party leaders, elites, grassroots) and varies in 
forms, duration and purpose (Ramsbotham et al., 2011:181). All these institutions, 
individuals and techniques fall in the category of third party interventions in a conflict. 
Third party interventions employ a number of methods which include mediation, 
conciliation, problem solving, good offices, facilitation, adjudication and arbitration 
and peacekeeping (Fisher and Keashly, 1990:32). However, mediation is the most 
common form of third party intervention among the other methods and is a conflict 
resolution method. 
Zartman and Touval (2007:437) views mediation as a mode of negotiation in which a 
third party helps parties find solutions which they cannot find themselves. Bercovitch 
and Jackson (2012:34), however, perceive mediation as a process of conflict 
management related to but distinct from the parties’ own negotiations where those in 
conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from an outsider (whether 
an individual, an organisation, a group or a state) to change their perceptions or 
behaviour and to do so without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of 
the law.  
Mediation generally comprises of parties in conflict, a mediator, process of mediation 
and the context of the mediation as its elements. These elements together determine 
the nature, quality and the effectiveness of the mediation and indicate why some 
efforts at mediation succeed while others fail (Ibid, 2012:35). Despite being defined 
in many forms, most scholars seem to agree that mediation is an assisted and 
facilitated negotiation. IGAD in the North-South Sudan conflict used the mediation 
strategy in order to negotiate the CPA.  
Mediation is an informal process in which a neutral third party with no power to 
impose a resolution helps the disputing parties to reach a mutually acceptable 
settlement (Bush and Folger, 1994:43).  Thus, mediation can perform a valuable role 
in opening up a new political space by allowing the parties to present their cases, 
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explore them in-depth, frame and order the discussion and question the advantages 
and the disadvantages of different options.  
Mediation is important especially at a stage when at least some of the conflicting 
parties have come to accept that pursuing conflict is unlikely to achieve their goal at 
least before reaching the stage of accepting formal negotiations (Darby and Mac 
Ginty, 2008:94 and 97). The circumstances that led to the IGAD intervention in the 
north and south Sudan conflict provide a good example on this aspect. Thus,  
mediation is most likely to take place when a conflict is intractable, drawn out or 
complex, the parties’ own conflict management efforts reach an impasse and when 
neither party is prepared to cooperate openly to break their stalemate.  
Mediation is guided by a number of models in its execution. The models include the 
great power model, multi-government model and the international figures or eminent 
persons’ model (Darby and Mac Ginty, 2008:95). In the great power model, 
moderators have considerable leverage on the adversaries, in the multi-government 
model, the intermediary  action is done  by a group of  governments while in the 
international figures or eminent persons model, major international figures or 
eminent persons are used by utilizing their reputation and prestige. Kofi Annan and 
the 2007 Kenya post-elections conflict is a case in point in the context of the eminent 
persons’ model. The IGAD framework in the Sudan CPA mediation however 
represented a multi-government model at work. Similarly Bercovitch and Jackson 
(2012:38-40) allege that mediation can be carried by individuals, states and 
institutions and organisations. 
Mediation works better if a framework for whatever is to be negotiated is put in place 
in order to avoid straying from important issues and for the purposes of order during 
its course. The Declaration of Principles (DOPs) and the Machakos protocol in the 
case of the north-south Sudan peace process provide cases in point on this aspect. 
However, such frameworks can sometimes be a cause for peace processes to break 
down due to the positions of conflict parties on the issues included (Lesch, 
1998:181-182).  
There are a number of debates on the methods of mediation which require a clear 
understanding if at all mediation has to be effective. These include the utility of the 
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models specifically when the conflict in question takes place within the formal 
boundaries of one of the members of the international community – (that is a 
territorial state) whereby the formal government of the state is one of the parties to 
the conflict opposed by an ethnic or other types of insurgences and when the issues 
in the conflict revolve around the preservation of the unity of the state as opposed to 
its division or disintegration (Mitchel, 2008:96).   
Folger and Bush (1994:55-58) argue that the problem at heart in such scenarios 
becomes the positions of the governments and International Organisations (IOs) 
such as UN, European Union (EU), AU and the Organisation of the American States 
(OAS) in the context of them becoming honest brokers.23 These organisations may 
be biased and as such may not be in a position to work as expected due to issues of 
policies that they tend to uphold.24  
The representatives of the governments in the said organisations would somehow be 
biased as they would be in favour of the principles of continuing territorial integrity 
and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries unless genocide clearly 
threatens. Darby and MacGinty (2008:96)  affirm that the two principles  raise major 
barriers to intermediary action even in situations  where the effects of protracted 
social conflicts spill over borders and disrupt neighbours through raids, refugees, 
reinforcements, routes for arms and general mayhem.  
Further intellectual and practical debate in the area is the question on the type of 
entry which might be appropriate to perform mediatory tasks in a conflict that is 
violent, protracted and dangerous to a region but which takes place within the 
confines of an existing state or country no matter how collapsed the former or 
disintegrated the latter. Other scholars have included the question of the timing of 
mediation, external neutrals versus inside partials as effective intermediaries and the 
appropriate forms of intermediary activities and their relation to the various stages of 
the peace process as some of the possible areas for consideration as part of the 
solutions to the debate (Bercovitch and Rubin, 1992:30).   
                                                          
23
 A person or country that tries to get other people or countries to reach an agreement or to solve a problem 
without getting involved with either side (an honest broker) 
24
 African Union on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a state as was articulated in the 
Cairo Declaration of 1964 with a view to uphold the concept of territorial sovereignty in a case in point on this. 
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Concepts of the hurting stalemate and the ripe moment for the purposes of entry of 
the mediators, the need to make a choice between the use of external neutrals 
versus the inside partials, using only one of them and may be mixing them and the 
proper handling of mediation as a process in the context of the outside neutrals and 
inside partials and the right timing in the context of entry resulting from the hurting 
stalemate and the ripe moment would assist to achieve the best in a 
mediation/negotiation process.  
 The discipline of mediation provides an opportunity to posit a better understanding 
as to when mediation for a conflict can be done, when it can help, appropriate 
mediators and the mediator role and functions. IGAD in the 2005 Sudan CPA context 
may have emerged and succeeded due to these factors.   
IOs, governments, NGOs, and individuals all play a big role in mediation. The entities 
require some form of power in order for them to function well in their mediation work. 
Boulding (1989:22) suggests hard power/ threat power (do what one wants) and soft 
power divided into exchange power (associated with bargaining and compromising 
approaches) and integrative power (associated with transformative and long term 
problem solving) in which is factored “the together we can do something that is better 
for both of us” idea may all be useful at some points in the process of mediation. 
Such powers should properly be understood by all the concerned in order to reduce 
abuse in certain circumstances and quarters (Ramsbotham, et al., 2011:23).  
The fact that third parties operate at many levels and many different sectors within 
and between societies adds to the complexity and confusion in how some of the 
parties in a conflict would apply the powers that have been articulated (Reimann, 
2004:4). This problem arises from the fact that some of the roles involve the 
interveners (mediators) in their official capacity while others are performed in a more 
informal manner. If this can be checked, such problems cannot surface. 
Some interveners operate at the highest levels of decision making, others on the 
influence given at the middle ranges of society whilst others typically at the 
community or grassroots level. The different levels of operating by the different 
cadres can create problems in the discharge of the mediator roles. The CPA 
mediation had involved many stakeholders who included; IGAD, IGAD Partners 
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Forum (IPF), AU and USA and its allies (UK, Italy and Norway). These tended to 
have different levels of power and differing views on how the mediation/negotiation 
was to be done.  
Mediation as part of the third party intervention activities in the global domain is 
included in what is termed as multi-track diplomacy (Diamond and Mac Donald, 
1996:1-2). Ramsbotham et al. (2011:23-24 and 28) posit that track-one diplomacy 
involves official governmental or inter-governmental representatives who may use 
good offices, mediation and the stick and carrot strategies to seek or force outcomes 
in typical win- lose scenarios.  
In contrast, track two involves unofficial mediators who do not carry with them the 
sticks and carrots but work with parties or their constituencies to facilitate 
agreements and encourage the parties to see their predicament in a lose-lose 
situation to a win-win scenario (see table 2.2). The question is what about track 
three diplomacy? Diamond and MacDonald, (1996:28) introduced a scenario in 
which emphasis is placed on the importance of indigenous resources and the local 
actors to undertake the roles. This approach is referred to as track-three diplomacy 
(table 2.2 refers). This approach provides a counter force to the argument of 
mediation being a preserve of the western models which side-line the indigenous 
approaches. 
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Table 2:2: Track I, II and III Actors and their Strategies  
 Track I Track II Track III 
Actors involved Political and 
military 
Leaders as 
mediators and/or 
representatives of 
conflict parties. 
From private 
individuals, 
academics, 
professionals, ‚civil 
mediation, citizens 
diplomacy‘ to 
international and 
local non-
governmental 
organisations 
involved in conflict 
resolution  
From local 
grassroots 
organisations to 
local and 
international 
development 
agencies, human 
rights 
organisations and 
humanitarian 
assistance 
organisations  
Strategies used Outcome-oriented: 
From official and 
coercive measures 
like sanctions, 
arbitration, power 
mediation to non-
coercive measures 
like facilitation, 
negotiation, 
mediation, fact-
finding missions 
and good offices‘ 
Process-oriented: 
Non-official and 
non-coercive 
measures mainly 
facilitation, 
consultation in the 
form of problem-
solving workshops 
and round table 
conferences  
Process- and/or 
structure-oriented: 
Capacity building, 
trauma work, 
grassroots training, 
development and 
human rights work 
 
Source: Riemann, C. (2010). Assessing the state of the art in conflict transformation.  
Berghof centre - http://www.berghof-handbook.net  
The approach sounds practical but one would wonder as to where such an approach 
would draw its muscle from in terms of power and resources. Mediation of the CPA 
centred on the first approach (Young, 2012:116). In this case, complete negative 
peace could not be achieved and likewise, positive peace could not be realised as 
the social justice could not be advanced as some of the actors who could advance 
its course were left out.  
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Zartman and Touval (2007:438) present a caveat that mediation facilitates 
settlement of conflicts but does not ensure reconciliation or remove the root causes 
of conflict. For the purposes of effectiveness and continuity, mediators should be 
encouraged as a matter of principle to follow through on settlements that support 
implementation and adherence to the agreements by the parties. The caveat and the 
additional comment are presented with a view to bring out the weaknesses of 
mediation.  
It is then advisable for mediators to have an understanding of these weaknesses lest 
all their effort would be considered a total waste of time. IGAD mediation of the CPA 
provides a better example on this aspect whereby due to lapses within it was not 
given an opportunity to oversee the implementation of the agreement and the 
mediation of the post referendum issues (Young, 2012:3550). What is important at 
the end it of it all is to view mediation as assisted negotiation. 
2.2.6 Peacebuilding in conflict resolution 
Peacebuilding is one of the most recent methods of conflict resolution in the 
international community which was described officially for the first time by the former 
UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali in his ‘Agenda for peace document in 1992’.25 
Peace is perceived to represent the centre of the revolutionary development of 
international conflict resolution theory and practice which goes beyond the more 
limited objectives of conflict management as a holistic concept which aims at no less 
than the complete transformation of political, economic and social structures within a 
nation experiencing violent conflict (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2012:168). This 
position implies that conflict transformation is linked to the method of peacebuilding. 
Thus, peacebuilding aims at restoring broken relationships, promoting reconciliation, 
institution building and political reform and facilitating economic transformation. 
Boutros- Ghali (1992:10) defines peacebuilding as action to identify and support 
structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into 
                                                          
25
  An Agenda for peace is a report written for the United Nations by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
in 1992. In it, Boutros-Ghali responds to a request by the UN Security Council for an "analysis and 
recommendations" to strengthen peacemaking and peace-keeping. The document outlines the way Boutros-
Ghali felt the UN should respond to conflict in the post-Cold War world.  
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conflict.26  Paris (2004:38) perceives peacebuilding as action undertaken at the end 
of a civil conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of fighting. Francis 
(2012:5) in a narrow perspective definition views it as programmes and intervention 
efforts at capacity building, state reconstruction, reconciliation and social 
transformation and in a broad perspective, views it as security, political, economic 
social, developmental and military programmes and interventions geared towards 
strengthening political settlements and addressing the cause of conflict.  
Peacebuilding is generally about undertaking programmes designed to address the 
causes of conflict and the grievances of the past and to promote long term stability 
and justice. Additionally other actors focus on the post-conflict dimension whilst 
others include periods before, during and after the conflict. This is a clear translation 
that the area has gradually been changing due to new developments and new 
understanding of issues.27 
Fisher et al. (2000:14) in clarifying this position state that peacebuilding is not 
primarily concerned with conflict behaviour but attempts to address the underlying 
context and attitudes that give rise to violence such as unequal access to 
employment, discrimination, unacknowledged and unforgiven responsibility for past  
times prejudice, mistrust, fear and hostility between camps. Thus, peacebuilding is a 
low profile work that can at least in theory continue through all stages of conflict but 
is likely to be stronger either in later stages after settlement and a reduction of violent 
behaviour or in earlier stages before any open violence has occurred. Peacebuilding 
would flourish better in a scenario whereby the attitudes and behaviour are no longer 
violent and hostile in order to assist to transform the conflict structure as is 
articulated in the Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory. 
Bercovitch and Jackson (2012:172-173) state that despite this being the case, 
peacebuilding generally entails concerted action by international third parties working 
both in military and civilian capacity, employing a hybrid of short-to medium and long 
term political and development activities that are aimed at recovering from war, 
                                                          
26
 It is noted that such actions take various forms which include; demilitarization, restructuring, police and 
judicial reform, economic development and elections among others. 
27
 The 1995 supplement to ‘an Agenda for peace is a clear testimony of this development. 
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preventing a relapse into violent conflict, strengthening local capacities for peaceful 
conflict resolution and creating the conditions for genuine long term human security. 
The institutional key assumption at the heart of peacebuilding is that violent conflict 
has complex and multiple causes that are rooted in the political, economic and social 
structure of society including intolerable poverty, inequality and relative deprivation, 
injustice, institutional failure, political grievances and social divisions among others. 
Related to this assumption is that peacebuilding assumes that the causes of these 
kinds of conflict are generic and therefore a universal approach or template can be 
applied across all cases (Curtis, 2015:2003). 
This assumption implies that resolving conflict and creating durable structures of 
peace requires concerted efforts in order to deal with the deep structural problems. 
Paris (2009:42) argues that the application of a universal peacebuilding template 
across all cases is problematic since the current international approach is grounded 
in the western liberal theory which at times may not be applicable or suitable to 
certain non-western scenarios. 
Thus, there is an underlying belief that liberal democratic tendencies as are in 
western developed countries  preclude the possibility of violent internal conflict and 
for that reason fit to be applied as a one size fits all solution in areas facing conflict in 
order to achieve peace. However, the ideal position in this case is that peacebuilding 
cannot succeed without the cooperation of the people who are being helped and that 
lasting peace cannot be imported from the outside but that it has to be generated 
from within. The question would be ‘could this scenario have applied to the case of 
the northern-southern Sudan conflict and now in the intrastate conflicts in the two 
states which also are contributing to the tensions and threats to a return to war 
between the two states?’   
The orientations of the people of northern and southern Sudan at the time although 
in one country were/are different. People in northern Sudan were/are generally Arab 
and Muslim as they embrace Islam as their religion although some are Muslim but 
not Arab. The people of southern Sudan however had/have an African profile and 
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embrace either Christian or traditional beliefs28. Considering this situation, 
peacebuilding in Sudan required incorporating the practices of the two regions with 
the Western conflict resolution approach model in order for peace to be achieved. In 
that way, attitudes, behaviour and the conflict as advanced in the Galung’s ABC 
conflict triangle theory would may be have changed and likewise Liberal peace 
would have been easier to achieve as is advanced in the Liberal peace theory.  
The aims and tasks of peacebuilding are important for the understanding of the 
concept and the outcomes of the exercise.  Kumar (1997:3) includes restoration, 
structural reforms and institution building as some of the aims/tasks of 
peacebuilding. Ramsbotham et al. (1999:203), conceive the peacebuilding 
aims/tasks in terms of interim or short term tasks, and long term tasks across the 
range of sectors such as security, political, economic and social. Paris (2009:4) on 
the same however includes security, development, humanitarian assistance, 
governance and the rule of law. 
An analysis of the aims/tasks as a framework for understanding and executing 
peacebuilding point to a consensus that peacebuilding can be summarised under 
four main headings which include security rehabilitation (establishing and 
maintaining security, law and order and security sector reforms), political 
rehabilitation (reconstructing political institutions and legitimate government), 
economic rehabilitation (emergency humanitarian assistance and long term 
economic reforms and restructuring) and social rehabilitation (justice, reconciliation 
and local capacity building (see figure 2.4).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
28
 Muslims are individuals who embrace Islam as their religion hence Muslims are part of a religious sect. Arabs 
on the other hand are individuals that dwell or own the Arabian or Arab regions. Thus, they form a specific 
internationally known nationality. They speak the Arabic (Arabian) language and can choose whatever faith or 
religion they plan to follow.  This implies that there are Christian Arabs, Muslim Arabs or just Arabs depending 
on their desired orientation and likewise others are Muslim but not Arab.  
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Figure 2.4: The Utstein Peacebuilding Palette  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Smith, D. (2004).Towards a strategic framework for peacebuilding: Getting 
their act together. Norway: PRIO. 
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societies coming out of civil wars should thus include these aspects in order to 
achieve peace and avoid a relapse of conflict.  
Three elements which are central to the concept of peacebuilding include: the 
rehabilitation, reconstruction and reconciliation of the societies that have suffered the 
ravages of an armed conflict; creation of security related, political and /or socio-
economic mechanisms needed to build trust between the parties and to prevent the 
resumption of violence and an external foreign intervention to create conditions 
conducive to peace (David, 1999:27). Peace agreements in this regard require 
factoring these elements in order to advance peacebuilding to achieve peace in 
conflict situations.  
The key assumption in relation to peacebuilding in this regard is that violent social 
conflict has complex and multiple causes that are rooted in the political, economic 
and social structures of society, including intolerable poverty, inequality and relative 
deprivation, justice, institutional failure, political grievance and social division among 
others (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2012:172). It can then be argued that these aspects 
require addressing if at all conflict is to be resolved and for peace to be achieved. 
This position suggests that peacebuilding should then be perceived as action by 
international third parties working in both military and civilian capacity, employing a 
hybrid of short, medium and long term political development activities that are aimed 
at recovery from violent conflict, preventing a relapse of the same, strengthening 
local capacities for peaceful conflict resolution and creating the conditions for 
genuine long term human security.  
Reconciliation and justice play a big role in peacebuilding. Omission of these two 
factors may spell disaster due to the fact that the attitudes and behaviours of the 
parties may remain hostile and violent which may not assist to resolve/transform the 
conflict structure.  
Reconciliation is perceived as the re-establishment of friendly relations and in the 
case of armed conflicts; incorporates the search for truth, justice, forgiveness and 
accommodation between conflicting groups or people (Ramsbotham et al, 
2011:247). Pankhurst (1999:240) on the same, states that reconciliation can mean 
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ending fighting, improving relations between states, commitment to peaceful co-
existence and/or sacrificing something for the sake of compromise. This position 
implies that reconciliation is about former enemies setting aside past enmity and the 
creation of emotional space to forge a new relationship. This may imply behaviour 
and attitudes of the victims not being hostile and violent which in turn can lead to the 
resolution/transformation of a conflict. 
Considering the fact that individuals/institutions at times violate human rights, there 
is a need that after a conflict, the perpetrators be dealt with in order to achieve 
justice.  This calls for a justice approach to investigate and punish human rights 
violators in order to put back in place the moral order of the society. Transitional 
justice (TJ) is such an approach. TJ is a set of judicial and non-judicial measures 
implemented in order to redress legacies of human rights abuses. Such measures 
include criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programs, and various 
kinds of institutional reforms (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2009:153).  
The scenario in this case suggests that TJ seeks recognition for victims and 
promotion of possibilities for peace, reconciliation and democracy. However, TJ is 
not a special form of justice but justice adapted to societies transforming themselves 
after a period of pervasive human rights abuse.Two extremes of justice and 
reconciliation in this regard summarises an overview of the minimal and the complex 
dimensions of the two aspects29. Branch (2011:15) however is critical of TJ and 
perceives the de-contextualization of violence and of individuals, the failure to 
emphasize and understand continuity after transition and the neglect of socio-
economic concerns as its major problems.  
Pankhurst (1999:240) argues that the concept of post-conflict justice is difficult as 
each party has a different idea of what would constitute a just outcome but adds that 
reconciliation and justice are increasingly recognised as important issues in the 
transition to democracy and in obtaining positive peace. It can then be contended 
                                                          
29 First a minimal peace settlement which does not address social justice; has minimum rule of law and 
personal security; has no national reconciliation measures (other than leaders signing a peace agreement); has 
no allocation of blame for war crimes and complete impunity; 'low intensity' democracy and fragile protection 
of human rights. Second a complex peace accord with international support and local political agreement for 
longer-term provision of: processes of truth revelation, prosecution, amnesty and reconciliation; rule of law; 
ensuring absolute standards of human rights; facilitating widespread participation in associational life and 
democratic political structure (Pankhurst (1999:244).   
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that the objective of reconciliation and justice is to deal with the past particularly the 
legacy of massive human rights abuses and to lay the foundations for a peaceful and 
democratic future.  
The perception in the context of the peacebuilding framework above is that it 
includes aspects which can change the attitudes, behaviour and the conflict as 
advanced in the Galtung ABC conflict triangle theory and likewise through the 
peacebuilding activities, achieve the Liberal peace status. Negative peace and 
positive peace would then all be possible in such a scenario. The case of the Sudan 
CPA in this case required giving attention to these aspects in order to achieve 
sustainable peace. 
Peacebuilding is an evolving body of theory and practice that grew out of UN 
peacekeeping, conflict resolution and development (Paris, 2004:4). The available 
literature in this regard, however, indicate  that there has been no general agreement 
on the examples of peacebuilding in practice and the forms in which it can take place 
(Chandler, 2001:12-13).  
Bercovitch and Jackson (2012:177) on the argument however state that 
peacebuilding practice takes place in three main forms namely; fully formed 
comprehensive UN directed peacebuilding operations, peacekeeping operations with 
significant peacebuilding dimensions and post-conflict transitions and a plethora of 
peacebuilding policies, projects and programmes within the wider activities of a large 
number of international, national and non-governmental agencies. Peacebuilding is 
generally undertaken by the UN, the concerned nation on its own and the concerned 
nation supported by international Governmental Organisations (IGOs) and local 
NGOs. The case of Sudan in this regard fits the later scenario which it is viewed was 
problematic as it did not have a clear control of the other supporting agences. This 
suggests that activities and their coordination were not properly sequenced and 
directed.  
Francis (2012:11) argues that the main problem of peacebuilding in most instances 
has been lack of coordination and failure to include the required programmes on the 
recommended framework of peacebuilding. The context of the UN directed 
peacebuilding is that it excessively focuses on state reconstruction which usually is 
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to the detriment of reconciliation in that not much policy relevant thought as well as 
pragmatic interventions specifically target how the very process of post-war state 
building creates tensions, competition and conflict.  
Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1999:198) state that UN peacebuilding adopts a 
state-centric top-down approach that neglects smaller NGOs, local agents and 
indigenous resources. In the case of the go it alone government peacebuilding, due 
to prejudices developed during the conflict, fails to reach out to other parties which in 
the end does not assist to build the required peace, political dimensions (to the 
detriment of economic and particularly psychological aspects of peacebuilding) and 
the prevention of a return to conflict.   
Activities such as societal reconstruction, peace education, conflict resolution 
training and local capacity building are given low priority in the overall programme 
coupled with failing to work with local partners particularly elements of the civil 
society committed to peacebuilding in the case of the UN and failure to take on 
board the justice and reconciliation aspect in the case of national governments. The 
justice and reconciliation aspect in the peacebuilding framework in this regard should 
be viewed as key while at the same time not neglecting the other areas of the 
framework.   
Peacebuilding is faced with a number of challenges that eventually cascade into the 
major debates on its practice. Bercovitch and Jackson (2012:179-182), on this 
aspect state that challenges of peacebuilding include conceptual, theoretical, 
normative, political and practical aspects.  Paris (2009:26) on the same states that 
the debates about peacebuilding focus on a wide range of controversies such as the 
impact and the legitimacy of promoting liberal democracy and market economies in 
conflict prone societies, the nature of the state and state building in many regions of 
the developing world and broader questions about power threats to peace and 
security intervention and hegemony in international relations.  
The one size fits all approach, imposition of economic structures which may 
sometimes create poverty and relative deprivation on the locals, peacebuilding 
principles coming into conflict with practice, timeframe for the peacebuilding process, 
shifting of interests by the sponsors and coordination among others are perceived to 
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be some of the major challenges of peacebuilding (Paris, 2004:231). The failure to 
come up with clear positions on these issues is fertile ground for total failure of the 
concept and that these debates underscore the problems that peacebuilding as one 
of the methods of conflict resolution encounters.  
Peacebuilding, however, is a very important enterprise which should have both top 
down and bottom up approaches as a reflection of hybridity and attempt to deal with 
all the areas which appear in its framework of action (tasks/aims). MacGinty (2011:1) 
perceives hybridity as both a process and a condition of interaction between actors 
and practices which can assist to achieve positive peace. 
The one size fits all approach, imposition of economic and political prescriptions, 
coordination problems and the focusing on state reconstruction other than justice 
and reconciliation require critical attention if conflict resolution has to have meaning 
in conflict situations (Francis:2012:5). Richmond (2011:17) in supporting these 
positions advances the concept of hybridity and states that there should be hybridity 
in peacebuilding which should represent both the capacity of international liberal and 
local peacebuilding actors and projects to engage with each other which should 
perhaps be to the benefit of the local version of peace.   
2.3 Peace agreements conceptualised   
Peace agreements originate from a perspective in which societies/entities in conflict 
situations wish to manage and eventually resolve their incompatibilities in order to 
achieve peace. Peace agreements are basically conflict settlements meaning that 
they involve conflict parties agreeing on conflict issues that often involve a 
compromise or some concessions from them.  In this case, although the settlement 
may suggest finality, the conflict attitudes and underlying structural contradictions 
may not have been addressed (Ramsbotham, et al., 2011:31).  
 In view of Galtung’s definitions of peace, peace agreements represent negative 
peace as they are meant to remove violence but require other processes in order for 
societies to achieve positive peace. The processes of mediation and negotiation as 
the methods of conflict resolution by which agreements are reached seek to de-
escalate conflict with at least some formality (Dietz, et al., 2011:11). The Sudan CPA 
which had in it six protocols should then be viewed in this light. The question is ‘to 
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what extent did the CPA work and in that context why are there still significant 
problems between north and south Sudan?’  Peace agreements have many 
definitions and in that context there are many difficulties in trying to define a peace 
agreement (Wallensteen 2007:76).  
UN peacemaker (2006:4) defines peace agreements as contracts intended to end a 
violent conflict or to significantly transform a conflict so that it can be more 
constructively addressed. Wallensteen (2007:75) defines them as signed treaties 
that regulate (resolve or find a process for) the incompatibility, are concluded 
between the warring parties and put an end to conflict behaviour. Darby and 
MacGinty (2008:193) drawing upon the above articulations, define them as political 
documents agreed upon by conflicting parties to resolve a conflict with the capacity 
to have  a real impact  on people’s lives. Mottiarr and Muvumba (2011:8) however, 
view peace agreements as arrangements by warring parties to explicitly regulate or 
resolve incompatibilities.  
The definitions above translate that peace agreements are basically conflict 
settlement meant to indicate what has been agreed, halt the fighting to achieve 
negative peace and what is likely to happen thereafter to completely resolve 
conflict/s to achieve positive peace. Various reasons are advanced to explain the 
adoption of peace agreements. According to Pratt (2009:5) reasons include war 
fatigue, the search for durable peace, a declaration of a no winner and no loser 
outcome, military versus peace settlement victory and recognition of the effects of 
war on the social, political and cultural life of the community and ambition to be 
associated with a process and culture of democratisation.  
Peace agreements are reached to achieve peace by trying to address the concerns 
of the conflicting parties. The belief is then that the Sudan CPA was authored in line 
with this approach hence the inclusion of the six protocols in the CPA. However, 
settlements do not end conflict but that they are simple arrangements to continue 
bargaining under consensually defined rules of interaction. 
The extent of any agreement is important particularly in terms of the degree to which 
it deals with the constitutional, territorial and security that lie at the core of a conflict 
otherwise it can merely be concerned with the manifestations of the conflict (Darby 
and Mac Ginty, 2008: 199). Within the context of this assertion, a debate has ensued 
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in the field as to whether it is prudent to stretch the limit of peace accords to cultural 
and economic issues that define the development aspect of conflicts. This argument 
has appeared docile but deeper thoughts may necessitate their inclusion as it is 
viewed that there non-inclusion may not assist to resolve conflicts.  
Agreements, however, require that they be matched with the problems of the conflict 
at hand. It may then be for this reason that the phases/ stages of the peace process 
also become anchored with what the parties to the conflict aspire for. Sisk 
(2008:198) states that settlements in internal conflicts reflect the convergence point 
of the parties at the negotiating table among their preferences for new rules, 
structures or institutions to constitute the post-war peace.  
Waterman (1991:292) argues that civil wars are conflicts over political order and 
settlements in them entail the re-creation of the conditions for a viable common 
political order and as such peace agreements should be viewed as conflict 
settlement and not conflict resolution as they are just part of the process of resolving 
a conflict. Darby and MacGinty (2008:199) state that peace agreements do not end 
wars/conflicts but simply allow for the continuation of bargaining under consensually 
defined rules of interaction. 
There are various types of agreements that can be reached during a peace process 
and can all sometimes be referred to as peace agreements. Stedman et al. 
(2002:12) states that each type of agreement has a distinct purpose and as such 
serves a value in itself towards building positive momentum for a final settlement.  
According to Hampson (1996:76), types of agreements include cessation of 
hostilities/ceasefire agreements, pre-negotiation agreements, interim or preliminary 
agreements, implementation agreements, comprehensive and framework 
agreements.  Bell (2000:19) in her approach states that peace agreements at the 
different stages of a conflict in a peace process include; pre-negotiation agreements, 
framework or substantive agreements and implementation/or renegotiation 
agreements. The UN Peacemaker data bank (2006) agrees with Bell (2000) in their 
categorization of agreements but adds cessation of hostilities or ceasefire agreement 
on the list.  
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These categories can be confusing and as such require a clear understanding about 
what they mean and stand for. The understanding should be that different stages of 
peace processes tend to have particular types of agreements hence the many terms 
all referred to as peace agreements. The Sudan case provides a good example in 
this context. Different agreements were reached but in the end all were referred 
finally together as a CPA.  
Agreements reached may be partial or full (Bell, 2006:379). Partial agreements are 
those agreements reached where it is not possible for all parties to converge on 
resolving the conflict at the same time or the parties cannot address all the issues at 
the same time. In contrast full agreements are the end result of an agreement 
combined with the necessary implementation agreements (Bell, 2000:21). 
Thus, peace agreements are not easily distinguished, as their content may 
sometimes overlap. Wallensteen and Sollenberg (1997:99) argue that not all types of 
agreements are needed for each conflict. Some processes may have step-by-step 
agreements that lead towards a comprehensive settlement while other peace 
processes may seek to negotiate one agreement comprehensively at a time. The 
CPA should then be viewed in the former context. 
Framework/ substantive agreements/ comprehensive agreements are terms which at 
most times are confused and used interchangeably as conflict settlement in the 
discipline of conflict resolution (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1997:100). UN 
Peacemaker (2006:3) views framework agreements as agreements that broadly 
agree on the principles and agenda upon which the substantive issues will be 
negotiated usually accompanied by protracted negotiations that result in annexures 
that contain the negotiated details on substantive issues, or are a series of 
subsequent agreements that are sometimes collectively known as comprehensive 
agreements which are meant to address the substance of the underlying issues of a 
dispute. Their conclusion is often marked by a handshake, signifying a historical 
moment that ends a long standing conflict and that they seek to find the common 
ground between the interests and needs of the parties to the conflict, and resolve the 
substantive issues in dispute.  
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The signing of the CPA in 2005 is a good example whereby Garang (south Sudan) 
and Taha (north Sudan) shook each other’s hands (Collins, 2008:271).  The 
definition tends to use ‘issues’ to define the agreement.  The Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program (2008:2) however defines a CPA as one signed by all parties regulating or 
resolving the incompatibility. From the definition, the institution tends to focus on the 
parties involved in negotiations in determining the nature or the comprehensiveness 
of a peace agreement.  
Others view comprehensive agreements as those signed by the major contending 
parties ending inter and intra-state conflicts (USIP, 2008:4). While not offering a clear 
definition per se, its digital collection of peace agreements contains a parties’ bias 
view.  Bell (2006:377) views substantive/framework as agreements which aim at 
sustaining cease-fires, provide a framework for governance designed to address the 
root causes of the conflict and thus to halt the violence more permanently and that 
they are usually public and formally recorded in written signed form and include 
international participants. They establish or confirm mechanisms for demilitarization 
and demobilization intended to end military violence by linking them to new 
constitutional structures addressing governance, elections, and legal and human 
rights institutions. Similarly, at times they build up consensus on issue by issue basis 
in a set of agreements that are ultimately brought together or ratified by a 
comprehensive final agreement (Ibid:2006:378). 
UN peacemaker (2006:3) states that peace agreements are not always structured in 
the same way.  Sometimes they are just one document consisting various chapters 
or discrete components. In other instances, each substantive component can be part 
of one comprehensive agreement or be a stand-alone agreement that is negotiated 
separately and during different periods of a peace process.  It could then be due to 
this factor that other agreements are referred to as framework whilst the separate 
ones put together become referred to as CPA. The CPA and its protocols present a 
text book example in this context. Several single agreements were reached and after 
being lumped together were referred to as a CPA.   
From the definitions, the substantive/framework agreement is the closest correlate to 
a comprehensive agreement since it provides a framework for governance designed 
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to address the root causes of the conflict and thus to halt the violence more 
permanently. The literature provided in this regard translates that peace agreements 
that are to be deemed comprehensive are defined in a number of ways and that their 
definition is determined by a focus of particular aspects in a peace process. How 
then was the Sudan CPA of 2005 perceived? 
Steadman (1997:7), Licklider (2001: 701) and UPCD (2008:3) though with slight 
differences in their perceptions, all specify the inclusion of major parties and 
substantive issues in negotiations in order to produce a comprehensive agreement. 
The aspect of major parties is however debatable as it is viewed that other important 
groups of the society for example the civil society are equally important when it 
comes to representing the grassroots at the negotiating table. This is also in addition 
to a fact that if others are left out, they become spoilers who in essence can stymie 
the achievement of negative peace. 
Hampson (1996:218), however, in his view states that a good agreement would be 
one that is crafted by all parties to the conflict. This is to say that if parties are 
excluded from negotiations and eventually an agreement formalised, or if their 
interests are not represented at the bargaining table, they will have a much stronger 
incentive to defect from the peace process and resort to violence to achieve their 
aims. The questions would then be “how many parties had negotiated the 2005 
Sudan CPA and what type of issues were tabled in order to produce what came to 
be called the CPA?” 
The general view should then be that a CPA is a written document produced through 
a process of negotiation, defined by the process and product of negotiations, not the 
implementation or impact of the written document since an agreement can still be 
comprehensive even if it does not induce a comprehensive peace. The Sudan CPA’s 
effectiveness or non-effectiveness and reasons as to why there are still significant 
problems as dilemmas of the parties may have originated from the processes it went 
through and the parties which were involved with its formulation.  
The most important aspect which comes out significantly from the argument on the 
debate of the comprehensiveness of an agreement is the question of inclusiveness 
and substantive issues. The inclusion of parties to the conflict and substantive issues 
are crucial aspects in the determination of the comprehensiveness of an agreement 
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but at the same time the issue of inclusiveness require careful consideration for fear 
of creating chaos during the negotiations and spoilers later during the 
implementation phase of the peace process. The factors in this regard are important 
as they can make attitudes of the parties not to be hostile, their behaviour not to be 
violent and the conflict structure to be transformed as is advanced by the Galtung’s 
ABC conflict triangle theory. Similarly, in the context of peacebuilding, through the 
mutual understanding of the parties positive peace modelled in the context of liberal 
peace as advanced in the liberal peace theory can be attained. 
The success or failure of peace agreements depend on the seriousness of 
negotiators to sell the accord to their constituents and to deliver on any concessions 
or reforms agreed on. This means that if other parties are left out, the selling of the 
accord to the constituents of the locked out parties cannot take place and as such 
their attitudes and behaviour may not change. This scenario would translate the 
conflict not being transformed as negative peace cannot be attained which 
eventually affects the initiation of positive peace.  
Debate about substantive issues in a comprehensive peace agreement appears to 
be easy but if it has to be meaningful then it needs to be accorded careful 
interpretation. According to UPCD (2008:5) substantive issues refer to those issues 
genuinely in contention and underlying the conflict specifically those that instigated 
the conflict. In a different view Darby and Mac Ginty, (2003: 271) perceive 
substantive issues as those which include bread and butter issues as part of the 
economic and social realm which make a real difference to the constituencies 
whereby without them, the process could lead to public disenchantment which can 
overshadow political or constitutional compromises. Issues such as constitutional or 
legal considerations may not necessarily be the only substantive issues since they 
only affect the elite and not those at the lower levels.   
The substantive issues of agreements differ from conflict to conflict. The type of war, 
the issues in dispute and how the war is brought to an end are factors that alter the 
structure and substance of a peace agreement (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 
(1997:102). The disputed issues in intra-state wars are normally about security or 
territory while in the context of interstate wars ideology might be an additional factor. 
Some peace agreements primarily focus on arrangements to enhance security and 
provide clarity on territorial issues while others concentrate on rebuilding governance 
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mechanisms. Thus, the substances of peace agreements in each of these cases are 
naturally different. 
What is important, however, is an understanding that extremely contentious issues 
are often agreed in principle by the parties involved, but the details of exactly how 
they will be resolved are left to be dealt with as part of  confidence-building 
measures (Darby and Mac Ginty 2000:8). The questions in the context of the 2005 
Sudan CPA, would then be what were the substantial issues and why is it that even 
after the agreement as settlement which allowed South Sudan to separate from 
North Sudan legally, there are still significant problems between the parties?  
Substantial issues are a very important aspect of a CPA because without them 
negotiations cannot have a proper basis and that there would be nothing to 
concretize the aspect of comprehensiveness in a comprehensive agreement 
produced thereafter. Substantive issues through the negotiations form the basis of 
conflict resolution and transformation triggered through the aspects in the Galtung 
ABC theory and the Liberal peace theory.  
Peace agreements are useless on their own if they cannot be implemented. 
Implementation is the process of carrying out a specific peace agreement. 
Implementation of peace agreements in this regard is very important if at all 
whatever was agreed on has to have meaning. Failure to move forward with 
implementation, specifically on the part of the government, which usually makes the 
most concessions, can ignite suspicion and fear that the settlement is being used as 
a ruse to buy time for military recovery (Stedman, 2001:7). Implementation requires 
full commitment of the parties in order to avoid such developments. If parties are not 
convinced that their minimum interests are served by the peace accord, they will 
seek ways to delay, obstruct and stymie the process.  
Schneider (2005:322-323) in supporting this position, states that in addition to the 
commitment of the parties themselves, monitoring and verification usually by 
independent international entities provides the most effective mechanism to ensure 
the implementation of the accords. This is a direct translation that full and active 
support by the international community for the implementation of the accords has a 
huge determining role in the success or failure of the agreement (Steadman, 
2001:21. The greater the amount of international commitment involved, the greater 
the likelihood that implementation would succeed. Failure to implement a peace 
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accord would reverse the gains made during the mediation/negotiation processes 
(MacGinty, 2008: 257). This would most probably setback the attainment of the 
liberal peace status as the parties would degenerate back to conflict. Sudan and 
later Sudan and South Sudan faced dilemmas in the implementation of the CPA at 
some point due to the lack of support and commitment on the aspect of monitoring 
by members of the international community. Hence, the presence of tensions and 
threats between them to a return to war as at some point certain aspects which could 
have been enforced through the monitoring process did not take place. 
The challenge of peace agreements may be lack of renegotiation mechanism. 
According to Pratt (2009:17) peace agreements should have mechanisms for 
renegotiation in case of critical problems in the course of their life cycle. A lack of 
inclusion of such a mechanism has always been problematic specifically during the 
implementation phase and that as such require to be given due attention during the 
mediation/negotiation process of the agreement.  
The bottom line of it all is that the definition of a CPA is a very challenging endeavour 
but at the same time important in the clarification of what it is and what constitutes it. 
Clarity of the definition of a CPA, its contents, parties involved in reaching the 
agreement and the how of its implementation would assist bring in consistency in the 
discourse of CPAs. This suggests that comprehensive agreements seek to find the 
common ground between the interests and the needs of the parties to the conflict 
and with time through other initiatives to resolve the substantive issues. The case of 
the Sudan CPA may require analysing if at all it was indeed comprehensive.  
Other circles contend that the Sudan agreement was viewed as comprehensive due 
to the oversight which it was given by a strong international community presence 
which was spearheaded by America. However, this cannot be true as an agreement 
can only be labelled as comprehensive only if it includes the aspects of inclusiveness 
on the part of the parties and substantive issues to be negotiated on to settle a 
conflict. 
The question is ‘to what extent did the CPA work and why it is that there are still 
existing problems between North and South Sudan? This position it can be noted 
presents a trial to the agreement and the dilemmas that are faced by Sudan and 
South Sudan. 
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2.4 Self-determination and the options of power sharing and separation 
conceptualised  
Peace agreements are generally the outcomes of the conflict resolution methods of 
mediation or negotiation reached as settlements by conflict parties to manage a 
conflict with a view to eventually resolve it. Sisk (2008:197) states that parties in 
internal conflicts face essentially two choices for the settlement of underlying 
conflicts – separation that is partition and power sharing which basically is unity. 
Essentially the two options are a way of expressing the right to self-determination by 
the contending parties. Parker (2000:1) alleges that the right to self-determination 
can be exercised either within a territory (unity) or outside a territory (separation). 
South Sudan could have been able to exercise its right to self-determination either 
with Sudan or outside it.  
Lesch (1998:12) defines self-determination as the individual and the collective right 
to freely determine political status and freely pursue economic, social and cultural 
development. Williams (2011:97) in the context of international law defines self-
determination as the attaining of independence of a self-defined national group. 
From the two definitions, self-determination is altogether a very complicated concept 
as it has been problematic in how it is perceived by many actors in the international 
system. The case of South Sudan in its quest for the right to self-determination and 
later its inclusion in the 2005 CPA raises questions on the discourse of the concept 
under the general international law and the African regional law and how it could 
assist to resolve the north-south Sudan conflict. 
According to Lesch (1998:12), formulation of the concept passed through two 
phases and that the first phase stressed ethnic nationalism while the second 
emphasised territorial nationalism.30 The first phase is linked to the multi-ethnic 
Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires disintegration during World War I 
(WWI) whereby the victorious powers granted the ethnic groups within the empires 
to express their right to self-determination through achieving political independence 
                                                          
30
 The ethnic nationalism model is guided by a view that a state should be coterminous with one self-defined 
ethnic group (Indonesia, Israel, and Turkey to be defined by their Javanese, Jewish and Turkic ethnic cores as 
an example) while in the case of the territorial ethnic model, residents in a particular territory have common 
allegiance to the state, irrespective of their ethnicity (Switzerland and United States of America as examples) 
(Lesch, 1998:6 &7).  
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while the second phase is limited to the decolonisation process after World War II 
(WWII) (Ibid:13). 
Dersso (2012:1-2), states that  the right to self- determination as a concept emerged 
after being enunciated as a principle of international law in the context of 
decolonisation during the 1960s and its enunciation in the 1960 UN General 
Assembly Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and 
peoples, later at the enunciation of the right to self-determination under the 1970 UN 
General Assembly declaration on friendly relations and its inclusion in two UN 
covenants (International Covenant on Civil and Political rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).   
The implications on the developments of the concept in this case translates that a 
section of a population of a state, as people inhabiting a particular territory or 
administrative entity sharing the same culture or language are entitled to some form 
of autonomous or self-governance status negotiated between them and the state in 
which they live in. Espiell (1980:60) reaffirms the 1960 UN General Assembly 
Declaration and adds that the right to self-determination applies to peoples under 
colonial rule, alien subjugation, domination or exploitation and was thus not 
universal. 
In summary, the international law on the right to self-determination only generates at 
best a right to external self-determination of former colonies, where a people is 
oppressed and where a definable group is denied meaningful access to the 
government to pursue their political, economic, social and cultural development. In 
the three circumstances which according to the international law merit the right to 
self-determination, South Sudan on its demand to the right to self-determination did 
not qualify using the basis of a former colony since it had never been one but 
qualified on the other aspects of the law. This situation as can be noted presented a 
dilemma to both North and South Sudan. 
The African regional law articulation on the concept of the right to self-determination 
is closely linked to the liberation of the African peoples who were under colonial 
domination and those who were systematically oppressed by the practice of 
apartheid but while confirming the concept, the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) 
charter defended the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the states 
(Onguergouz, 1993:479).  
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The right to self-determination was partly understood simply as the principles of 
decolonization and the non-intervention in the internal affairs of each member state 
of the OAU in spite of the fact that some ethnic, religious or cultural groups were 
trapped within the new boundaries. The understanding throughout post-colonial 
Africa has been the preservation of the boundaries left behind by the colonial 
authorities as it was seen to be important for the peace and stability of the whole 
continent by embracing the political and legal concept of territorial integrity and 
sovereignty.  
According to the OAU, self-determination was thus seen to mean the freedom of the 
totality of the people of a state to pursue own ends without external interference and 
imposing an obligation on the OAU and its member states to refrain from actions that 
threaten the territorial integrity of a state or its independent existence in addition to a 
concern to liberate African peoples under colonial rule and apartheid oppression.  
 
The OAU through the Cairo declaration in 1964 introduced the principle of Uti 
possidetis with a view to prevent border wars and calls for separation or secession in 
the territories of its member states.31  The position meant that claims for the right to 
self-determination outside the articulated scenarios were not considered to have 
legitimate basis within the normative framework of the OAU.32 Thus, self-
determination was generally limited to ending colonial rule and that the concept was 
a one-time action that would not apply to post-colonial political situations (Lesch, 
1998:13). 
 
                                                          
31
 In 1964 the Organisation of African Unity passed a resolution stating that the principle of stability of 
borders—the key principle of uti possidetis—would be applied across Africa. Most of Africa was already 
independent by this time, so the resolution was principally a political directive to settle disputes by treaty 
based on pre-existing borders rather than by resorting to force. To date, adherence to this principle has 
allowed African countries to avoid border wars; the notable exception, the Eritrean–Ethiopian War of 1998–
2000, had its roots in secession from an independent African country rather than a conflict between two 
decolonized neighbours (Dersso, 2012:7). On the other hand, the colonial boundaries often did not follow 
ethnic lines, and this has helped lead to violent and bloody civil wars among differing ethnic groups in many 
post-colonial (and post-Communist) countries, including Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, 
Nigeria, Uganda, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and the former Yugoslavia. 
32
 Biafra in Nigeria and Katanga in the Democratic Republic of Congo are cases in point (Pantazopolous, 
1995:17-18). 
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Minority groups in this regard were to, had to and must remain within the borders of 
existing states after the end of the colonial rule which in essence was a direct 
translation that the right to self-determination in the eyes of the two laws did not and 
does not embrace separation or secession from an independent state. The demand 
for the right to self-determination in the case of South Sudan arose from a historical 
claim that southern Sudan was not a part of Sudan and as a result of the 
southerners being marginalised by the Sudan governments after the country had 
attained independence from the British. It is against a background of the core 
concerns by the southerners on a number of governance issues that they decided to 
take up arms against the government in the two civil wars33.  
Peace agreements are settlements and within them the negotiated solutions of the 
substantive issues form their basis for achieving negative peace (Darby and 
MacGinty, 2008:4). The questions in this case would then be “how was the quest by 
South Sudan for the right to self-determination handled against its being viewed with 
ambivalence in the international community and how was the right to self-
determination factored in the CPA in order to resolve the North and South Sudan 
conflict?” 
Considering the fact that the north-south Sudan conflict had been going on for a long 
time it was important that a peace agreement be reached to settle the conflict and 
eventually resolve it. Similarly, the international community and the AU despite their 
reservations on the right to self-determination were to be encouraged to support the 
concept and its options of unity or separation in the agreement to resolve the conflict. 
The aim would be to achieve negative peace through the agreement and positive 
peace through the peacebuilding activities. Such a scenario would translate the 
attitudes, behaviour and the conflict being transformed as is advanced in the 
Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory and likewise through peacebuilding activities, 
Liberal peace being realised as espoused in the Liberal peace theory. 
2.4.1 Power sharing and separation/partition 
Power sharing and separation are options which come under the concept of the right 
to self-determination. In the context of a negotiated settlement and specifically 
                                                          
33
 The first civil war took place from 1955 to 1972 and the second civil took place from 1983 to 2005 (Lesch, 
1998: 36)  and Collins (2008:139) 
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regarding internal conflicts, parties to the conflict essentially face two choices – 
partition/separation or power sharing in situations where the right to self-
determination is granted (Sisk, 2008:197). The two options are part of a concept 
which can be a substantive issue for consideration during mediation/negotiation 
processes as part of a settlement which through implementation can assist to 
achieve negative peace and eventually positive peace.  
2.4.1.1 Power sharing 
Power sharing is an option of the right to self-determination as part of conflict 
settlement to achieve negative peace and eventually aid to resolve and transform a 
conflict. Esman (2004:178) defines power sharing as an inherent accommodative set 
of attitudes, processes and institutions in which the art of governance becomes a 
matter of bargaining, conciliating and compromising the aspirations and the 
grievances of disgruntled communities. Sisk (2002:vii) views power sharing as 
practices and institutions that result in broad based governing coalitions generally 
inclusive of all major groups in a society, which can reconcile principles of self-
determination and democracy in multi-ethnic states and principles that are often 
perceived at odds.  
Thus, power sharing is a powerful conflict management method which can be used 
to end civil wars or an approach which can be applied to build peace in a post-
conflict situation. It is necessary to have a clear understanding of power sharing 
regarding what it stands for and how it is/can be utilised as a translation of a peace 
agreement.  
Jarstad (2006:72), in his overview points out that the term power sharing is 
employed in two separate strands of literature – one strand pertains to democratic 
theory and the other to conflict management – with the former focusing on political 
methods of power sharing that offer rival groups a role in the political process and 
primarily serve to produce function and democracy in divided societies and the later 
viewing the approach as a method of ending conflict and maintaining peace by 
focusing on territorial, military and political power sharing. The Power sharing 
protocol in the Sudan CPA should then be viewed to have been authored in the 
context of the later context with focus to make unity attractive specifically to the 
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Southerners. The conflict required settling, managing and later resolving and 
transforming within the contexts of negative and positive peace.   
Sriram (2008:21) states that power sharing arrangements may include four 
dimensions- security, territory, politics and economics and that more than one of 
these aspects feature in peace negotiations and agreements. Hoddie and Hartzell 
(2005:86-90), perceive it to include; central power sharing, territorial power sharing, 
military power sharing and economic power sharing as some of the ways in which 
power can be shared.  
The power sharing provisions as espoused by the different scholars are important as 
they include the important aspects which are usually at the heart of most internal 
conflicts. Roeder and Rothchild (2005:92) state that war is less likely to break out 
during the initiation phase if negotiated settlements promise to establish power 
sharing institutions and policies or practices that make it difficult for any one group to 
use state resources to the detriment of other groups. At times power sharing has 
been a source of further conflict between parties. Parties may not easily share power 
as the same power is sometimes the source of the conflict. 
Power sharing has two major approaches and these include; the consociational or 
group building approach which relies on accommodation by group leaders at the 
centre and a high degree of group autonomy and the integrative approach which 
seeks to create incentives for moderation by political leaders on divisive themes and 
to enhance minority influence in majority decision making (Sisk, 1996:34&40).  
Consociational approaches rely on elite accommodation and guarantees groups to 
protect their interests whereas the integrative approach relies on the incentives for 
intergroup cooperation such as electoral systems that encourage the formation of 
pre-election pacts among candidates or political parties across ethnic lines. The 
approaches are only good for the elite but do not work well for the cadres below 
them. This would not assist to make the attitudes of the lower cadres not to be 
hostile, their behaviour not to be violent and for conflict not to be transformed. Power 
sharing would assist to achieve negative peace but not necessarily positive peace 
due to the fact that it focuses on the elite and not the lower cadres. 
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Consociationalism  relies on four basic principles (broad based or grand coalition 
executive, minority veto, proportionality in the allocation of civil service positions and 
public funds and group autonomy while the integrative approach proposes a typology 
of five mechanisms aimed at reducing ethnic conflicts and includes; dispersion of 
power often territorial, promotion of intra-ethnic competition, inducements for inter-
ethnic cooperation, policies to encourage alternative social alignments and managed 
distribution of resources  (Sisk, 2002:34 &44).  
Against the background of the two approaches, the question is which approach best 
manages conflict? Consociationalists suggest that conflict management is best 
promoted by accommodation among group leaders representative of their 
communities through cooperative problem solving in post- election coalitions. The 
integrationists, however, argue that the likelihood of violent conflict is reduced more 
effectively by institutions and practices that create incentives for the formation of pre-
election coalitions and that encourage intra-group competition (Ibid:6).  
The two approaches of power sharing are conflict management approaches which 
seek to promote governing coalitions that are broadly inclusive of all groups in 
deeply divided multi-ethnic societies but approached from different perspectives. The 
parties of the north-south Sudan conflict needed to have a clear understanding of 
power sharing in order for them to make informed choices in their endeavours to end 
and resolve the conflict.  
2.4.1.2 Separation/partition 
The scenario of the Sudan conflict offers an interesting case of the concept of the 
right to self-determination which was included in the CPA with an option of 
separation for the southerners in order to settle/manage the conflict with a view to 
eventually resolve it against a background of intense reservations about the concept.      
Partition refers to the creation of an entirely new state that enjoys full sovereignty 
and international recognition (Darby and Mac Ginty, 2008:197). Sambanis and Wohl 
(2009:82-118) define partition as a civil war outcome that results in territorial 
separation of a sovereign state while Samabanis (2000:445) defines it as a war 
outcome that involves both border adjustment and demographic changes. Kaufmann 
(1996:136-175) who is the main advocate of the concept of partition, perceives 
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partition as separations jointly decided upon by the responsible powers – either 
agreed between the two sides or imposed on both sides by a stronger third party. 
From the various definitions advanced by the different scholars, partition to others is 
understood as fresh division of territory which is executed by a sovereign or a great 
power as it occurred at the time of decolonisation while others consider it as  mere 
separation of the conflicting populations. Whatever is the case, the question should 
be “would separation as an option of the right to self-determination end and resolve a 
conflict?” Northern and southern Sudan needed to have a clear understanding on 
this as they were trying to end and resolve their conflict. 
However, there is a difference between partition/separation and secession. O’Leary, 
(2001: 54) defines partition as a fresh border cut through at least one community’s 
national homeland, creating at least two separate political units under different 
sovereigns or authorities and secession as the dividing of territory along a previously 
established line of division. Secessionists usually have an established claim to a unit, 
either in recent or older history while those gunning for separation do not necessarily 
have a history of being a separate entity. The split of Eritrea from Ethiopia offers a 
good example of secession. 
Sambanis and Wohl (2009:84) do not include population transfers in their definition 
while all others include it as a very important factor. There is no consensus among 
the pro-partition advocates as to what is the best practice on the notion. The issue of 
population transfers in both the successor state and the rump state is an important 
one in that if left unaddressed it can be a source of conflict in the case of a 
separation decision. How then was the issue of citizenship to be handled if southern 
Sudan decided to separate?  A separation decision by the southerners in this regard 
would be a dilemma to both the parties in the context of the citizenship status of their 
populations living in the created states. 
The international community claims that the separation option is problematic as it 
sets a precedent for other disgruntled groups in other countries to demand the same.  
Downes (2006:53), however, argues that single state solutions imposed by third 
party interventions when one or more of the parties prefer independence run an 
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increased risk of failure because they go against the preferences of the groups 
involved.   
North and South Sudan in this regard even after separating have been involved with 
cases of fighting each other meaning that the option presented a trial to the 
agreement which brought about the separation. The question is whether the case of 
the Sudan and later the two Sudans confirms the fears of the international 
community that the partition option is not good due to the tensions and threats that 
may exist between the separated states. 
Partition is either de jure whereby a new state formed from a separation is 
internationally recognised or de facto whereby there is divided sovereignty over the 
territory of a single internationally recognised state (Chapman and Roeder, 
2007:677-691). The cases of Bangladesh, Croatia, Eritrea and South Sudan provide 
best examples of the de jure partition while the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
in Georgia, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in Cyprus and Somaliland in 
Somalia provide the best examples of the de facto partition (Sambanis and Wohl, 
2009:50).  
What has become unique in this regard is that the international community has 
demonstrated certain ambivalence towards partition and that although it has 
opposed the recognition of other partitions, it has also been able to sanction them in 
others as can be evidenced here34. Partition was part of the CPA whereby the south 
could only separate after a referendum. In this case a referendum was conducted in 
2011 and the result was that the south chose to separate from Sudan. Since this was 
an internationally sanctioned activity, the separation fell into the category of a de jure 
partition. The problem is that even after a recognised and legal separation of South 
Sudan from Sudan, tensions and threats to a return to war still exist between them. 
This scenario presents a dilemma as to really what was wrong or went wrong with 
the CPA. The CPA was put to a trial by such developments. 
There are a number of debates that have been advanced by a number of scholars 
on the aspect of the partition option. The question which, however, would require 
                                                          
34
 Biafra in Nigeria and Katanga in DRC were all opposed while Eritrea was allowed to secede from Ethiopia 
(Bamfo, 2012:21). 
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addressing from the arguments of the advocates would then be, “how should 
separation best be defined, viewed and executed? Should separation be considered 
just as a case of transferring populations, redrawing of borders or a complete case of 
independence?” These areas are of particular relevance to this study because in 
them comes out a clear understanding of what separations are all about as conflict 
management and the option of the right to self-determination concept in a settlement 
concerning societies that are divided. This would also assist in finding out as well if 
the approach augurs well with conflict resolution and transformation which aim at 
addressing the underlying causes of a conflict in order for it to be completely 
resolved.  
2.5 Conclusion 
The belief is that the conceptualisations of conflict resolution, peace agreements and 
the right to self-determination and its options of unity and separation done in this 
chapter gives a sound grounding about what the available literature says about 
peace processes which are important  for the understanding of the North-South 
Sudan peace process which resulted in the  CPA. 
Resolution of a conflict implies that the deep-rooted sources of conflict are 
addressed whereby in the context of the conflicting parties behaviour is no longer 
violent, attitudes are no longer hostile and the structure of the conflict no longer 
exploitative as part of conflict transformation. Conflict transformation refers to the 
longer-term and deeper structural dimensions of conflict resolution (Bercovitch and 
Jackson (2012:9). The peace which develops thereafter is then deeply rooted and 
sustainable. Conflict resolution in this regard requires having specific approaches 
and methods in order for the process to be effective.  
Conflict resolution approaches and its’ methods have been evolving over the time. 
Others have attached them to generations whilst others have simply classified them 
as traditional and 21st century approaches. The traditional/first generation approach 
is associated with state-centric conflicts while the 21st century approaches and the 
perspective of generations are associated with the intrastate patterns. The traditional 
African approaches are mostly problematic for ending violence but work better in the 
context of facilitating reconciliation.  
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Mediation, negotiation and peacebuilding are the most common methods of the 
conflict resolution approaches. Through the conflict resolution approaches methods, 
a conflict can be settled in the form of an agreement while implementation of such 
agreements as part of peacebuilding end up with the conflict being resolved or 
transformed. Absence of violence brings about negative peace while social justice 
through the peacebuilding method brings about positive peace.  
Peace agreements are conflict settlements which indicate what has been agreed, 
halt the fighting and what accordingly is likely to happen thereafter to completely 
resolve conflict/s and bring peace. There are various types of agreements that are 
reached during peace processes and  sometimes are all  referred to as peace 
agreements. Peace agreements deemed to be comprehensive are defined in a 
number of ways and that their definition is determined by a focus of particular 
aspects in a peace process.  
Parties to conflict and substantive issues are crucial aspects in the determination of 
the comprehensiveness of an agreement but at the same time the issue of 
inclusiveness requires careful consideration for fear of creating chaos during the 
negotiations and spoilers later during the implementation phase of the agreement 
(Bell, 2006:377).  This position suggests that comprehensive agreements seek to 
find the common ground between the interests and the needs of the parties to 
conflict and with time through other initiatives to resolve the substantive issues but 
requires to be handled with caution in the interest of avoiding chaos.  
Substantive issues in a peace agreement form the basis of the solutions advanced 
by the parties. These originate from the core concerns which need addressing during 
the mediation/negotiation process.  The right to self-determination and its options of 
separation or unity is a case in point on this aspect.  
Self-determination is a contested concept and as such is viewed with ambivalence in 
the international community. In regards to the options of self-determination, unity 
translates the concept being exercised within the territory and separation as the 
concept being exercised outside the territory (Parker, 2000:1).  
The two options (unity and separation)  are all part of conflict management and are 
very important in the context of achieving negative peace which through 
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peacebuilding activities can assist to transit to the status of positive peace. The basis 
of the concept of self-determination is grounded in the International law and in the 
African context, the African regional law. 
The international law on the right to self-determination only generates at best a right 
to external self-determination of former colonies,  where a people is oppressed and 
where a definable group is denied meaningful access to the government to pursue 
their political, economic, social and cultural development. The African regional law 
on the right to self-determination however is linked to the liberation of the African 
peoples under colonial domination and those systematically oppressed by the 
practice of apartheid (Dersso, 2012: 2-4). Thus self-determination is perceived 
differently by the international law and the African regional law positions.  
Power sharing is an option of the right to self-determination as part of conflict 
settlement in order to achieve negative peace and eventually to assist to resolve and 
transform a conflict. The consociational  and the integrative approaches are the two 
main strands of power sharing whereby the former relies on elite accommodation 
and the later on incentives for intergroup cooperation such as electoral systems. The 
part of elite accommodation is problematic in the first option in the context of 
resolving conflict as the grassroots are usually not consulted or given due attention.  
Separation is the other option of the right to self-determination and involves the fresh 
division of territory which is either executed by a sovereign or a great power as it 
occurred at the time of colonisation/decolonisation or to separate conflicting 
populations (Darby and Mac Ginty,2008:197). Separation and secession are different 
(O’Leary, 2001: 54) and on the same, internationally recognised separation is termed 
as de jure while the one not recognised is known as de facto (Chapman and Roeder, 
2007:677-691). The international community has demonstrated certain ambivalence 
towards separation/secession and that although it has opposed the recognition of 
other separations it has also been able to sanction them in others. These positions 
create dilemmas. 
Each of the concepts discussed in the chapter were crucial to and were put to  test in 
Sudan. Likewise the concepts in this chapter it must be noted have been considered 
within a framework of the Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory and the Liberal 
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peace theory and overall the framework will be applied to and critiqued within the 
context of the Sudan conflict case.  
The next chapter discusses the historical perspective of the Sudan with focus on the 
scenarios which caused the conflict and factors that eventually led to the split of the 
country to become Sudan and South Sudan. 
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Chapter 3 
3.0 Historical perspective 
3.1 Introduction 
The chapter examines the historical perspective of Sudan with a view to develop a 
clear understanding of the relationship of northern and southern Sudan against a 
current background of tensions and threats to a return to war. For more than two 
centuries, Sudan attracted an unusual level of attention beyond its borders. The 
reason mostly has been due to its record of violent conflicts which mostly pitied 
people perceived to be Arab and Islamic against those outside this designation. 
Historically in this case, Sudanese were categorised as either Muslims or non-
Muslim and those in the Muslim categorisation also partitioned with those claiming 
Arab identity and those who do not (Natsios, 2012:15).   
The history of Sudan is complex and long, spanning from the existence of ancient 
states as period before the colonial era, the colonial era itself and the post-
independence era (Collins, 2008:1). The history of independent Sudan begins with 
the withdrawal of the British and the Egyptian rulers on 1 January 1956. Each era left 
behind layers of alien institutions upon the deep indigenous themes that were woven 
into the fabric of the Sudanese past (Ibid, 2008:1). The trail of events indicates that 
due to interactions that took place between people of northern and southern Sudan, 
there have always been dilemmas between them in terms of their relationship. This 
suggests that such dilemmas have characterised tensions between the people of 
these two areas.  
This chapter discusses historical/colonial legacy, post-independence regimes 
(Military and civilian), the international, regional and sub-regional factors and the 
experiences from previous efforts to resolve the conflict.  
3.2 Historical/colonial legacy 
Collins (2008:1) identifies the early States of Sudan and the coming of the Arabs, the 
Turkiya, the Mahdiyah and the Anglo-Egyptian eras or periods to have shaped and 
laid the foundation of the relationship of southern and northern Sudan. The 
perception is that these eras present the  conflict in Sudan in two distinct 
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perspectives; the first three eras describe the  period of the on-going confrontation 
between two cultures (African and Arab) leading to the African Arab divide; and the 
last era as a perspective which created the  northern and the southern regions 
through an artificial boundary.  
The area which came to be called Sudan initially was a broad land that extended 
through central Africa referred to as Bilad al-sudan (the land of the black people) by 
Arabs (Natsios, 2012:14). This situation is a direct translation that the area at the 
time did not have Arabs. At the time, independent kingdoms and Sultanates (Fur and 
Funji Sultanates and the Azande and the Shilluk Kingdoms) controlled varying 
amounts of territory and engaged in trade, cultural interchange and military conflict 
(Lesch, 1998:25).  The search for Ivory, gold, later slaves and other resources during 
the eras of the Turkiyya, Mahdiyya and the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium aided by 
the northern tribes most specifically in the south, created relationship problems 
between the people of the two areas. Through this narrative, the dilemmas between 
northern and southern Sudan and later the tensions may have started to emerge 
from the historical injustices which resulted from prevailing relationships in the afore-
named periods. 
3.2.1 The early States and the coming of the Arabs to Sudan 
The early states are alleged to have existed in Sudan that is both in north and south 
Sudan. The most prominent of these States’ kingdoms in the north were Nubia and 
Alwa (Holt, 1961:16-17). The existence of these states was followed by a history of 
Islamic conquest and Arabisation of these northern Sudan kingdoms in a gradual 
incremental process whereby the dominant ethnic groups of the areas intermarried 
with the incoming Arab immigrants, traders, religious groups and later as slave 
raiders (Hassan, 1967:90). Over centuries, this process produced a mixed African-
Arab racial group that resembled the African peoples across the continent below the 
Sahara.   
Kebede (1971:1) argues that through this process, by 14th century much of northern 
Sudan was transformed into an overwhelmingly Arabized and Islamized society. 
Likewise (Johnson, 2003:24) states that the intermarriages that occurred during the 
period, presented the formation of the Arab-Islamic identity which as time went by 
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became attached with assimilationist tendencies on the indigenous people which 
developed from a perception that the Arab-Islamic model was superior and that of 
the natives inferior (Ibid.2003:24-25).  
What followed after this was a process of Arabization and Islamization whereby the 
non-Moslems were enslaved. Slavery in this case was used to classify people into a 
master race, comprising the Arabs and Muslims and the enslavable race comprising 
the Black Africans who were deemed to have no culture but could be redeemed by 
their adoption of Islam, the Arabic language, culture and off-course fusing their blood 
with the master race through marriages (Collins, 2008:8). 
Woodward (1990:23) states that the interactions of the religious groups and the 
traders of goods and later slaves contributed to the emergence of a partially stratified 
society whereby in the social strata, slaves were at the bottom and that while the 
hierarchy emerged, social, religious and political character resulted in the creation of 
ethnic and sectarian identities as well. Ruay, (1994:45) states that the region now 
called Southern Sudan was historically not part of Bilad al Sudan (early Sudan). Wai 
(1981:27) on this aspect argues that this status quo was due to the fact that southern 
Sudan was sheltered and isolated by a series of formidable geographical barriers 
which made communications, social interactions, political alliances or unity 
impossible.  
In a different perspective, the ethnicities which were and are found in South Sudan 
whose categories ethnically are Nilotes, Nilo-Hamites and western Sudanic were 
only unique to the area and not in the northern Sudan of the time (Albino, 1970:23). 
It is then contended that considering the fact that the location was not considered as 
part of northern Sudan and that its ethnicities were/are different from those of the 
north, southern Sudan although at the time not properly demarcated was an entity on 
its own and required to be identified as an independent territory. This situation may 
have contributed to the dilemmas which northern and southern Sudan faced which 
eventually might have attributed to their hostile relationship in their interactions. 
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3.2.2 The Turkiya (1821-1885) 
The Turkiya was established by Muhammed Ali, an Albanian who facilitated the 
conquest of Egypt on behalf of the Ottoman Sultan of Istanbul in Turkey in 1821 
(Collins, 2008:10). Johnson (2011:4) alleges that the desire of Muhammed was to 
make Egypt an international power in the near East and the Mediterranean and in 
pursuit of this goal, through his son Ismail invaded Sudan in order to gain control of 
valuable resources such as gold, ivory and most of all slaves which were to be used 
to sustain his military build -up. Slave raids in northern Sudan at the time had been 
common beginning from the previous centuries as part of the trans-Sahara trade 
which constituted the economic backbone of the Eastern Sudanic kingdoms of 
Sennar and Darfur (Musso, 2011:3). 
 A later realisation that northern Sudan could not provide enough of the required 
resources and forms of taxes imposed on the Arab traders and farmers, forced all 
these bodies to venture into southern Sudan where the resources were more 
plentiful. According to Alier (1991:12), the explorers, traders, soldiers and Christian 
missionaries made their way slowly into southern Sudan. Initially the traders 
(Europeans, Egyptians, Syrians, other Ottoman subjects and Northern Sudanese) 
came first to obtain Ivory through barter with the local people but later established 
own private companies in the Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal states and obtained  
resources for export through a combination of trade, slave raiding and tributes paid 
to them by the subjugated local people.  
This  state of affairs presented the beginning of hostility between the Northerners 
and all the foreigners  and  southern Sudan as the locals became subjected to 
intense slave raids  which ended up with those captured being taken to be sold as 
slaves, conscripted into the military, social units being undermined, government 
monopoly of the Ivory trade which had been their source of cash income, payment of 
tax and being forced to provide labour (corvée) for infrastructure development 
(Collins:2008:12-13).   
According to Beswick (1994: 9-47), the irony about the activities of the foreigners 
especially those from North Sudan and the Turkiyya was their mistreatment of non-
Muslims who were enslaved without remorse. The activities in southern Sudan 
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eventually led to the conquest of the area and annexing it as part of Sudan and for 
slave trade to become a state activity which with time spread to the whole of 
southern Sudan, Nuba Mountains and Darfur (Beshir, 1984:13). The activities of the 
foreigners in southern Sudan consequently disturbed the peaceful life of southern 
Sudan and triggered the beginning of tensions, confusion, oppression and 
repression between the people of the two areas. 
The background of forced annexation of southern Sudan concretizes the claim that 
north of Sudan and south of Sudan were separate entities which were only brought 
together for the convenience of exploiters.  These positions indicate that the 
relationship of North and South Sudan got poisoned long time ago and thus forced 
the two areas to be hostile to each other. This translates that the attitudes, behaviour 
and the conflict between the Turkiyya including the people of the North and South 
Sudan could not be changed as is advanced in the Galtung’s ABC theory and thus at 
the time conflict resolution could not work between the corned parties. 
3.2.3 The Mahdiya (1885-1898) 
Mahdiya was formed by Muhammad Ahmad bin Abdalla, who it is alleged that 
through visions, Prophet Muhammad chose him as a Mahdi (the guided one) to lead 
an army of believers to usher in a new age of Islamic justice and devotion 
(Natsios:2012:20). The Mahdiya in this regard was Mahdi’s political movement which 
was a violent reaction to the foreign presence in Sudan and to the perceived 
corruption of Islam under the Turkiya. According to Wai (1981:30), the objectives of 
the Mahdiya were to remove the Egyptians out of Sudan, do away with the 
malpractices of a government seen as repugnant to the Islamic religion and to 
establish the right ways of life.  
The Mahdiya army was recruited  from the rural poor whose spiritual leaders were 
the members of the Sufi orders who were despised by the more legalistic Islam of 
the Al-Alzher University which was introduced  by the Egyptians,  slave traders 
whose businesses had been damaged  by the westerners brought in by  Ismail 
Pasha to supress slave trade, the Baqqara Arab cattle herders whose livelihoods 
were being decimated by the confiscatory tax system  and   southerners who were 
being harassed by the Northern Arabs and the Turkiya (Johnson, 2011:6-7). The 
96 
 
Mahdiya in this case was a force which was organised to revenge threatened 
business interests and religious practices in Sudan.   
Lesch (1998:28), states that the southerners at the time only cooperated with the 
Mahdiya Northerners in order to expel the Turkish Garrisons in their areas and 
eventually may be to free themselves from foreign control and the predatory raids on 
them. The Mahdiyya however it is noted had its own imperial agenda in southern 
Sudan since after the Egyptian forces were successfully driven out of Sudan, the 
Mahdi invaded southern Sudan and conducted ceaseless slave raids which resulted 
in thousands of southerners being despatched to the North at Omdurman to be sold 
(Wai: 1981: 27).  
According to Lienhardt (1961:164-165) the southerners in general did not embrace 
Islam and in turn came into conflict with the Mahdists   whose divine mission was to 
rid the world of infidels,  carry their holy war to the south and with it have  full scale 
slavery re-launched. In retrospect, although the southerners were anxious to rid 
themselves of the Egyptian rule, they did not want new alien masters especially 
slave raiders; hence their resorting to resistance though in the end with devastating 
consequences (Ibid: 166). The Mahdiya ended after its defeat in I898 at the battle of 
Omdurman (Collins, 2008:32). 
This brings to light a fact that the Mahdiyya era was no less inhumane than the 
Turkiya era as the brutality had left indelible scars on the feelings of the southern 
Sudanese people (Natsios, 2012:26). The established views which the events of the 
Mahdist era portray in the north-south Sudan relationship are that southerners were 
ill- treated and not considered as part of Sudan at the time. This scenario it can be 
contended played out as a contributory factor to the dilemmas on the relationship of 
North and South Sudan later in the process.  
3.2.4 The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium -1898-1956 
The Anglo-Egyptian era came into the limelight after the joint British and Egyptian 
force defeated the Khalifa and his Mahdi Army (Wai 1981:33). The collapse of the 
Mahdiya presented the British government with a dilemma as to who was to govern 
Sudan at the time as the conquest had been undertaken to recover former provinces 
in Sudan and the Suez in order to secure the upper Nile waters and to avenge the 
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death of Gordon, a British General who was   killed by the Mahdists during the 
defence of Khartoum (Natsios, 2012: 24).  
According to the Condominium’s agreement, Britain and Egypt agreed to rule the 
Sudan jointly and that the agreement expressly recognised the authority of the rights 
to the government of the United Kingdom (UK) as a result of the conquest (Badour, 
1960:84-990). The articulation of the Condominium’s relationship as can be noted 
presented what can be called a diplomatic fiction as in the process the British 
became the main rulers while Egypt took a nominal position. The irony of the 
arrangement became more pronounced in 1924 when a British Governor General, 
Lee Stack was assassinated by an Egyptian nationalist and as a reaction, the British 
expelled all the Egyptian officials and troops from the Sudan. This state of affairs, it  
can be noted translated that a new and separate sovereign had been created by the 
British and championed through the leadership of the Governor Generals supported 
by British officers in Sudan. 
In the context of the Sudan, British pacification of Northern Sudan was carried out 
easily whilst that of southern Sudan was met with a lot of resistance (Johnson, 
2011:9). Natsios (2012:29) states that this was the case because the situation in 
Northern Sudan only involved taking over the structures which had been left by the 
Mahdists while in southern Sudan, the Mahdist state had virtually no control over the 
region outside its garrisons at Fashoda, Bor and Rejaf.  
This implies that that there were no structures in southern Sudan and as such effort 
was required in order to establish a foot print of the Condominium government in a 
place where this government was not even known.  Lesch (1998:3) states that the 
motivation for the southern resistance originated from the destruction of their social 
values by the Turkiya and the Mahdiya, forced labour, taxation irrespective of the 
individuals wealth and without provisions of equivalent return in social services and 
forced reduction of group freedom.   
The differences in the administration takeover by the Condominium government in 
northern and southern Sudan may translate that the two regions were different, a 
fact believed to have been much clear in the minds of the inhabitants of the two 
areas than as may have been envisioned by the Condominium government.  Collins 
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(2008: 35-36) states that initially after the defeat of the Mahdists, Sudan was 
administered by British officers from the Egyptian Army but in the new Condominium 
system, Northern Sudan was  administered by the Sudan Political Service (SPS) 
while Southern Sudan was administered by contract British military officers without 
pension known as “Bog Barons”35.  
 The situation created by the British in Sudan at the time it can be noted was a 
conscious policy that was laid down as an acceptance that the two areas were 
separate polities (Ibid, 2008:37). This scenario explains the later developments in the 
relationship of the two regions of Sudan after the British and the Egyptians had left 
especially in how they viewed their oneness. The northerners tended to view the 
southerners as their under dogs and likewise the southerners viewed their northern 
colleagues as their enemies. This represented a dilemma which the two regions 
faced in the perspective of their relationship even after the country’s independence. 
The British with a view to consolidate further their footprints in both northern and 
southern Sudan, adopted an indirect rule approach which later was promulgated as 
the policy of native administration (Nastios, 2012:29). Native administration in this 
regard involved a thin layer of educated British administrators exercising authority 
through traditional tribal chiefs, Sheiks and clan elders whose influence they 
strengthened, cultivated and facilitated.  
 Collins (2008:38) alleges that the indirect rule approach served the British as a 
useful administrative device, as a political doctrine and as a religious dogma. In the 
context of northern Sudan, the approach was a proper channel for Sudanese 
nationalism, for it conferred on the fundamental notables of the Sufi orders and the 
Ansar greater authority to maintain the status quo against the secular opposition 
whilst in the case of the south, it was meant to assist the Christian missionaries to 
turn the tide against the encroaching Islam.36  
                                                          
35
 The SPS cadres were individuals who were graduates from Oxford and Cambridge Universities while the Bog 
Barons were retired British officers. The difference of the ruling elite in the two areas augments the fact that 
the areas were perceived to be different and separate although both of them were under the British.  
36
Sufi orders are the Islamic followers of hard line Muslims and in the case of Sudan they related mostly with 
the Mahdi doctrines while the Ansar were the moderate followers of Islam which came from Egypt. 
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The government in this regard in 1922 promulgated the passports and permits 
ordinance and later in 1930 a Southern policy in order to separate the south from 
north Sudan (Johnson, 2011:11). The passport and the permit ordinance of 1922 
served the primary aim of the colonial policy by which southern Sudan under the 
heading of Closed District Ordinance (CDO) became off limits to non-African 
Sudanese.  The CDO area designated as southern Sudan with slight changes is 
what became the 1 January 1956 boundary of north and south Sudan (see figure 
3.1).  
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Figure 3.1 Map of Sudan -1 January 1956 
 
Source:  United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations Cartographic 
Section, April 2007. 
This scenario suggests that all the northern Arab Sudanese were to be kept out of 
southern Sudan where feelings of intense hatred still prevailed due to the lingering 
memories of the Arab slave trade (Johnson, 2011:11). Similarly, the southern 
Sudanese were also restricted from entering the north. 
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In regards to the Southern policy of 1930, basis for its formulation included the 
premises that Negroid Africans of the south were culturally and to some extent 
racially distinct from the northern Arab Sudanese and that the southern provinces 
would either develop eventually as a separate territorial and political entity or be 
integrated into what was then the British East Africa (Wai, 1981:35). The idea of 
including southern Sudan into the British East was however never seriously 
considered as there was no mention about it throughout the period of the 
Condominium.  
Justifications for the 1922 CDO and the 1930 Southern policy included; preventing 
Arab slave traders from harvesting their human quarry in the south, curbing the 
Islamic religion from spreading in southern Sudan and encouraging a religion which 
was friendly to the administration, preventing resistance forces in southern Sudan 
from uniting with the ranks of the north to overthrow the Anglo-Egyptian 
administration and  in relation to the assassination of Sir Lee Stack in Cairo, remove 
those from the south and the north who were agitating the situation (Alier, 1991:17) .  
The policy was abrogated in 1946 but at the time it had enhanced a distinction 
between northern and southern Sudan as it was evident that the two areas had 
glimpsed the idea that they were separate from how the Condominium had been 
administering them (Lesch, 1998:32). The negotiations which were carried out in 
1946 act as a pointer to the separateness of the two areas (Wai, 1981:39-40).  
What became distinct out of this situation was the emphasis on the characteristics of 
the peoples of the areas in Sudan (the north as Arab and the south as African).   The 
identities which were created (Arab and African) and the manner in which the Anglo-
Egyptian Condominium had administered the two areas it is noted had a lot to do 
with the dilemmas which the two regions faced later especially after attaining 
independence from the British in 1956. 
3.3 Post-independence regimes (Military and parliamentary) 
Sudan has experienced three parliamentary and three military regimes since its 
independence in 1956 through a trajectory which was followed against a background 
of deep rooted asymmetrical relations between Sudan and southern Sudan 
(Sikainga, 1993:78). The reasons for the frequent changes in the ruling governments 
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may have been exacerbated by political problems between the north and the south. 
These had their roots in the historical and political developments of the country 
focused mostly on the nationality question and as time went by the Southern 
problem which at the time were not given due attention. The relationship of northern 
and southern Sudan was affected by the management of the successive post-
independence governments (military and parliamentary) in Khartoum and the 
reactions of the southerners.  
3.3.1 The first Parliamentary regime, 1954-1958 
The first parliamentary government commenced on 9 January, 1954 which was a 
day when the British essentially transferred power into the hands of the Sudanese 
(Holt and Daly, 2000:145). The government created at the time was mostly based on 
the leadership of the sectarian parties (Umma Party, National Unionist Party (NUP), 
People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP).  
In trying to pursue a smooth transition to the self-determination of Sudan, the 1953  
Sudan Anglo-Egyptian agreement provided for three international commissions 
which namely were, the Governor General’s commission, the election commission 
and the Sudanization commission (Wai, 1981:47). The task of the Sudanization 
commission was to complete the task of the Sudanization of the administration; the 
police, the defence force and any government post that might affect the freedom of 
the Sudanese at the time of self-determination.  
According to Collins (2008: 65), the Sudanization committee’s report indicated that 
there were 800 posts which had to be Sudanized through the work of a Public 
Service Commission (PSC), consisting entirely of northerners and mostly NUP 
members which was set up to effect the recruitment and appointments to the posts 
to be Sudanized. Out of the available 800 senior administrative posts, only 6 were 
given to the southerners and the rest got filled by the northerners (Ibid: 2008:65).  
The effective exclusion of the Southerners from the senior administrative positions in 
the South and even in the North left profound resentment among the southerners 
although in response, the all Northerners’ Sudanization commission claimed that the 
Southerners lacked seniority, experience, academic degrees and fluency in Arabic 
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which in other words meant that there were no qualified southerners (Albino, 
1970:33).  
It is contended that in the actions of the commission, the northern politicians were 
trying to stress the rights of the numerical majority and formal equality for all the 
citizens while the southern leaders were trying to stress the need to protect the 
minority, the need to achieve equitable opportunities and access to economic and 
political goods. The positions which the two groups had come to adopt on the issue 
were certainly a recipe for disaster in that each area started conceptualising itself as 
different from the other. Collins (2008: 65) claims that due to the status quo of the 
two parties at the time, each side felt that it was upholding a moral principle but in 
retrospective a polarization was being created. This occasioned dilemmas that the 
two regions faced in their relationship at the time and up to now. 
There was a rapid increase of northern civil servants to replace British officials in 
southern Sudan as a result of the Sudanisation (Johnson, 2011:27). An order that 
followed during the same period for the southern troops of the Equatorial Corps to 
travel to Khartoum for independence celebrations increased the southerners’ fears of 
northern domination and colonization and resulting from such fears, the southern 
soldiers’ staged a mutiny in 1955 which involved the killing of northern officials and 
their families (Iyob and Khdiagala, 2006:80).  
The mutiny was suppressed by the members of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) 
whereby some of the mutineers were killed whilst others fled into the bush. Those 
who fled formed a rebel movement against the government which came to be called 
the Anyanya in 1963 and thus it is alleged that the mutiny was the beginning of the 
first civil war between north and south Sudan (Poggo, 2009:71). Thus, the 
southerners were not happy with the government at the time the country was about 
to become independent. 
In reaction to the Sudanization implementation, the southerners through the Liberal 
Party convened a conference at Juba in 1954 whereby the injustice of the Public 
Service Commission had occupied much of the debates and in responding to the 
situation, the resolution which was unanimously passed was a demand for a federal 
status for the South and a call upon all the southerners irrespective of their party 
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affiliation to be ready for sacrifices (Albino, 1970: 34). This resulted in a  request for 
a federal status of the South being advanced to the northern politicians with an 
ultimatum that if their demand was not going to be granted they would not endorse 
the independence motion unless the south would be granted its demand. This was in 
addition to calling for a plebiscite in the south under the United Nations (UN) 
auspices in order to determine the relationship with the north (Malwal, 1981:47).  
The north’s fear to jeopardize the independence plans of the country, in response to 
the south’s demands calmed them by promising to consider their demands fully after 
independence (Albino, 1970:36). Thus, the south was not happy with relationship 
with the north and it can be noted that the demands which were advanced were 
evidence enough that the relation of the entities was not good. 
Sudan eventually achieved independence in 1956 but with a temporary constitution 
which was only meant to facilitate an orderly transition to independence and as such 
required that a permanent constitution be arranged (Johnson, 2011:30). According to 
Wai (1981:71) the parliament appointed a National Constitutional Commission (NCC) 
which was  northern members heavy to work on a draft permanent constitution but 
that as soon as it got down to work  did run into problems.  
The problem that arose was that the northern members advocated for a strong 
centralized and unitary system of government while the southern members 
advocated for a federal government as per their demand before the independence.  
These positions manifested dilemmas between the two entities as each one of them 
wanted a different form of government (centralised unitary system and a federated 
system of government). 
The irony about it all was that while the situation had stalemated between the camps, 
the northern group went ahead on its own and produced a draft constitution which 
was against what had been discussed with their southern counterparts. Their 
recommendations were for Sudan to become a parliamentary democratic republic, 
Islam as the official state religion and Arabic as the official and national language 
although in the end the southerners managed to block its passing (Ibid, 1981:75).  
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Johnson (2011: 30), states that the northerners argument on the draft constitution 
was the fear about the Southern stance on their demand for a federation which they 
viewed would be used to advance a separation agenda. In reaction to the situation 
the Southerners through their spokesperson said the following: 
“The south has no ill intentions whatsoever towards the north: the south simply claims to run 
its own local affairs in a united Sudan. The South has no intention of separating from the 
north for had that been the case nothing on earth could have prevented the demand for 
separation. The claim to federate with the north is a right that the south undoubtedly 
possesses as a consequence of the principle of self-determination which reason and 
democracy grant to people”.
37
 
The south at the time despite the many differences with the north, wanted to stay 
within a united Sudan but under a federal system of government. The dilemma here 
is the demand for unity and not separation by the southerners at the time. Wai 
(1981:79) argues that despite the proposed policies in the draft constitution being 
rejected, they got included in the constitution by the short lived parliamentary regime 
and in due course were vigorously pursued by the succeeding military and civilian 
regimes which in turn did not augur well with the southerners’ aspirations.  
It can be noted in this context that the Sudanization implementation, the demand for 
a federal status by the southerners before the independence and its rejection after 
independence during the deliberation of the subject by the NCC and the few 
numbers of the southerners who were being included in major policy decisions 
indicates that there was outright marginalisation of the southerners by the 
commission.  
Equally the southerners’ intransigence to the ideas which were being advanced by 
the northerners created fault-lines in the north-south relations that in the end each 
party felt it would have been better if each was on its own. The first parliamentary 
government in many ways contributed to the emergence of the troubled relationship 
of north and south Sudan.  
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 Quote from a southern parties’ spokesperson’s speech in response to the Northerners claims that federation 
was not necessary in Sudan because if implemented, it would be used by the Southerners to further their 
separationist tendencies (Wai, 1981:71). 
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3.3.2 The military regime -1958-1964 
The military regime came to power after the first parliamentary regime through a 
military coup which was led by General Ibrahim Abboud. The reasons for the coup 
included the Prime Minister at the time losing faith in the parliamentary politics, party 
disputes becoming more acute, the economic situation deteriorating and in view of 
the southern Sudan crisis, the thinking that the continuing deterioration of the 
situation could not be resolved by political manoeuvres but only through a military 
dictatorship which could employ brutal techniques to suppress the southerners’ 
demands (Wai, 1981:76).  
In order to show and instil fear to both the northerners and the southerners, General 
Abboud after taking over power abolished the five man supreme council, suspended 
the 1956 interim constitution, dissolved the parliament, banned political parties and 
vested the supreme authority for the legislature, executive and the judiciary in the 
supreme council of the Armed forces under his chairmanship as the acting President 
and Prime Minister (Lesch, 1998: 38),.  
The actions which were taken at the time were based on fear of a possible rally by 
the indigenous African population pressing for a federal status which it is believed 
had shaken the government’s foundation (Poggo, 2008:91-93 & Lesch, 1998:38-39). 
It is believed that the regime as a reaction was trying to make a mock show of what it 
was capable to do and that since the military was the only national institution in a 
multi- ethnic and sectarian Sudan, General Abboud and his officers naively assumed 
that they could achieve national integration and unity by the application of proper 
military discipline to improve a rigid and insensitive policy of Arabization and 
Islamization (Collins: 2008:72-73). The two approaches included the adoption of both 
an Arab identity, the Arabic language accompanied by the Islamization of non-
Muslim and non-Arab African southerners.   
According to Poggo (2009:108 -109), Abboud argued that cultural homogenisation 
was essential to Sudan’s unity and believed that Christianity was an alien religion 
that foreign missionaries had imposed on the Southerners and through the same 
lines of thought expressed contempt for African religions and disparaged  indigenous 
languages and customs. Government measures to this effect inherited the 
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Arabization agenda of the previous regime, opened Islamic institutes in the south, 
constructed mosques, changed the weekly holiday in the South from Sunday which 
had been the official holiday for Christians and southern employees to Friday which 
was a Moslem day of rest and prayer and did set up a department of religious affairs 
for the supervision of Islamic schools and institutes (Sanderson, 1981: 368).  Poggo 
(2009:92) states that in addition to all this, the government launched a military 
operation named Nadafa Junub which was meant to cleanse the south of resistance 
activities.38  
To achieve these ends, courts, administration schools and Christian missionaries 
especially in the south were targeted as spring boards for the implementation of his 
policies. To this effect the institution of the missionary societies act of 1962 to 
regulate the activities of the missionaries followed by the regulations of the 
missionary societies which opened up expulsions of the missionaries from Sudan, 
closure of schools and use of local administration authorities to enforce and reinforce 
government initiatives sit very well as concrete examples of the targeting measures 
(Poggo: 2009:104-105). The actions of the Abboud regime in this case were 
basically actions to stifle the political demands of the southerners.  
The existence of the 1956 constitution, parliamentary politics and the presence of the 
political parties in the Southern region may have helped to restrain northern 
Sudanese who were advocating the use of force to suppress the southern demands 
of federalism or separation. Things could have been worse if this was not the case 
(Ibid: 2009:109).  
The changing of Sunday as the official resting day in the south and the imposition of 
the Friday in its place was viewed as the taking away of the southerners’ most prized 
aspect of the difference between them and the north. The institutional changes in the 
educational system in the south with a view to promote the Arab culture and Islam 
were interpreted as life changing experiences with no hope (Collins, 2008:78-79). 
The policies of the regime were viewed to have revived the memories of the military 
                                                          
38
Nadafa Junub literally meant cleansing the South. It was a military campaign primarily aimed at destroying 
the sanctuaries of the Southern rebels along the borders of Sudan’s neighbours. These Southern villages along 
the borders were burnt down and thus forced many villagers to cross into Congo, Uganda, Kenya and   Ethiopia 
to seek refuge (Poggo: 2009:110). 
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and the slave raids of the Turkiyya and the Mahdiyya eras and with the pressure to 
convert to Islam and to adopt the Arab culture at the time might have created a 
distinct picture that the north and the south were different and as such required may 
be to live apart and not as a united entity.   
The activities of the regime at the time in this context can then be seen to have 
contributed to the development of the poor relationship between north and south 
Sudan which may have contributed to the dilemmas that the two regions faced later 
in the process of their co-existence and eventually as separate states.   
3.3.3 The second parliamentary regime (1964 -1969) 
The second Parliamentary regime was ushered in after General Abboud was 
removed from power through what was termed as the ‘October Revolution (Natsios, 
2012:45).39 The regime’s period saw a transitional government and four coalition 
governments that followed, mostly comprised of the Northern traditional sectarian 
parties (Umma, NUP and PDP and later the Islamic Charter Front (ICF) although the 
Sudan Communist Party (SCP) was always on the side-lines (Holt and Daly, 
2000:156). Except for the SCP, all the other parties were involved in the pursuit of 
identity politics bent on Arabization, Islamization and marginalisation of the 
Southerners. 
3.3.3.1 The Transitional Government 
The transitional government was formed by parties which participated in the 
overthrowing of the Abboud military government under the collective term ‘United 
Front’ and was led by Sir Al-Khatim al Khalifa as the Prime Minister (Alier, 1991:26). 
 During the tenure of the Transitional Government, a round table conference was 
organised in 1965 with a view to discuss the “Southern problem” and possibly reach 
an agreement which would satisfy the regional interests as well as the national 
interest of Sudan.40 Lesch (1998: 40) states that the south was represented by three 
parties (Sudan African National Union (SANU) inside, SANU outside and the 
                                                          
39
 Revolts which were triggered by the Khartoum University students and eventually ended with the removal of 
the military regime of the General in October 1964 hence the term ‘October Revolution’. 
40
The Southern resistance to North’s domination came to be termed as the” Southern problem” (Collins, 
2008:77-78). 
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Southern Front (SF)) while the north was represented by all its political parties’ with 
observation representation from seven African and Arab countries.  
The Southern parties representation was divided as can be evidenced from the 
number of parties at the conference.  Due to the division of the southern parties at 
the conference, they did not have a common position and as a result differently 
demanded a plebiscite on unity, federal status and separation of the south (Alier, 
1991:29).  
The North which was represented by all its political parties’ with a common position 
of a united Sudan rejected all the proposals which were advanced by the southern 
parties (Ibid: 1991:29-30). This resulted in an agreement not being reached and the 
conference being terminated but agreed to constitute a twelve man committee (six 
from each side) which would draft a working paper to be considered when the 
conference would reconvene at a later date (Woodward, 1990:113). 
The establishment of a twelve man committee manifested a failure of the conference 
to achieve its objectives and that it was only constituted to save the face of the 
government. The positions of the representatives of the southerners and the 
Northerners at this conference manifested the dilemmas that the two regions faced 
at the time which later on may have been the contributing factors of the tensions 
between the two regions even after the independence of South Sudan.   
The observers from the African and the Arab countries  noted that there were wide 
differences  in the perception of issues by the northern and the southern camps 
during the conference and as such in their view felt that there was no place in the 
Sudan for a centralized form of government (Wai:1981:100). The positions of the 
Southerners representatives who were opting for separation and the observers 
converged and in that case the best option would have been a talk of separation.  
The failure of the Committee to find a solution showed that the northerners were not 
interested in achieving peace with the southerners. This was evident because the 
northern members later went it alone on the final report. 
The events of the round table conference and what followed gives an indication that 
there was bad blood in the relationship of north and south Sudan and in view of that 
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fact each side developed a dislike of the other. The round table conference’s failure 
to resolve the Southern problem strengthened the conviction of many southerners 
that their grievances could only be satisfied through the barrel of the gun and the 
resolve behind the joining of the resistance by many southerners in the civil wars 
(Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006:81). This scenario presented some of the dilemmas that 
north and south Sudan faced which may have contributed to tensions between them 
in their later relations even after independence of South Sudan. 
3.3.3.2 Coalition Governments and polarisation  
The civilian Governments that followed after the Transitional Government were all 
coalition governments due to the failure of the parties to achieve absolute majorities 
during elections41. During these coalitions, governments competitive overbidding 
among them fostered the assertion of the assimilationist control model that ignored 
the interests of other ethnic groups and the ideological tendencies.  
Given the government’s parliamentary majority; democratic devices were used to 
achieve non democratic ends (Lesch, 1998:42). All the governments that came into 
power during the regime advanced and supported policies of Arabization and 
Islamization through the use of force which in turn further antagonised and alienated 
the southerners (Wai, 1981:125). For example, Sadqi al-Mahdi strongly asserted an 
Arab-Islamic ethnic bias when he became Prime Minister in 1966 by openly saying: 
“The dominant feature of our nation is an Islamic one and its’ overpowering 
expression is Arab and this nation will not have its prestige and pride preserved 
except under an Islam revival”.
42  
This position suggests that Sadiq believed that the southern Sudanese culture was 
not a culture in itself and therefore contended that the southerners had to be 
converted to Islam and Arabized. 
                                                          
41
 The first coalition was Umma and NUP with Muhammed Ahmed Mahjoub as Prime minister, followed by the 
Umma and NUP but with Sadiq al-Mahdi as the Prime Minister after Mahjoub was thrown out with a vote of 
no confidence within the Umma party, the third coalition was NUP,PDP three Southern parties and an Umma 
breakaway party headed by Imam al-Hadi with Mahjoub as the Prime Minister after Sadiq al-Mahdi was given 
a vote of no confidence and the fourth coalition after the elections of 1968, DUP (a new party which originated 
from the merging of NUP and PDP) and the traditional wing of  the Umma party with Mahjoub as the Prime 
Minister (Wai, 1981: 109-120). 
42
 Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi speech to the constituent Assembly in October 1966(Wai, 1981:125) .  
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In line with Sadiq’s thinking, a 1968 draft constitution termed Islam the official 
religion, Arabic language and Sharia to serve as the source of the civil and criminal 
law, banned communism and all other atheist ideologies (Johnson, 2012: 35).  Lesch 
(1998:42) argues that  the second parliamentary regime’s key policies were mostly  
involved with  the targeting and  expelling of the SCP from Parliament, renewing 
discussion of an Islamic constitution and intensifying the war in the South which was 
being waged by the Anyanya.  
The southerners however argued that they were not opposed to the northern 
identification with the Arab world and its obsession with Islam, but detested the 
northern disregard for their own African values and their campaign to integrate the 
south into the Arab fold. The fact of the matter is that southerners were neither Arabs 
nor Muslims, had no desire or right to be part of the Arab world and therefore it was 
only befitting that northern Sudanese permit them to identify themselves with Africa 
(Wai, 1981:129).  
Daly and Sikainga (1983: 82-83) state that the conduct of politics by the northerners 
during the period forced the African south to intensify the warring activities. It can 
then be argued that through these positions, the preoccupation with the question of 
whether or not Sudan should adopt an Islamic constitution polarised the Arab-African 
relations. It is then right to assume that the northerners thought that non- Arab and 
non-Muslim people lacked cultural and national identities of their own as Sadiq al-
Mahdi had tried to articulate during his first speech to the constituent Assembly.  
The expression of the assimilationist model not surprisingly then led to the 
marginalised people to call for separation although through their knowledge of the 
international community’s stance on the option of separation, made them to consider 
the option of federalism based on the ethnic pluralism model. The southerners in this 
regard faced a dilemma in the context of what would have been the best option for 
them (Unity or separation).  
It can then be noted in the light of what the regime wanted and the position of the 
southerners that both parties faced dilemmas which resulted in a tense relationship.  
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The tense relationship at the time begins to explain the problems which the parties 
were experiencing later during the CPA period, after the separation and later after 
the independence of South Sudan from Sudan.  
3.3.4 The second Military regime (1969-1985) 
The second Military regime emerged after a military coup which was led by Colonel 
Jaafar Mohammed Numeiri and a group of officers who were frustrated in their 
efforts to bring about reform in the military after a realisation that neither the 
belligerent forces, the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) nor the 
government forces (SAF) would ever achieve a clear cut victory over the other during 
the first civil war. (Poggo, 2009: 187). Lesch (1998: 46) states that Numeiri pledged 
that his regime was determined to arrive at a lasting solution on the basis of the right 
of the Southern people to regional autonomy within a united Sudan and to that effect 
made a broadcast of the new policy43. The negotiations of the 1972 Addis-Ababa 
agreement may have had its origins from what Numeiri had promised.  
Numeiri gave the Southern problem a totally new approach. In this regard, a peace 
agreement was negotiated in 1972 in Addis-Ababa-Ethiopia and through it; a 
regional Self-Government Act was enacted for the southern provinces. In a gesture 
to show commitment to the political developments between north and south Sudan, 
the Addis-Ababa agreement and the regional self-government were incorporated into 
the permanent constitution of 1973 with attached safeguards that would prevent the 
northern majority from making arbitrary changes (Daly and Sikainga, 1993:27).  
Through these actions, the constitution stressed the dual Arab and African identity of 
the Sudan, respect for Islam, Christianity and noble spiritual beliefs, the equality of 
all persons before the law and the prohibition of any form of discrimination on the 
basis of religion, race, language or gender.  Thus, the Addis-Ababa agreement and 
the constitution articulated the ethnic pluralist model since they included both the 
aspects of equality before the law for all and special protection for the minorities. The 
actions of the regime in this regard created a dilemma especially in the context of the 
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 The broadcast stated that “the revolutionary government is confident and determined enough to face the 
existing realities. The government recognises the historic and the cultural differences between North and 
South Sudan and believes that the unity of the country was to be built on these objective realities. In that 
regard, the Southern people have the right to develop their respective cultural and traditions within a united 
socialist Sudan (Alier, 1991: 49).  
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perception the north had on the south. It is noted that for the first time the North had 
accepted that the people of the north and the south were equal and as such had to 
be treated equally as citizens of one state.  
At the time, Sudan embarked on a number of development projects which included; 
construction of the Jonglei canal which would be used for irrigation agriculture to 
produce crops for sale to other countries, completion of oil prospecting and 
confirmation of its availability in the southern part of Western Sudan and a decision 
to have an oil refinery initially at Bentiu in southern Sudan but later moved to Kosti in 
northern Sudan (Collins, 2008:120-123). The locations of all these valuable projects 
were in southern Sudan and in that regard; it had become a cause for concern for 
the government.44   
According to Natsios (2012: 60-61), in a surprise turn of events the government 
promulgated Republican Order Number 1 on 5 July1983 which broke the South into 
three provinces and a follow up Republican Order Number 1 in September 1983 
which became commonly known as the September laws  imposed Sharia law on all 
peoples and the provinces of Sudan. The very regime which had brought about 
change in the handling of the Southern problem later changed its tune and started to 
do its business like the previous regimes. Arabisation and Islamization was back on 
the government’s agenda in this case. 
 The issues of natural resources (discovery of oil, water and land), 
misunderstandings on the absorption of the Anyanya, manipulation of Southern 
parties by Numeiri and his reconciliation with the northern political forces were at the 
heart of the sudden change (Collins:2008:138). The government had planned to 
move southern military units to the north in order to reduce the risk of a full scale civil 
war but through a leak this came to be known by the southerners and the military 
units concerned (Ibid: 2009:140).  
                                                          
44
 Khartoum tried to redraw the boundary between North and South Sudan in July 1980 to include the oilfields 
areas and the rich grazing areas of land in Upper Nile and Barhl Ghazal but the decision was rescinded after 
Southern students took to the streets to protest (Collins, 2008:123). It is noted against this background that 
Northern and Southern views over oil exploration and exploitation, land and water resources became ever 
more divergent and acrimonious. 
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Daly and Sikainga (1993: 84) state that in order to win the support of the sectarian 
parties, Numeiri decided to turn against the south and to abrogate the Addis-Ababa 
agreement.  According to Collins (2008: 138), the Northerners were adamantly 
opposed to a single Southern region, a secular constitution, autonomy, the English 
language and the security arrangements whereby the southerners had an equal role 
in the southern command. In a move to guarantee political stability, Numeiri brought 
back into the government fold his previous opponents, the National Islamic Front 
(NIF) particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, but in return for that support they made it 
clear that their support was going to be contingent upon the emasculation of the 
Addis-Ababa agreement and his imposition of an Islamic constitution (Johnson, 
2011:43).  
Numeiri’s authoritarianism it can be noted undermined any possibility of establishing 
a pluralist political system in which citizens would have equal rights. Instead of 
sharing power, he played the south off against the northern Islamists, favouring the 
former in the first half of his rule and then shifting to the later thus taking an Islamic 
perspective in its logical extreme by excluding non-Muslims and silencing Muslims 
who differed.  This implies that the second military regime brought political 
turbulence into the political environment of the Sudanese state.  
The changing of stances in the political decisions presented the dilemmas which 
were faced by north and south Sudan which caused tensions which have never 
healed and are still there even later after the separation of South Sudan. The 
emergence of the second civil war in Sudan was mostly based on these 
developments which it is believed facilitated the founding of the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). 
3.3.5 The third Parliamentary regime 
The third Parliamentary regime emerged after the overthrow of Numieri in April, 1985 
instigated by a group of professionals who later formed an organisation called the 
National Alliance for the Salvation of the Country (NASC) (Collins, 2008:156-157). 
Due to a lack of leadership, the military came in and took the lead as a governing 
arm called the Transitional Military Council (TMC) but after negotiations with the 
NASC agreed and appointed a civilian Provisional Council of Ministers (PCM).  
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The TMC as from its name and its civilian organisation were transitional and were to 
hand over power to a democratically elected government after one year (Ibid, 
2008:16). This regime emerged when the second north-south Sudan civil war led by 
Dr John Garang was in its second year after its commencement in 1983 (Natsios, 
2012:65-66). Garang, a Dinka from southern Sudan established and became the 
leader of the SPLM/A which was founded from military units at Bor and Pibor 
composed of southern Sudanese soldiers which had mutinied against the 
government.45 It is noted that in order for the SPLM/A to avoid being perceived as  a 
southern Sudan movement/party, it embraced the term “New Sudan” as the agenda 
for the struggle. The importance of the concept was its emphasis that the revolution 
was not for a separate south but for all the Sudanese with a commitment to fight 
racism and tribalism (Collins, 2008:143). This aspect will be discussed further later in 
the study46.  
The TMC actions soon after take over included; declaring a state of emergency, 
suspending the constitution, dissolving the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU) which was 
Numeiri’s political party and the National and Regional Assemblies, releasing 
political prisoners and disbanding the security forces (Lesch, 1998:64).  
The main issues which were problematic between the TMC as a military organisation 
and the PCM as a civilian organisation which had similarly haunted all the previous 
governments of independent Sudan were the constitution, the Southern problem, 
Sharia and the overarching state of the Sudanese economy (Holy and Daly, 
2000:182).  
The TMC and the PCM in response to some of the issues, reverted to the provisional 
constitution of 1956, as amended in 1964, and in terms of the Southern problem 
preserved the autonomy of the South, reverted the regionalism imposed by Numeiri 
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 John Garang initially joined the Anyanya in the first civil war and after the Addis-Ababa agreement of 1972, 
was integrated into the Sudan Armed Forces in which he attained the rank of Lieutenant Colonel after his 
military and academic studies in the United States of America (USA). Garang and his network of Southern 
officers had planned the second Sudan civil war for some time. When the 105
th
 Battalion mutinied at Bor and 
Pibor, on being sent to assist the government to quell the rebellion, he simply joined them and disappeared 
with them into Ethiopia. SPLM was formed secretly in April, 1983 but was formerly pronounced on 31 July 
1983 as a movement and an Army after Garang had become its commander in chief (Natsios, 2012:65-67).  
46
 Garang on this aspect had declared that the democratic “New Sudan” would guarantee equality, freedom, 
economic and social justice and would break the monopoly of power by any one group (Lesch, 1998:88). 
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and as a peace gesture, invited and included the SPLM/A’s leader Dr John Garang 
to be part of them with a view to form a kind of a national unity government (Lesch, 
1998; 64). The TMC also spearheaded initiatives through the NASC to negotiate 
peace with the SPLM/A at Koka Dam in Ethiopia and eventually managed to sign the 
Koka Dam declaration proposal for National Action (Collins, 2008:161).  
In terms of a military solution, the TMC concluded a Defence pact with Libya, 
solicited additional support and appealed for money and arms from well-wishers from 
the Arab states of the Gulf and other countries in order to strengthen its forces to 
defeat the South’s rebellion (Smock, 1993: 90-91).  
Thus, overall the constitution which was amended in this case did not satisfy those in 
the alliance and the south who wanted to revoke the September decrees and re-
institute secular civil, criminal and commercial codes. The retention of the Sharia law 
in the constitution in this case was problematic for the north-south relationship as it 
was one of the reasons for the war which was being fought with the south. 
Surprisingly, whilst trying to achieve peace politically with the south, it concluded a 
defence pact with Libya and solicited financial and material support all aimed at 
defeating the southern rebellion which was being spearheaded by the SPLM/A.  
The actions of the TMC presented a number of dilemmas on the political scene 
concerning the relationship of north and south Sudan. The actions were not clear on 
what they wanted to achieve. On one hand, appeared to forge peace but on the 
other, appeared to instigate war. This created tensions and dilemmas which it is 
viewed may explain the same in the context of the relation between Sudan and 
South Sudan before and after the 2005 CPA. 
The TMC and the PCM effectively handed over power to a government after the 
elections which were held in 1986. Woodward (1990: 207) states that in every 
election in Sudan since 1954, there were usually no clear victors and likewise in 
1986 even if the Umma Party led by Sadiq al-Mahdi secured many seats, could not 
form its own government and had to negotiate with the DUP to form a coalition 
government. It was thus difficult to form a government in Sudan which could totally 
be free of hardliners from the previous governments who could effectively give peace 
a chance. 
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Daly and Sikainga (1993:23-24) state that Sadiq had committed in his early days to 
do a number of things in order to bring peace to Sudan which included the abolition 
of the 1983 September Laws, stamping out corruption and re-arming the National 
Army among others.47 Sadiq once he had come to power, although he had 
repeatedly pledged to do what he promised failed to do so due to impediments in the 
political system as has been articulated and as an Arab and a devout Moslem who 
had to advance Arabization and Islamization.48   
Natsios (2012:74-75) states that Sadiq before being elected as a Prime Minister, had 
written a tract on a strategy to deal with the Southern problem in which were 
included suggestions to foment tribal rivalries in the south and provided an argument 
that the Arab culture was fundamentally superior to the Southern African Christian 
culture and as such required that it assimilate the Arab culture. Sadiq had it can be 
noted had a pre-planned agenda which had focused on dealing with the Southern 
problem and enhancing the Arab-Islam image just as the previous regimes had 
done.  
The military and the government armed militias had been carrying out brutal attacks 
on the Southerners in order to pursue the government’s agenda of Arabisation and 
Islamisation (Collins, 2008:178).  The activities of all the successive governments of 
Sadiq generally by design targeted the use of brutality on the southerners in order to 
drive them to embrace the Arab and Islamic culture. 
The resort to tribalism, starvation and the indiscriminate bombings tortured the 
southerners greatly and as a result revealed anew the hollowness of the northern 
parties’ nationalist pretensions as it became evident that the successive 
governments of Sadiq were essentially a continuity of the attitudes of the northern 
                                                          
47
 Other areas he had promised to deal with included, basing his rule on the combination of the National 
Charter of April 1985, the Charter for the Defence of Democracy of November 1985 and the Koka Dam 
Declaration, introducing and supporting a new Ministry of Peace and National Constitutional Affairs to thrash 
out the Southern problem, revitalising the economy and steadying the foreign relations. 
48
He  failed  to repeal the  September laws and  instead strengthened them using Hassan al-Turabi who he had 
appointed as the Attorney General, failed to honour what he had agreed with Dr Garang at an OAU summit in 
the spirit of  the Koka Dam Declaration and declared the Declaration as flawed in the Constituent Assembly, 
through the government’s organised, armed and funded Arab tribes along the North-South border to  form 
militias who along with the Army raided and burned Southern villages, used government resources (weapons, 
money and jobs) to turn one Southern tribe against another and in an attempt to break the SPLM/A during the 
humanitarian crisis of 1988 – 1989, prevented food deliveries  by the  international agencies to Southern 
Sudan as part of international assistance. 
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Sudanese elite towards the inheritance of political independence on their part 
(Lesch, 1998:66).   
The audit trail in this case of most of the activities during the third parliamentary 
regime can then be said to have served as catalysts of enmity between the 
northerners and the southerners which became very difficult to heal.  This implies 
that there were a lot of dilemmas which eventually led to a tense and hostile 
relationship between the two parties. Reflections of the experiences of the third 
parliamentary regime may start to explain the hostile relationship between northern 
and southern Sudan before and after South Sudan’s separation. 
3.3.6 The third Military regime (The national Islamic front and al Bashir) 
1989 to present 
The emergence of the third Military regime commenced with the overthrow of the 
Sadiq al-Mahdi government by a bloodless coup which was orchestrated by the 
National Islamic Front (NIF) through a group of middle ranking military officers led by 
Colonel Hassan Ahmed Bashir on 30 June, 1989 (Colllins, 2008:185).  According to 
Natsios (2012:80) the military coup officers called themselves the Revolutionary 
Command Council (RCC) and through a radio broadcast announced the reasons for 
the takeover as: “Failures of the democratic government to respect international 
human rights and to make good foreign relations with Central Africa”. 
However it is noted that the reasons for the coup were to stop Sadiq from going to 
Addis-Ababa to participate in peace negotiations with the SPLM/A which were tipped 
to dilute the much favoured Arab-Islamic hegemony and its agenda. Initially the 
military had appeared to be on their own regarding the coup, but as time went by, it 
became apparent that the RCC was basically a tool of the NIF which was being led 
by Hassan al-Turabi (Collins, 2008:186). 
 O’Ballance (2000:168) states that in an extraordinary gesture of respect during the 
release of al-Turabi from prison all the members of the RCC took an oath of 
allegiance to him. The events as they transpired translated that al-Turabi had 
masterminded the coup that brought Bashir to power and that although he was only 
seen as the leader of the NIF, he remained the eminence grise of the regime – that 
119 
 
is not occupying any important post before 1996 but unquestionably in control of the 
government in full (Holt and Daly, 2000:188). 
The regime after formally establishing a government, adopted the term ‘Islamist’ and 
made a number of sweeping changes on the political scene, the military and the 
police, the media and the constitution.49  The most prominent of the changes was the 
re-introduction of the 1983 September laws and in 1998 through a botched 
referendum on a draft constitution, introduced a permanent constitution whereby 
Sharia became the sole source of the legislation (Collin, 2008: 191-224).  
The refusal of the Moslem north to repeal the September laws, later enhancing them 
and finally coming up with a constitution whose legislation was based on Sharia was 
an open translation that the northerners desired to continue dominating the south in 
the name of Islam and the Arab culture which according to the history was the cause 
of the fault-line in the north-south relations.  These actions it is contended cemented 
the southerners resolve to aspire to separate from the North although Garang’s new 
Sudan vision contradicted this position.  
In attempts to win the second civil war against the southerners, the Khartoum 
government resolved to the use of civilian militias (as was the case with the previous 
regime) and a paramilitary wing called the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) (Young, 
2012:33).50 The government used the Murahiliin militia, the PDF  and at some point 
the Lords’ Resistance Army (LRA) which had crossed over from Uganda  to kill 
unarmed southern civilians, raping women, burning villages (which forced people to 
be displaced or to flee to neighbouring countries), and stealing cattle (Natsios: 
2012:88). 
In a similar regard, the discovery of oil and later the commencement of its extraction 
had become important for the economy of the country which in the initial stages of 
the regime was at a nadir (Lesch, 1998:93-94).  The belief was that oil revenues 
would improve the economy and that in order to improve the revenue base, more 
                                                          
49
 Islamists is a term which when the RCC formally established their government adopted. It was a term which 
was preferred by al-Turabi to distinguish his regime and its followers and to differentiate their politics and 
theology from those of the secular political parties – like the communists, the Baathists and the democrats.  
50
 The PDF was established as both a check on the unreliable Army and as a means to implement the NIF’s 
Islamic civilisation project and ensure that its version of the Islamic way of life and Islamic values replace the 
eclectic Sufi notions of Islam favoured by most Muslim Sudanese. 
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expansion of oil exploration and extraction in the south where it was mostly found 
had to be increased.  
Collins (2008:233) states that the SAF and the Baqqara Murahilin systematically 
depopulated parts of West Nile which was earmarked for oil wells drilling assisted by 
Chinese workers and the Afghan Mujahidiin through burning of villages, killing 
people and capturing large herds of cattle. The oil factor in this case had effects on 
the north and south Sudan relationship at the time and after the separation of South 
Sudan from the Sudan. 
In the context of the north, the oil revenues assisted to  modernise the military and to 
equip it with new weapon systems which in turn provided tactical reverses against 
the SPLM/A in the field whilst in the case of the south many people got killed, lost 
property, became homeless and, were forced to flee to neighbouring countries 
(Natsios, 2012:11). The irony about the situation was that some of the militias 
engaged in the government activities were southerners.  
The oil factor it is noted changed the political and the economic aspects of the war 
as oil became something tangible worth fighting over. The belief was that it could 
change the lives of whoever controlled it but at the same time contributed to the poor 
relationship status of north and south Sudan which came to endure for a long time.  
The situation which was created during the third military regime unlike in the context 
of the Garang’s new Sudan concept for achieving peace exacerbated the 
Southerners resolve for self-determination as it was felt that the north and the south 
could not live in a united country together.  The bottom line in this context was that 
any potential for a liberal or ethnic pluralist system was stifled by control structures 
that were enforcing the regime’s assimilationist approach. The content of the Islamist 
ideology, the mechanisms of control and the model by which divergent voices were 
silenced it can be argued strained the relationship of northern and southern Sudan 
even though they were in one country.   
3.4 The international, Regional and Sub regional factors 
The dynamics of the international/ Regional and the sub-regional levels played a 
huge part in the developments of the northern-southern Sudan conflict. The levels of 
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analysis (international, regional and sub-regional) generally developed from the 
political, economic and the social factors which transpired during the period of the 
civil wars in Sudan. 
 According to Wakoson (1987:90-106), the nature of the conflict during the first war 
was exclusively regionalist in that the southern politicians specifically demanded a 
federal united Sudan that could guarantee South Sudan political autonomy while the 
Anyanya which was a resistance armed movement demanded outright separation of 
southern Sudan from Sudan.  
It can be argued in this regard that there were contradictions in the agendas of the 
members of the Equatorial corps who had taken part in the Torit mutiny and the 
southern politicians. The political elite after realising that their aspirations could not 
be met by the government changed their position and joined in the cause of the 
members of the Equatorial corps (Ibid: 1987:107). The southern elite who reverted to 
supporting them in this regard fled to the neighbouring countries and through 
communication, the two groups in the process formed a resistance movement called 
“Anyanya” with an objective to separate from the north.  
The formation of the Sudan African National Union (SANU), the South Sudan 
Provisional Government (SSPG), Nile Provisional Government (NPG) and the South 
Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) provide the trajectory of the idea of separation 
in the case of South Sudan during the first civil war (Poggo, 2009:123).  
The southerners’ resolve for separation is further noted in their negotiations of the 
1972 Addis Ababa agreement where in their initial position demanded it (Collins, 
2008:109). Their demand did not appeal to Emperor Haile Selassie who was the 
chair of the negotiations and at the time chairman of the OAU whose statutes were 
and are very much against separation in its member states and the positions of the 
World Council of Churches (WCC) and All African Churches Conference (AACC) as 
organisations which had arranged for the negotiations to take place (Ibid). Johnson 
(2011:39) states that due to the position of Emperor Haile Selassie as the OAU 
chairman and the fact that he was fighting his own secessionist war in Eritrea at the 
time; the negotiations were proposed with a united Sudan as a precondition.  
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The activities of the successive regimes (civilian and military) at the national level 
had influenced the southerners to consider self-determination and the option of 
separation. This translates that the relationship between south and north Sudan was 
not good and had been the same over a period of time. The 1972 Addis Ababa 
agreement outcome was not a reflection of the southerners’ aspirations but a result 
of the influence of the regional/sub-regional factors.   
The SPLM/A during the second war (1983-2005) claimed that its objective was 
essentially to establish a new secular, united and socialist Sudan whose vision was: 
“A united Sudan under a socialist system that affords democracy and human rights 
to all nationalities and guarantees freedom to all religions, beliefs and outlooks” 
(Mansour, 1987:21-23). Daly and Sikainga (1993:22) state that Ethiopia gave 
support to the SPLM/A during the initial period of the second war in reaction to the 
Khartoum government’s support for its rebels- the Tigrean Peoples Liberation Front 
(TPLF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF).  
The SPLM/A’s socialist orientation, the call for unity approaches and the use of 
‘liberation struggle’ and  ‘Manifesto’ terms from  a Communism manifesto  and 
alignment with the Leninist and Marxist ideologies explained the Ethiopian (under the 
Marxist DERG), Soviet Union, Cuban and Libyan support to it with the war effort as 
these countries also followed the same ideologies (Smock,1993:87).  
 According to  Yilmaz (2008: 44),  Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe collapsed  and the  Cold War came to an end between 1989 and 1991 
resulting in most of the countries which had been part of the Eastern bloc countries 
(Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) claiming  self-determination and 
being recognised by the United Nations (UN). The end of the Cold War it can be 
contended was a dynamic which provided a basis for the UN to act in a different 
manner by accepting the self-determination of the countries against a background of 
restrictions on self-determination in its guiding statutes.  
The scenario implies that there was a  change at the international level regarding the 
issues of self-determination and the option of separation which may have been noted 
by the Sudan government and the SPLM/A. The Mengistu regime in Ethiopia which 
had been supporting the SPLA collapsed in 1991 and was replaced by the  Ethiopian 
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People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and  within the  period, Eritrea 
which was part of Ethiopia led by the Eritrea People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) 
separated and  became independent (Johnson,1991:89 and 136). The events in 
Ethiopia also led to the fate of Eritrea at the regional level. The end of the Cold War 
also  presented a dilemma to the SPLM/A (and even the government of Khartoum) 
as it was forced  to balance between its own stated objective of fighting for  the 
survival of socialism and suppressing the regional aspirations for self-determination 
in an environment bolstered by the realisation of such an aspiration (Maundi et al, 
2006:130).  
 In the context of Sudan, a precedence of countries separating had been set both at 
the international and regional levels with the revival of self-determination which had 
come as a result of the end of the Cold war and the eventual collapse of the Soviet 
Union bloc. The state of affairs at the time meant that the claims of self-
determination could no longer be overlooked in the hope of being protected by the 
international and regional statutes. The case of Eritrea was viewed as the 
incarnation of self-determination aspirations in Africa as its independence seemed to 
have had an impact on the sacredness of the OAU’’s principle of uti possidetis.51    
O’Ballance (2000:172) notes that the SPLMA in 1991 experienced internal problems 
and eventually split. The SPLM/A officers based at Nasir close to the border with 
Ethiopia came to conclude that the goal of a united, multi-religious Sudan was 
unrealistic since the Khartoum government would never compromise on its ideology. 
The group felt that the SPLM/A was to negotiate with Khartoum in order to gain the 
south’s independence and let the NIF led government create a homogeneous 
Muslim society in the north.  
Smock (1993:128) states that three leading officers (Riek Machar, Lam Akol and 
Gordon Kong) announced that they had removed Garang from the leadership 
position of the SPLM/A because of his dictatorial behaviour, human rights abuse, his 
endorsement of a united Sudan, ethnic bias and failing to establish civilian 
administration in the large areas of the south that were under the control of the 
SPLM/A. Apart from the personal clashes, the real reason for the three officers’ 
                                                          
51
 Meaning territory remains in the hands of the belligerent state actually in possession at the end of a war 
unless otherwise provided for by treaty.  
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revolt was difference of opinion on whether or not the south was to separate from 
Sudan as already it had been made clear by those revolting that they were in favour 
of a black independent south Sudanese state (O’Ballance, 2000:172).  
John Garang was a Dinka from the Upper Nile region, in particular the district 
surrounding the town of Bor, and the Dinkas were noted to have a disproportionate 
share of leading positions in the SPLM/A (Prunier, 1994:2). Gordon Kong and Riek 
Machar came from the second largest ethnic group in the southern Sudan, the Nuer 
while Lam Akol was a Shilluk, a people who mainly live in northern parts of the 
Upper Nile region. It was no coincidence that the rebel leaders drew their support 
mainly from the Upper Nile region and among the Nuer. Rolandsen (2005:34) states 
that the revolt resulted in SPLM/A splitting into two with those at Nasir and their 
followers being called SPLM/A Nasir and those who were with Garang at Torit as 
SPLM/A Torit.  
The decision of the three officers to advance an idea of separation might have 
originated from the imminent partition of Ethiopia which eventually led to the 
independence of Eritrea, the de-facto division of Somalia and the breaking apart of 
the Soviet Union (Johnson, 2011:89-99). The SPLM/A Political Military High 
Command (PMHC) at Torit as a reaction to the challenge by the SPLM/A Nasir camp 
convened a meeting whereby for the first time the right to self -determination and 
eventual separation was adopted as a new agenda for the SPLM/A. SPLM Nasir in 
due course came to be called SPLM/A United but due to disagreements, 
disintengrated with the Machar forming his own South Sudan Independence 
Movement/Army (SSIM/A) (Roalndsen, 2005:37).  
This implies that the splits were generally a result of ethnicity. Ethnicity as in chapter 
one is perceived as group identity, based on common cultural affiliation and a belief 
in a shared ancestry and a common future (Cheeseman et al., 2015:95). Ethnicity is 
predominantly linked to specific places, either existing or mythical, as a central pillar 
of identity construction. The Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk ethnic lines in this regard 
represent a major fault line in the intra-relationship of the peoples of South Sudan 
and a source of the south-south conflict which also has been problematic in the 
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Sudan-South Sudan relationship. This position it can be noted has been one of the 
dilemmas in the relationship of Sudan and South Sudan.   
According to Lesch (1998:188) the shift of the initial agenda of the SPLM/A Torit 
from a united Sudan concept to that of separation was meant to undercut the Nasir 
group by acknowledging the wide yearning for independence of many southerners. 
This suggests that Garang may still have nursed his united Sudan agenda but feared 
for the SPLM/A becoming irrelevant due to the developments that had taken place 
internationally, regionally and domestically. 
 The pronouncement of the SPLM/A Nasir in favour of independence for the south 
and later as a reaction by the SPLM/A Torit to proclaim the same were all the 
influence of the international, regional and sub-regional political developments  which 
brought back to life the self-determination option  at the time. This scenario may 
have influenced the emergence of the right to self-determination and the option of 
separation during the 2005 CPA. The reasons for such a position most specifically 
may have originated from the troubled relationship of northern and southern Sudan.  
3.5 Experiences from the previous efforts to settle/resolve the conflict 
The conflict in Sudan took a very long time to be partially concluded and in its course 
manifested itself through two civil wars – 1955-1972 and 1983 -2005. During the 
course of the two wars, the parties to the conflict made some efforts to resolve the 
conflict. Through the efforts which were made either directly or as reactions from the 
efforts, the option of separation by the way of the right to self-determination at times 
emerged.  The efforts it is to be noted in both the wars involved internal and external 
actors.  
Muandi et al. (2006:135), states that mediation attempts by external actors were 
mostly stymied by the successive Sudan governments’ own peace approaches of 
direct interparty negotiations. For external mediation, the parties to the conflict and 
the prospective mediators initial perceptions of the nature of the conflict in the two 
wars and their prescribed solutions were instrumental in discouraging the attempts 
and as an example in the case of Africa, the conflict was viewed in the traditional 
government versus rebels perspective (intrastate) which then did not merit 
interference by others.  
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 Some individual African countries were sympathetic and supportive of the Anyanya 
and the SPLM/A, but collectively were constrained by the OAU principles of non-
interference in the internal affairs of the organisation’s sovereign members and the 
sanctity of international borders (Maundi et al. 2006: 134). Thus, neither the 
regionalist nor the centralist objectives of the southern Sudan rebellion could be 
openly supported by African governments and that any mediation attempt originating 
from an African country would have been interpreted as recognition of a rebel 
movement and be construed as unfriendly against Sudan and a direct violation of the 
OAU principles. 
The western countries and specifically in the context of the second war saw the 
SPLM/A’s initial socialist objectives as running counter to their policy positions 
especially in Africa (Rolandsen, 2005:53). A successful socialist resolution in Sudan 
would have put the region into the strong grip of two socialist states (Somalia and 
Ethiopia) and as such in the domain of the Cold war politics at the time would have 
been detrimental to western countries’ interests in the region and even beyond. The 
position implies that the western countries’ interests at the time therefore had to stick 
with the Sudan government regardless of its embarrassing policies.  The opposite 
was true for the socialist countries in that they could not be involved in the 
interventions to mediate the conflict as they were perceived by the state as a major 
source of the conflict. This background provides a basis of the experiences by both 
the parties to the conflict to resolve the conflict and how in due course the right to 
self-determination with its options of unity or separation might have taken root. 
3.5.1 The Experiences from the first civil war 
The first civil war played out for a period of 17 years (1955-1972). Efforts to resolve 
the war during the period revolved around a solution of one Sudan or two Sudans 
although the Khartoum government always felt a military solution involving the rebel 
defeat would have been the appropriate one (Eprile 1974: 145). The frequent 
changes of governments (from military to civilian and vice versa) coupled with the 
belief that the Arab north was superior to the African south made the resolution of 
the conflict difficult. The most significant efforts during the period however were the 
Round Table conference of 1965 and the 1972 Addis-Ababa agreement. 
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3.5.1.1 The Round table conference -1965 
The Round table conference and the subsequent formation of the twelve man 
committee were the activities which were lined up by the Khartoum government in an 
attempt to resolve the conflict (Johnson, 2011:33). The conference was meant to be 
an opportunity to end the first civil war as an initiative of the transitional civilian 
government at the time (Lesch, 1998:40). When the conference members could not  
reach an agreed solution, it was abruptly terminated  however in order to save face 
from the failure, a twelve man committee (six from the north and six from the south) 
was organised as a working group to draft proposals for constitutional and  
administrative reforms (Collins, 2008:84).  
The twelve man committee eventually although dogged with problems of 
disagreements which led to the southerners walking out of it, produced a report 
which unfortunately was politely ignored by the government of Khartoum. The 
southerners started to have a clear understanding that they did not have political 
space in the Khartoum government while the Khartoum government started to have 
a clear understanding of what the southerners wanted politically (Johnson, 2011:33-
34). 
The Round table conference and the subsequent twelve man committee outcomes 
clearly spelt out that the north did not want to share political space with the 
southerners. This position suggests that the observers noted that the relationship of 
the concerned parties was not good and as such any efforts between them to 
achieve peace would always be difficult. 
3.5.1.2 The 1972 Addis-Abba peace agreement 
The Addis-Ababa agreement was an agreement which was signed between the 
GOS and the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) representing   southern 
Sudan in Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia which paved the way to end the conflict at the time 
and the establishment of Regional autonomous rule in southern Sudan (Ahmad, 
2010:5-6). Poggo (2009: 188) states that the main aspects of the agreement were 
the division of functions and power and the military (security) arrangements. The 
arrangement suggested that southern Sudan have a Regional self-government 
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consisting of a Regional Assembly with legislative powers and a High Executive 
Council (HEC) with executive powers (Addis-Ababa agreement, 1973:37). 
The Addis-Ababa agreement and the Regional government Act for the south were 
incorporated into the permanent constitution of 1973 and as  way of safeguarding the 
constitution, any amendment could only be possible through a three quarters vote in 
the National Assembly and a two third majority in a referendum of the southern 
provinces (Lesch,1998:47). The constitution and the safeguards were meant to build 
the confidence of the southerners about the new relationship with northern Sudan. 
The 1972 Addis-Ababa agreement, however, got abrogated in June 1983 through a 
Republican order in which was stipulated the re-division of the South into three 
Regions (Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile and Equatorial) (Collins, 2008:137).  
Surprisingly, the agreement was abrogated without following the safeguards which 
had been put in place and included in the permanent constitution (Rogier, 2005:15-
16). These actions translate that Numieri undermined any possibility of establishing a 
pluralist political system in which citizens would have equal rights and that instead of 
sharing power; he played the south off against the northern Islamists, favouring the 
former in the first half of his rule and then shifting to the later.  
The abrogation of the Addis-Ababa agreement and what followed as actions of the 
government were experiences that had disturbed most of the southerners as they no 
longer felt as part of Sudan. The experiences of the period in question created 
hostility in the relationship of North and South Sudan. This may explain the reasons 
for the tensions and dilemmas in the relationship between northern and southern 
Sudan at the time and later after the CPA.  
3.5.2. Experiences from the second civil war  
The second civil war between north and south Sudan was mainly fought  against a 
background of ideologies by both the Khartoum government and  south  Sudan rebel 
movement –SPLM/A.   
Contrary to the aspirations of the first and the second Anyanya movement leadership 
and other southern civilian leadership, SPLM/A’s new inclination originated from a 
call that the problem was not  just of the south but rather a problem of the whole 
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Sudan (Akol,2001:22).  The SPLM/A in this regard adopted a centralist approach 
which was based on the idea of changing the state structures whilst advocating for a 
united Sudan. Similarly the Khartoum government’s approach was that of a united 
Sudan however with an Arab and Islamic identity perspective.  This implies that 
Khartoum government and the SPLM/A had similar aspirations but with different 
approaches.  
In waging war with the sole objective of replacing the state,  the SPLM/A was on  a 
collision course with the military regime and thus set the conflict in a zero-sum 
equation which ruled out the possibility of a compromise settlement (Maundi et al. 
2006:128). 
The state of affairs at the time required that the conflict be resolved. In this regard a 
number of initiatives by both internal and external actors were taken to resolve the 
conflict.52 The contradicting positions of the government and the SPLM/A suggest 
that the attitudes, behaviour and the conflict structure could not be changed as is 
advanced in the Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory. 
3.5.2.1 The Koka Dam Declaration-1986 
The Koka Dam conference was an interparty initiative whose objective was to pave a 
way for a national constitutional conference to take place in order to resolve and end 
the north-south Sudan conflict and took place at Koka Dam in Ethiopia (Collins, 
2008:161). The document which came out as an agreement of the conference came 
to be called ‘The Koka Dam Declaration: A programme for national action and its 
contents consisted of eight  points for a new Sudan that would be free from racism, 
tribalism, sectarianism and all causes of discrimination and disparity (Lesch, 
1998:166).  
It is argued that what became unique during the conference was that the Umma 
Party and all the secular and non-secular Arab political groups attended the meet but 
none from the TMC, DUP and NIF. The attendance of the Umma Party had provided 
an indication that the party was in agreement with the conference and the outcome 
                                                          
52
The external actors mostly presented themselves in the forms of Inter-Governmental Organisations (IGOs), 
eminent personalities and states while internally  initiatives came from interparty approaches, concerned 
individuals  or professional bodies (Maundi et al., 2006: 137).   
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but in a surprise turn of events, Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of the Umma party which had 
signed the declaration after winning the elections that followed, disowned the 
declaration (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006:89).  
 Sadiq as the leader of the party that had endorsed the Koka declaration after his 
election as a Prime minister formed a coalition with the DUP and endorsed the 1968 
draft constitution which had in it the Islamic law which was at the heart of the 
problem of the north-south relations (Lesch, 1998:100). The implications of the 
endorsement of the 1968 draft constitution was a fall out in relations with the 
southern politicians not to mention the SPLM/A.  Mansour (1992:395), states that the 
Prime Minister (PM), Sadiq al-Mahdi surprisingly kept changing his positions time 
and again on the Koka Dam issue.  
The position of the government and Prime Minister Sadiq at the time as evidenced 
from what had been happening forced many to draw conclusions that the north did 
not want to resolve the conflict and to relate well with the south. It can then be 
alleged that the experiences from the aftermath of the Koka Dam initiative were that 
northern Sudan did not want to make peace with southern Sudan in the absence of 
the south not accepting the Arabisation and Islamisation agenda. This position 
suggests that the north faced a dilemma on the resolution of its conflict with the 
south. 
This scenario implies that the relationship of north and south Sudan was not good 
due to lack of trust and remains in that state up to now. This begins to explain the 
tensions and threats to a return to war that still exist between them even after the 
separation of South Sudan.  
3.5.2.2. The DUP-SPLM/A ACCORD – 1988 
The DUP-SPLM/A accord was an intra-party initiative whose overtures    came to the 
fore after the DUP had been angered by the Umma-NIF alliance, irritation by the 
Prime Minister Sadiq’s indecisiveness on crucial national issues and a concern about 
the impact on the country’s economy (Lesch, 1998: 120-121).  
Johnson (2011:84) states that the circumstances and DUP’s anticipation concerning 
the elections which were about to be  conducted forced its leader Muhammed 
131 
 
Uthman al Mirghan  to have a direct face to face  meeting with Garang, the SPLM/A 
leader in Ethiopia and ended up with a DUP-SPLM/A accord. It is argued that the 
accord was a modified Koka Dam Declaration which the DUP had effectively timed 
to have an impact on the Sudanese politics as it is noted that the accord was viewed 
positively by the general public and negatively by the government.   
The Sadiq government refused to endorse the agreement by alleging that it was not 
relevant but in an effort to salvage the situation, the African parties, intellectuals and 
the DUP further organised a workshop at Abo in Ethiopia in order to further the 
agenda of the accord (Lesch, 1998: 122-123).  The Military issued an ultimatum to 
the Prime minster to either provide the arms necessary to fight to end the war or to 
negotiate a peace agreement and likewise, the public, political parties and the trade 
unions signed a national declaration of peace to embrace the DUP-SPLM/A accord.   
It is noted that following the actions of the Military and the public, the Prime minister 
and his government were forced to endorse the accord but the process got 
sabotaged by a group of committed Muslim officers in the Army supported by the NIF 
who carried out a pre-emptive coup and thus prevented the peace settlement and 
the realisation of the DUP-SPLM/A accord (Collins, 2008:169-170). 
Ahmad (2011:7) alleges that the DUP-SPLM/A initiative was the last attempt toward 
reaching a settlement of the conflict during the last democratic regime in Sudan. The 
scenario that played out in the context of the DUP-SPLM/A accord and how it was 
hijacked at the eleventh hour provides an experience of the dilemmas faced by north 
and south Sudan in relation to their attempts to resolve the conflict. In retrospect 
then, it can be noted that experiences of how the DUP-SPLM/A accord was handled 
and the developments thereafter may have a bearing in the tensions between the 
northern and southern Sudan which exist up to now even after the separation of 
South Sudan.  
 3.5.2.3 The Carter Initiative -1989 
The Carter initiative was an effort by Jimmy Carter, the former President of the 
United States of America (USA) to at least resolve the north–south Sudan conflict. 
Maundi et al. (2006:140) states that the initiative was influenced by an 
announcement by a new Khartoum government that it had no place for the DUP-
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SPLM/A accord but would prefer to have peace discussions with the SPLM/A based 
on peace plans from each side as the basis.  
Government to this effect contacted the SPLM/A two weeks after it came to power 
and organised a National Dialogue Conference which it had planned to use as a 
basis to build a national consensus on a new federal government structure. The 
signals  from the parties compelled Carter, the former president of USA who had an 
interest in eradicating Guinea worms and river blindness in Sudan to register a 
concern on the impact of the war on peace and human life in particular (Iyob and 
Khadiagala,2006:92). Apart from the parties’ willingness to talk, their acceptance of 
the initiative was based on the recognition of the importance and the impact of a 
former USA President on the peace process and the USA policies on Sudan.53 
 Lesch (1998:170) states that with the background of the meeting which the 
government had  with the SPLM/A whereby it was made clear  that Sharia was the 
main problem, Carter believed that solving the issue of the Sharia would pave the 
way for an agreement on the nature of the constitutional system. Against this 
background, the parties were invited for a conference to be chaired by Carter in 
Nairobi-Kenya to resolve the issue.  
Maundi et al. (2006:140-141) states that a proposal  by the  conference chair to 
suspend the Islamic laws for three months until when  a national conference could 
decide on the issue drew a blank response and resulted in an impasse. The 
stalemate meant that each side was not prepared to move away or to make any 
concessions from the positions that they had established.  
The positions of the parties in this regard suggest that they came to the conference 
geared for confrontation and not for compromise (Iyob and Khadiagal, 2006:92). The 
position is manifested from the fact that during the conference, the government stuck 
to its programme of the National Dialogue Conference which focused on a federal 
system in which non-Muslims could be exempted  from some and not all Islamic laws 
while the SPLM/A maintained  a demand to cancel Islamic laws and to form a broad 
national unity government.  
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 It should be noted that the USA policies were anti-communist and as the SPLM/A had initially harnessed 
communism, translated that they were anti- SPLM/A. 
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The development implies that the parties wanted the situation to remain the way it 
was which might have meant let’s live as separate entities. The experience from the 
Carter conference scenario indicated that the parties faced dilemmas with their 
relationship in the sense that they showed a lack of tolerance to each other over the 
issue of the Sharia. The positions of the north and the south in this regard revealed 
that any conflict resolution attempts involving the two parties would always be 
problematic. This explains the existence of tensions and the threats between Sudan 
and South Sudan in their relationship. 
3.5.2.4 The USA mediation attempt (The Herman Cohen Initiative) – 1990 
The USA mediation initiative was generally a response to President Bashir’s request 
in March 1990 to it to assume  the role of a mediator mostly due to the military 
balance at the time which had tilted more in favour of the SPLM/A with a view for him 
to claim a diplomatic high ground (Johnson, 2011:111). According to Maundi et al. 
(2006: 141), the attempt by the USA was initiated by the Assistant Secretary of State 
for African Affairs, Herman Cohen based on the Obasanjo-Deng approach and 
motivated by peace and humanitarian concerns just like the Carter’s initiative.  
Cohen advanced two proposals which were; separating the forces by mutual 
withdrawal and establishing a civilian administration in the South under the SPLM/A 
and as a second option, Khartoum to negotiate a comprehensive settlement based 
on a federal arrangement (Lesch, 1993:127). The first option basically involved 
establishing a de-facto state while the second option involved a federal approach 
which in actual sense were the ideas of separation and power sharing (unity) as part 
of the right to self-determination concept. Bashir rejected the entire plan whereas the 
SPLM/A agreed with it.54 The irony in this case is Bashir’s rejection of the options 
since it was him who had requested the USA to mediate the conflict between his 
government and the SPLMA.  
Separating the troops would have created a buffer zone which would have required 
monitoring by an external force which Khartoum would not have accepted as it would 
have been seen as an affront to its sovereignty. On a different note, the SPLM/A with 
a centralist objective of the ‘New Sudan’ would have found it difficult to accept a 
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 A de-facto state is a state  that is not legally recognized internationally 
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regionalist self-rule option since a settlement based on autonomy would have 
complicated matters with its principal supporter – Ethiopia which at the time was also 
fighting a war on its soil to suppress such an objective (Iyob and Khadiagala, 
2006:93. 
The centralist approach which the SPLM/A had adopted was directly in tandem with 
that of the state on the unity of Sudan although each tended to differ in the way it 
was to be achieved. The status quo in this case created a zero sum scenario which 
required rethinking although the positions of the parties pointed to a direction that 
each was not interested to live with the other side by side. However, considering the 
SPLM/A’s supporters’ rhetoric, the first option of the initiative made a lot of sense to 
their cause.  
The experience from the initiative although it had collapsed in the process due to 
international political developments was that the North faced a dilemma on how it 
could resolve the conflict outside its’ purported agenda of Arabisation and 
Islamization. The hard line position by the government in this case was evidence 
enough that it did not want to resolve the conflict and to relate with SPLM/A.   The 
position of the government from the initiative may suggest that it faced a dilemma 
over the resolution of the conflict hence tensions that are characteristic currently of 
the status quo between Sudan and South Sudan even after the separation of South 
Sudan.   
3.5.2.5 Abuja 1 and 2 initiatives 
The Abuja1 and 2 initiatives were the OAU’s attempts to resolve the Sudan conflict 
which came about after President Bashir had expressed willingness to talk and 
through the overture, the Nigerian President Ibrahim Babangida through emissaries 
received an acceptance to mediate the Sudan conflict (Rogier, 2005:38).  
According to Iyob and Khadiagala (2006:94) Bashir’s showing of interest for a 
mediation initiative followed a favourable military situation in the battlefield after the 
SPLM/A’s split and having reclaimed most of the areas from them which he felt 
would make the Khartoum government negotiate any initiative from a privileged 
position. It is argued that Babangida’s OAU chairmanship was of course one of the 
factors  in the Khartoum’s and SPLM/A’s acceptance of intervention but it would 
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seem that more importantly Sudan wanted to learn how Nigeria was coping with 
divisive politics in the context of  regional, cultural and religious diversities which 
were a problem in Sudan.  
The position might have originated from the fact that Nigeria had been able to forge 
a relatively stable national identity  not based on religion, geographic location or 
ethnicity but on individuals’ equality before the law although it had a lot of similarities 
with the Sudan situation (Maundi et al. (2006:144). Iyob and Khadiagala (2006:95), 
State that during Abuja 1, the government’s position was for a federal state with a 
commitment to respect religion, linguistic and cultural diversities of the country and 
the primacy of the majority rights while the two SPLM/As’ positions initially favoured 
a secular democratic system based on the principle of equality before the law but 
later changed to a regionalist self-determination position.55 
The SPLM/A rejected the government’s position especially on the principle of the 
right of the majority because it had packaged the controversial religious issues while 
the government rejected the SPLM/A’s position because it contained demands for 
reviving multiparty politics which it opposed. The rigid positions which were taken by 
the parties, despite the mediators’ effort to try to sway them otherwise, forced the 
talks to collapse and be adjourned to a later date (Lesch, 1998:172). 
Abuja 2 only convened with the intervention of Kenya and Uganda otherwise it 
appeared that it would not have taken place. According to Maundi et al. (2006:146), 
the government advanced the contentious issue of Sharia laws with an allowance of 
exempting the south from certain Sharia provisions as its position while the SPLM/A 
Mainstream  surprisingly continued with the self-determination demand but based on 
its’ new Sudan concept with  the principal objective of a secular democratic Sudan. 
Failure of the parties’ to change their positions eventually led to the collapse of the 
Abuja 2 initiative.  
The parties’ positions during the two Abuja initiatives revealed a rigid position of the 
north rooted in the Sharia and the majority rules orientation. Likewise in the context 
of the SPLM/A, it was not clear with its position as initially it presented a separation 
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 The SPLM/A had two delegations (SPLM/A Mainstream and SPLM/A Nasir) in both the Abuja 1 and 2 
initiatives. It is alleged that the Khartoum government had insisted on a separate delegation of the SPLM/A 
Nasir with a view to play the two groups against each other (Lesch, 1998:172).  
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posture but later a unity posture based on the new Sudan concept. The experience 
from the initiative was that it became clear in the minds of the two SPLM/A 
delegations that their differences were only privileging the north on its rigid agenda.  
This realisation and the experiences obtained, raised the relationship problem 
between north and south Sudan due to the north’s rigid position on the Sharia and 
the majority rules position and the vagueness of the SPLM/A position as it kept 
changing. This scenario it is noted presented the dilemmas that were faced by the 
two parties and may suggest the problems of conflict resolution of the north-south 
Sudan conflict at the time and the tensions and the threats to a return to war that 
exist between the two parties up to now.  
3.5.2.6    The Chukudum UMMA-SPLM/A accord 
The relationship between UMMA and SPLM/A can best be traced to the Koka Dam 
conference in 1986 whereby the two parties had attended and endorsed its 
declaration and in 1996 whereby the two parties pledged to tirelessly work together 
with fellow members in the NDA to accelerate the removal of the Khartoum 
government, hold a constitutional conference and to establish a democratic 
government (Lesch, 1998:188).  
The relationship of UMMA Party and the SPLM/A was based on their agenda to 
oppose the Khartoum government which was mostly linked with the ‘New Sudan 
‘perspective of the SPLM/A (Johnson, 2011:71).  SPLM/A at the time was threatened 
and weakened with splits within it  while the Umma party was suffering from the 
government’s ban of political parties and the imprisonment of its’ leader.56 The 
prevailing situations of the two parties at time are viewed in this regard to have 
played a part.  
NDA initially had disagreements within it over the issue of self-determination by the 
SPLM/A but Garang, the SPLM/A leader, managed to allay the fears of those who 
were concerned (Lesch, 1998:192). Garang in his response argued that the right to 
self-determination was a basic component of democracy and human rights principles 
to which the alliance was already committed to and warned that failure to establish a 
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At the time, the two parties belonged to the NDA which was an opposition organisation with an agenda to 
oust the Khartoum government (Kebede, 1997:24).  
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mutually acceptable political system would compel the south to demand 
independence which the Umma Party understood and accepted. 
Johnson (2011:104) states that Umma’s acceptance of the SPLM/s position on self-
determination came against a background of international acceptance of the right to 
self-determination and the importance of a secular democratic state secured through 
the support of the IGAD principles of 1994. The Umma party hoped that the south 
would opt to remain within Sudan as it was its plan to constitute a democratic 
government based on territorial decentralisation which at the time was resonating 
well with Garang’s new Sudan Concept. 
The Chukudum accord was signed on 12 December 1994 and as an agreement 
conceded that unity could not be based on force but to arise from free choice and 
further endorsed the NDA Nairobi Declaration of 1993 and the IGAD DOPs.  
Umma signed the declarations after recognising that a vote for the separation of the  
South would be an outcome not only from the policies of the time but of its 
perception’s prior view that Sudanese self-consciousness is Islamic and Arabic and 
also its failure to recognise the grievances of the African Sudanese ethnic groups 
(Johnson, 2011:104). The Chukudum accord in this context can be viewed to have 
brought out clearly the questions of self-determination and even the probability of a 
referendum during a transitional period given the circumstances which had 
developed at the time.  
The position translates that Chukudum added weight to the factor of the right to self-
determination for the south. The acceptance by a major party of the north contributed 
to some of the dilemmas the parties in the conflict faced which later had a bearing in 
the relations of north and south Sudan initially as one country and later as two 
states. 
3.5.2.7 The Asmara accords 1994 and 1995 
The Asmara accords include the resolutions of the Asmara Declaration of December, 
1994 and the NDA conference of June 1995 (Lesch, 1998:194-195). According to 
Iyob and Khadiagala (2006:107-108) the Asmara Declaration came out from a 
meeting organised by Eritrea between SPLM/A and leading Sudan opposition groups 
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(Umma, DUP and the Sudan Allied Forces (SAF)) which stressed on the aspect of 
unity but left the door open to southern independence in case of violations of the 
principles of multiracialism and the separation of state and religion.  
The NDA conference however, provided for an interim government after the 
overthrow of the NIF regime, self-determination as a basic right of peoples and a 
referendum for Abyei, Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile areas to decide whether or not 
to join the south (Collins, 2008:213).  
It is argued however that in both the instances of the two Asmaras, the religion factor 
remained vague while the non-use of religion in politics was affirmed; they remained 
silent on the secular state aspect.  However the right to self-determination and the 
referendum aspects came out clearly in the two forums and that the CPA of 2005 
was almost similar to the positions adopted during the Asmara Accords.  
Ironically however the Chukudum and the Asmara accords were almost identical to 
the SPLM/A proposals at the Abuja meetings in 1992 and 1993 which the NDA 
members had scorned at the time. 
The two Asmara events can be alleged to have provided an opportunity to both the 
northerners and the southerners about the idea of self-determination. It is believed 
that Eritrea may have influenced the direction towards the right to self-determination 
concept and its options of separation and unity as a country which had broken away 
from Ethiopia to the Sudanese opposition. The Asmara accords experience 
presented dilemmas to the conflict parties in Sudan in the way the case of the right 
to self-determination was to be handled. It can however be argued that the accords 
provided a basis for conflict resolution although it also was divisive to a certain 
extent. 
3.5.2.8 The first IGAD initiative 
The Inter-Governmental Drought and Development Authority (IGADD), later called 
the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was a regional 
organisation mainly created to respond to famine and environmental issues from 
1983 to 1984 comprising seven countries mainly from the horn of Africa (Iyob and 
Khadiagala, 2006:103).  According to Young (2012:83) the IGAD peace initiative for 
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Sudan was embarked on after being requested by President Bashir of Sudan during 
its annual summit in 1993. The reasons for Bashir’s request came against a 
background of Sudan encountering high costs of living as a result of its civil war with 
the SPLM/A and isolation at the regional and international levels due to its 
fundamentalist and discrimination policies (Inter Africa Group, 1994).   
IGAD’s acceptance to take the challenge to mediate in the Sudan conflict, it is 
argued was based on the fact that it was an interested party and that although its 
members perceived the conflict differently; collectively they were concerned with its 
spill over effects in terms of the security in their countries (El-Affendi, 2001:585). 
The Sudan IGAD initiative went through four meetings, with a proposed agenda 
which included the interim arrangements and the constitutional principle underlying 
the resolution of the civil war which basically focused on the introduction of the right 
to self-determination and the question of a referendum for southern Sudan and the 
other areas which were united with it and an articulation of its Declaration of 
principles (DOPs) (Collins, 2008:2007).57 (See appendix 5 on the DOPs). This 
translated that IGAD tried to be clear on how the conflict was to be resolved which in 
the context of Khartoum was problematic. 
It is noted from the meetings that the Khartoum Government did not accept the 
positions which were advanced and chose to suggest its own formula which was the 
use of a military option. The Khartoum leader of delegation to these meetings as a 
sign of desperation and disappointment had this to say: “If you want to separate the 
South from the North, it will be done through the barrel of a gun. We will fight for it to 
the last man” (Lesch, 1998:183).  
The IGAD peace initiative came out clearly on the issue of the right to self-
determination for the south in the discussions of the four meetings that it had held 
with the Khartoum government and the SPLM/A and through the DOPs which it had 
produced to become the basis of the mediation/negotiation process of the conflict58.  
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 The DOPs were authored by IGAD as the basis for the mediation and negotiation of the North and South 
Sudan conflict during its initial meeting in 1994. 
58
 Susan Page, 04 October 2013, South Sudan 
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The experience of the four IGAD meetings can then be claimed to have provided the 
parties with dilemmas as it tried to be neutral in the resolution of the conflict as much 
as possible. Khartoum it is noted was surprised with the options which it felt were 
against it while SPLM/A was surprised with the options which it felt were in its favour. 
The position of the IGAD in this regard contributed to the dilemmas which the conflict 
parties faced which likely to an extent caused tensions and threats to a return to war 
at the time and even after the south separated.  
3.6 Conclusion 
The history of Sudan provides a trajectory of the relationship of Sudan and South 
Sudan initially as one country and now as two countries. The Turkiyya, the 
Mahdiyya, the British and the Egyptian condominium and all the post-independence 
military and civilian regimes of Sudan were responsible for the status quo. All 
administrations during these times viewed southern Sudan as different from northern 
Sudan. The interactions in the areas of religion, trade and politics created a culture 
of hostility between the people of north and south Sudan as at all times the 
Southerners were marginalised in these areas. 
The clash on an appropriate nomenclature of a national identity whereby the GOS 
wanted an Arab-Islamic one while the south wanted it to be African resulted in an 
intractable conflict which became difficult to resolve. The two civil wars (1955 to1972 
and 1983 to 2005) were generally the outcome of the poor relationship of the two 
parties/regions.  
Demands for the right to self-determination with the options of unity (federal status, 
confederation and autonomy) and separation were all attempts by the south to 
liberate itself from the GOS which never ceased to champion the Arab-Islamic 
assimilationist policies which the south detested.  
Both parties faced dilemmas in their efforts to resolve the conflict as many initiatives 
were embarked on. The dilemmas faced by the parties in the attempts generated a 
poor relationship status of the north and the south. This poor relationship explains 
the emergence of tensions at the time and even now after the separation of South 
Sudan from Sudan. Any attempts of conflict resolution/transformation through 
agreements as settlements are likely to encounter problems. 
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The next chapter discusses the analysis of the CPA in the context of conflict 
resolution. It aims at providing a general overview of the 2005 Sudan CPA and the 
activities as related to conflict resolution. 
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Chapter 4 
4.0 Analysis of the 2005 Sudan Comprehensive peace 
agreement in the context of conflict resolution  
4.1 Introduction 
The Sudanese conflict had/has been very devastating to the people Sudan initially 
as one country and now for the people of Sudan and South Sudan and the 
neighbouring countries. According to Azar (1990:16-17), a situation like this, 
translates into the deterioration of security, institutional deformity, psychological 
ossification and increased dependency and cliency on the part of the conflict actors 
in a country. The conflict forced millions of people to be either internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) or refugees, thereby destabilising the security of the region.  
The conflict was a challenge to international peace and security hence the need for 
resolution to avoid its negative effects. Attempts to resolve the conflict (internal and 
external) were many but the most significant was the Inter-Governmental Authority 
on Drought and  Development (IGADD) later IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development) led initiative backed by the US and its allies UK, Norway and Italy 
referred to as the Troika or the Quartet.59 According to Ramsbotham et al. (2011:31), 
as articulated in chapter 2 conflict resolution is about addressing and transforming 
the deep rooted sources of a conflict. The objective of the IGAD initiative was to 
resolve/transform the conflict and achieve peace.  
Galtung, (1996:9) as in chapter 2 views peace as an occurrence of harmony 
characterised by lack of violence, conflict behaviour and the freedom from fear of 
violence or non-violence, creative conflict transformation and categorised as either 
negative peace or positive peace. In conflict situations/war, conflict is only ended 
either through military victory or a mediated/negotiated settlement guaranteed by a 
peace agreement. Wallenstein and Sollenberg (1997:343) as in chapter 2 define 
peace agreements as arrangements entered into by warring parties to explicitly 
regulate or resolve basic incompatibilities. In essence peace agreements are conflict 
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 The Troika or the Quartet comprised of the United States of America (USA), United Kingdom (UK), Norway 
and Italy) supported and revived the Sudan conflict peace talks.  
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settlements. It is contended in this regard that parties to a conflict face dilemmas in 
the course of the attempts to resolve conflict which in many instances tend to derail 
conflict resolution efforts (Barash, 1991:9-11). 
The IGAD peace initiative culminated into the CPA, which contributed to partially 
ending the war in Sudan. The question is whether the CPA only partially ended the 
war (negative peace) or whether it went beyond and contributed social justice 
(positive peace) in the context of conflict resolution through the lens of its related 
theories of Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory and the Liberal peace theory. 
Against this background, the mediation of the CPA, negotiations of the CPA, the 
perspective of the protocols as to whether they were adequate and appropriate and 
the peacebuilding initiatives in the context of conflict resolution will be discussed. 
4.2 Mediation of the CPA  
The Sudanese conflict was an intrastate conflict which required managing and 
eventually resolving to eliminate the devastating effects with a view to achieve 
durable peace. The attainment of peace required the two conflicting parties to 
resolve their incompatibilities. 
The Sudanese governments, for reasons of national interests, preferred own direct 
interparty negotiations as opposed to mediated negotiations for a long time Maundi 
et al. (2006:135). Although initially successful, with time such an approach became 
difficult to sustain and opened up to a chapter of outside third party interventions 
which focused attention on mediation to facilitate negotiations of the conflicting 
parties.  
Mediation is essentially a pacific, non-coercive and non-binding approach to conflict 
management that is entered into freely by the concerned parties who at the same 
time maintain control over the substance of the agreement (Fisher, 2014:4). In a 
similar regard according to Ramsbotham et al. (2011:23-24 and 28), third party 
intervention (which includes mediation as one of its methods) which is a form of 
diplomacy, plays an important part in how the actions of the actors can be perceived 
in the context of conflict resolution (see table 2.2).  Mediation is also one of the 
important conflict resolution approaches method. 
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President Al-Bashir of Sudan during an annual summit of IGAD in 1993, in Addis-
Ababa requested the organisation to mediate in his country’s North-South conflict 
(Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006:103).60 The request meant that a third party should 
intervene to resolve the conflict, either by the great power, the multi-government and 
the eminent persons’ model as the dominant models of mediation (Mitchel 2008:95). 
According to Bercovitch and Jackson (2012:38-40) mediation can be done by 
individuals, states and institutions and organisations.  
The IGAD mediation was a multi-governmental model or mediation by a regional 
organisation. The use of this model, however, raises doubts, especially when the 
conflict is within the formal boundaries of one of the members of the organisation or 
formal government of a state as one of the parties to a conflict opposed by ethnic or 
other types of insurgences. The same is the case when the issues in the conflict 
revolve around the preservation of the unity of the state as opposed to its division or 
disintegration (Mitchel, 2008:95-96). It becomes difficult to discover an appropriate 
government or an honest broker given the tendency of states and the 
international/regional organisations to use the principles of territorial integrity and 
non-interference in the internal affairs of any country unless genocide clearly 
threatens.61  
Conflict resolution approaches include the traditional/first generation approach which 
is best suited for dealing with inter-state conflicts and the 21st century approaches 
which are suitable for dealing with intrastate conflicts (Richmond, 2002:9). Since the 
conflict at the time was intrastate in its nature, the choice of IGAD as a sub-regional 
governmental organisation was appropriate as it fitted well with the 21st century 
conflict resolution approaches which are predicated on the participation of many 
actors of the society involved with conflict in the peacemaking process.  
The north-south Sudan conflict involved many parties which included military, 
political, armed groups, civil society and the grassroots level. However, only the 
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 IGAD is an organisation whose members include the seven countries of the Horn of Africa namely; Djibouti, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda which initially was instituted to deal with the coordination 
of regional responses to famine and environmental issues largely due to pressure from aid agencies and 
international donors. In due course however, following new thinking on the role of regionalism and regional 
cooperation in safeguarding international order resulted in the organisation undertaking subsequent 
responsibilities in the fields of peace and security (El-Affendi2001:581).  
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 Interview with Susan Page, 4 September, 2013, Bradford, United Kingdom. 
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GOS and the SPML/A were included in the mediation process while all the others 
were left out.62 IGAD used a first generation/traditional conflict resolution approach 
by only involving officials of the two conflicting parties. Bercovitch and Jackson 
(2012:6) state that the first generation/traditional conflict resolution approach is a 
state-centric Westphalia system whose goal is to resolve conflict so as to protect 
order and security and by reinforcing the ability of states to pursue their own 
interests.  
This particular conflict resolution approach uses the traditional tools of conflict 
management which revolve around legal methods, peacekeeping, mediation and 
negotiation frameworks and the incorporation of actors defined in terms of either 
states or insurgents (Richmond, 2002:9). This suggests that those who were left out 
in northern and southern Sudan continued with the conflict as spoilers of the peace 
process which is a direct translation that whatever settlement was reached was only 
respected by those who were included in the process. 
The attitudes of the parties which were left out were still hostile, the behaviour violent 
and the conflict structure not changed as fighting still continued. Galutng’s ABC 
conflict triangle theory in this case could not apply. Likewise as the conflict structure 
could not be transformed, peacebuilding activities could not take place for liberal 
peace to take root as is espoused in the Liberal peace theory.  
4.2.1 Origins and reasons for the mediation 
There must have been good reasons by the Government of Sudan (GOS)   to 
request IGAD to mediate in its conflict and for the SPLM/A to accept the proposal. 
According to Iyob and Khadiagala (2006:102), the request was dictated by difficulties 
it faced, relating to its pursuance of a military option in its conflict with southern 
Sudan― although IGAD came in at a time while the military balance was in its 
favour, there were economic and political challenges within its military ranks.63 At the 
time, no less than three military coups were attempted during the period 1991 and 
1993. There was increased solidarity between the northern political parties under the 
NDA and the SPLM/A and the government at the time was being isolated 
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internationally and regionally because of its discriminatory and fundamentalist 
policies.64  
These developments suggest that Sudan was under pressure to effectively govern 
the country and thought to take mediation as an option. Mediation is important 
especially at a stage when at least some of the conflicting parties have come to 
accept that pursuing conflict is unlikely to achieve their goal at least before reaching 
the stage of accepting formal negotiations (Darby and Mac Ginty, 2008:94-97). 
Bashir may have been in this position hence his request for mediation.65 
However, Bashir’s gesture was a calculated strategy which was based on trying to 
prove to the world that Africans had become mature enough to resolve their own 
problems and as such no longer required a foreign guardian (Young, 2012:83). It is 
perceived that Sudan wanted to pre-empt foreign intervention - that is to pre-empt 
any UN’s initiative on the country’s problems which also came with a fear that in the 
absence of a viable peace process, the USA military engagement which at the time 
was underway in Somalia could be unleashed on the country66.  
The request by Sudan for the mediation was done to protect itself against anticipated 
actions of the International community and to use the fellow members of the IGAD as 
a legal shield (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006:101). For fellow members of the IGAD, an 
organisation of sovereign states would in no way support a rebel movement bent on 
challenging its sovereignty. This may have originated from the fact that Ethiopia and 
Eritrea who were among the IGAD member states were viewed as best friends as 
they were being governed by former insurgents indebted to Sudan for the support 
which it had given to them during their liberation struggles (Young, 2012:83). 
 The SPLM/A which was fighting the government was undergoing a very difficult 
period resulting from the  loss of support from the Derg in Ethiopia and a split which 
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resulted in the emergence of two parallel SPLM/A groups (SPLM/A-Mainstream and 
SPLM/A Nasri later called SPLM/A-United).67  
The SPLM/A due to its vulnerable position, (militarily and politically) had no option 
but to accept the IGAD mediation proposal. However, SPLM/A viewed the proposal 
for IGAD to mediate with scepticism mainly due to the fact that IGAD as an inter-
state organisation would perhaps be inclined to favour the GOS (Iyob and 
khadiagala, 2006:104).  
At the end of it all the parties preferred IGAD over other respective mediators due to 
the fact that the organisation at the time resonated well with the new African 
perspective of searching for African solutions to African problems. Maundi et al. 
(2006:148), state that the basis of this position had been a sober realisation by 
African countries of the reluctance and the inability of external actors to act on 
conflicts in Africa and that even within Africa, the choice of IGAD was in line with the 
layered responsibility framework after the failure of other OAU sponsored initiatives. 
It should however be argued that the key reason for IGAD to be allowed to mediate 
in the northern and southern Sudan conflict in 1993 was because the Cold war which 
had been a basis of support for the conflicting parties  had ended. This position 
made making an ‘African solution’ acceptable and in this case using the IGAD. 
Mediation is likely to be used and accepted when parties calculate that it will help 
them with a face saving way out of a conflict or a means of influencing their 
opponent or that rejecting mediation will result in great harm than accepting 
(Kleiboer, 1996:380). Zartman (2000:22), states that parties are most likely to accept 
mediation and cooperate for a peaceful resolution only after certain conditions are 
met – that is when they find themselves locked in conflict from which they cannot 
escalate to unilateral victory and the deadlock is painful to both of them (although not 
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necessarily in equal degrees or for the same reasons) they seek a way out and 
terms such a situation a ripe moment.68  
The positions of Sudan and the SPLM/A at the time suggest that the two parties 
faced dilemmas in how they could proceed with the conflict as they were all helpless 
in the circumstances they were in. What was problematic to the acceptance of the 
mediation by the two parties was that each party felt hurt at different times and as 
such real commitment to resolve the conflict appeared could be elusive. This 
suggests that only partial negative peace could be achieved and positive peace for 
both potential and actual conflict would be difficult to attain as it would be difficult to 
reconcile the parties. 
IGAD’s acceptance of the challenge to mediate was based more on the fact that it 
was an interested party to the conflict (Maundi et al. 2006:149). Although individually 
its members might have perceived the conflict from different perspectives, 
collectively they saw it more on regional security terms specifically concerning the 
spill over effects on their countries’ political stability.  
This suggests that the objective of the IGAD members supported by the western 
powers in this regard was generally to help a fellow member in order to help 
themselves as well. The position of IGAD presented a riddle in terms of being a 
neutral and honest broker in the context of conflict resolution although it satisfactorily 
positioned itself in terms of the liberal peace perspective69.    
The GOS and SPLM/A in this case faced dilemmas in the context of the conflict 
settlement, management and resolution/transformation due to the dynamics of their 
relationship and the organisation which was handling the mediation.  
 4.2.2 IGAD mediation frameworks 
There were in all two IGAD mediation initiatives (the first from 1993 - 2001 and the 
second from 2002-2005) focused to end the Sudan conflict and achieve peace. 
Surprisingly, each came up with its own framework as the basis for the negotiations 
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although it was claimed they were the same. The Declaration of Principles (DOPs) 
served as the basis for the first initiative while the Machakos framework which was 
also a protocol served as the basis for the second IGAD initiative.70  
The DOPs emerged in view of lack of progress during the meetings of the first 
initiative’s negotiations whereby the issues of the right to self- determination and the 
separation of the state and religion took centre stage. In a move to make progress, 
the IGAD mediators authored the DOPs and handed them to the delegates for them 
to examine confidentially and to be discussed at the next round of talks (Lesch, 
1998:181-182).  
SPLM/A-M and SPLM/A United endorsed the DOPs while the government 
delegation rejected them completely on the grounds that mediators were not 
supposed to state their preferred outcome and that the issues of religion and state, 
secularism and self-determination were outside the scope of IGAD. This was a bad 
start for mediation however, IGAD went ahead and adopted the DOPs as the basis 
for the negotiation of the conflict. Carnevale and Pruitt (1992:564) state that 
mediation is important especially at a stage when at least some of the conflicting 
parties have accepted that pursuing the conflict is unlikely to achieve their goals 
even before accepting formal negotiations. This claim supports the positions of the 
two SPLM/A factions which might also have had an effect on the actions of the GOS 
later to return to the table.  
The Machakos framework was authored during the second Initiative after Kenya 
appeared to have taken over the process as the members of the IGAD collective 
appeared to have taken a back seat (Young, 2012:355). The Special envoy General 
Lazarus Sumbeiywo described the DOPs as a complete analysis and stated that the 
Machakos protocol as a framework was a single text zeroed in on the two aspects of 
self-determination and the separation of state and religion in the context of the north 
and south Sudan conflict.71  
Against this background, it can be seen that the DOPs had a broad focus which had 
included dealing with the resolution of conflict in the whole of Sudan while the 
                                                          
70
 Interview with Bona Malwal, 22 October, 2013, Oxford University -United Kingdom. 
71
 Interview with General Lazarus Sumbeiywo, 12 September, 2013, Nairobi-Kenya 
150 
 
Machakos framework had been a filtered version of the DOPs which had a 
concentration on the northern-southern Sudan conflict only. The parties faced a 
dilemma as to which framework would be effective. Likewise the narrowing down of 
the agenda by the Machakos framework implies that the other issues in the other 
areas related to the conflict would not be resolved.72 Darfur and east of Sudan in this 
case were left out (Young, 2012:100). It is argued that Darfur was left in the CPA 
mediation/negotiation to avoid complicating the settlement of the northern and 
southern Sudan conflict. Secondly it is perceived that while the population of the 
area was non-Arab, Islam was their religion and as such was considered as part of 
the heartland of the GOS whose agenda was the Islamisation of the whole Sudan.  
East Sudan was left out for the same reasons but was treated/is treated differently 
as it is seen as a buffer zone for any conflict with either Ethiopia or Eritrea. The 
reasoning may possibly be that the area can easily align with these countries. Thus 
complete negative peace could not be achieved as the other actors including those 
in these areas continued fighting. Positive peace as advanced in the Liberal peace 
theory could not be realised as the conflict structure could not be changed.  
The refocusing of the DOPs at Machakos, was a direct translation that IGAD as an 
organisation was facing disunity among its’ members on the Sudan conflict which 
may have had its origins from the tensions between some of the member countries 
which had reached a highest level with the outbreak of the Ethiopia- Eritrea war and 
the USA and its allies’ close relationship with Kenya at the time (Young, 2012:91). 
This affected the mediation efforts, the negotiations at the table and the relationship 
of the two parties later after the process. This position may explain the dilemmas that 
were faced by the parties and the tensions and the threats to a return to war later in 
the process between them. 
The DOPs and later the Machakos framework were acts in the right direction in the 
context of conflict resolution. However, the adoption of the Machakos framework to 
some extent could not assist to deal with attitudes, behaviour and the conflict 
structure as are advanced in the Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory as it was 
narrow in its focus. The failure to transform the conflict structure would imply not 
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being able to carry out peacebuilding activities which assist to achieve liberal peace 
as is advanced in the Liberal peace theory.  
Iyob and Khadiagala (2006:105) state that the DOPs were an important formula as 
the basis for future negotiations of the conflict with a view to resolve the conflict in 
the whole of Sudan but the contradiction that came with the Machakos framework 
which only focused on the north-south Sudan conflict perspective is noted to have 
prejudiced the conflict resolution process which could have served to achieve peace. 
The change of the framework from the DOPs to Machakos in this regard was a 
dilemma which the conflict parties had faced in the attempt to resolve the conflict. 
4.3 Negotiation of the CPA 
Negotiation is one of the methods of the conflict resolution approaches that aims at 
stopping violence and reaching an agreement through a joint decision-making 
process by parties involved in a conflict. Negotiation is perceived as was defined in 
chapter 2. Generally negotiation is a process by which actors communicate and 
exchange proposals in an attempt to agree about the dimensions of conflict 
termination and their future relationship (Ramsbotham, et al., 2011:299).  
Negotiation is a practical act whereby the parties in conflict sit together to discuss 
their incompatibilities with a view to resolve a conflict and circumstances allowing 
achieve durable peace. The parties in Sudan who were involved with conflict 
accepted mediation with a view to allow the conflict to be resolved through 
interactions at a table.  
The Sudan conflict parties, despite their acceptance to negotiate, did not really have 
a commitment to give the process full attention considering the fact that it had been a 
norm for the GOS to  dishonour agreements and thus made both parties to have a 
business as usual attitude on the exercise.73 One of the respondents had this to say: 
“[t]here had been many agreements in Sudan which had been reached through 
negotiations but all of them were dishonoured. Our view was that it was going to be 
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the same like before in the case of the IGAD process. I personally had this chat with 
chairman”.74  
This position translates that the parties had apprehensions with the IGAD 
negotiation. Bercovitch and Jackson (2012:21) allege that the parties, the issues and 
the context are the core elements of any negotiation process and that each one has 
an effect on how the process is conducted and on the range of the options it may 
achieve.  The absence of any one of the elements affects the outcome of negotiation 
processes in the context of conflict resolution.    
4.3.1 Actors in the negotiations 
The conflict in Sudan at the time IGAD intervened as already articulated had a 
number of actors who were involved in it who included; the military, other armed 
groups, political parties and civil society groups.75 It is noted however that only the 
GOS and the SPML/A-M were privileged to seat at the negotiating table while other 
political parties from the north and the south were left out.76 Who gets a seat and 
who does not matters a lot in peacemaking since active participation of those given 
an opportunity potentially generates domestic political support, international 
legitimacy and secures their influence in post-conflict state institutions in addition to 
giving value to the element of inclusiveness.   
IGAD as was the case with the mediation used a first generation/traditional conflict 
approach which is exclusive in its nature other than the 21st century approaches 
which are inclusive in their nature. Lanz (2010:275) indicated that the factors of 
practical requirements and the international norms inform the dynamics of inclusion 
and exclusion of entities in peace negotiations (See table 2.1). Similarly Peace 
Accords Matrix in the same chapter 2 indicates that agreements require the 
involvement of major parties (those with influence) in its definition of a CPA.  
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The realpolitik approach of only stakeholders who add value to the process and 
augment the chances of reaching a sustainable settlement to be given seats at the 
table, regardless of normative factors was used maximally in the context of the 
mediation/negotiation determination of the actors who had to be at the table at 
Machakos and later Naivasha. This arrangement whereby others were left out was 
not in the best interest of conflict resolution which was supposed to ensure the 
achievement of complete negative peace and eventually positive peace. Those left 
out naturally continued fighting and even after an agreement they would be spoilers 
of the settlement. Likewise by leaving out the other groups, IGAD narrowed its broad 
based perspective which it had set out in the DOPs.   
These actions in essence killed the spirit of the Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory 
whereby attitudes are not to be hostile, behaviour not to be violent and the 
contradictions in terms of the conflict structure changing as part of a conflict 
resolution/transformation process. Likewise peacebuilding activities could not 
effectively take place and thus liberal peace as advanced in the Liberal peace theory 
could not be achieved.   
4.3.2 Conduct of the negotiations 
The negotiations of the Sudan CPA initially involved teams of negotiators from the 
GOS and the SPLM/A-M at Machakos, but was narrowed down to two people, 
Osman Taha (Vice President of Sudan at the time) representing the government and 
John Garang representing the SPLM/A at Naivasha. One of the respondents had this 
to say about the negotiations during the Naivasha phase “Negotiations alternated 
between the two leaders alone with no one else permitted to sit with them. The chief 
mediator, the Troika observers and the experts in this case were not even allowed”.77  
This arrangement was a direct result of the mediators who restricted the participation 
of the parties may be guided by the practical requirements and the normative 
dimension perspectives in order to achieve the best out of the exercise. The 
negotiation approach which was used at Machakos to come up with the framework 
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agreement was more practical and better in its approach to resolve the conflict than 
the later process at Naivasha which only involved the two principals of the parties.78  
During the Machakos phase, the two groups of the negotiators adopted a problem 
solving approach whereby the members were given opportunities to give their views 
even athough they had to consult their leadership on crucial decisions. To the 
contrary, during the Naivasha phase issues were negotiated only by the two 
principals without inputs from their colleagues79.  
According to Young (2012:106), leaving the negotiations in the hands of only two 
people assuming they would continue to be influential to resolving the conflict, risked 
losing institutional memory and continuity. Rogier (2005:93-94) argues that the 
negotiation exercise by the two individuals reduced the role of the IGAD mediators 
supposedly in place to provide guidance and direction and who also could  have 
acted as witnesses in cases of departures from some of the agreed issues later after 
the process. The death of Garang six months after the signing of the agreement is a 
case in point in this regard. 
The negotiation approach whereby the two leaders  from only two parties in a conflict 
which involved many parties and groups sat alone in a room without others missed 
out on contributions from others who could have added more to the process and on 
the issues which could have assisted in the context of conflict resolution.  
The exclusion of the other members of the two parties it is noted affected the content 
of the settlement and the aspects of conflict resolution/transformation.80 The view is 
that those who were not involved were senior people in the parties and by being 
locked out by their leaders felt neglected and cheated. Likewise by locking out the 
mediators, the negotiations lost out more in the context of their oversight and advice. 
Members of the delegations and the mediators did not know some of the issues 
which had been discussed by the two leaders.  
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As is advanced in the Galtung’s ABC theory, the attitudes and the behaviour of those 
left out still remained violent and hostile and that due to the status quo, the conflict 
structure could not be transformed. Liberal peace as espoused in the Liberal peace 
theory could not be realised as it would be difficult to carry out peacebuilding 
activities which support it later in the process.  
Similarly, the NCP which was the GOS party at the negotiations opposed allowing 
the NDA to the negotiations because it feared that its members would gang up on 
them and confuse its agenda. In a similar context the SPLM/A on the same feared 
that members of the NDA could make a common cause with their Northern 
colleagues and that such participation would side track the North-South faces of the 
negotiations81.   
Young (2012:109) states that NCP feared that the SSDF which was comparable in 
strength to the SPLM/A would make common cause with the SPLM/A and create 
problems whilst SPLM/A viewed them as NCP puppets whose presence could have 
undermined their claim of militarily controlling most of the areas in the rural Southern 
Sudan on the part of the other Armed groups in the conflict.  
The exclusion of the other political parties and the armed groups to take part in the 
negotiations, it can be claimed ignored the intra-regional differences of the country 
and wrongly made an indication internally and externally that the NCP led 
government and the SPLM/A-M were homogeneous blocs in the regional divide. This 
status quo did not help the factor of conflict resolution/transformation in that the root 
causes of the conflict could not be removed. Peace could not be built as there was 
no foundation on which it could be built on as the other actors were locked out.  
The conducted negotiations focused to achieve partial negative peace only and not 
to resolve the conflict completely and to build peace which could have achieved 
positive peace. One respondent had this to say; “The CPA was an extended 
ceasefire to allow our fighters to rest, re-arm and once refreshed to return to fight. 
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There can never be genuine peace between the north and the south. We are 
different”.82   
The omission of the civil society as the grassroots representatives from both north 
and south Sudan in the negotiations, created a problem regarding conflict resolution. 
Complicating an already difficult process, less secrecy in view of the principles of 
civil society, requirement of a serious research to determine the authenticity of the 
various organisations for consideration to be at the table and advancement of 
proposals on how they could be involved were the justifications for the absence of 
the civil society at the table by the IGAD and the parties involved with the negotiation 
(Young, 2012:113-114).  
The inclusion of the civil society could have served well in overcoming the claim of a 
lack of democratic legitimacy of the parties which were at the table and assist in 
clarifying the contention that the process lacked the support of the Sudanese people. 
The claim translated a lack of ownership of the agreement by the people of the north 
and the south considering the fact that NCP came into the government through a 
coup and the SPLM/A through a mutiny – which then made them both not to be 
legitimate representatives of the constituents in their regions.83  
Lanz (2010:282) as in chapter 2 states that civil society builds popular support for the 
implementation of an agreement and supports the consolidation of peace in the long 
run. The absence of the civil society at the negotiating table of the Sudan conflict can 
in this regard be viewed to have been a problem as it meant losing out on most of 
the aspects that involve conflict resolution in addition to the question of the lack of 
legitimacy of the concerned parties. The chief mediator had this to say:  
“We attempted to include everybody from north and south Sudan who could assist in the peace 
process but it must be understood that not everybody could be there. The ballot box later in the 
process gave everybody a chance to contribute”.84 
This position translates that IGAD defended the position of excluding other 
stakeholders who could have assisted with the conflict resolution process. This was 
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a direct translation that the old approaches of conflict resolution are exclusive in 
nature and a preserve of soldiers, diplomats and the political elite which do not really 
assist to resolve the underlying roots of conflict. Bercovitch and Jackson (2012:186), 
however, state that the issue of inclusiveness requires careful consideration for fear 
of creating chaos during the negotiations and spoilers later during the 
implementation phase of the peace process. IGAD may have justified their reasons 
from this point. 
The 21st Century conflict resolution approaches are non-exclusive processes which 
involve Track II practitioners, NGOs, civil society groups, the media and individuals 
with a stake in peace processes (Bercovitch and Jackson (2012:186). Exclusions of 
the groups in the Sudan negotiations provided ground for spoilers later in the 
process who affected negative peace and even the process of positive peace. 
The government of Sudan for a long time had been supported by Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Libya and Iran while the SPLM/A at different times was 
supported by Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Kenya and Libya (Antwi-Boateng and 
O’Mahony, 2008:138). Despite this knowledge that these countries helped to fuel 
and sustain the conflict in Sudan, apart from those in the IGAD, were not included in 
the process and not even as observers.  
Their presence could have assisted to legally bind them to stop their destabilising 
support to any of the conflict parties and even in contributing to some of the 
protocols which in turn could have assisted the conflict resolution process in the 
country85. Thus, the CPA negotiations and the conflict resolution approach did not 
resonate well with the reality on the ground due to the failure to include some of the 
most important actors who were supporting and sustaining the conflict. No reason 
could stop these countries continuing providing support to the parties in Sudan which 
in essence meant failure to achieve complete negative peace and eventually even 
positive peace.  
According to Reimann (2004:3) as in chapter 2, core elements of negotiation include 
the parties, the issues and the context. The parties’ part is important in regard to who 
should be represented at the negotiating table as part of the inclusion and exclusion 
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criteria. Success or failure of peace agreements depend on the seriousness of 
negotiators to sell the accord to their constituents and to deliver on any concessions 
or reforms agreed on. This means that if other parties are left out, the selling of the 
peace ideas to the constituents of the locked out parties cannot take place. In such 
circumstances, attitudes, behaviour and the conflict cannot be changed or 
transformed. The conduct of the negotiations created dilemmas for the parties 
involved in the Sudan conflict and ended up affecting negative peace and positive 
peace as are advanced in the Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory and the Liberal 
peace theory. 
4.3.3 The outcomes of the negotiations 
The outcomes of a negotiation process are important for the resolution and the 
transformation of a conflict in order to achieve peace. The core concerns of the 
southerners included the question of national identity, the socio-economic and 
political gap between the centre and periphery and the constant threat of ‘Arabisation 
and Islamisation’ by the northern elite (Raftopoulos and Alexander, 2006:25). The 
core concerns in this regard were the substantive issues which the CPA through the 
negotiation process was to address in order to resolve and transform the conflict. 
Substantive issues advanced by parties form the basis of the solutions of a 
settlement. These originate from the core concerns which require addressing during 
the mediation/negotiation process (Darby and MacGinty, 2008:63). 
Ramsbotham et al. (2011: 187) state that outcomes of negotiations are either 
integrative or distributive in their nature. Integrative outcomes though not favoured by 
parties work well for conflict resolution/transformation. The outcome of the 
negotiations between the  NCP and the SPLM/A was a long agreement comprising 
six agreements and two annexures together which  came to be called the  2005 
Sudan CPA after being signed on 9 January 2005 in Kenya (Brosche,2009:6). The 
CPA in this regard was a collection of partial agreements.86  
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Although the outcome was referred to as comprehensive, other issues remained 
unresolved whilst others were not even touched. The issues of religion and the state 
and the question of the national identity are cases in point.87  
The extent of any agreement is important particularly in terms of the degree to which 
it deals with the constitutional, territorial and security aspects that lie at the core of a 
conflict otherwise it can merely be concerned with the manifestations of the conflict 
(Darby and Mac Ginty, 2008: 199). There are many types of conflicts however 
conflicts over political order and settlements in them entail the re-creation of the 
conditions for a viable common political order.  
The position that certain issues remained unresolved or untouched translates that 
the negotiations failed to tackle some of the substantive issues which could have re-
created the conditions for the viable common political order. Some of the dilemmas 
the parties faced explain the tensions or threats to a return to war even after 
southern Sudan separated from Sudan. 
The CPA as a broad outcome essentially partially managed to end the north- south 
Sudan conflict. Conflict resolution implies that deep rooted sources of conflict are 
addressed and transformed (Ramsbothan et al. 2011:31). This could not happen as 
some of the substantive issues which were part of the core concerns of the SPLM/A 
as a rebel movement were not resolved. A respondent was of the view that 
“resolving the conflict was important but we could not compromise some of the 
country’s national interests”.88 
The attitudes, behaviour of both the contending parties still remained violent and 
hostile and imply that the conflict could not be resolved and transformed. The 
Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory in this case could not take root and likewise 
due to a lack of key basis for achieving peace, liberal peace as advanced in the 
Liberal peace theory could not be attained.  
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4.4 The perspective of the CPA protocols  
The outcome of the mediation and negotiation of the CPA which took place at Karen, 
Machakos and finally Naivasha in Kenya were protocols which were meant to 
systematically address the concerns which had been at the heart of the Sudan 
conflict. Against the background of the core concerns, the IGAD mediation and the 
negotiation between GOS and the SPLM/A-M that took place produced six protocols 
which were supported by two annexures (Sudan 2005 CPA).  
For  Bischoff (2007:3) as in chapter 2, the key elements in a peace agreement 
includes its formal nature, the conditions that signal the intention to end hostilities, 
indications of what has been resolved and what is likely to happen thereafter. In the 
context of the CPA protocols, it can be claimed that each one of them was meant to 
contribute to the ending of the conflict and furthermore to bring about durable peace. 
This meant bringing an end to the hostilities (negative peace) and thereafter social 
justice being pursued (positive peace) which eventually would translate the 
underlying sources of the conflict being addressed (conflict 
resolution/transformation).  
The protocols missed a lot of points which could have made them more solid and 
robust for the purposes that they were intended. One of the respondents had this to 
say: “[w]e attempted to include as many details as possible but as I already 
explained, it was difficult as the chairman and the vice President were the final 
authority”.89 My take on this is that most points could not be included due to the 
decisions of the two leaders.  
This position points to the origins of some of the dilemmas which the parties faced at 
the time and thereafter the tensions and threats to a return to war being experienced 
even after South Sudan separated from Sudan. Due to these factors, the protocols 
could only achieve partial negative peace and not positive peace.  
4.4.1 The Machakos protocol  
The Machakos peace protocol was signed on 20 July by the GOS and the SPLM/A. 
It was not necessarily a peace agreement but an agreement on the framework for 
further discussions about peace. The protocol specified the core principles of the 
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governance of the country and details for the transition period until a referendum 
could be held against a background of claims of separation of state and religion 
within a federal state and the exercise of the right to self-determination through a 
referendum as major issues (Johnson, 20011:53).  
The special envoy General Sumbeiywo described the relationship of the DOPs and 
the Machakos framework/protocol (Young, 2012.95).  Although Machakos was 
viewed as a simplification, in actual sense it had completely departed from the 
DOPs. With respect to the differences, while the DOPs called for the separation of 
the state and religion in the whole of Sudan, Machakos only endorsed the principle in 
southern Sudan which was an express translation of moving away from a broader 
vision of Sudan’s problems to meeting the immediate needs of the parties.90  
In addition to this contradiction, while the DOPs made the right to self-determination 
subject to failure of the national government to introduce democracy, secularism and 
fair distribution of resources, Machakos granted the south the right to self-
determination after a transitional period irrespective of any changes within the state 
by the government.  
Lesch, (1998:12) defined self-determination as a concept of individual and collective 
rights to freely choose political status and other freedoms.  This definition translates 
that the parties at the table took differing positions which had implications in terms of 
conflict resolution/transformation specifically in the context of the implementation of 
the agreement. The right to self-determination was a solution advanced in order to 
collectively address all the core concerns as the substantive issues by the SPLM/A.    
Young (2012:94) states that Garang was upset when he learnt that his deputy, Salva 
Kirr had signed the Machakos protocol which had the right to self-determination with 
an option for South Sudan to separate in it and in reaction removed him as the 
leader of delegation of the SPLM/A’s negotiating team. Similarly, the GOS  criticised 
its leader of delegation, Dr Salahudin Ghazi for  signing the protocol and as a show 
of displeasure relegated him to a mere team member of the negotiating group during 
the subsequent negotiations meeting (Johnson: 2011:13). A respondent said that: 
“[t]here wasn’t unanimity with the delegation or with the government. Before I signed, 
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I had received an urgent call from a senior member of the government who advised 
me not to sign”.91  
On the same within the Troika, the USA on hearing about it rejected it and claimed 
not to have been consulted thus towing the line of its special envoy Senator Jack 
Danforth who thought that the problem of Sudan could be resolved by just dividing 
the oil resource92. The UK stated that the south was not ready to be on its own and 
as such required to be under somebody- thus appeared to be vague but was seen to 
be in favour of Khartoum’s position while Norway and Italy expressed happiness at 
the development –thus indicating favouring the protocol and the aspect (Waihenya, 
2006:146).  
From the different positions that the parties took on the position of the right to self-
determination, the parties did not mediate and negotiate the protocol in good faith 
and as such did not own the agreement fully despite having appended their 
signatures to it. The agreement could not achieve complete negative peace and that 
positive peace through peacebuilding activities as part of conflict resolution in line 
with its theory of liberal peace could be difficult to advance as some of the 
international backers who could support its grounding were indifferent to it.  
The narrowing of the scope of the negotiation by Machakos from a broad base of the 
DOPs implies that conflict resolution would be difficult because other areas which 
were part of the conflict system were left out and likewise issues which initially 
covered the whole Sudan were reduced to only those of north and south Sudan. 
What this scenario entails is that only partial negative peace could be achieved 
between GOS and SPLM/A and the conflict continuing in the other areas of the 
country which effectively dwarfed the chances of positive peace. This scenario 
explains the tensions and the threats to a return to war in Sudan at the time and now 
between the two Sudans. 
On a different note, Machakos used the 1 January, 1956 boundary as the basis for 
the definition of northern and southern Sudan. The exercise was meant to simplify 
the reference of the area in contention (Johnson, 2011:59). This act was problematic 
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in the sense that it curtailed any discussions that would concern any other area in 
Sudan other than the south.  
Southern Blue Nile state which is in the northern most part of South Sudan had parts 
of it as part of the Closed District Ordinance during the condominium.93  Abyei 
however which now is in Sudan was only transferred to Southern Kordofan in 1905 
for administration purposes from Bahr el Ghazal which was in southern Sudan now 
South Sudan. Southern Kordofan especially the Nuba Mountains area in Sudan 
shares a border area with South Sudan. The people in these areas (Bahr el Ghazal 
in South Sudan and Nuba Mountains and Abyei in Sudan) have common 
characteristics. The irony about this point is that at the time, SPLM/A was in control 
of these areas and fighting under the slogan of ‘the new Sudan vision’ which was 
generally about the unity of Sudan as has been articulated in chapter 3.94  
The 1 January 1956 boundary as a basis of defining the northern and southern 
Sudan regions was really not a good idea in the context of conflict resolution based 
on the facts as articulated above. This should have been left and considered later in 
the process on a case by case basis of the areas as a hard position on the 
demarcation could not assist to achieve negative and positive peace in the two 
regions.  This position suggests that the state of affairs from the approach of the 1 
January 1956 boundary demarcation between northern and southern Sudan created 
a hard position for further bargaining of the border issue later in the process. 
SPLM/A in the protocol allowed Sharia to remain as the source of legislation in the 
north while the south was to be governed by a secular legislation. As a reciprocation, 
the GOS accepted an internationally monitored referendum that would be held after 
a transition period of six and half years in which the south would decide whether to 
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separate or continue to exist within a united federal Sudan as an acceptance of the 
south’s demand on the right to self-determination(CPA articles 2.5 and 6.4).   
The bases of the conflict in Sudan were the core concerns of those in the periphery 
of the state, which the SPLM/A-M was representing.95 This state of affairs required 
that any agreement be designed to engage Sudan as a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, 
multi-religious and multicultural society in order to address the concerns. Machakos 
by allowing the south and the north to have different sources of legislation in the 
context of religion was a failure to address the threat of Arabisation and Islamisation 
as one of the core concerns advanced by the southerners.  
Likewise the protocol denied the Muslim majority of northern Sudan the basic right to 
decide whether they wanted the version of Islam which had been imposed on them 
by a government which came to power through a military coup. The fact that the 
forum accepted the North to continue embracing the Islamic law and the south to 
embrace secularism was a direct translation of the making of unity attractive clause 
in the protocol untenable and a clear manifestation of failure to manage and 
eventually resolve the conflict. Even complete negative peace could not be attained 
as both the parties would still be fighting through proxies. This shows some of the 
dilemmas that parties faced during the period and may explain the tensions and 
threats to a return to war now in the two states. 
The action of separating the north and the south in religious terms provided a fertile 
ground for a security dilemma between the two areas. As time went by, the two areas 
became used to the idea that they were separate from the other and as a measure of 
defending themselves, all the time competed in arming themselves in order to be 
superior to the other. The parties in case of any trigger could easily go to war with 
each other. This suggests that conflict resolution was being undermined as the 
attitudes and the behaviour of the actors were still hostile and violent and that the 
conflict structure could not be transformed as is advanced in the Galtung’s ABC 
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conflict triangle theory.  Later in the process positive peace as is advanced in the 
Liberal peace theory could not be attained. 
The differing perceptions of the right to self- determination by the Machakos protocol 
and the DOPs, the use of the 1 January1956 boundary as the basis for the definition 
of north and south Sudan and Sharia as a source of legislation in the north while the 
south had a secular legislation were problematic to the parties. It is noted in this 
regard that they are indicative of the dilemmas that the parties faced at the time and 
may explain the tensions and threats to a return to war at the time and now being 
experienced in the two Sudans. 
Ramsbotham et al., (2011:175-176) state that conflicts are inherently  dynamic and 
that conflict resolution has to  engage with a complex of shifting relations often within 
a wider system that has become resistant to piecemeal changes. This position 
serves the interpretation of the Sudan conflict well in the context of all the 
approaches which were taken as part of conflict resolution. 
4.4.2 The security arrangements protocol  
The security arrangements protocol was signed on 20 September, 2003. According 
to Rogier (2005: 120), the objective of a security plan under a peace agreement is to 
ensure that armed factions responsible for potential violence have been neutralised 
and reintegrated into society and for government to assert legitimate control over 
security via lawfully constituted security personnel assisted by a sustainable level of 
involvement by international forces. The security arrangements protocol was 
supposed to be designed in these lines in order for it to contribute to negative peace 
and as a basis for positive peace.  
The major concessions of the protocol basically included; the Sudanese Armed 
Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) to remain largely 
separate armies during the interim period, although they were to be treated equally 
as Sudan’s National Armed Forces (SNAF). It was also planned that should unity be 
opted for by the southern voters during the referendum, the forces were to form a 
single Army of Sudan but at the time the two forces were to deploy to their respective 
sides of the 1956 border (SAF to go beyond the 13th parallel towards the north and 
the SPLA beyond the 12th parallel towards the south) (See figure 3.1).  Other details 
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included all Other Armed Groups (OAGs) to be disbanded, creation of Joint 
Integrated Units (JIUs) composed of equal numbers of soldiers from SAF and SPLA 
(JIUs earmarked to be the nucleus  of the national army should unity be opted for 
during the referendum)  and finally creation of a Joint Defence Board (JDB) which 
was to be under the presidency to coordinate the two forces and to command the 
JIUs (Raftopoulos and Alexander, 2006:34) and (CPA chapter 6, Article 6.1-6.5).  
Sriram (2008:21) states that security, territory, politics and economics are the most 
important dimensions that feature highly in negotiations and peace agreements. The 
security arrangements of the Sudan CPA were basically a power sharing 
arrangement with focus on the security factor.  
Hoddie and Hartzell (2003:309) state that four most common methods used in 
sharing military power include; creation of a new military and /or police force by 
drawing members from the fighting forces (state and non- state) in proportion to their 
former size, creation of a new force drawing equal  numbers from former fighting 
forces, appointment of weaker or non-dominant armed factions to key  leadership 
posts in the security forces and permitting combatants to keep their own security or 
fighting forces. The latter is what was arrived at during the 2005 CPA negotiations as 
part of the security arrangements protocol.  
The decision to have two separate armies in one country, have them live in two 
separate domains and with different command structures was a problem in the 
context of conflict resolution. The arrangement it is noted was a fertile ground for 
developing a security dilemma as the existence of each would definitely end up 
threatening the other which with time would eventually lead the two forces to a 
physical confrontation.96 This means that the arrangement was only positive in the 
sense of making the guns silent for a period (negative peace) but could not assist in 
the context of positive peace as part of conflict resolution/transformation.  
Conflict resolution/transformation implies addressing the deep rooted sources of 
conflict so that behaviour is not violent, attitudes are not hostile and the structure of 
the conflict being transformed (Ramsbotham et al., 2011:31). The agreement to have 
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two separate armies in one country was a clear indication of lack of trust between 
the negotiating parties.  
Chapter 2 established the existence and importance of African indigenous conflict 
resolution approaches which differ from place to place on the continent. African 
traditional approaches of resolving conflict emphasise social trust building and 
restoration of the conditions for communal co-existence and if this was absent during 
the negotiations of the agreement, then chances of conflict resolution/transformation 
could be limited even if the agreement was signed by the two parties 
(Murithi:2008:17). This position suggests that an indigenous dimension at some point 
could have assisted in some way to resolve the conflict.  
Despite the two armies being designated as parts of a national army, the GOS 
refused to take the responsibility of funding the SPLA, meaning that the SPLM was 
to be responsible for the administration of its force97. This implies that the two forces 
were considered to be different from the other and that it may have confirmed the 
SPLM’s claims of marginalisation by the GOS. Negative peace in this case became 
difficult to achieve.    
The attitudes and the behaviour of the SPLM/A could not change and as such the 
conflict structure could also not be transformed. In this case the Galtung’s ABC 
conflict triangle theory could not take root and likewise Liberal peace as advanced in 
the Liberal peace theory achieved through peacebuilding activities in the 
implementation phase could not be attained. 
The protocol only recognised the SAF and the SPLA as the legitimate forces in 
Sudan while all the OAGs were to be disbanded. OAGs in Sudan referred in 
particular to the Southern militias who were affiliated to the GOS like the SSDF 
which had been receiving support from the government since the agreement they 
had signed with the government in 1997 (Rogier (2005:124),.  
The CPA Chapter IV, Article 7 of the protocol states that the OAGs shall be 
incorporated into the recognised forces of either party (Army, Police, Prisons and 
Wild life forces) or re-integrated into the civil service and civil society institutions 
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within a year. It is a known fact that the SSDF as one of the OAGs was a force which 
was comparable to the SPLM/A-M in terms of capacity. The fact that these OAGs 
from all the locations in Sudan were not included in the negotiations of the protocol/ 
whole agreement meant that they were not aware of these developments.  
Even if the SAF and the SPLA were made to stop fighting, these groups continued 
fighting and thus in essence imply that the protocol could not achieve complete 
negative peace.98 This explains the tensions and the threats to a return to war that 
are there between the states of Sudan and South Sudan.   
Rogier (2005:126) states that the deteriorating security conditions in South Sudan 
since 2003 suggest that Khartoum is still able to use its influence on some of the 
OAGs (SSDF) members to undermine rather than to foster peace with South Sudan. 
Similarly the activities of the SPLM/A now called Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/ North (SPLM/N) in Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile states in 
Sudan indicate the influence of SPLM/A-M in Sudan in terms of threat to peace.  
The developments of these scenarios in Sudan mean that unless the components of 
the SSDF and the SPLM/A in both Sudan and South Sudan become accommodated 
and included in the political and military administrations, they would remain potential 
spoilers both independently and at the service of other actors.99 This situation 
presented dilemmas to the parties and made the case of complete negative peace 
and even positive peace to be a problem to achieve in Sudan and now in the two 
Sudans.  
The JIUs as a creation of the protocol also seem to have been a problem in the 
context of negative and positive peace. The terms joint and integrated were 
problematic in the sense that literal meaning of the former means deploying forces 
side by side but retaining own command and control while in the later, means 
merging and being placed under a single command.100 Lack of clarity in these terms 
and how the units were to operate created a fear that at some point the forces were 
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going to be a source of violence most specifically in terms of their relationship which 
had a history of animosity.  
Similarly the protocol lacked the details on what would happen if the South opted for 
separation. The JIUs would be abandoned and as such would be a source of 
violence and insecurity in the areas that they were in. This played out after southern 
Sudan voted for separation. The negative peace which has been there has been 
undermined due to their activities and similarly it has been difficult for positive peace 
to thrive. The scenario indicates how the CPA was tested and the dilemmas that the 
parties faced. This may explain the tensions and the threats to a return to war in the 
two Sudans and between them.    
Thomas ((1987:1) states that security does not simply refer to the military dimension 
alone as it has often been assumed, but includes the whole range of dimensions of a 
state’s existence which are taken care of in the more developed states for example 
internal security of the state through nation/state building, the search for secure 
systems of food, health, money and trade.  
At the time of the negotiations, Sudan had problems of IDPs within the country, 
refugees in the neighbouring countries and others, a national security institution 
which was controlled by the GOS and matters of persecutions of the Christian 
churches and slavery101. These aspects were serious security issues which are 
argued to be some of the factors which were fuelling the conflict in Sudan.  The non-
inclusion of these issues as serious security concerns in the protocol meant that the 
attitudes and the behaviour of the parties could not change and thus the conflict 
structure could not be changed as is advanced in the Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle 
theory. This translates that complete negative peace could not be achieved and 
likewise due to poorly targeted peacebuilding activities liberal peace could not be 
attained as is advanced in the Liberal peace theory. 
The protocol concentrated more on the state’s security other than the human 
security part which was a critical area. In regard to the whole security protocol then, 
it leaned more towards addressing the negative peace part hence its concentration 
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on the armed forces only and the overlooking of the positive peace part. 
Peacebuilding activities which could lead to positive peace to achieve liberal peace 
in this case as advanced in the Liberal peace theory could not be realised.  
4.4.3 The wealth sharing protocol 
The wealth sharing protocol was signed on 7 January 2004. The main concessions 
in the protocol were; establishing funding facilities for reconstruction and 
development, sharing of oil and non-oil revenues and the banking system focusing 
mainly on southern Sudan and not any other area in Sudan (CPA Chapter III, 
Articles 1, 2 &3).  
The reasons for both state and non- state parties concern about post-conflict 
distribution of wealth and control over resources among others include; selfish 
reasons (well-being of cadres, leadership and looking after real or desired 
constituents), paying of fighters (which promote predatory or rent seeking 
behaviour), distribution of resources as one of the critical reasons that the conflict is 
for and fear of rivals receiving  greater economic  benefits which can in turn assist 
them to develop greater social power and capital or status (Sriram (2008:25). The 
wealth sharing protocol really revolved around these lines of reasoning with focus to 
address some of the core concerns which included the socio-economic and the 
political gap between the centre and the periphery. 
The starting point of the wealth sharing deal is viewed as the differences that were 
there between the centre and the periphery as was discussed in chapter 3, whereby 
it was viewed that resources for the state were only benefitting the centre and its few 
northern elites while the periphery representing the other parts of the country 
(southern Sudan and other areas in the East, West and the remote northern areas) 
was not being considered (Collins, 2008:134). There was an unequitable distribution 
of resources situation in Sudan.  
The exclusion of the other parties at the negotiating table however meant that the 
discussions for wealth only centred on  north and south Sudan as the negotiating 
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partners against a background of other parties and areas being involved and fighting 
alongside either the government or the SPLM/A.102  
Cases in point were SSDF in the south aligning with the government, SPLM/A-M 
aligning with northern political parties under the umbrella of the NDA (which included 
militia groups in the Nuba Mountains -Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile state in the 
North, Beja Congress and the Rashaida in the East) and a stand-alone conflict in the 
west in Darfur between the government and militia groups. This suggests that any 
solution which came out during the CPA wealth sharing protocol negotiations had 
implications in the other areas of the country.  
War continued in these mentioned areas and resulted in failure to achieve complete 
negative peace and at the same time positive peace becoming difficult to attain. The 
tensions and the threats to a return to war then in one Sudan and now in the two 
Sudans may have been caused by this situation. 
Only oil and non-oil revenues from southern Sudan were to be shared. Johnson 
(2011: 117), states that the main controversy stemmed from the fact that the location 
of most of the oilfields are in the south and due to this fact, the southerners 
developed a strong feeling that the  oil was theirs. The SPLM/A’s point of departure 
was therefore that the oil was in the south and in that light any agreement had to 
reflect that fact while on the other hand, government held that natural resources 
were national resources and further argued that it had engaged foreign companies to 
prospect the oil, invested on the infrastructure and as such was to be a major 
beneficiary of the investment through the revenues.103  The outcome of the 
negotiations on the oil revenue sharing at the end was that 2% was earmarked for 
the oil producing areas/states and 50%-50% shares of the balance to the GOS and 
SPLM/A (CPA Chapter III, Article 5.6).  
 The sharing of the oil revenues if it was indeed a national resource was unfair to the 
other areas of Sudan especially those which were in the periphery away from north 
and south Sudan. The exercise would not help to end the war as the other areas 
would still be fighting the GOS for their share as well. The facts on the ground were 
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that no southerner knew how much oil was being produced at the wells, the 
quantities that flowed through the pipelines to the refineries in the north, how much 
went into the oil tankers that went on the high seas and the quantity of oil traded at 
the intricate world markets.104  
The arrangement was unfair in the context of making unity attractive and the 
defacing of the marginalisation claim by the southerners. A better approach would 
have been to consider the comprehensive definition of the country’s economy or the 
country’s GDP and use it as the basis for the sharing exercise. The way this aspect 
was worked out encouraged both parties to view themselves as different from the 
other and in the process encouraged continuation of fighting between them and thus 
negative peace and even positive became difficult to achieve.105 The oil and non-oil 
revenues in this case also explain the tensions and threats to a return to war at the 
time and even now in the two separate Sudans. 
The parties had agreed to use the 1 January 1956 boundary as the basis for the 
demarcation of Sudan and South Sudan (see figure 3.1). Thomas (2009:19) in the 
case of the oil resource states that 75% of the oil production came from the south, 
another 15% from areas of Abyei claimed by southern Sudan and that most proven 
southern reserves are near the border of the two areas. Considering the fact that oil 
was a major resource for the country’s economy, both parties were forced to 
concentrate their military forces in the areas which means that the issue of oil 
became militarized. This status quo could not make unity attractive as each party 
was already in a state of war with a view to protect their most prized resource ‘oil’.106  
This suggests that peacebuilding as part of conflict resolution could not take place in 
the areas due to the posture that each of the parties had taken and as such 
complete negative and eventual transition to positive peace could not be realised as 
are advanced in the Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory and the Liberal peace 
theory. 
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The protocol included an agreement of dual banking and monetary system whereby 
two banks (Central Bank of Sudan in the north and the Bank of Southern Sudan in 
the south) would operate and two currencies would circulate during the interim 
period (Rogier, 2005:132). The arrangement reflected Sudan’s conflicting identities 
in that the central bank of Sudan would operate according to the Islamic law while 
the Bank of Southern Sudan which was going to be created would apply 
conventional banking regulations.  
Similarly, in the context of the monetary system, failure to agree on a single 
currency, the Sudanese Dinar more associated with Islam remained the currency for 
the North while the South was to use multiple currencies which included Kenyan and 
Ugandan Shillings, USA dollars and the Sudan Pound until the Central Bank could 
design a new currency that would reflect the cultural diversity of Sudan which at the 
time was even doubtful considering the positions of the parties at the table.107 The 
evidence given here suggests that the two parties failed to resolve the national 
identity question, separating state and religion and to encourage each other to make 
unity attractive as was envisioned in the Machakos protocol and by the whole CPA.  
This position translates that negotiation as a method of conflict resolution failed on 
this protocol as what came out clearly made an indication that the two regions did 
not want to live together in one country. Similarly, in such a situation conflict would 
not end and peace could not be built due to the intransigence of the two parties.  
Complete negative peace could not be achieved and likewise due to an absence of a 
conducive atmosphere positive peace could not be attained as some of the core 
concerns had not been addressed during the negotiations. 
In the context of reconstruction and development, the parties noted that South 
Sudan and the other war affected areas which were not in south Sudan faced 
serious needs in terms of basic government functions, civil administration and social 
and physical infrastructure (Rogier, 2005:130).This suggests that they had to be 
brought to the same level of socio-economic and public standards as the northern 
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states. This implies that regional imbalances between north and south Sudan were 
acknowledged.108  
In order to arrest this status quo, the agreement included the establishment of two 
reconstruction and development funds (Southern Sudan Reconstruction and 
Development Fund (SSRDF) and the National Development and Reconstruction 
Fund (NDRF) with the former responsible for south Sudan and the later for other war 
affected areas in north Sudan and likewise two Multi-Donor Trust Funds as pools for 
the funds from the donors (MTDFs). The arrangement was a dual mechanism for 
reconstruction and development of north and south Sudan which in essence 
defeated the purpose of making unity attractive as was aspired in the Machakos 
protocol.109 The two areas were already being perceived as separate states which to 
an extent may have made the southerners to solidify their resolve to separate from 
Sudan. 
The structure could not help to develop a nationwide view of Sudan but instead only 
contributed to consolidate (including the donors’ perceptions) a north-south paradigm 
which the CPA required to overcome.110 This presents some of the challenges the 
agreement encountered and the dilemmas which the parties faced at the time. This 
position begins to explain the tensions and later the threats to a return to war initially 
as one Sudan and later as two Sudans.  
Many respondents claim that the protocol had serious shortcomings in the areas of 
land ownership, water and other resources generally from which it gave some 
indications that the conflict could not be resolved between the two areas - north and 
south Sudan.111 Land ownership was a problem in Sudan and that land disputes are 
anchored both in the history of displacements which occurred because of the civil 
war and in the ethnic memory of traditional boundaries between ethnic groups (De 
kock (2011:16-17).  
The returnees (IDPs and those who had been refugees in different countries) and 
the residents could find themselves involved in disputes over land in both North and 
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South Sudan especially in the areas which were held by the rebels (SPLM/A-M and 
SPLM/A United). These developments created local frictions which at most times 
ended up as ethnic clashes. The question of land ownership was not given proper 
attention and as such meant that conflict resolution failed short of the intended 
effects.  
In an analysis, the protocol concentrated on the sharing of revenues and their 
management other than resources/assets which could have alleviated the problem of 
unequal distribution of resources and future problems of who owns what among the 
parties. Similarly the question of instituting different reconstruction and development 
arrangements also created problems in the context of making unity attractive for the 
two areas.  
The protocol gave more to drive the separation of the two parties other than the 
intended factor of making unity attractive. This eventually translated a failure to 
remove some of the underlying sources of conflict and thus in the long run affected 
the reconstruction agenda. This meant that the war could not be ended completely 
as there were still issues between the parties that were forcing them to continue 
fighting and thus not being able to achieve negative peace and in due course 
positive peace. This may explain the problems the agreement had to endure, the 
dilemmas the parties faced and the tensions and the threats to a return to war then 
and currently in the two separate Sudans. 
4.4.4 The power sharing protocol 
The Machakos protocol, which provided for power sharing and granted the right to 
self-determination to the people of south Sudan, was signed on 26 May 2004. The 
right to self-determination can be exercised either within a territory (unity) or outside 
a territory (partition/separation) as part of conflict management (Parker, 2000:1). The 
right to self-determination and the options that came with it (unity or separation) was 
conflict management in a conflict settlement meant to contain/regulate the war 
between north and south Sudan.  
In order to make unity attractive as opposed to separation, the parties were 
encouraged to agree to share power. Most scholars argue that wars that end at the 
peace table tend to feature power sharing outcomes either in a form of interim 
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governments or as seemingly permanent features of politics and that power sharing 
solutions ostensibly are designed to marry principles of democracy with the need for 
conflict management in deeply divided societies (Darby and MacGinty, 2008:195). 
Sudan adopted an interim government with a view to make unity attractive especially 
for the southerners for them not opt for separation in a referendum which was 
agreed on in the CPA.112 
Hoddie and Hartzell (2005:86-90), as in chapter 2 views powers sharing in the 
context of  central power sharing, territorial power sharing, military power sharing 
and economic power sharing as some of the ways in which power can be shared. It 
can be argued that power sharing in Sudan took this perspective. 
Significant compromises in the protocol at the national level included issues of the 
presidency, human rights and democracy, elections and pre- election 
representations, sharia law in Khartoum as the country’s capital (mostly governance 
of national issues), asymmetrical federalism issues which included the formation of 
the government of South Sudan, affirmative action for the southerners, state level 
representation and finally the three areas (Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile 
states) which were debated under the auspices of the government of Kenya in a 
separate process from that of the IGAD (Rogier, 2005:107).  
 
The power sharing in Sudan was done at three levels which were; the national level, 
Southern Sudan level and the local government level throughout Sudan.113 The crux 
of the power-sharing agreement lies in a guarantee of unity while introducing an 
autonomous interim government in the south. Power sharing in this context created 
tensions within the CPA itself as it represented the concept of two systems in one 
country (Haslie & Borchgrevink, 2006:29). This implies that there required to be a 
delicate balance between the objectives of a meaningful autonomy in the south and 
the maintenance of unity within the larger Sudan. It can be argued in this context that 
there was tension in the choice between separation and unity in the state-building 
process of Sudan. 
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The protocol allocated 52% to the NCP, 28% to the SPLM/A, 14% to the northern 
political parties and 6% to the southern political parties of the national power at the 
national level (Raftopoulos and Alexander, 2006:26). This arrangement implies that 
the large majority of the political parties in the North, the West, the East and the 
South could not have room to buy into the central government as large chunks of 
national power were pre-divided between the two parties which were privileged to sit 
at the negotiating table.114 This arrangement it is noted narrowly addressed the 
conflict as it only focused on the two parties (GOS and SPLM/A) whilst other parties 
and the OAGs were not included.  
Those who were locked out or given very little national power were still forced to 
continue fighting for their causes which in turn meant not being able to achieve 
complete negative peace and eventually positive peace.115 This further concretises a 
claim that apart from the arrangement being unacceptable to others in the periphery; 
it strengthened separatist tendencies that have eventually brought about the ideas of 
the balkanization of the country. Darfur, Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan states are 
cases in point. Attitudes and the behaviour of the other parties in this regard still 
remained hostile and as such the conflict could not be transformed as is advanced in 
the Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory.  
The figures of the division of power among the parties as they stood, as it can be 
noted gave the government a mechanical advantage above all the others in that it 
could still manipulate issues which the others were against to especially in terms of 
voting in the parliament.116 This scenario exacerbated the conflict other than ending 
it. The conflict resolution approach and its methods which were used to bring about 
peace in this regard failed to yield good results.  
Collins (2008:170), states that the NCP led government came to power through a 
military coup in 1989 and similarly the SPLM/A came to its’ status through a mutiny 
in 2003 (Ibid: 139:140). Based on these factors, the two parties had questionable 
political legitimacy as representatives of the people since they had not been 
democratically elected to the positions they were claiming and thus were not 
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supposed to share power.  This status quo as seen by other stakeholders in the 
country was a trigger to conflict in the country.  
This situation suggests that the conflict which was already underway could not easily 
be ended and resolved. The perception in this case was that negative peace at the 
time and later positive peace could not be completely achieved due to the lack of 
legitimacy of the two parties which had usurped power illegally from their societies. 
The Galtung ABC conflict triangle theory in this case could not take root and likewise 
liberal peace as advanced in the Liberal peace theory could not be attained.   
Some of the core concerns against the government were the question of national 
identity and the threat of Islamisation and Arabization of the whole country by the 
Northern elite. Considering the fact that the Machakos protocol failed to resolve the 
issues of sharia and the national identity between the two parties, it was challenging 
for the parties to share power in a government which had different sources of 
legislation in one country without a consensus in the articulated areas. Since no 
solution was reached on these two areas, negative peace could not be completely 
achieved as is advanced in the Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory. Similarly 
liberal peace could not be attained due the absence of key peacebuilding elements 
as are advanced in the Liberal peace theory.  
The other issues in the protocol (elements of human rights and democratisation 
which also included the provision for the sharing of power in the national security 
service, elections and pre-election of representatives, issues of the government of 
national unity and the three areas) were welcome developments as they would assist 
to bring on board the elements of positive and negative peace.  What was of interest 
is that most of these issues however were left in the hands of the presidency.117 The 
question was how and when the issues in question were going to be planned for if at 
all they had to be implemented. 
The feeling is that most of these activities were tabled for window dressing purposes 
and could not actually be given due attention later in the process.118 This point could 
not assist to resolve the conflict and to allow peacebuilding which could have allowed 
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positive peace to take root in the country. This scenario may answer the dilemmas 
that were faced by the parties in the conflict and the tensions and threats to a return 
to war at the time and even now after the separation of southern Sudan. 
Similarly, if the three areas (Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile) were agreed 
to be negotiated outside the IGAD framework, how then could they be made part of 
the CPA and on the same, what message did this arrangement send to the 
representatives of the areas. This arrangement gave out a signal that all did not 
augur well with the conflict resolution approach which was employed and specifically 
the peacebuilding aspects that could have assisted to transform the conflict.119 
The presumption is usually that the ideal outcome of peacebuilding as a conflict 
resolution method after armed conflict is a liberal capitalist state (Sriram (2000:21). 
The outcomes of the power sharing protocol could not be assumed as it is believed 
that most of what it stood for was a direct trigger of more conflicts at the centre and 
the periphery of the GOS and within the SPLM/A.  
In the final analysis, the case of the power sharing protocol in the context of the 2005 
Sudan CPA, mostly served the purpose of trying to achieve negative peace but erred 
in its process as it only involved only two parties to share enormous power and 
disregarded others in the country. The situation made conflict resolution to be difficult 
to achieve most specifically due to short sighted mediation and negotiation 
processes of the IGAD and the differing contents of the DOPs and the Machakos 
protocol as frameworks of the negotiations. Although there were traces of the 
aspects to achieve positive peace, most of them were limited to the narrow focus of 
the participation in the sharing of power to accommodate the elite of the two parties 
while other issues were left in the hands of the presidency without proper 
elaboration.  
4.4.5 The Abyei protocol  
Abyei is located in north Sudan along the border between North and South Sudan 
that is according to the 1 January, 1956 boundary although historically the area had 
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initially been part of south Sudan (Natsios, 2012:171-173) (see figure 4.1 & 5.1 
table). 
Figure 4.1-Map of the location of Abyei 
 
Source:Google Maps :http://www.auschwitzinstitute.org/ 
The area concerned is a traditional territory of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms as 
transferred from Bahr- al Ghazal in southern Sudan to Kordofan in northern Sudan in 
1905 while the Misseriya who are nomads mostly from western Sudan come to the 
area only during the dry season to graze and water their animals (Johnson, 
2011:35).  
In this regard it can be alleged that the history of the area, the people and their 
activities in the area and the issues at stake in the area formed the basis of the Abyei 
protocol.120 According to Rogier (2005:115-116), at the time of the negotiations, the 
area was under the control of the SPLM/A-M, which was fighting the government of 
Sudan under the concept of a ‘new Sudan vision’. Main compromises in the protocol 
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included; the provision for the administration, the sharing of local oil revenues, and 
the guarantee of continued access to traditional grazing areas by both the Ngok 
Dinka and the Misseriya (CPA chapter IV article 1.1).  
Abyei was transferred from Bahr el Ghazal in South Sudan to Kordofan in 1905 by 
an administrative order, that the area so transferred included the nine Ngok Dinka 
chiefdoms and no mention of the Misseriya in the transaction enhances the claims 
by the south to be the rightful owners of the area.121  
The fact that the Misseriya as nomads come seasonally to the area to graze and 
water their animals creates a problem which requires resolving.  Failure to consult 
and include the constituents of the area in the negotiations was problematic and left 
as it was would not stop clashes between the two entities.122 Complete negative 
peace could not be envisioned as the sources of the conflict were not removed 
during the negotiations.  
 The issue of Abyei and the other two areas (Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue 
Nile states)  which will be covered later, were negotiated outside the IGAD  
mediation framework as it was contended that they were not included in the DOPs 
and the Machakos protocols which were the frameworks for the negotiations 
(Waihenya, 2006:100).The negotiations were chaired by Kenya and due to the 
impasse that developed between the two parties during the negotiations; the 
Americans intervened and drafted the protocol which was presented by the USA 
envoy, Senator Jack Danforth to the parties in order to break the impasse.123  
This suggests that although the protocol was debated upon and eventually accepted; 
the parties did not fully own it due to the fact that it was not authored by them and as 
such viewed the whole process as an arbitration in which a settlement had been 
imposed on them.  
The fact that the parties took it on board without consulting their constituents on the 
ground meant that the solution could not be well received by their constituents 
especially on the GOS’s side. This situation provided a loophole for the parties not to 
                                                          
121
 Interview with Douglas Johnson, 27 November 2013, Oxford-UK  
122
 Interview with Bona Malwal, 22 October 2013, Oxford-UK 
123
 Interview with General Lazarus Sumbeiywo, 12 September 2013, Nairobi- Kenya 
182 
 
honour the protocol and for the constituents of the area to reject it. This explains the 
dilemmas that were faced by the parties and the tensions and threats to a return to 
war then and now between the two Sudans. 
The loopholes of the protocol included the area to be administered not being defined 
and being left to the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) for definition, in the case 
of the referendum, voters being defined as members of the Ngok Dinka community 
as well as other Sudanese residing in the area, basis for sharing  the oil revenues 
(50% GOS, 42%SPLM/A and  2% each for the oil producing states and areas)  and 
not spelling out compensations in case of the area deciding to separate (Raftopoulos 
and Alexander, 2005:36).  
The loopholes suggest that the attitudes and the behaviour of the parties were still 
hostile and violent translating that the conflict structure could not be transformed.124 
Due to these loopholes violence was triggered in the area during the interim period 
and as such complete negative peace could not be achieved as fighting continued 
which in turn has not allowed positive peace to be initiated. These are some of the 
dilemmas that the parties faced and partial reasons for the tensions and the threats 
to a return to war then and now between the parties.   
Rogier (2005:116), however, argues that the reasons for the government’s 
resistance on the protocol were generally to protect the Misseriya pastoralists’ 
seasonal access to water and grazing in the area and beyond and a fear of the 
potential impact on northern stability which could result from news of Abyei changing 
status although at the heart of the whole resistance was the issue of oil in the area 
as a contributor to its economy.  
Resources like oil are often said to lie at the heart of many conflicts especially in 
Africa and usually result in commission of serious violations of human rights, 
violations of the international humanitarian law or violations amounting to crimes 
under international law (Williams, 2011:74). Sudan is prepared to do anything just to 
save Abyei going to South Sudan. This explains the tensions and the threats to a 
return to war before and now after South Sudan separated from Sudan. 
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The north’s position on the case of the claim by the south to the area is referred to as 
a poisonous thorn in its heart.125 With the cases of oil and the security of the two 
parties at the heart of the conflict in the area, there is no way the conflict can be 
resolved and for peace to be achieved in the area. This implies complete negative 
peace and even positive peace not being achieved despite the protocol being in 
place.  
In summary, the protocol, except for its loopholes could have resolved the problem 
of the area but due to the positions of the parties as articulated, it was anticipated 
would face a lot of resistance and lack of commitment which would translate 
continuation of the conflict through proxies. This made negative and positive peace 
not to be achieved as the conflict could not be transformed due to the security and 
the socio-economic framework factors on the Utstein pallet of peace building not 
being addressed (see figure 2.3).  
4.4.6 Protocol on the resolution of conflict in Southern Kordofan and the 
Blue Nile states 
The major concessions in the protocol include administration arrangements, 
autonomy in the areas and popular consultations on the status of the two areas 
through the state legislatures after elections, the holding of elections and institution 
of a land commission which would be drawn from both parties (GOS and SPLM-M) 
and the areas themselves (CPA chapter V, Articles 1,3,4 and 9).  
The area referred to as Southern Blue Nile is located in Sudan and is east of the 
northern most part of South Sudan (See figure 4.2). It is however argued that parts 
of the area had been part of the CDO which mostly were areas of southern Sudan 
during the condominium and as such it is surprising that it was not considered as 
part of southern Sudan as per the 1 January 1956 boundary of the two regions (Flint, 
2011:7).  Nuba Mountains is part of north Sudan and is located in the border area 
between Sudan and South Sudan however although being part of the north, its 
population shares more of its characteristics with those of the people of South Sudan 
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(See figure 4.2). This is one of the reasons as to why the two areas aligned with the 
SPLM/A-M in the north –south Sudan conflict.126  
The history of the locations of the areas and the characteristics of the people of the 
areas required consideration during the negotiation of the protocol. Leaving the 
situation as it was translated continued opposition to the government and fighting 
with the government, scenarios which cannot assist to achieve complete negative 
and positive peace in the context of conflict resolution/transformation.  
Rogier (2005:117) alleges that the Islamisation policy on non-Muslims, Arabisation of 
the non-Arabs, expropriation of land for use in mechanised farming schemes and 
use of forced labour generally translated as political and economic marginalisation 
were the factors that mostly alienated the people of the two areas against the 
government and for those reasons provided a basis for their demand for a right to 
self-determination.  
In the context of the protocol’s compromises, most of the concerns of the two areas 
were not addressed as had been the case with the south and Abyei.127 Johnson 
(2011:174-175) confirms that autonomy was not the same as self-determination 
which had an option of separation and referendum not the same as popular 
consultations. The popular consultations did not include a provision for a radical re-
negotiation of the CPA nor did it include the option of either of the states joining the 
south. The popular consultations were nothing of a solution but a blanket action to 
cover failure of negotiating the real issues.128  
Autonomy was out of question as the areas would still be under the firm control of 
the Khartoum government dominated by the NCP which was at the table during the 
negotiations, the question of land would not be addressed as the protocol did not 
give out the exact details on it, Sharia would still apply to the areas and that the 
people of the areas would not be directly consulted on the protocol since the 
government had rejected the option of a referendum.129  The protocol was 
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inadequate in as far as the issues of the two areas were concerned as it did not 
address any of the two areas’ core concerns.130  
This implies that conflict in the areas could/cannot be ended. The views of most of 
the respondents however were that the two areas are very important specifically to 
Sudan in the context of its security and resources and as such were red lines in the 
negotiations.131 Likewise, the areas are important to South Sudan in terms of 
security as the fighters in the areas were/are part of them.132 This meant that they 
could not be allowed to go anywhere.  It is then noted that the Southern 
Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile protocol was more of a work plan than a 
final settlement as it had failed to satisfy the aspirations of the people of the areas- 
most importantly, their long-standing demand for self-determination to protect their 
societies and their culture which could then have reversed decades of 
marginalization and discrimination.  
Complete negative peace and positive peace were sacrificed as no solution was 
given to the concerns of the areas.  Creative ambiguity was the term that the chief 
mediator referred to in the protocol of the two areas in this case.133 In this case 
liberal peace as espoused in the Liberal peace theory could not take root as the 
conflict could not be transformed. 
Thus, instead of giving out peace to the two areas, the protocol exacerbated conflict 
which certainly was very contradictory to the tenets of conflict resolution. This 
suggests that neither negative peace nor positive was and could be realised in the 
two areas. What is problematic is that since most of the concerns were never 
touched on, translates that there was/is no peace to be built to transform the conflict. 
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4.4.7 Permanent ceasefire and security arrangement implementation 
modalities and appendices and Implementation modalities and global 
implementation Matrix and appendices (Annexures I &II) 
The major concessions in the protocol of the permanent ceasefire and security 
implementation modalities were; setting up the implementation modalities for the 
permanent ceasefire and security arrangements in the pre-interim and the interim 
period (CPA Annexure I and II).  
Barltrop (2008:22) states that the protocol amplified the 2003 security arrangement 
protocol after a realisation that certain aspects like the principles of proportional 
downsizing of both forces and a pledge to institute Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Re-integration (DDR) for all those who would be affected by force reduction and 
downsizing with the assistance from the international community were not included 
in the negotiations of the security arrangement. The permanent ceasefire 
arrangement was authored with a view to assist with conflict management in order to 
regulate/contain/deter the parties’ conflict behaviour after the agreement.134  
In line with this protocol, the two parties (GOS and SPLM/A-M), during the period of 
the negotiations were seen to be maximizing the strategy of fight and talk as a tool of 
consolidating power.135 Waihenya (2006:97) states that SPLM/A captured Torit soon 
after the signing of the Machakos protocol and similarly SAF as a way of revenge 
made sure recaptured Torit before returning to the table.  
The security protocol and the CPA itself were not negotiated in good faith as the idea 
was to be seen to be talking peace at the table, while the real intention was war.136  
This status quo in essence meant that each party did not want the conflict to end and 
have peace among their midst and thus the exercise failed to contribute to negative 
peace which would have eventually contributed to positive peace. This explains the 
tensions and the threats to a return to war at the time and after the separation of 
southern Sudan. 
Johnson (2011: 62) states that a ceasefire agreement normally includes permanent 
arrangements for monitoring performance and for integration and demobilisation of 
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forces while cessation of hostilities implies freezing in place interim arrangements 
that would depend on renewal if it is to last. The parties refused to have a ceasefire 
agreement and instead a cessation of hostilities was agreed upon as a temporary 
measure to enable the negotiations to proceed.137 This scenario was a clear 
manifestation of lack of commitment by the parties to end the war and to resolve the 
conflict and as such complete negative peace could not be achieved. 
The protocol expounded on the details of the DDR although the parties themselves 
were not going to embark on a substantial DDR as the targets for the exercise were 
members of the aligned armed groups only (Barltrop, 2008:23). The two armed 
groups (SAF and SPLA) were going to be intact and still poised to continue fighting if 
there was going to be any need.  
This suggests that despite the protocol on the ceasefire and security being agreed 
on, necessarily fighting between the parties never stopped and would never stop.  
Thus, Complete negative peace was only given lip service at the table as in reality 
war was/is still on going on the ground.138  
Through the insistence of Garang, a clause was inserted in the protocol giving the 
SPLA the right to import military equipment and to receive financial support from 
outside the country subject only to notification and approval of the GOS.139 This part 
of the protocol is viewed to have been problematic in the context of negative peace 
and the resolution of the conflict as the party would have a free hand in the 
importation of military equipment which was to be used to sustain the war. The 
parties did not trust each other and as such the conflict could not be resolved as 
complete negative peace could not be achieved.  
Regarding the case of positive peace, the protocol at some point stipulated that the 
DDR should take place within a comprehensive process of national reconciliation 
and healing throughout the country (CPA Annexure I, Article 27.5). The two parties 
had rejected the reconciliation component into the CPA after the IGAD secretariat 
had proposed it at some point which was supposed to have been joined together 
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with the aspect of justice.140 Justice would have assisted to punish human rights 
violators and put back in place the moral order of the society while reconciliation 
would have assisted to build positive relationships and to develop a shared vision of 
the future.  
The perception in regards to the inclusion of reconciliation as part of the DDR is that 
it was misplaced as it only focused on the armed groups and not the whole 
population. Factoring of the aspects of justice and reconciliation into the agreement 
could have helped to achieve positive peace and in that case liberal peace as is 
advanced in the Liberal peace theory could have partially taken root (see figure 2.4). 
The annexure and the CPA as a whole lacked focus in its articulation of elements 
which could have contributed to negative peace and eventually positive peace. The 
attitudes and the behaviour of the parties were/are still hostile and violent and that 
due to such a status quo the conflict structure could not be changed.   
What is also seen to have been problematic with this protocol was its failure to 
address the question of disarming civilians most specifically in South Sudan who 
possess arms arguably for their self-defence.141 These arms even after the 
agreement are at times used to attack other ethnicities and for criminal activities 
which in turn destabilises the security environment.  The annexure on this dimension 
failed to deal with the south-south conflict which was/is very acute and more deadly 
than the north-south conflict. This suggests that there are more inter-clan clashes 
and criminal activities in South Sudan as sources of insecurity. This explains the 
challenges the agreement encountered, dilemmas which were faced by the parties 
and the tensions and the threats to a return to a war then and after the separation of 
South Sudan.   
The implementation modalities protocol in the form of tables generally outlined the 
schedules, the targets and the responsible parties for implementing all the protocols 
(see CPA Annexure II). The argument for its contribution to negative peace only 
comes in the context that it was to guide and police the implementation process of 
the CPA (Barltrop, 2008:24). The weakness of the annexure was that it did not have 
a specified agency which was to enforce and make follow ups on the progress of the 
                                                          
140
 Interview with General Lazarus Sumbeiywo, 12 September 2013, Nairobi-Kenya 
141
 Interview with Alan Goultry, 5 November 2013, through a telephone conference. Bradford: United Kingdom 
189 
 
implementation of the whole CPA.142 The job functions of the Assessment and 
Evaluation Commission (AEC) which was established for a related task did not really 
include this area.143 This suggests that negative peace posed difficulties to monitor 
and as such positive peace could not be attained in an environment which was 
insecure.  
4.5 Peacebuilding 
The CPA was a political settlement which was intended to end the north-south 
Sudan conflict and achieve peace. The peace however required building. Boutros- 
Ghali, (1992:10) as in chapter 2 perceives peacebuilding as action to identify and 
support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into 
conflict. This scenario implies that the CPA in itself was part of peacebuilding. 
Peacebuilding is generally undertaken by the UN, the concerned nation on its own 
and the concerned nation supported by international Governmental Organisations 
(IGOs) and local NGOs (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2012:177). In the context of the 
UN the main forms include; fully formed comprehensive UN directed peacebuilding 
operations, peacekeeping operations with significant peacebuilding dimensions and 
post-conflict transitions and a plethora of peacebuilding policies, projects and 
programmes within the wider activities of a large number of international, national 
and non-governmental agencies. It is noted that peacebuilding in Sudan did not have 
a clear lead agent as it is viewed that many agents were active despite the presence 
of the UN144. This implies that the attitudes and the behaviour of the parties were still 
violent and hostile and as such  the conflict  could not be transformed as is advanced 
in Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory and likewise Liberal peace as advanced in 
the Liberal peace theory could not be easily be realised.  
It is noted that rehabilitation, reconstruction and reconciliation of the societies that 
have suffered the ravages of an armed conflict; creation of security related, political 
and /or socio-economic mechanisms needed to build trust between the parties and 
to prevent the resumption of violence and an external foreign intervention to create 
conditions conducive to peace are the three elements that are central to 
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peacebuilding (David, 1999:27). It is contended that the 2005 CPA included these 
elements in its protocols but were sketchy and their timing and sequencing were not 
very concise.145 This implies that peacebuilding did not have a clear pattern to be 
followed. 
Institutions play a big part in the context of achieving liberalisation. It is contended 
that Sudan at the time did not have the appropriate institutions which could have 
promoted political and economic competition as part of liberalisation despite their 
inclusion in the CPA. This implies that issues such as social justice, welfare 
provision, tradition, custom, culture, the grassroots inclusion, reconciliation, equity 
and humanistic agendas for peace which are the heart of peacebuilding could not 
effectively take place. A clear translation in this regard is that democratisation, a free 
market economy, individual rights and the rule of law which constitute Liberal peace 
could not take place. This begins to explain problems of implementation of the CPA 
and likewise the tensions and the threats to a return to war later in the process. 
Institutionalisation before liberalisation is important if peacebuilding is to be 
successful (Paris, 2004:187). The CPA may have overlooked this important area.  
4.6 Conclusion 
The 2005 Sudan CPA was a product of the IGAD member countries led initiative 
supported by the USA and its allies commonly referred to as the ‘Troika’  which had  
aimed at identifying the root causes of the harmful political conflict, eliminating 
historical injustices and avoiding the losses of wars and destruction specifically 
between north and south Sudan. The CPA was a conflict settlement which was 
arrived at in order to address the core concerns of the SPLM/A-M against the GOS 
as part of conflict resolution/transformation in order to achieve peace.  
Generally, conflicts are resolved when a discernible outcome has been reached, 
conflict behaviour terminates and a satisfactory distribution of values and resources 
has been agreed upon (Anola, 2009:340). The north-south Sudan conflict required 
meeting these stated requirements in order for it to qualify as resolved and for the 
dilemmas that the parties were facing to be cleared.  
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The first generation/traditional conflict resolution approach which is suitable for 
interstate conflicts was used by the IGAD to guide the resolution of the conflict. The 
traditional conflict resolution approach is a state-centric Westphalian system whose 
goal is to resolve conflict so as to protect order and security and by reinforcing the 
ability of states to pursue their own interests and is mostly the preserve of diplomats, 
soldiers and the political elite (Richmond, 2002:9).  
The approach in the context of the Sudan conflict created problems in the resolution 
of the conflict as it could not accommodate some of the key actors who could have 
assisted to resolve/transform the conflict. Thus, the actors who could not be 
accommodated in the process became spoilers and as such complete negative 
peace could not be achieved as was desired. Other conflict resolution approaches 
like those categorised as 21st century approaches which allow wider participation 
could have done better in terms of participation and coverage of issues (Bercovitch 
and Jackson, 2012:186). 
The involvement of IGAD to intervene in the conflict resolution of the conflict implied 
the use of a multi-government/institution or organisation model. Mitchel (2008:95-96) 
as in chapter 2 states that this model raises doubts especially when the conflict in 
question takes place within the formal boundaries of one of the members of the 
community of the organisation or formal government of a state as one of the parties 
to a conflict opposed by an ethnic or other types of insurgences and when the issues 
in the conflict revolve around the preservation of the unity of the state as opposed to 
its division or disintegration. The organisation found it difficult to act against a fellow 
member state in some issues due to the tendency of using the principles of territorial 
integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of any country unless genocide 
clearly threatens.146    
Mediation, negotiation and peacebuilding were the dominant methods which were 
used in the conflict resolution approach. The mediation frameworks which were used 
(the DOPs and the Machakos framework) contradicted each other (Young, 2012:95-
96). The DOPs were broad in their scope, that is were designed to deal with the 
conflict in the whole country while the Machakos framework only concentrated on the 
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north-south Sudan conflict. The issues concerning north and south Sudan were 
included whilst those concerning other areas were left out.  
This status quo translates that the scope of the mediation was narrow in terms of the 
participation of the actors and the issues which could have assisted to achieve 
complete negative peace. This explains the tensions and the threats to a return to 
war at the time and later in the process by the two parties through their proxies in the 
other areas. 
Negotiation as a method of the conflict resolution approaches forms an important 
part of conflict resolution. The parties, issues and the context are the important 
elements of negotiations (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2012:22). The parties in the 
conflict included political parties, armed groups and the civil society in the Sudan 
conflict but only the NCP representing the GOS and the SPLM/A-M representing 
southern Sudan were included while all others were not included. The solutions 
required to be sold to the constituents but in the case of the parties which were 
locked out this could not take place. This was one of the dilemmas which were faced 
by the parties during the period and a factor that led to some of the tensions then 
and after the separation of South Sudan.  
The conduct of the negotiations at Naivasha were problematic as only Osman Taha 
as the Vice President of Sudan and Garang representing the SPLM/A sat alone to 
negotiate and resolve the issues which were at stake.147 The arrangement deprived 
the process expertise and contributions from others and thus affected the content of 
the settlement as it was based only on the discussions of the two leaders. 
Some of the core concerns as the issues at the heart of the conflict were either 
unresolved or left untouched. This suggests that the conflict structure could not be 
transformed as is advanced in the Galtungs’ ABC theory. The attitudes and the 
behaviour of the other members of the delegations still remained hostile and violent 
due lack of knowledge of the developments and similarly peacebuilding activities 
which contribute to achieving liberal peace as advanced in the Liberal peace theory 
could not effectively be implemented.  
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The articulated background indicates that the CPA resulted from a bilateral process 
which was restricted to the two main warring parties and by implication too narrowly 
focused on the north-south dimension of the conflict. The conflict resolution process 
is based on the settlement of the substantive issues which are referred to as the core 
concerns of the parties. Peace agreements/settlements are meant to address 
political, territorial, and socio-economic and security issues (Darby and MacGinty, 
2008:195). The extent of any agreement is important particularly in terms of the 
degree to which it deals with constitutional, territorial and security aspects (Bischoff, 
2007:3). The outcome of the mediation/negotiation process was six agreements and 
two annexures which together are called the 2005 Sudan CPA which were supposed 
to address the substantive issues as had been advanced by the SPLM/A articulated 
earlier. The content of some of the protocols and their provisions did not reflect these 
aspects. This explains the challenge the agreement encountered, dilemmas the 
parties faced and the tensions and the threats to a return to war at the time after the 
separation of South Sudan. 
The CPA’s Machakos protocol was important in that it gave the south the right to 
self-determination with its options of unity or separation through a referendum after a 
six and half year period. The right to self-determination is a contested concept 
internationally and its’ use in other African intrastate conflicts has been problematic 
(Bamfo, 2012:38). Katanga in DRC, Biafra in Nigeria and Eritrea are cases in point in 
the context of the suitability of the concept. The referendum in regards to its 
attachment to the right to self-determination with its options was a hallmark of the 
CPA as it provided an opportunity for the conflicting parties to completely resolve the 
conflict. 
The other protocols had good intentions but inadequacy in their content pushed the 
south to consider separation other than the desired unity which was aspired for in the 
Machakos protocol. The established view from this status quo is that through the 
problems of the conflict resolution approach, flaws in the frameworks of mediation 
and the mediation itself, a flawed negotiation process and a poorly coordinated 
peacebuilding process resulted in the lack of inclusiveness, narrow focus on the 
conflict issues, failure to resolve some of the substantive issues and the inadequacy 
in the content of some of the protocols or complete absence of some provisions of 
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the 2005 Sudan CPA. The resulting CPA in this regard was challenged in these 
areas. 
The peacebuilding bit in the CPA was problematic in the sense that it was sketchy 
and was not properly timed and sequenced. This implies that it could not assist to 
achieve Liberal peace as is advanced in the Liberal peace theory grounded in the 
liberal peace thesis. This may explain part of the tensions and the threats to a return 
to war at the time and later after the separation of South Sudan. 
The CPA can be contended to have failed to be comprehensive in its representation 
since it was restricted to two parties that granted themselves the lion’s share of 
power until when the referendum was held and only covered issues involving north 
and south Sudan as opposed to the whole country.148  
Thus, the agreement leaned towards the usual but inaccurate approach of looking at 
the Sudan problem in a fragmented way which kept ignoring the broad issues. The 
position of the CPA begins to explain the challenges the agreement encountered, the 
dilemmas the parties faced or are facing and the tensions and the threats to a return 
to war at the time and after the separation of South Sudan. The chapter it is believed 
provides a broad overview of the CPA which manifests how it was arrived at and the 
problems thereafter. The next chapter discusses the implications of the mediation, 
the negotiation and the implementation process of the CPA. 
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Chapter 5 
5.0 The implications of the mediation, the negotiation and the 
implementation processes of the CPA 
5.1. Introduction 
The desired end-state of any mediation /negotiation as part of conflict resolution is 
the signing of a peace agreement. The most important point about peace 
agreements in this context is that they are a necessary step to any lasting peaceful 
arrangement and durable order. This translates that they constitute an integral part 
of conflict resolution/transformation. Conflict resolution according to Bercovitch and 
Jackson (2012:1) as articulated in chapter 2 is a range of formal or informal activities 
undertaken by parties to a conflict, or outsiders, designed to limit and reduce the 
level of conflict and to achieve some understanding on future interactions and 
distribution of resources. 
The 2005 Sudan CPA was a very long and rigorous process of mediation/negotiation 
which aimed at resolving the conflict which had bedevilled north and south Sudan for 
nearly half a century. It was meant to address the in-group and out-group struggles, 
religious domination, ethnicity, victimisation and marginalisation as the core areas of 
concern of the second civil war which was championed by the SPLM/A of south 
Sudan (Raftopoulos and Alexander, 2006:25). These were the problems which the 
CPA tried to resolve through its protocols which were categorised to address issues 
at the national level, institutions in southern Sudan and the transitional areas (Abyei, 
Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile states). 
Despite reaching the agreement/s, there were other areas which remained 
untouched, unresolved and also at the end selectively implemented due to the 
mediation, negotiation and the implementation processes. If some issues were left 
untouched, some unresolved and that once the agreement was reached others 
remained unimplemented, then how did the actors of the peace process expect the 
conflict to be resolved and for the country to achieve the sought for peace. Conflict 
resolution does not completely remove all the problems of a conflict but the correct 
position would not be to deliberately make omissions and expect all to be well.  
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This chapter examines issues in the CPA which were untouched and unresolved 
during the CPA mediation/negotiation and those that were either partially or not 
implemented with a view to establish how they finally affected conflict 
resolution/transformation of the Sudan conflict and the implications thereafter. 
5.2 The untouched issues of the CPA 
The 2005 Sudan CPA was a result of the mediation and negotiation processes which 
were carried out by the IGAD as a mediator supported by members of the Troika. 
The exercise was essentially meant to resolve the issues as were advanced by the 
SPLM/A representing Southern Sudan and to an extent all in the periphery of the 
central government of Sudan.  
As stated by Rogier (2005:17-18) in chapter 3, the CPA was meant to address the 
core concerns which had triggered both the first and second civil wars. This required 
that an agreement be designed to engage Sudan as a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, 
multi-religious and a multi-cultural society if at all the conflict had to be ended and 
resolved. These core concerns were translated in the DOPs and the Machakos 
protocol. These came to be viewed as the frameworks of the IGAD 
mediation/negotiation from which the right to self-determination for the South, 
separation of state and religion, system of government during the interim period, 
sharing of resources and the security arrangements originated.149 
Hampson (1996:217), as in chapter 2 refers to dealing with the core issues in conflict 
as an exercise which involves bringing about real transformation of conflict which 
incorporates norms and principles to which parties subscribe, such as equity in 
democracy and being consistent with standards of human rights, justice and respect 
for individuals and groups as one of the pre-conditions to achieve a successful 
peace settlement. 
While it is generally agreed that the 2005 CPA achieved partial negative peace, it is 
argued that it left out other areas untouched which could have assisted to bring 
about positive peace to the country. Bischoff (2005:7) states that sustainable peace 
agreements should be able to reach into the post-conflict peacebuilding phase and 
be able to begin to address the in-depth causes of conflict as part of the 
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opportunities to encourage the transformation of political relations. The case of the 
Sudan CPA does not seem to have situated itself in this way since some of the 
important aspects which were part of the core concerns were left untouched. 
The core concerns which had to be addressed like the national identity question and 
marginalisation of the periphery by the centre which could have gone hand in hand 
with the aspect of justice and reconciliation, separation as the antithesis of power 
sharing that is in the case of the South opting for it during the proposed referendum, 
sharing of resources and civilian disarmament specifically in the border areas and 
South Sudan were left untouched for reasons which were not clear.150 
5.2.1 Reconciliation and justice  
The civil war/s in Sudan involved the use of force by the conflicting parties and 
similarly it is a known fact that their encounters occurred on a space which was 
occupied by civilians as a battlefield. In the course of the conflict in this regard both 
the GOS and the SPLM/A were involved in the perpetration of human rights 
violations and as such required that the society in Sudan be reconciled.151   
Bercovitch and Jackson (2012:151) state that justice and reconciliation aims at 
dealing decisively with the past, particularly the legacy of massive human rights 
abuses and lay the foundation for a peaceful and democratic future. Justice in this 
case is necessary for putting back in place the moral order of society while 
reconciliation attempts to transform hostilities among parties previously engaged in a 
conflict/dispute into feelings of acceptance and even forgiveness of past animosities 
or harmful acts.  
Barash and Webel (2009:446) argue that there is a legitimate worry that once a 
people in a community have experienced lacerating violence, it is not only difficult 
but also perhaps impossible for the victims to return to a pattern of peaceful 
coexistence. Thus, without the aspect of justice and reconciliation, the desired peace 
between north and south Sudan and even within South Sudan could not be realised.  
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The GOS through its Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), the People’s Defence Force 
(PDF) and the Murahilin in south Sudan attacked and burnt peoples’ villages, killed 
civilians who included the old, women and children. Additionally in the case of 
women and children, they took them to the north where they were traded or kept in 
slavery. Similarly, the SPLM/A raided areas which they felt were supporting the 
government’s side.152  
Collins (2008:219-220) on the same state  that the GOS was also involved in 
summary executions, killings, enforced or involuntary disappearances, arbitrary 
arrests, torture and detention, torture and displacement of large civilian populations 
in the Nuba Mountains and South Sudan through their fighters or security agents.  
Inside the combat zones, unarmed civilians had been targeted by both the 
government troops and the SPLM/A-M and similarly outside the combat zones 
agents of the same parties were involved in a variety of human rights violations. This 
situation reflected the core concern of marginalisation. These activities created deep 
rooted hatred between the north and the south, within the south and within the 
north.153 This suggests that the parties faced a dilemma on this aspect which 
involved both of them. This situation required to be addressed through the 
administration of justice (transitional justice) and reconciliation as part of the 
peacebuilding activities to transform the conflict (see figure 2.3).  
It is contended against this background that if the commitment to a united Sudan 
was to be achieved, then there was a need for a north-south and also at some point 
a south-south justice and reconciliation process as a way of achieving complete 
negative and positive peace. The view in this case is that it was/is quite evident that 
there was/is intense hatred between the people of the north and the south and 
among southerners due to what happened during the course of the conflict.154  
This implies that the attitudes and the behaviour of the parties in north and south 
Sudan and within south Sudan were/are still hostile and violent and that the conflict 
structure had not changed. Complete negative peace could not be achieved in this 
case and likewise positive peace as are advanced in the Galtung’s ABC theory and 
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the Liberal peace theory. Reconciliation and justice should have been a must include 
issue in the mediation/negotiation process of the agreement to facilitate conflict 
resolution/transformation to end the conflict. 
Young (2012:13) argues that although the IGAD secretariat had proposed a 
reconciliation component in the CPA, it was opposed by the NCP representing the 
GOS and the SPLM/A representing the south.155 The reason behind such a position 
was that both parties knew that they had committed major crimes during the civil war 
which would have put them in bad light in the eyes of their people.156 
Reconciliation and justice through its components of truth, mercy, healing and peace 
assists alienated societies to forge a spirit of coexistence (Lederarch, 1997:30).  The 
aspect may have been omitted to prevent the locals to know the truth about the 
perpetrators of the criminal activities in both the northern and southern camps which 
would have further complicated the spirit of resolving the conflict. Sumbeiywo, the 
chief negotiator had this to say on reconciliation and justice: 
“It is a well-known fact that in any war situation truth is the first casualty, if the attainment of 
peace through a negotiated agreement or by whatever means is to mean anything to the 
people and to last, then it must be based on justice and reconciliation. No justice and 
reconciliation between any groups even between two members of the same family can take 
place without the truth first being uncovered and accepted”.
157
 
This quote summarises the importance of reconciliation and justice for a society 
coming out of a conflict. This was how somebody who took an active part in the 
negotiations of the agreement felt about justice and reconciliation yet the aspect was 
not given due attention in the agreement apart from vague mention about it in a few 
areas in some of the protocols of the agreement.158   
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5.2.2 Human security 
The 2005 Sudan CPA had covered the aspects of politics, the economy, security and 
the territory in the six protocols that constituted it. However, considering the 
elements of security represented by the security arrangements protocol, only a state 
centric face was given attention while the human security aspect was omitted159. 
Kaldor (1987:18) perceives human security as a paradigm for understanding global 
vulnerabilities whose proponents challenge the traditional notion of national security 
by arguing that the proper referent for security should be the individual rather than 
the state.  
In the context of the security protocol, there were details of two separate armies, 
formation of the JIUs and a Joint Defence Board and similarly in the security 
arrangement protocol annex,  only the SAF and the SPLA were targeted in the DDR 
programme while civilians who equally had weapons which could be used to 
perpetuate criminal activities were not included.160  
The civilians who had weapons were a problem as they could easily engage in 
criminal activities and similarly even with the agreement in place, continue the war 
on their own. The concentration of focus on the state security aspects translated that 
there was a disregard of the human security of the people which was equally 
important in order to resolve the conflict.161 
The Nuer communities were displaced from their homelands due to the oil extraction 
ventures and that the Christian churches were being persecuted in addition to their 
property being confiscated and some of their ministers being killed.162 The 
persecutions of the Christians was an attempt by the government to suppress 
Christianity as part of the Islamic agenda and as punishment due to a belief that they 
gave support to the SPLM/A (Malwal, 2005:53-57). This evidence implies that the 
GOS continued with the marginalisation of its subjects but as time went by the 
SPLM/A-M also joined the band wagon.  
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These positions suggest that complete negative peace could not be achieved as the 
aggrieved people wanted to retaliate as revenge. Likewise positive peace could not 
be achieved as many injustices were being perpetrated by the conflict parties. The 
omission of human security in the resolution of the Sudan conflict can then be 
viewed to have been problematic in the field of conflict resolution/transformation. 
This meant that the Galtung’s ABC conflict triangletheory and the Liberal peace 
theory which focus on conflict resolution/transformation could not take root in Sudan. 
This begins to explain the tensions and the threats to a return to war at the time and 
after the separation of South Sudan. 
5.2.3 Separation     
The CPA had addressed the political questions between the GOS and the SPLM/A-
M through the Machakos and the power sharing protocols (Rogier, 2005:9). The 
Machakos protocol provided the general framework for the political settlement in that 
it allowed the north to retain Sharia as a source of its legislation and self-
determination for the south which would allow it either to remain as part of Sudan or 
separate from it and a secular legislation. It also provided for a largely autonomous 
government for southern Sudan and the establishment of a Government of National 
Unity (GONU) in which southern Sudan was to be a participant (Waihenya, 2006:88).  
Power sharing gave out a picture of a united Sudan which could have been changed 
with ease that is if the south opted to remain in a united Sudan. There was, however, 
no details provided if south Sudan opted to separate from north Sudan. The chief 
mediator noted that “[n]obody envisioned beyond the referendum, certainly the issue 
of separation was not in Garang’s plan as he believed that he was going to rule 
Sudan and quoting him stated that – There were going to be elections, he was going 
to win and govern Sudan”.163 Similarly in another interview, on the same, the 
respondent said “there was nothing which was discussed and written beyond the 
referendum”.164 This evidence suggests that the mediation/negotiation of the CPA 
did not touch on the aspect of separation as there was a belief that Sudan was going 
to remain a united country. By not touching on separation in detail, the mediation and 
negotiation processes of CPA watered down an effective conflict resolution process 
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in the sense that no plans were put in place to deal with a situation whereby the 
south would vote for separation.  
 Even if south Sudan was claiming for self-determination, some of its people wanted 
it to be exercised within Sudan while others wanted it to be exercised outside. The 
problem anticipated in this regard was that those supporting the unity case would 
likely undermine the choice and create chaos. Similarly in the case of the north, the 
option of separation by the south would be undermined and the north would be 
forced to continue the conflict with the south.165 This challenged the CPA and 
presents some of the dilemmas which were faced by the parties. 
An anticipation of the scenario playing out in this direction implied that complete 
negative peace could not be achieved and likewise positive peace as there would be 
no basis in which the conflict would have been transformed. The omission of the 
details on separation while those of power sharing were provided was problematic in 
the context of conflict resolution. By south Sudan opting for separation, that action 
would have translated the attitudes and the behaviour of those supporting unity 
being hostile and violent and the conflict structure not being transformed. In this 
case, the Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory and likewise the Liberal peace 
theory would not have taken root or be applicable. 
5.2.4 Sharing of resources   
Resources are one of the root causes or exacerbating factor of many conflicts 
particularly in Africa. In the case of Sudan, De kock (2011:7) notes that the struggle 
for resources by people living in the periphery and the high politics of oil featured 
highly during the mediation/negotiation of the CPA. As a response to the query on 
the socio-economic gap between the centre and the periphery, the 
mediation/negotiations arrived at the wealth sharing protocol which basically 
provided a framework for the allocation and sustainable decentralisation of 
resources.  
The intention of sharing the wealth was good but in the context of conflict resolution 
it should have focused on the sharing of resources.166 This is because the protocol 
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only focused on the revenues which were being generated from south Sudan in the 
form of oil and taxes and overlooked the fact that the country had a number of 
resources which if the south was going to opt for separation during the proposed 
referendum, problems would arise between the two parties on how their resources 
were to be shared. Cases in point include issues of the oilfields and the oil industry 
infrastructure (pipeline, refineries and the sea port) which all belonged to the state 
but were found either in the north or the south or were/are used jointly by the north 
and the south.  
The sharing of resources would have been more practical than wealth sharing which 
was based on the flow of revenues in consideration to a fact that the south during the 
referendum could opt to separate. Considering that oil is an economic lifeline of 
Sudan, an option by southern Sudan to separate would create a problem and conflict 
would not end.  
This was one of the dilemmas that were faced by the parties and begins to explain 
the tensions and the threats to a return to war at the time and after the separation of 
the south. In this case, complete negative peace could not be achieved and 
eventually even positive as the attitudes and the behaviour of the parties could still 
be hostile and violent and the conflict structure not being changed as advanced in 
the Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory and the Liberal peace theory. 
Williams (2011:74) states that struggles to control resources contribute to outbreaks 
of conflict when there is competition for scarce resources. The case of Sudan shows 
that negotiating an agreement on revenue sharing and not resource sharing may 
have been a deliberate act by the parties in anticipation of the problem of the Abyei 
area and the demarcation of the Sudan-South Sudan border.167 
In a similar regard, given the controversy surrounding the water resources and in this 
case particularly the Jonglei canal on the White Nile river in the south, reference was 
not made about it, yet it was a very important issue to both the north and the south in 
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addition to the fact that it also involves a dimension of international treaties with other 
countries in the region. The aspect may have been left untouched in order to avoid 
complicating the already difficult issue of revenue sharing.  
The failure in this case to address the sharing of resources in the CPA was 
problematic in the context of conflict resolution. The omission meant that the conflict 
could not be completely resolved as some of the issues remained unresolved.168 
Since the south had most of the oil while the north had the infrastructure for 
transporting the oil to the markets (pipe lines, refineries and a seaport), revenue 
sharing instead of resource sharing was a let-down to an agreement which was 
meant to end and resolve a conflict. This position suggests that the CPA was 
challenged. 
5.2.5 Darfur 
Darfur is a region which is located in Western Sudan. The major armed conflict in the 
Darfur region of Sudan began in February 2003 when the Sudan Liberation 
Movement (SLM) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebel groups began 
fighting the government of Sudan, which they accused of oppressing Darfur's non-
Arab population (Collins, 2008:287). The reasons for the conflict in Darfur were 
related to those of the north-south conflict, the Beja in the East, in the Nuba 
Mountains and in the Blue Nile state.169 The Darfur conflict which had become a 
flash point in Sudan at the time despite having related objectives with the north-south 
conflict was left untouched during the mediation/negotiations of the CPA.170 
Darfur was treated as a separate and an unrelated conflict by the internal actors 
(GOS and the SPLM/A) and the international community.  However, once the CPA 
was signed, all the international diplomatic attention switched to it due to claims of 
genocide (Johnson, 2011:154-156). President Bashir later in the process was 
indicted for crimes against humanity and genocide in 2008 by the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) just to show the gravity of the atrocities in Darfur.  
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The switching of the attention from the CPA to Darfur orphaned certain critical 
aspects of the CPA’s effective implementation171. Lack of implementation of certain 
aspects of the agreement meant that the conflict could then not be fully resolved or 
transformed and as such negative peace became shaky while positive peace could 
not be attained. 
The omission of the Darfur issue brings on board the implications of the narrow focus 
of the CPA which if it had been broadened could have prevented the shift of attention 
of the international community as the issue could have been part of the same 
process.172 By leaving the Darfur issue untouched, the CPA lost out on what it could 
have achieved in the context of conflict resolution. In this case positive peace could 
not be attained as the post conflict-peacebuilding activities were not carried out as 
was planned. This implied liberal peace as advanced in the Liberal peace theory not 
being attained. 
5.2.6 Civilian disarmament and arms control 
In a bid to achieve security, the mediation/negotiation of the CPA devised the 
security arrangements protocol and an addition to it in a form of an annexure, called 
the agreement on the permanent ceasefire (Barltrop, 2008:14). The reality at the 
time in Sudan and now in the two Sudans is that civilians had and have arms even 
after the signing of the CPA which were given to them either by the GOS or the 
SPLM/A especially in South Sudan and the border areas between north and south 
Sudan for purposes of community security or assisting the two actors in their war 
effort.  
The presence of arms in the hands of civilians and without mechanisms to recover 
them had been and is a source of violent conflicts between communities in both 
Sudan and South Sudan which manifest in the form of cattle raiding, revenge attacks 
and armed robberies.173 
The protocol and its amplification despite including the DDR for the two separate 
Armies (SAF and SPLA) and the OAGs, was silent on the disarmament of civilians 
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and arms control (CPA chapter VI). The one reference in the CPA that appears to 
refer to civilian rather than OAG arms control and disarmament is the statement that 
empowers the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMT) to monitor and verify the 
disarmament of all Sudanese civilians who are illegally armed.174  
Possession of arms and an absence of a mechanism to control them raised the 
levels of insecurity at the time and even after the separation of the south from the 
Sudan.175 The arms were at times used to support the conflicting parties in their 
encounters with each other and for criminal activities sanctioned by the leadership of 
the parties especially in the border areas and South Sudan. This situation posed a 
dilemma to them on how they could manage the situation. This implies that there 
was insecurity due to the arms possessed by the civilians at the time even after the 
separation of the south and as such complete negative peace could not be attained 
and likewise later positive peace. 
This suggests that the attitudes and the behaviour of the parties were still hostile and 
violent and the conflict in that state could not be transformed and thus the Galtung’s 
ABC conflict theory could not work. Similarly liberal peace as advanced in the Liberal 
peace theory could not be attained. 
5.3 The unresolved issues  
The 2005 Sudan CPA was a serious attempt to address the problems of unequal 
development and mismanaged diversity that caused a lot of violence and suffering in 
Sudan especially in southern Sudan. Many scholars and commentators of peace 
studies focusing on conflict resolution perceive the agreement to have been intended 
to make the unity of Sudan attractive and that if it failed, existing trends at the time 
towards fragmentation would accelerate and become more violent. Darby and 
MacGinty (2008:4) as in chapter 2 state that peace agreements are settlements and 
within them the negotiated solutions of the substantive issues form their basis for 
achieving negative peace and eventually positive peace. A peace agreement 
constitutes an integral part of conflict resolution.  
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The 2005 CPA was supposed to deal with all the substantive issues that had been of 
concern to the parties. It is, however, noted that some of the core concerns which 
had triggered the conflict went unresolved as the CPA was signed.176 The agreement 
during the implementation phase encountered problems due to this scenario and as 
such complete negative peace and eventually positive peace could not be 
completely achieved. 
5.3.1 Definition of Northern and Southern Sudan   
The IGAD peace initiative through the Machakos and the power sharing protocols 
used the 1 January, 1956 Independence boundary to define the areas which were 
being defined as north and south Sudan (See figure 3.1). The parties during the 
mediation/negotiation processes settled for the 1 January, 1956 Independence Day 
boundary to define the territories of north and south Sudan in order to have a picture 
of the area which was being discussed (Johnson, 2011:44). However, the parties did 
not define the areas that constituted the territories of north and south Sudan.177  
The parties despite settling for the 1 January, 1956 border called for the border to be 
demarcated within six months.178  From this position, it is clear then that the border 
that was agreed on was not clear but may simply have been a visualisation.  
Johnson (2010:15) states that much of the boundary area was not surveyed and that 
even the most detailed contemporary maps do not have records of significant 
topographical features along the said boundary line. (See figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1: The 1952 topographical map of the northern and southern Sudan 
boundary 
 
Source: Durham University Archive 
 Although this was a compromise position of the two parties, the position might have 
been arrived at without due consideration of other factors which were very important 
if tensions between northern and southern Sudan were to be dealt with 
completely.179  
Broschė (2007:8-9) argues that the definition of the northern-southern border in 
Sudan was important as it had a great bearing on the implementation of the other 
CPA protocols and provisions like the re-deployment of the armed forces, sharing of 
revenues, implementation of the Abyei protocol and the establishment of the political 
constituencies in preparation for the elections and developmental purposes. 
Similarly, self-determination as defined in chapters 2 and 4 could not be talked about 
for a people who did not have a defined territorial space.  These scenarios suggest 
that the issue of the border between the two areas required resolving through the 
definition of the territories of the two areas.  
Collins (2008:35-36),  states that through a Closed Districts Ordinance and later a 
Southern policy, north and south Sudan were administered as separate entities 
although  there had been no clear boundary between them. There was no territorial 
definition of northern or southern Sudan until very late in the Condominium era and 
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that during both the Turkiyya and the Condominium eras there were various 
alterations and definitions of provinces that eventually became the provinces now 
included in northern and southern Sudan.180 The available historical factors indicate 
that the 1956 boundary was generally based on the provincial boundaries of the 
provinces during the Condominium era but which with time kept changing in addition 
to the fact that there is no single authoritative source stating precisely what those 
boundaries looked like on that date.181  (See table 5.1). 
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Table 5.1- Sudan boundary changes 1905-1960 
Date Change Other 
1905 Transfer of Ngok & Twic Dinka from BGP to KP SIR 128, p.3 
AR 1905, pp.3, 
111 
19?? Transfer of Twic Dinka from KP to BGP ID 1912, p.7 
1912 Adjustment between UNP & KP around Kaka AR 1912, v.I, 
p.261 
1913 Separation of NMP from KP SGG 227, p.734 
AR 1913, v.II, 
p.75 
1917 Adjustment of UNP–WNP boundary SGG 337, p.937 
1918 Adjustment of UNP–WNP boundary SGG 337, p.937 
1920 Adjustment of UNP–WNP boundary SGG 363, 
p.1313 
1921 Adjustment between UNP & Nuba Mts SGG 386, 
p.1512 
1923 Transfer of Kaka from UNP & Nuba Mts SGG 414, 
p.1808 
1925 Transfer of Daga from Fung (BNP) to UNP AR 1925, p.13 
1926 Transfer of Tonga & Morada from UNP to NMP SGG 480, p.253 
1927 Transfer of Nuer & Dinka from NMP to BGP SGG 489, pp.59-
60 
SMIR 399, p.4 
c.1927 Transfer of Kaka from NMP to UNP MRS 1927 
1928 Transfer of Tonga & Morada from NMP to UNP SGG 511, p.378 
1928 Amalgamation of NMP and KP SGG 511, p.378 
AR 1928, p.125 
1931 Transfer of Rueng Dinka from KP to UNP SGG 546, p.115 
1938 Transfer of Koma, Meban & Uduk from BNP to 
UNP 
SGG 660, p.15 
1953 Transfer of Koma & Uduk from UNP to BNP SGG 858, p.412 
1956 Adjustment between UNP & BNP boundary SGG 896, 
pp.319-20 
1960 Transfer of Hofrat en-Nahas from BGP to DP SGG 947, p.473 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
Geographical Terms 
BGP Bahr al-Ghazal province 
BNP Blue Nile province 
DP Darfur province 
KP Kordofan province 
NMP Nuba Mountains province 
UNP Upper Nile province 
WNP White Nile province 
 
Source: Durham University archive 
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The northern-southern Sudan border is historically a series of provincial boundary 
changes that the 1972 Addis-Ababa agreement retroactively defined as the north-
south boundary using the borders of the provinces as they had existed on 1 January, 
1956 (Articles 3&4, Addis Ababa Agreement, 1972, GDRS and SSLM). The border 
of northern and southern Sudan was only created in 1972 and the 1956 January 
border was basically a depiction of the boundaries of the provinces that were in a 
country called Sudan. Johnson had this to say on the boundary of northern and 
southern Sudan: 
“There are no maps of the 1956 border from 1956.  The administrative borders were laid out 
on maps by the survey department from the 1930s through to the early 1950s; there’s no one 
map that shows, in sufficient detail, where the border exactly is in 1956.  A full collection of 
maps – I’m pretty certain there aren’t any missing ones?”
182
 
This position implies that there was no clear boundary between northern and 
southern Sudan which means that the agreed designation during the CPA 
negotiation process was not correct. It should however be noted that the last part of 
the quote above implies that all maps for Sudan at the time were there but none 
indicates the border line between northern and southern Sudan. Likewise in regards 
to the absence of an undisputed map of the 1956 border between north and south 
Sudan, it should be noted that although there are possible sources available from 
local maps at the Durham Archive, these have not been agreed by the GOS.This 
was a dilemma that the parties faced and begins to explain the tensions and threats 
to a return to war at the time and even now after the separation of South Sudan.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
182
 Interview with Douglas Johnson, 27 November, 2013, Oxford-United Kingdom 
212 
 
Figure 5.2: Map of Sudan and South Sudan contested areas and fighting since the 
beginning of 2012. 
 
Source: NordNordWest / Wikipedia, License: CC BY-SA  
 
The issue of the border as agreed in the CPA was not resolved but simply a 
compromise position between the two parties and the mediators. More problems 
arose later in the process due failure to resolve the border issue (See figure 5.2). 
This translated that complete negative peace could not be achieved and likewise 
later positive peace due to the fact that a lot of activities which were to take place to 
achieve peace were based on the border designation which in this case was 
problematic. 
This scenario begins to explain reasons as to why issues of citizenship, natural 
resources, economic cooperation, grazing rights of the cross border populations and 
security between the two states are problematic after the separation of South Sudan. 
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Liberal peace as advanced in the Liberal peace theory could not be achieved as the 
conflict could not be transformed which could have allowed peacebuilding activities 
to take place in the areas.  
5.3.2 Religion and the question of national identity  
The core concerns which turned out to be the substantive issues in the 
mediation/negation of the CPA as articulated in chapter 3 included the question of 
national identity; the socio-economic and political gap between the centre and 
periphery; and the constant threat of ‘Arabisation and Islamisation’ by the northern 
elite (Raftopoulos and Alexander, 2006:25).   
An Arab-Islamic identity had been widely adopted by the inhabitants of northern 
Sudan whose ingredients were the Arabic language, claims to Arabic ancestry and 
Islam (Collins, 2008:8). Sharkey (2008:22) alleges that there occurred over the 
centuries a process of Arabisation which entailed the gradual spread of the Arab 
identity and the Arabic language and along with it the Islamic religion in northern 
Sudan.  
Wai (1981:97) states that Sudan on its independence day on January 1, 1956, 
declared Arabic as its sole official language and Islam as the religion of the state with 
a view to assimilate all who were non-Arabs and non-Muslims to embrace the Arab 
Islam identity as a national identity for the country. The fears of the southerners on 
the question of the national identity and the threat of Arabisation and Islamisation by 
the northern elite were well founded and that the northerners were prepared to do all 
they could to achieve their aspirations.  
In order to advance the Arab- Islamic agenda, successive post-independence 
regimes (civilian and military) forced non-Arabs and non-Moslems to convert to Islam 
and in turn become Arab by speaking the Arabic language as a way of unifying the 
state.183 The GOS adopted an assimilationist approach on the southerners whereby 
they were being forced and tortured to convert to Arabism and Islam against their 
choice of either to be Christians or to remain as adherents of their traditional beliefs. 
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This  status quo raised questions as to whether the country was Arab or African, 
Afro-Arab or Arab-African and in the case of religion as to whether the country was 
to be considered Islamic and governed by Islamic law since there had never been 
any plebiscite in the country to determine the issue in regards to the Independence 
day proclamations.184 
The Machakos protocol allowed the north to retain Sharia and the south to adopt 
western customary international law as the bases of their sources of legislations 
(CPA chapter 1, Article 3.2). The protocol by allowing Sharia application in the 
northern Sudan and its non-application in southern Sudan sanctioned two different 
bases of legislation in one country and thus indicated complete failure to resolve the 
issues of religion and national identity.185  More so, the issues apart from being 
mentioned in the Machakos protocol, they are not mentioned again anywhere else in 
the whole CPA. Failure to come up with solutions on the two issues meant that the 
parties faced a dilemma.  
The solution encouraged the two camps to view each other as different entities that 
could not tolerate living together. Commenting on these aspects two respondents 
had this to say; “Those Arab and Moslem people tortured us when we were in 
Khartoum. I was attending University and it was difficult for me as a Christian female” 
and “the southerners had and have to learn that Arab culture and Islam are superior 
concepts in order to live peacefully in Khartoum. It would have been difficult to live 
together in one country”.186 This suggests that the status quo which was established 
that allowed the two peoples of Sudan who were fighting to live apart in one country 
was a clear translation that complete negative peace could not be achieved and 
likewise positive peace. The reasons are that attitudes were still hostile and the 
behaviour violent due to their living apart and as such the conflict could not be 
transformed. Similarly aspects of peacebuilding which could have assisted to 
achieve liberal peace as advanced in the Liberal peace theory due to the same 
reason could not take place properly. 
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 Likewise, the parties were encouraged to make unity attractive most especially in 
the case of the southerners in order for them not to vote for separation during the 
referendum. The question is, if some of their core concerns were not resolved how 
this could have been the case?187 The situation of failure to come up with solutions 
on the question of the national identity and religion advanced through the 
assimilationist policies of Arabisation and Islamisation begin to explain the tensions 
and the treats to a return to war that were there at the time and later after the 
separation of South Sudan. 
5.3.3 The Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile states resolution  
The CPA included the resolution of the conflict in Southern Kordofan (which includes 
the Nuba Mountains) and the Blue Nile states as one of its protocols for the 
resolution of the North-South conflict. South Kordofan (Nuba Mountains) and the 
Blue Nile states according to the January 1, 1956 boundary are in Sudan (See 
Figure 5.3).  
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Figure 5.3: Map of the locations of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States  
 
                   Source: UN Maps, 2009 
The history of the two states has mostly been linked to being part of southern Sudan 
as can be seen from the changes they went through in terms of provinces they 
belonged to and how they related with other provinces (See table 5.1).  The areas 
had been part of the CDO which is viewed to have been a silent marker of the area 
supposedly to be southern Sudan by the Condominium regime. 
The core concerns of the two areas against the GOS were similar to those of the 
south as have been indicated in chapter 4 but with an addition of a claim of land 
expropriation by the government which it was using for large mechanized farming 
schemes (Rogier, 2005:120). The main concessions in the protocol as part of the 
solutions to their concerns included; autonomy status, rotational governorship 
between NCP and SPLM every three years and 55% to NCP and 45% to SPLM in 
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the State Legislatures,  the equal presence of the two armies (SAF and SPLM/A-M, 
including the JIUs), ad hoc funding mechanism through the National Reconstruction 
and Development Fund (NRDF) dedicated to the northern war affected areas with 
Southern Kordofan  entitled to 2% of oil revenues as an oil producing state, popular 
consultations, a democratic mechanism to ascertain the view of the people of the 
States on the CPA implementation and the establishment of a land commission to 
deal with land issues (CPA chapter V). These concessions represented special 
economic, security and political arrangements to war affected areas that had fought 
alongside the SPLM/A but were not under the jurisdiction of the SPLM/A-M (De-
Alessi, 2013:85). 
The concessions in the protocol it is noted were not related to the core 
concerns/substantive issues of the people of the two areas which required to be 
settled as part of the agreement.188 This was in addition to the fact that the protocol 
was authored outside the framework of the IGAD peace process chaired by Kenya 
and only brought in as part of the CPA(Johnson, 2011:118). 
The problems with the protocol  included, the two areas  remaining firmly under the 
control of the north’s jurisdiction dominated by the  NCP, expropriation of land not 
addressed as the instituted land commission was only to review land contracts and 
leases and the examination of the criteria in use for land allocation, Sharia not 
touched upon but since the areas were in the north to have Sharia as the basis of 
their legislation and popular consultation which was a confusing term as it really was 
not related to a referendum or self-determination as were granted for  southern 
Sudan and Abyei.  
The Chief mediator had this to say on the protocol “the resolution was creative 
ambiguity. In the case of the popular consultations in East Timor, they were in fact a 
referendum but my view is that the two areas had to be sacrificed by the SPLM/A 
with a hope that may be through its position in the GoNU something someday would 
come out for the areas”189. What was disheartening in regards to the resolution of the 
two areas was that the concerns were to be addressed within the framework of each 
of the state (South Kordofan and Blue Nile) (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006:56). 
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The fact that the protocol did not adequately address the government’s Islamisation 
policy which had more to do with the national identity assimilationist orientation and 
the land expropriation issues which were viewed to be critical to the resolution of the 
conflict in the two areas, implies that the government was going to have and would 
continue having problems with the governance of the two states.190  
Many troops in the SPLM/A-M came from these areas and with the developments 
which took place; it meant that these troops were likely to continue with the 
fighting.191 It is also important to note that historically many GOS troops also came 
from these areas. In terms of the popular consultations, the people were not going to 
be consulted on the protocol which implied that the exercise was an empty promise. 
The fact that the areas were under the SPLM/A-M control but geographically and 
politically belonged to the north presented a dilemma to the parties during the 
negotiations. Similarly, the fact that the parties failed to resolve the concerns of the 
two areas in the CPA suggests that the parties faced a dilemma. These positions 
begin to explain the tensions and the threats to a return to war at the time and after 
the separation of South Sudan from Sudan.  
Bercovitch and Jackson (2011:20) state that conflict resolution is about participation 
and modalities and that agreements are about issues covered and parties involved in 
them. Since the core issues of the two areas were not addressed in the protocol and 
the people of the areas were not allowed to participate fully in the process, then 
complete negative peace could not be achieved and likewise positive peace. The 
most hurting position however was that the two areas were denied a referendum on 
self-determination while the south and Abyei were granted.  
Thus, the attitudes and the behaviour of the people of the area were still going to be 
violent and hostile and as such the conflict could not be transformed. The Galtung’s 
ABC conflict triangle theory could not be applicable in this case. The failure to 
resolve the concerns of the people also meant that peacebuilding, which could assist 
to achieve liberal peace, could not take place as is advanced in the Liberal peace 
theory. 
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5.4 The selective implementation of the CPA 
The aim of the CPA was to end the protracted civil war through a democratic 
transformation process which would establish a system of government that would 
correct the imbalances of the past (Johnson 2011:168). The agreement required to 
be implemented in order for the required status quo to be attained. Implementation of 
a peace agreement according to Steadman et al., (2000:2) as in chapter 2 is a 
process of carrying out specific activities which were agreed in a peace process 
whose success is measured in relation to the ending of violence and the conclusion 
of war on self-enforcing basis.  
In order to implement the Sudan CPA, a number of structures were put in place 
which included the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) (to monitor the 
implementation of the CPA provisions and production of mid-term progress reports) 
and the UNMIS (to monitor the ceasefire situation). The African Union High Level 
Implementation Panel (AUHIP) also later became part of these structures. It can be 
noted that AUHIP in this context became a new framework for resolving the conflict 
which initially was in the hands of IGAD. IGAD in this regard felt undermined.192 
Despite the presence of the appropriate structures, the implementation of the Sudan 
CPA faced a number of challenges as the protocols and some of the important 
provisions were neglected, postponed or compromised.193  
Young (2012:107) states that Garang, the leader of the SPLM/A and Osman Taha 
the vice president of Sudan at the time during the negotiations of the CPA operated 
as if they would hold the presidency and could work out the inevitable problems of 
the agreement’s problems and in this context the two agreed that the critical cases 
ranging from Abyei to border demarcation would ultimately be differed to and 
resolved in the presidency. The intractable problems facing the implementation of 
the CPA were left to the presidency but with the death of Garang and his 
replacement by Salva, the problems remained unresolved or unimplemented.194 The 
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implementation of the CPA by the GoNU had been selective and at times slowed 
deliberately.  
The main problem facing full implementation of the agreement was that the National 
Congress Party (NCP) saw the CPA as a threat against its own existence due to the 
fact that an entirely implemented CPA would create a more democratic and 
transparent Sudan which would challenge the power base it had at the time. The 
neglect/non-implementation, postponements and compromises retarded the effective 
resolution of the north-south Sudan conflict and affected the relationship of the 
concerned two parties. 
5.4.1 The Abyei Resolution Protocol 
The Abyei protocol as part of the CPA was meant to resolve the dispute between the 
north and south Sudan concerning the Abyei area and to contribute to the larger 
picture of the agreement.  Abyei is a source of dispute between Sudan and South 
Sudan for the obvious reasons of natural resource endowments (oil and pasture 
land) and its centrality in terms of the boundary demarcation issue between north 
and south Sudan.195   
Abyei is home to the Ngok Dinka tribe, cousins of the south’s populous Dinka tribe, 
and bordered to the north and north east by the Misseriya Arab cattle herders 
(Baggara) who pass through the area every year to graze their animals (Johnson, 
2011:35). The two tribes lived within separate administrative boundaries in colonial 
days, until 1905, when the British transferred the nine chiefdoms of the Ngok Dinka 
in Abyei from Bahr el-Ghazal in South Sudan to Kordofan province in north Sudan 
(see table 5.1). During the two wars in Sudan, the Ngok Dinkas began to gravitate 
increasingly towards the southern rebels and the south’s cause while the Misseriya 
received preferential treatment from the central government and identified firmly with 
northern Sudan (Deng, 1995:292). 
The Abyei area is problematic because it once used to be part of southern Sudan but 
for administrative reasons was transferred to the north in 1905.  Additionally, its 
status is complicated by the presence of huge oil reserves and good pasture for 
animal grazing in terms of resources and divisions of the tribes associated with the 
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area during the war (the Ngok Dinka supporting the south and the Misseria Arabs 
supporting the north). Thus, the parties to the conflict faced/face a dilemma in terms 
of ownership of the area and the presence of the resources in the area. This implies 
that the agreement was challenged. 
The Abyei protocol in the CPA defined the process by which the dispute was to be 
resolved but it did not define the status of the territory of Abyei (residents of the area, 
the boundaries of the area and the amount of oil revenues which could be derived 
from the area).196 Thus, the protocol did not have adequate details to assist with the 
complete resolution of the conflict. The main concessions of the Abyei protocol 
include the outlines of the provision for administration, the sharing of local oil 
revenues, and the guarantee of continued access to traditional grazing areas by both 
the Ngok and Misseriya (CPA chapter IV).197 
Natural resources provide a strong base for territorial attachments and that territorial 
attachments are directly or indirectly connected to natural resources (Abdalla, 
2010:3). The case of Abyei suggests that the oil abundance and the grazing rights of 
the Misseriya were and are at the heart of the dispute.  
Most of the oilfields lie in South Sudan and that eighty percent of the oilfields that lie 
within northern Sudan are found in Abyei (Raftopoulos and Alexander, 2006:33). 
This suggests that if Abyei would become part of the south, the resultant new 
international boundary would transfer these fields from Sudan to the newly 
independent South Sudan state. The parties faced a dilemma on this aspect which 
may explain the tensions and the threats to a return to war at the time and even after 
the separation of South Sudan. 
The time of the CPA mediation/negotiation, oil was contributing about 60% of 
Sudan’s annual budget and 90% of GOSS annual budget and that from the wealth 
sharing protocol GOS had lost out some of its revenues as it had to share it with the 
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south.198 This suggests that north Sudan had a lot to lose if Abyei would opt to 
become part of the south. 
Regarding defining the Abyei area, the task was left with the ABC and their report 
was to be final and binding but surprisingly after the report was submitted, the GOS 
rejected it (Johnson, 2007:14). The reason for the rejection was that the definition of 
the boundary placed active oil fields inside the Abyei Area. Officially the NCP 
presents resistance to the boundary as grassroots opposition from the Misseriya but 
in reality the resistance is mobilized from within the government.199 This position by 
the GOS implies that the protocol could not be implemented. 
Oil revenue and grazing rights of the Misserya to the area is the major problem for 
the GOS while loss of territory of a close tribe and the oil in the area plays out a big 
role in the case of the GOSS. These factors hardened the position of the GOS to the 
extent that it decided to become uncooperative on the issue as much as possible.  
Moro (2011:78) states that tensions usually escalate where political elites are keen 
to exploit bad inter-group relations so as to further narrow interests in resources and 
power. The Misseriya of the North and the Ngok Dinka in this case were being used 
as pawns in the conflict between the north and the south. 
Due to further impasse on the definition of Abyei, the parties took the issue to the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at the Hague. Although the north was 
successful in that the Heglig area was delinked from Abyei, the protocol still 
remained unimplemented (Bockenforde, 2010: 563). The GOS had thus, resolved 
not to implement the protocol thereby reneging on the agreement.  
The GOS did not implement the protocol as fighting broke in and out of Abyei during 
the period 08-11 January 2011 just as voting in southern Sudan on the referendum 
had begun which was to have taken place simultaneously with the referendum of 
Abyei.200 This scenario implies that there was selective implementation of the 
agreements as the GOS was able to implement other protocols but for economic 
reasons decided not to implement this protocol.  
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The attacks on Abyei were organised by the GOS using its SAF, PDF and northern 
militias and were aimed at removing southern Sudanese Police who had been 
protecting the inhabitants of the area in order to create chaos with a view to block the 
residents of Abyei to conduct their referendum as was stipulated in the CPA. Due to 
the chaos, it was announced that the referendum could not take place and effectively 
meant that the whole protocol could not be implemented as the interim period of the 
CPA also ended as the attacks took place.201  
One respondent commented on the situation of Abyei that: “If you are a leader in 
north or south Sudan and you give up Abyei then you are lost politically”.202 Another 
respondent noted that “the chaos in Abyei is the fault of the SPLM/A. They did not 
want to cooperate with us and in return that is what they got”.203 The GOS in this 
case was a spoiler on the implementation of the Abyei protocol as it prevented the 
referendum not to take place.  
The non-implementation of the protocol created a dilemma in the sense that the 
future of Abyei and the relationship of north and the south became uncertain and the 
spirit of the CPA could not be guaranteed. Thus, the attitudes and the behaviour of 
the parties were still hostile and violent. As such, the conflict could not be 
transformed to achieve complete negative peace in the context of the Galtung’s ABC 
conflict triangle theory. Similarly, post-peacebuilding activities could not take place in 
order for liberal peace to take root as is advanced in the Liberal peace theory. 
5.4.2 The power sharing protocol issues 
The Machakos protocol in the 2005 Sudan CPA provided the South with a right to 
self-determination through a referendum after a six and half year period. Self-
determination is viewed as the freedom to form own government by a state/people 
without external influence and that it can be exercised either within a state (unity) or 
outside the state (separation). The power sharing protocol in this case was a direct 
result of the Machakos protocol considering the fact that the South had been handed 
the right to self-determination as part of the conflict settlement. 
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Power sharing as in chapter 2 and 4 is viewed as practices and institutions that 
result in broad based governing coalitions generally inclusive of all major groups in a 
society, which can reconcile principles of self-determination and democracy in multi-
ethnic states and principles that are often perceived at odds (Sisk (2002:vii). 
According to Rogier (2005:107-113), power sharing in the CPA was categorised with 
activities at the national level and at the asymmetrical federalism level in the case of 
southern Sudan. The distribution of power at the national level included 52% for the 
NCP, 28% for SPLM/A, 14% for political parties in the north and 6% for southern 
Sudan parties.204 According to the protocol, the distribution of ministerial and state 
ministerial positions was to follow the power sharing rationale whereby the ministries 
had been categorised into sovereignty, economic and service clusters (CPA chapter 
II Article 2.5.3).  
This meant that the NCP would choose a ministry and the SPLM/A would take the 
other in the cluster pair. Despite these clear instructions of positions distributions, the 
NCP dominated leadership in the key ministerial positions. Although there was a 
clear template on the distribution of the ministerial positions in the power sharing 
protocol, all the institutions which are critical in the running of the state went into the 
hands of the NCP members.205 For example, the ministries of Energy and Mining 
and the Finance which were paired together and expected to be shared between the 
two parties were all taken up by the NCP.   
All the institutions which were most critical like the economy (oil sector), National 
Security (Military and State Security) and the application of the Sharia law were all in 
the hands of the NCP. Thus, changes which could have reflected the solutions of the 
concerns that had triggered the conflict would be difficult to implement.  Power was 
not being shared fairly and that while intended to manage the conflict would actually 
create a crisis as the Southerners were being frustrated.  
The SPLM/A got eight ministerial posts (Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, Investment, 
education, Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Cabinet Affairs) and had ministers of 
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State or junior ministers in virtually all the ministries they did not control.206 The 
portfolios meant that SPLM/A did not have any position of influence to change 
anything as they did not have the power to do so. This was a cause for concern on 
the part of effective power sharing. A big concern in the case of implementation was 
that few people who had been at the Naivasha talks from the two parties (NCP and 
SPLM/A) had been given ministerial positions in the GoNU. One respondent 
commented on the appointments that “the GoNU looked like the government of 
national split”.207 
Thus, implementation of the CPA and power sharing for that matter without 
assigning people informed of the rationale behind the commitments and the 
background of the concessions or ways in which the negotiations had intended the 
provisions to be carried out would be very difficult. SPLM/A cabinet or deputy 
ministers in the GoNU who were given offices in Khartoum were isolated and 
marginalised and thus resulted in them being viewed as figure heads.   
There was either deep rooted lack of trust between the two parties or deliberate 
efforts to undermine the CPA and as can be noted did not make unity attractive as 
was envisaged during the CPA mediation/negotiations. The attitudes and the 
behaviour of the individuals in the parties had not changed, that is to say, they were 
still hostile and violent due to what was happening on the ground and in that case 
the conflict could not be transformed. Complete negative peace could be achieved 
and even later in the process positive peace could not be attained. Thus, the 
agreement was facing, the tensions and the threats to a return to war at the time and 
even after the separation of the south. In the context of the affirmative action for the 
southerners as part of the asymmetric federalism drive, the civil service commission 
which was supposed to lead the initiative was delayed in its formation.208 This 
resulted in the civil service remaining dominated by the Northerners.  
The lack of implementation of the affirmative action agenda on the southerners’ 
employment meant the SPLM/A ministers finding themselves being forced to rely on 
civil servants who were NCP appointees who at all cost tried not to serve them well. 
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One of the respondents had this to say on this: “[t]hey gave me a nice office, a big 
car, police escorts, but I had no power, the civil servants working with me could not 
brief me, show me documents or carry out my instructions”.209 Thus, implementation 
of the power sharing protocol on this aspect could not contribute to the effectiveness 
of the CPA regarding negative and positive peace as feeds of conflict resolution 
threaded through the Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle and the Liberal peace theories. 
Power sharing in an agreement must be seen as an instrument for participation that 
allows for the parties to work as equal partners during both the negotiations and the 
implementation phases (Hampson, 1996:222).  
This was not the case between the NCP and the SPLM/A. With the state of affairs of 
the implementation of the power sharing protocol some of the provisions in the 
protocol could not be achieved. The way the NCP and the SPLM/A scenario played 
out meant that the attitudes were still hostile, behaviour violent and the conflict 
between them not yet transformed as is advanced in the Galtung’s ABC conflict 
triangle theory. Post-conflict peacebuilding could not be undertaken to achieve liberal 
peace as is advanced in the Liberal peace theory.  
5.4.2.1 Border demarcation, census and elections  
The CPA stipulated that elections be held during the third implementation year and 
left the date of the presidential elections open. Young (2012:138) states that the CPA 
included border demarcation and a national census as the necessary pre-requisites 
for the planned elections which were perceived as an element which was going to 
bring about the democratic transformation of Sudan as part of the liberal peace 
agenda. Demarcation of the border in this case was going to assist with the proper 
allocation of resources for developmental purposes, power sharing and constituency 
borders for the intended elections exercise in addition to the issues of citizenship, 
grazing rights, security and economic cooperation (Hemmer, 2009:11).  
The areas that had to be demarcated included the Blue Nile and the Southern 
Kordofan states in northern Sudan which were governed by the CPA’s two areas 
protocol, the disputed Abyei area with a protocol specific to it and five states in south 
                                                          
209
 Interview with Anna Ito, 8 July 2013, Juba- South Sudan 
  
227 
 
Sudan that were subject to the major CPA protocols governing power sharing, 
security and wealth sharing aspects (Belloni, 2011:419).  
Most of the areas in question are endowed with mineral resources which include oil 
and also provide grazing areas to pastoral tribes of northern Sudan during dry 
seasons.210 Thus, the CPA partners were aggressively competing over rights of 
access to land and resources. The border demarcation exercise in this case 
presented a dilemma to the parties as none of them wanted to lose out on the 
resources found in the areas and the people of the areas who support them.  
The parties due to these factors dragged their feet to carry out the exercise and in 
the process left the property rights and land ownership issues to fester without a 
solution during the interim period. This begins to explain the dilemmas which were 
faced by the parties and the tensions and the threats to a return to war at the time 
and after the separation of South Sudan.  
A Technical Border Commission (TBC) was an institution which was mandated to 
carry out the border demarcation exercise. In this case the TBC was to demarcate 
the northern-southern Sudan border as it existed on 1 January 1956, with a directive 
to consult all relevant maps, drawings and documents, visit all the  areas in northern 
and southern Sudan, consult leaders, administrators and foreign expertise if need be 
within a period of six months (Saeed, 2010:7-8).  
It is alleged that no map exists that accurately depicts the northern-south Sudan 
boundary at independence and thus presented the TBC with a challenge211 (See 
figures 3.1& 5.1). This evidence suggests that the exercise had become a political 
and not a technical venture as it was initially understood. Failure to demarcate the 
border in this case however meant failure to resolve the northern-southern Sudan 
conflict. This scenario implies that the work of the TBC was important to the 
realisation of peace in the case of Sudan and South Sudan.  
It can be argued that the TBC’s task was difficult as it had already been established 
that there were no maps which had been produced which clearly indicated the 
January, 1, 1956 boundary of northern and southern Sudan. Quote on p.211 of this 
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study refers. This implies that all the tasks which the TBC was supposed to carryout 
were important but could not yield the required results as was expected. 
It is alleged that the TBC which was instituted to carry out the demarcation exercise, 
had not completed its work by the time of the 2008 census and even the 2010 
elections (had reached agreement only on 80% of the border) although both these 
processes depended in part on the agreed definition of the territory of southern 
Sudan.212   
This implies that the basis of all the oil revenues sharing as had been agreed at the 
time were not correct as there was no definite definition of the two territories, the 
census exercise which followed was not correct and as such sharing of resources 
and constituencies demarcation especially in the border areas were flawed. Likewise 
the redeployment of the SAF and the SPLM/A in the areas as was planned was also 
not correct.  
Both sides blamed each other for the developments on this aspect, but it is felt that 
the SPLM/A did not push hard on the issue as it did not want the exercise to interfere 
with its referendum.213The SPLM/A felt that the demarcation of the border could be 
resolved better if the south became independent as at the time it could be able to get 
international support as an independent country. The SPLM/A’s attitude in this case 
prejudiced the case of conflict resolution as the border remained undefined at time 
and even now.  
This position suggests that the undefined boundary at the time hindered the CPA 
implementation, fuelled mistrust between its signatories and most recently, 
contributed to heightened anxiety and insecurity along the border.214 Complete 
negative peace and likewise positive peace could not be achieved as the attitudes 
and the behaviour of the parties had not changed to warrant the transformation of 
the conflict. Liberal peace in this case could not be attained.  
Census is an important stage of the preparations for elections as it is used to 
determine the number of eligible voters. The Sudan census was required to provide 
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data in order to adjust the power and the wealth sharing percentages at the national 
level which had been allocated to the NCP and the SPLM/A.215 The Central Bureau 
of Statistics (CBS) in the north and the South Sudan Commission for Census 
Statistics and Evaluation (SSCCSE) in the south were entrusted to oversee the 
census (Jooma, 2007:8).  
The Sudan census had been planned to take place before the end of the second 
year of the interim period although due to challenges (funding and capacity) beyond 
the control of the organisations entrusted to conduct the event, was delayed and 
took place in 2009.216 After the census was finally conducted in 2009, the south 
rejected its results despite the census in the south being carried out by its own 
agency (South Sudan Commission for Census Statistics and Evaluation (SSCCSE) 
(Jooma, 2007:8). The officially announced figures indicated that southern Sudan had 
just a little over 8 million people while the SPLM/A argued that the population of the 
south should consist of at least one-third of the country’s total population of 39 
million.  
More than 40% of the southerners may not have been counted in addition to the fact 
that the results may have been rigged.217 Likewise it is noted that the NCP and the 
SPLM failed to overcome their differences over the census results and the 
referendum law but decided to resume their dialogue on the issues218. Ashworth 
(2009:14) states that after the exercise, the southern census body freely shared its 
raw data with its northern counterpart but those in the north refused to do the same. 
It was at this point that the census is believed to have been rigged. The assumption 
is that the north changed the figures after it had full knowledge of the southern 
Sudan figures and comments from the two sources cited above collaborate with this 
position.  
The problem might have originated from the fact that the exercise was conducted by 
two different bodies SSCCSE in the south and CBS in the north which may not have 
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trusted each other.219 Lack of trust and corruption in this case emerged as a problem 
between the two parties (NCP and SPLM/A).This situation presented a danger to the 
peace agreement and required the NCP and the SPLM/A to break the impasse over 
the census, since it had a direct bearing on the issues of power-and wealth-sharing.  
This suggests that the census results could not be used as a basis for power and 
wealth sharing, the intended elections and even for the referendum later. The census 
acted as a spoiler to the partial negative peace which had been there for a time and 
as such could not allow effective post-conflict peacebuilding  in order to attain 
positive peace as part of liberal peace as advanced in the Liberal peace theory. 
The demarcation of the border and the census activities were important benchmarks 
for the 2010 polls as they were supposed to provide a basis for a representative 
allocation of seats in the legislature. Liberal peace demands at least the appearance 
of democratic accountability and in that regard the CPA stipulated that elections be 
held not later than the end of the third year of the interim period.220 The chief 
negotiator had this to say on the elections: “[a]fter three years all the parties will get a 
chance to compete for power through the electoral process” (Young, 2012:136) 
The elections would spearhead the democratic transformation of Sudan in the sense 
that they would open up  the political space to other parties which had been closed 
by the IGAD mediation frameworks and the power sharing  protocol  which had only 
concentrated power to the NCP and the SPLM/A.221  The NCP and the SPLM at the 
time of the signing of the Agreement were not national democratic political parties as 
they had not been democratically elected but raised to their status through a coup 
(NCP) and a mutiny (SPLM/A-M). The elections in this case would then serve to 
legitimise them. 
Despite the benefits and the good spirit in which the CPA had been agreed to have 
elections as part of peacebuilding as articulated in chapter 2, the elections were 
marred with a number of challenges.222 They were delayed, had a background of 
failure to demarcate the border between the two regions, contested census results in 
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the south and rigging by the North and a scenario of uncertainty about the North 
honouring them (Reeves, 2012:2). This suggests that the elections were going to 
create problems in the relationship of the two parties. 
The elections were competed for at six levels- National (President), southern Sudan 
(President), state (Governors), national legislative assembly, southern Sudan 
legislative assembly and the state legislative assembly (see table 5.1).  A number of 
developments complicated the scene of the whole exercise in the case of the parties 
and the candidates at a number of levels.  
Salva Kiir as the President of southern Sudan and the first Vice President of Sudan 
at the time opted out of the national presidential race and SPLM/A as a party through 
a political Bureau and not a National convention nominated Yasir Arman, a northern 
prominent member as its national presidential candidate and withdrew from all the 
elections in the north apart from the Blue Nile state just before the election date223. 
Following the action of the SPLM/A, other northern political parties boycotted the 
elections as they claimed that  free and fair elections were not possible, a move that 
eventually resulted in Bashir winning the Presidential elections (El Battalani, 
2009:210-211). 
The decision by the SPLM/A to run Yasir instead of Salva who was the leader of the 
SPLM/A gave out a powerful indication that despite the party’s commitment to a 
united Sudan, Salva was positioning himself to be a leader in an independent South 
Sudan.224 The move may also have been facilitated by the fact that the law could not 
allow him to contest in two races (National and southern Sudan levels) and a 
consideration that he could not win at the national level.  
Garang’s position as the leader of the SPLM/A had been to have a united Sudan. 
The position which Salva took in this regard implies that SPLM/A had become a 
separatist organisation although others within it still supported the agenda of a united 
Sudan. Thus, SPLM/A faced a dilemma in regards to its position on the options of 
the right to self-determination in the agreement.    
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The provisions in the CPA to make unity attractive required the two parties to jointly  
address and resolve the causes of the conflict and to restructure fundamentally the 
nature  of the Sudanese state (Johnson:2011:176). From what had transpired this 
was no longer going to be possible and translates that complete negative peace 
could not be achieved  
According to Curless (2010:7), Bashir won 68% of the vote in the Presidential 
elections following the withdrawal of the SPLM/A candidate while Salva in the 
south’s Presidential elections won with 93%.  These results were telling in that come 
the referendum, the south was going to separate from the north.225 
The withdrawal of the SPLM/A’s presidential candidate and the boycott by the 
SPLM/A and the northern opposition parties gave the NCP an opportunity to enlarge 
its majority in the legislature.226The direct translation in this regard is that democratic 
transformation which could only have been realised through the elections could not 
take place.  Similarly, due to the majority of the NCP in the legislature, government 
would always carry the day in major political decisions of the country.  
The actions of the SPLM/A’s show that its main focus in the elections was merely to 
obtain a guarantee for the 2011 self-determination referendum and as such was less 
preoccupied to challenge the NCP and Bashir in the north as was indicated by 
Salva’s decision to focus on the Southern presidential elections only and the 
withdraw of their presidential candidate days before the elections.227 The status quo 
which developed after the elections implied that the two parties were not prepared 
for a united Sudan and as such complete negative peace in the context of the 
conflict resolution could not be completely achieved.228  
It is contended that it was a mistake to have the elections before the referendum as 
at the time there were only a few months that were left before it could be held. 
However, holding the elections as was planned would create tensions between the 
winners and the losers which would eventually affect the conduct of the referendum 
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itself and the relationships of the parties and the individuals concerned.229 David Yau 
yau for example after losing in the elections rebelled against the GOSS and is still 
fighting it supported by the GOS (Copnall, 2014:165). It would have made a lot of 
sense for the elections to be held after the referendum when it would have been 
clear on the position of southern Sudan on its options of unity or separation. The 
elections would have then taken place either in the potential two countries or in one 
unified country.  
The case of disagreements over the demarcation of the border, the national census 
and the shambled elections meant that unity between north and south Sudan had 
failed to be attractive and that the underlying causes of the conflict had not been 
resolved/transformed.230 It is then argued in this case that power sharing as a 
protocol could not be fully implemented and realised. Thus, the 2010 elections 
wrongly grounded the CPA commitments to democratic transformation and the unity 
of Sudan in addition to dispelling any illusions about the democratic credentials of 
the SPLM/A. 
Thus, the attitudes and the behaviour of the parties were still hostile and violent in 
the case of the Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory and likewise peacebuilding 
activities with the elections as an example could not be effective in the case of the 
Liberal peace theory as the conflict could not be transformed. This explains the 
dilemmas the parties faced and the tensions and threats to a return to war at the 
time and after the separation of South Sudan.  
5.4.3 The wealth sharing protocol 
The wealth sharing protocol was based on trying to address the core concerns on 
the socio-economic gap between the centre and the periphery. The protocol was a 
convergence of the conflicting views on the best way to promote unity with the 
SPLM/A claiming the necessity of correcting historical imbalances in regional 
development and the GOS refusing to focus exclusively on the southerners needs 
(Rogier, 2005:129). 
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The common understanding was that the implementation of the protocol was marred 
with disagreements between the GOS and the GOSS over oil revenues and oil 
contracts. Bray and Lunde (2005:4), state that too often natural resources turn out to 
be a curse rather than a blessing for developing countries as they are closely 
associated with corruption.  
The NCP in the GoNU attained the control of the Ministries of Finance and Mining 
and Energy and a pole position in the running of the National Petroleum Commission 
(NPC).231 Due to this kind of positioning, the SPLM/A could not access any 
information relating to the oil production figures and the existing contracts at the time 
and similarly was at most locked out in terms of decision making in the negotiations 
of oil contracts. This state of affairs suggests that there was no sincerity and 
transparency regarding the protocol and the overall implementation of the whole 
agreement to resolve the conflict between the parties specifically in the case of 
equitable distribution of resources. 
A comparison between government reports and the annual reports of the Chinese 
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) operating in South Sudan indicated that 
Khartoum’s figures were between 9% and 26% less than the production reported by 
CNPC while figures for the northern oil fields agreed with those of the CNPC. 
Likewise NCP in 2005 claimed that the share of oil revenues for the south was 
$798.4 million and after administrative services, the South was to receive only 
$523.3 million of the remaining $603.9 million of the revealed calculations (Johnson, 
2011:170).   
The figures which were being provided to the SPLM/A were manipulated as they did 
not have access (despite having a state minister in the ministry) to the records on the 
quantity of the oil sold and the proceeds therefrom. This meant that the North was 
swindling the south which in essence could not help bridge the gap of mistrust 
between the two parties.232  
The SPLM/A signed an oil agreement with the White Nile  and  Moldovian Ascom  
companies in oil blocks which had already been leased to a Total led consortium 
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since 1980 (Wennmann: 2010:23). The SPLM/A in this case clearly violated the CPA 
as it did not have such a right under the agreement (CPA Chapter III, Article 4.2).  
The north lacked honesty in the transactions of the oil business and on the figures of 
the revenues which were to be given to the south. Similarly, the south demonstrated 
a lack of commitment to the agreement by violating what had been agreed in the 
context of oil contracts. The oil revenues and contracts transactions were not being 
carried out with honesty and as such created mistrust between the parties and 
eventually eroded the spirit of making unity attractive.233 
Raftopoulos and Alexander (2006:31) state that the smooth implementation of the 
wealth sharing protocol specifically oil revenues required to be dependent on the 
demarcation of the North-South border specifically along the oilfields. Sudan at the 
time had and has contested areas which were not and are yet to be clearly defined 
with Abyei an area rich in the oil resource included. The North claimed that the 
Heglig oilfied (Panthou), (an area 70km north of Unity State in the south) was outside 
the south’s area while the south felt otherwise (Bockenforde, 2010:560).  
Demarcation of the north-south border would have assisted to identify the oilfields 
from which the south and the north were and are entitled to the revenues. The two 
parties faced dilemmas in how the oil revenues were to be shared in the absence of 
a clearly defined border. This begins to explain the tensions at the time and after the 
separation of southern Sudan from Sudan.  
The scenario implies that the sharing of revenue during the interim period was based 
on wrong parameters and as such exacerbated the chances of the conflict not being 
resolved. The push and pulling evidenced on the issue was testimony enough that 
the parties were on a collision course and as such unity was no longer attractive. 
Attitudes, behaviour and the conflict due to these problems could not change to 
facilitate conflict resolution/transformation. Similarly, although talked about a lot as 
mostly part of the implementation, peacebuilding as part of the liberal peace theory 
appeared to be troubled.  
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According to Broschė (2007:8), the issues of border demarcation, failure to resolve 
the Abyei issue and the slow implementation pace of the other protocols of the CPA 
forced the SPLM/A in 2007 to withdraw from the GoNU during the interim period.  
Due to developments like these, it is noted that the NPC setting was problematic, 
revenue sharing did not have a concrete basis as the border was not demarcated 
which could have defined the oilfields from which revenues could be shared and the 
GOSS lacked the capacity in the oil industry which played out negatively on the 
issue of revenues. Likewise lack of respect for contracts by both parties created an 
atmosphere of mistrust and transparency and that all these factors together made 
unity not to be attractive and for the conflict to be difficult to resolve. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The CPA was meant to put together the causes of the conflict and through an 
implementation process address the root causes of the north-south Sudan conflict 
(Young, 2012:99). No peace treaty can undo the past but can only address and 
attempt to redress the consequences of the past and the CPA was not an 
exception.234 The untouched issues, the unresolved issues and the selective 
implementation of the protocols and some of their provisions and issues that 
emerged as milestones before the referendum are evidence that the parties faced 
dilemmas in most of the issues during the mediation, the negotiation and the 
implementation processes.  
The competing aspirations of the NCP and SPLM/A during the mediation and the 
negotiation of the CPA contributed to the status quo at the time. However,  the death 
of John Garang who was the leader of the SPLM/A may have affected the 
implementation of the CPA as the NCP felt threatened that further compliance would 
lead to its undoing since the successor of Garang was perceived more as a  
separatist. 235 
The untouched issues and the unresolved issues implied that the attitudes and the 
behaviour of the parties were still hostile and violent and likewise the conflict 
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structure had not changed or transformed as is advanced in the Galtung’s ABC 
conflict triangle theory. This meant that complete negative peace could not be 
achieved and similarly could not aid a transition to positive peace. 
The selective implementation of the agreement directly translated that peacebuilding 
in the post-conflict period could not be focused properly. This implies that 
democratization, economic interdependence and the international law and its 
institutions which reflect the liberal peace as is advanced in the Liberal peace theory 
could not take root. Thus, positive peace became out of question.  The problems of 
the untouched issues, the unresolved issues and selective implementation of the 
CPA in this case explains the tensions and the threats to a return to war which were 
there at the time and after the separation of South Sudan from the North. 
The next chapter discusses the referendum, the post-referendum and the post-
independence issues and the frameworks of the conflict resolution efforts.  
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Chapter 6 
6.0 The referendum, post-referendum, the post-independence 
issues and the conflict resolution efforts 
6.1 Introduction 
The 2005 Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was a landmark 
agreement which had aimed at bringing an end to Africa’s longest standing war 
between north and south Sudan as part of conflict resolution in Sudan. The agreed 
principles as part of the key features of the agreement included unity for the  people 
of Sudan and the right to self-determination in addition to an internationally 
monitored referendum after a six and half years period.236  
The agreement was part of a conflict resolution process as in itself without other 
approaches would only be conflict settlement. Conflict resolution is a process as has 
been articulated in chapter 2 (Ramsbotham, et al., 2011:30). The agreement was 
only reached after an intensive mediation/negotiation process and required to be 
implemented in order for it to achieve its objectives. Belloni (2011:419), states that 
the CPA’s ultimate objective was to make unity attractive to the south through a 
process of democratic transformation although self-determination of southern Sudan 
through a referendum during the interim period became more prominent.   
According to Rolandsen (2011:560), some issues were left unresolved while others 
were not touched during the CPA mediation/negotiation process. Likewise during the 
implementation phase some issues which were agreed on were not implemented 
and that new issues emerged which had not been anticipated as the milestones 
which were planned to be undertaken before the referendum which included border 
demarcation, census and elections were being executed. Woodward (2011:9) states 
that the problem that emanated from the implementation phase milestones resulted 
in the NCP becoming dominant in the North and the SPLM/A-M in the south.  This 
status quo forced Sudan to become two regions and made the referendum when it 
was carried out to be a formality of the division which had already occurred.237  
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The anticipation brought about by the outcomes of the elections was confirmed 
during the referendum as the South voted for separation.  Due to the results of the 
referendum, the outstanding CPA issues, issues which emerged during the 
implementation phase and likewise during the referendum, the post-referendum 
period and after the independence of South Sudan required resolving in the interest 
of good relations and peace between north and south Sudan.238 Due to the 
outstanding issues from the previous processes, the referendum, the post-
referendum and the post-Independence eras, tensions and threats to a return to war 
have been prevalent between the areas/states. Without good relations, high 
expectations of a better future would remain a mirage if the recurring disputes would 
not be resolved amicably between the two regions/states.  
The chapter in this regard will examine the referendum, post-referendum, the post-
independence issues and the IGAD and the AUHIP conflict resolution frameworks.  
6.2 The referendum 
The referendum as articulated in Chapter 4 and 5 originated from the southern 
Sudan demand for self-determination as a result of serious governance concerns 
with the government of Sudan which had triggered a conflict that spanned almost a 
period of 50 years.  The Machakos protocol provided the basis for the right to self-
determination and a referendum vote in order for the south to determine its future 
status by either confirming the unity of Sudan or its separation from the North. (CPA 
Chapter I, Article 1.3).  The CPA provided for a separate referendum on the same 
for the Abyei area and scheduled it to take place simultaneously with that of 
Southern Sudan (CPA Chapter 4, Article 1.3). 
Despite intermittent antagonism of the NCP and the SPLM/A, a timely and 
successful conclusion of the self-determination process in Southern Sudan and in 
Abyei would be a vindication of good intentions by both signatories of the CPA and  
its international guarantors (Verjee, 2000:5).  Such a scenario would open Sudan to 
normalization of relations with western donor countries and international institutions 
and in the process enable peace between the North and the South although failure 
could also eventually mean tensions or a return to war. 
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The Referendum Acts which were approved by the National Assembly in 2009 
provided the conditions under which the referenda for southern Sudan and Abyei 
would be held.239 The South Sudan Referendum Act (SSRA) required a simple 
majority vote on a turnout of 60 percent. If the turnout requirement was not met then 
the referendum would be repeated within 60 days (Government of National Unity, 
2009:23). The concern was about the turnout requirement which it is perceived was 
imposed to discourage the voters or for them to boycott the poll. Although the parties 
had agreed on the details in order for the vote to be accepted, the requirement was 
difficult to meet, may be in the interest of discouraging the Southerners and the 
Abyei people to vote for separation and to be attracted to the unity idea.240   
Young (2012:177) states that the GOSS and the international backers of the peace 
process considered the referenda of South Sudan and the Abyei areas as the main 
objective of the CPA.  The referenda in the areas would be used to gauge the 
commitment to democratisation of Sudan as failure would lead to tensions and 
threats to a return to war. 
Salva as the president of the GOSS and leader of the SPLM/A while in the USA 
during a meeting at the UN and later during a keynote address to the Congressional 
Black Caucus stated that while unity had been a priority since the signing of the 
CPA, it was no longer an attractive option for the people of south Sudan and in that 
case unity had not been made attractive.241  This position impressed upon all 
including north Sudan that south Sudan had positioned itself for separation and was 
not interested in the unity option come the referendum. 
The referendum of southern Sudan took place as it was scheduled and 98.83 
percent of Southern Sudanese voted for separation while only 1.37 percent voted for 
unity (see table 6.1). Thus, the 60 percent turnout and a simple majority requirement 
were met in order for the south to separate from the north. The vote in Abyei which 
was planned to run at the same time with that of Southern Sudan was suspended 
and since then the future status of the territory has yet to be resolved.242 
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Table 6.1: South Sudan Referendum results 
 Registered 
voters 
Separation 
voters 
Unity voters Separation 
percentage 
Unity 
percentage 
South 
Sudan 
3,770,600 3,697,467 16,129 97.57 0.43 
North 
Sudan 
69,597 38,003 27,918 57.65 42.35 
Out of 
Country 
voting 
(OCV) 
57,889 57,048 841 98.55 1.45 
Grand Total 3,898,086 3,792518 44,888 98.83 1.37 
 
Source: South Sudan Referendum Commission, 2011:2 
 
The evidence of the results of the referendum vote for the separation of the south 
was that there could not have been a reason for contestation. Contrary to the south 
Sudan situation, the case of the failure of the Abyei referendum to take place meant 
that one of the CPA protocols was not implemented.  
Medani (2011:144) argues that in Africa, externally induced peace agreements 
historically have proven far less durable and effective than internally negotiated 
power sharing agreement.  The case of Abyei stands out as its protocol was drafted 
by the Americans and was only brought to the parties for discussion and 
endorsement. This implies that the attitudes, the behaviour and the conflict structure 
as advanced in the Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory had not changed and as 
such complete negative peace could not be achieved and likewise peacebuilding on 
the part of the political framework democratisation not being able to be effective to 
achieve positive peace as is advanced in the Liberal peace theory.  
The blocking of the implementation of the Abyei and other CPA protocols can be 
related to as acts of bad faith on the part of the NCP which in essence was a direct 
act of sowing the seeds of conflict with the south. The reasons for the Abyei 
protocol’s non-implementation were none other than the availability of the oil in the 
area and the protection of the grazing rights of the north’s Misseria tribe which 
annually uses the area for their animals.243  
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The north simply did not want to lose more oil resources to the south hence the 
stance on the issue.244 One of the respondents from South Sudan quoted the 
President of Sudan in one of his speeches and said this: “we have given everything 
to South Sudan and we do not have anything new to offer”.245 The actions of Sudan 
over the Abyei issue were expected. Bona Malwal had this to say: “whatever had 
happened was not surprising. The whole issue was a replay of the history of Sudan 
whereby a tit for tat approach to issues is part of the culture in Sudan”.246   
The scenario in this context suggests that the attitudes and behaviour of the parties 
were still hostile and violent and as such the conflict structure could be changed as is 
advanced in the Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory. The implication in this case is 
that negative peace could not be completely achieved.  There were greater chances 
for the conflict to recur if the outstanding issues and the new issues resulting from 
mediation, negotiation and the implementation phases could not be resolved 
between them. The failure of the Abyei referendum begins to explain the problems 
the agreement encountered, some of the dilemmas which the parties faced and the 
tensions and the threats to a return to war at the time and after south Sudan had 
separated from the North. 
6.3 The post-referendum issues 
The referendum created a new form of relationship between north and south Sudan 
in that they were to formally become separate states due to the referendum results. 
The CPA did not define the relationship between the two areas in the event of a 
Southern vote for separation and arrangements on multiple issues were not in place 
(Blanchard, 2012:7). The outstanding issues from the mediation, negotiation and 
later the implementation phases required resolving in the interest of conflict 
resolution/transformation. Since the issues were to be dealt with after the 
referendum they came to be termed as the post-referendum issues.   
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Aljazeera Centre for Studies identified ten distinct post-referendum issues (Al-
Kabashi, 2010:2), a Chatham house report identified 12 (Thomas, 2010:24), a House 
of Commons Library paper identified 8 (Lunn, 2010:19-20), the SSRA 2009 had 11 
while the GOSS’s own list included 11 major problems but perceived four of them to 
be the most critical during both the post-referendum and the post-independence 
eras. For purposes of easy management, the issues were categorised into four 
categories namely; citizenship, security, financial, economic and natural resources 
and international treaties and legal issues (Young, 2012:182). What was required to 
be achieved in the case of these issues was basically a negative peace which 
eventually was to be transited to a status of positive peace most specifically in 
regards to the relationship of North and South Sudan. In this chapter only the most 
critical issues will be discussed.  
6.3.1 Nationality and citizenship  
The questions of nationality and citizenship became very critical aspects especially 
after the South had opted to separate during the referendum vote. Assal (2011:3) 
perceives nationality in line with a country where an individual was born and 
citizenship as the legal right to belong to a particular country. Smith (2001:1857-
1858) states that citizenship includes that acquired at birth and that which is acquired 
by a process of naturalization. The Sudan questions of nationality and citizenship 
were complicated by the problem of identity whereby the questions of Arab-African, 
northerner-southerner and Muslim and non- Muslim appeared to have had occupied 
a centre stage and viewed to have been one of the causes of the north-south conflict 
in the country.  
Dewaal (2009:3) states that in-spite of the controversies, disagreements and wars 
over the identity of the Sudanese nation; there has been no debate at all over who is 
classified as Sudanese. The position of the NCP in the case of the south opting for 
separation was that the southerners would be treated as foreigners and would lose 
their citizenship.247  The south’s, position called for giving people in the north and the 
South the right to choose citizenship in either of the two successor states.  The 
debate between the parties on the issue of citizenship had primarily focused on 
Southerners in the North and less so on northerners in the south and pastoralists 
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from the north who move to the south at certain periods of the year to look for 
pasture and water for their animals248. This position suggests presence of cultural 
links between Sudan and South Sudan and as such solutions on the questions of 
nationality and citizenship require a deliberate sober approach in order to avoid 
unnecessary tensions and threats to a return to war.  
Assal (2010:83) states that any agreement on citizenship in Sudan required to take 
account of the wishes of the concerned people, the traditional lifestyle of the 
pastoralists and border communities and the need to maintain livelihoods on both 
sides of the border.  This evidence suggests that there was a problem especially 
among the Northerners on the aspects of nationality and citizenship which still gives 
an indication that the conflict in their minds had not ended.  
The problem on the aspects of nationality and citizenship was that the NCP and 
SPLM/A had expressed contradictory opinions on them from a desk top position in 
the offices without consulting the people concerned. One respondent stated that the 
statements from Khartoum before the referendum projected a gloomy future of the 
relationship between the  two areas if the South were to vote for separation  and 
quoted the following speeches from senior NCP political leaders; The National 
Assembly speaker, Ahmed Ibrahim al-Tahir stated that, “southerners would be 
‘second class citizens’ in the north while Kamal Obeid, the Information Minister, 
announced publically that: ‘They will not enjoy citizenship rights, jobs or benefits, 
they will not be allowed to buy or sell in the Khartoum market and they will not be 
treated in hospitals.249 
The southerners were given rough treatment in the north and were forced to travel to 
South Sudan where they did not even know where they were going to stay. The 
status quo meant that there was a requirement for the fate of the southerners living 
in the north and northerners living in the south to be negotiated. The rights of ease of 
travel of the pastoralists and the border communities between the two parts of the 
country required to be managed as part of resolving the conflict in order to achieve 
sustainable peace.  
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In Abyei, the Misseriya were blocking those trying to go to the south while the Ngok 
Dinka were blocking the seasonal migration of the Misseriya after the referendum250. 
Thus, although partial negative peace had been achieved, peacebuilding activities in 
the areas of justice and reconciliation and security which could have assisted to 
transform the conflict and achieve positive peace as is advanced in the Liberal peace 
theory could not be achieved. Darby and MacGinty (2008:4) state that reconstruction 
does not merely concern the repair of physical damage; instead it should extend to 
the re-building of fractured relationships and communities. This explains the 
challenges of the agreement, the tensions and the threats to a return to war the two 
areas/states have been experiencing. 
6.3.2 Economic issues (debt, assets, oil and currency) 
The wealth sharing protocol of the CPA featured as the main need in the resolution 
of economic issues as a response on the query of inequitable distribution of 
resources between the centre and the periphery.  Decock (2011:6) states that the 
future of north and south Sudan depends on redefining how the two states manage 
conflict that stems from contested claims for control over and access to resources.  
The main features of the wealth sharing protocol which included an outline 
framework for resource allocation in which was factored the division of oil revenues 
was a direct attempt to address the resources distribution problem.251  However, 
issues of oil, debts, assets and currency appeared to be major in the context of the 
relationship between north and south Sudan after the separation of the South in the 
post-referendum era.   
Williams (2011:74-75) states that rent seeking, grievances, economic instability, 
conflict financing and peace spoiling are the most critical links of resources on the 
economic aspect which fuel conflict.  The CPA had managed to achieve partial 
negative peace but its failure to implement some of its protocols like the wealth 
sharing protocol which linked with the aspects of assets, debts, oil and currency 
complicated the achieved partial peace status and a transition to positive peace most 
specifically after the separation of the South.252 The peacebuilding aspect on the 
socio-economic part on the peacebuilding pallet could not take root which could have 
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assisted to achieve Liberal peace as is advanced in the Liberal peace theory (see 
figure 2.3).    
6.3.2.1 Assets and the national debt 
Sudan as a state had national assets and properties of state owned companies both 
in the north, the south and overseas. Oil industry infrastructure (pipeline, refineries 
and the sea port) and embassies are cases in point (Thomas, 2010:24).  These 
assets required to be divided up between Sudan and South Sudan. 
The national debt of Sudan during the mediation/negotiation period stood at 39 
billion Dollars (Young, 2012:185). Problems between the regions were that little debt 
financed investment reached the south and that some debt financing was used to 
fund the war against the South.  The north wanted the south to take on a portion of 
the debt burden but the south rejected the idea as it argued that the funds now as 
the debt were used by the north to wage war against it.253   
The evidence proffered on the issues of the assets and the debts suggests that the 
parties faced dilemmas on these aspects especially after the south’s vote to 
separate from the North. This situation begins to explain the tensions and threats to 
a return to war by the two parties. The position of the parties in this context implies 
that their attitudes and behaviour were still hostile and violent and as such the 
conflict structure could not be changed as is advanced in the Galtung’s ABC conflict 
triangle theory. 
6.3.2.2 Oil 
Oil is a major natural resource which is and has been at the centre of the Sudan 
conflict. Access to and control of oil wealth played a decisive role in sustaining and 
escalating the Sudanese civil war and played an integral role in financing the 
government’s war effort (Baker, 2011:43).  Under the CPA, oil revenues from oil 
pumped from the South were shared 50-50 between north and south Sudan but after 
the south’s vote to separate, the south became entitled to all the revenues within its 
territory (Young, 2012:183).  Considering the contribution of oil revenues to both 
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parties, the sharing in this regard remains the crucial issue in the relationship of 
North and South Sudan and an important aspect of future contention254.   
Most of the oilfields which generated about 85% of the total oil production are in the 
south but the sole export route for the South which is landlocked is a pipeline which 
runs to the North to Port Sudan on the Red Sea (Belloni.2011:418). South Sudan 
and Sudan have an important part in the extraction and the transportation of oil and 
that their future is economically linked due to these factors.  
In spite of the two states’ dependency on oil, during the post-referendum 
negotiations neither side was able to agree on a formula for the sharing of post-
separation oil revenues and resources.255 The two parties faced a dilemma. There 
was in this regard a need to have a new oil deal which was comprehensive, easily 
verifiable and commercially attractive with a dispute resolution mechanism. The 
absence of such a mechanism implies that complete negative peace had not been 
achieved even after South Sudan had separated from Sudan. This position explains 
the tensions and the threats to a return to war after the referendum.  
6.3.3 Security  
The basis of the security parameter in Sudan was the security arrangements 
protocol of the 2005 Sudan CPA (Rogier, 2005:151).  The belief was that the 
protocol was a remedy to the national security problem at the time but required 
reviewing after the separation of the south. Security after the referendum of the 
south has mostly concerned provocative activities of the two armed forces of the 
north and the south and use of militias by both camps as proxies. These 
developments in the post-referendum era have continued to complicate the 
relationship of the now separate states of Sudan and South Sudan.256 
Regarding the SAF and SPLA provocative activities, in early May 2011, there were 
clashes between the SAF and the SPLA in Abyei (Young 2012:266). An SAF convoy 
escorted by the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) detail was attacked by the 
SPLA and resulted in the death of a number of SAF troops. After a day, the SAF and 
the Misseiria PDF militias attacked Abyei town and subsequently occupied the town 
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after causing enormous damages and displacing some 100,000 people mostly the 
Ngok Dinkas into South Sudan where many still remain today.257  The presence of 
the Misseiria in the attack confirms the use of militias by Sudan as proxies. This 
evidence suggests that CPA had not achieved complete negative peace as even 
after South Sudan had opted to separate from Sudan, the forces of the two parties 
still fought each other. 
Blanchard (2012:12) states that in response to the violence which resulted in the 
population displacement and escalating tensions, through vigorous negotiations led 
by Ethiopia, the UN Security Council passed Resolution (UNSCR) 1990 in June 
2011, which authorised a peacekeeping operation called the UN Interim Security 
Force for Abyei (UNISFA). This peacekeeping force was composed of Ethiopian 
troops with an aim to separate the two forces and later to monitor the entire north-
south border in coordination with Sudan and South Sudan as part of conflict 
management articulated in chapter 2. 
This implies that attitudes and the behaviour of the parties were still hostile and 
violent and that the conflict had not changed as is advanced in the Galtung’s ABC 
theory. The position in this case is that peacebuilding activities as indicated on the 
Utstein palette on the security parameter especially on the aspect of security sector 
reform had not taken root (see figure 2.3). Liberal peace could not be attained as is 
advanced in the Liberal peace theory. 
In a different dimension, the SPLM/A members in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile 
states (which are in the border areas between Sudan and South Sudan) after the 
south’s vote for separation were left on their own as they were northerners but their 
local SPLM/A leaders in the areas remained popular.258 In the case of Southern 
Kordofan, these leaders together with other Northern SPLM/A members formed a 
new political party which they called the SPLM/A-North (SPLM/A-N). Since the new 
party in Southern Kordofan had retained the name SPLM/A, SPLM/A and SPLM/A-N 
became two separate organisations but remained tied by a history. 
The Sudanese military demanded that local SPLM/A forces, who had remained 
stationed in the two states throughout the CPA period (some as part of JIUs), be 
immediately withdrawn to South Sudan and to be disarmed (Young, 2012:272). The 
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SPLM/A-N rejected the Sudan’s demand, and when an order was given to forcibly 
disarm them in June 2011 by the governor of the state, fighting broke out. As soon 
as the fighting erupted, the SPLM/A in South Sudan continued supporting them and 
sheltered some of their leaders.259  
The SPLM/A in the South Sudan was using the SPLM/A-N as a proxy in their fight 
against Sudan. Thus, Sudan and South Sudan were at war indirectly. The security 
aspect of DDR in this context as was stipulated in the CPA security arrangement as 
part of post-conflict peacebuilding had failed to take effect. Liberal peace as is 
advanced in the Liberal peace theory in this scenario could not be attained in the two 
regions as the interim period had not yet expired at the time. This scenario begins to 
explain the tensions and the threats to a return to war that exist currently between 
Sudan and South Sudan. 
6.3.4 International treaties and legal issues 
Treaties form an important part of foreign policies of states as part of the 
international community and relations.  Sudan in this regard had entered into pacts 
with other states on a variety of matters. After southern Sudan had opted for 
separation during the referendum, the relations with other countries which were 
friendly with Sudan and hostile to it had either to be severed, retained or 
renegotiated. Depending on the issues which were agreed upon, such agreements 
would be scrapped off (Lunn, 2010:20).   
Sudan had either ratified or refused to be party to some treaties in the world and in 
the context of water specifically from the Nile River had an agreement with Egypt 
while in the context of the oil resource had business agreements with China, India 
and Malaysia (Thomas, 2000:24).  After the referendum vote, South Sudan had 
decided to honour and transfer/scrap some of these international agreements which 
had been reached by Sudan as part of its foreign policy.  South Sudan on this aspect 
had problems with China due to the support it gave north Sudan during the war 
specifically in the clearing of the local population in the areas where oilfields had to 
be established and Egypt in the context of the construction of the Jonglei canal.260 
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The problem in the case of China was that it was a partner in the oil extraction and 
the pipeline which was transporting oil from the south to the seaport at the Red sea.  
The south could not server the relationship with China but simply to renegotiate their 
relationship.  The perception in this case is that there was a need for South Sudan 
and Sudan to come up with positions through negotiated agreements in order to 
ensure that the issues in the treaties could not bring their existence to a collision 
course especially on issues which concerned the lifelines of both parties like it was in 
the case of China.261  Failure to reach agreements on such issues could result in 
complete negative peace not being realised. 
6.4 The post-independence issues  
Sudan and South Sudan became separate States after the results of a referendum 
which had been stipulated in the 2005 CPA.  It is contended in the context of the 
separation that despite their formal separation, the two states remain linked and 
divided over a range of shared interests and outstanding disputes.262 Thus,  apart 
from the mediation/negotiation process that birthed the CPA,  the implementation 
phase (interim period) and  the post-referendum period before the independence of 
South Sudan which represented the conflict resolution process created outstanding 
issues which are and have been sources of tensions between the two states 
(Blanchard, 2012:149-150).   
Bercovitch and Jackson (2012:31) as in chapter 2 stresses that conflict 
resolution/transformation is a process of addressing the underlying sources of 
conflict between parties. The outstanding issues as offshoots of the CPA process, 
the outstanding post referendum issues and issues that developed and were still 
developing after the independence of South Sudan on 9 July 2011, required 
resolving.   
The problem which arose after South Sudan became independent was that the 
conflict had changed from intrastate to an interstate status. The issues became 
difficult to resolve as they transformed to foreign policy issues which previously were 
simply domestic ones. The conflict resolution approach and its methods also 
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required changing in the interest of resolving issues which involve two states and not 
parties within one polity.  
Sudan and South Sudan are viewed as two lungs in one body whereby if one fails 
then the pressure on the other will be enormous (Copnall, 2015:217). The two 
Sudans in this regard should resolve the outstanding issues from the CPA process, 
those that emerged due to the vote to separate during the referendum and those that 
evolved as a result of independence in order to achieve peace and avoid the 
scenario as is depicted in the two lungs in the same body scenario. There are many 
issues on this area but only the critical ones will be dealt with in this section.   
6.4.1 Oil and the financial arrangements  
Oil has been and is a major factor in the economy of Sudan and presently even for 
South Sudan after separating from Sudan.  The two states to a large extent depend 
on extractive resources rent which in return qualify them to be labelled as rentier 
states.  Bablayi (1987:85) views exports earned or income derived from a gift of 
nature as economics rent.  One of the causes of the second Sudan civil war was the 
unequal distribution of resources between the centre and the periphery hence the 
inclusion of the 50-50% oil revenue sharing in the oil produced in the south in the 
CPA’s wealth sharing arrangement.263 
When South Sudan became independent, Sudan lost 75% of its oil reserves but the 
south as a land locked country remained reliant on the northern oil industry 
infrastructure (pipelines, refineries and the seaport) to export its oil (Belloni, 
2011:417).  This situation meant that South Sudan was and is dependent on Sudan 
for exporting its oil to the markets. Similarly Sudan was and is dependent to an 
extent on South Sudan for its economy from the rents which it collects from South 
Sudan for the use of its oil industry infrastructure. This position implies that the oil 
industry is a stabilizing factor in the relationship of the two states on which conflict 
resolution could thrive on but also a trigger for an uneasy relationship of the two 
states.  
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South Sudan separated from Sudan and became independent before a number of 
issues had been resolved. Young (2012:138) states that the unresolved oil issue 
became a major obstacle in the relations between the two states and as such 
constituted a serious impediment in the fragile peace between them. In October 
2011, deliberations on the future management of South Sudan’s petroleum sector, 
including pipeline rental, transit fees, port services, and joint development options 
took place and were considered pivotal to other negotiations between Juba and 
Khartoum but no agreement was reached (Blanchard, 2012:8).  
Sudan, seeking to offset the loss of its 50% share of the south’s oil revenues during 
the meeting had demanded oil transit and processing fees of $32-$36 per barrel. 
This was against South Sudan’s significantly lower counter-offers of under $1 per 
barrel which were more in line with international standards for transit fees.264 The two 
parties were far apart in their negotiations on the oil issue as a post referendum 
issue and later as a post-independence issue. This status quo is evident as it can be 
noted that no agreement was reached on the transit and processing fees of the oil 
per barrel on the part of South Sudan (Copnall, 2015:227-228).    
In the period between July and December 2012, Khartoum detained outbound 
tankers and diverted more than $800 million worth of oil from South Sudan as it was 
being exported through the country. Khartoum acknowledged diverting the oil, 
claimed that South Sudan owed it roughly $1 billion in unpaid transit fees, a figure 
which was based on the fee rates it was demanding in the negotiations against a 
background of South Sudan reporting not having received oil revenues for several 
months.265 In response South Sudan ordered oil companies inside its borders to shut 
down the oil production from its oil wells (Jumbert and Rolandsen, 2013:3).  
The situation only normalized through negotiation by the AUHIP initially through a 
meeting by the AUHIP supported by the presidents of Kenya and Ethiopia in January 
2012 whereby no deal was reached and later in September 2012, whereby a deal 
was reached as part of the conflict resolution process using the AUHIP framework.266 
Copnall (2015:237) states that the deal set the fees for South Sudan exporting its oil  
through Sudan at $11per a barrel for oil produced in Unity state and $9.10 per barrel 
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for Upper Nile and in addition South Sudan agreed to pay $3,028 billion as  
Transition Financial Assistance (TFA) to compensate  Sudan for the economic 
damage which its separation had caused which was to be paid at $15 per barrel to 
act as further incentive for Sudan to allow South Sudan’s oil exports to be 
uninterrupted.267   
This situation suggests that the structural and mutual dependency between the two 
countries related to oil revenues (with South Sudan holding the majority of the oil 
reserves and Sudan controlling the oil exporting infrastructure) makes oil and the 
requirement for better financial arrangement between the two states to be major 
issues in the negotiations of their future relations.  The oil factor in this case as can 
be noted is important to the economies of the two countries.  The reaction of the two 
countries on the issue says a lot about the non-existence of a cordial relationship 
between them and a pointer to a potential for the countries to go back to war which 
would directly mean absence of peace between the two parties. 
The conduct of the two states on the oil and financial arrangements implies that the 
attitudes and the behaviour of the parties were still hostile and violent and in that 
case that the conflict could not be transformed as is advanced in the Galtung’s ABC 
conflict triangle theory. This position implies that negative peace had not been 
completely achieved by the agreement and in that case explains the tensions and 
the threats to a return to war between the two states. 
6.4.2 Debts and debts relief 
Just like on the issue of financial arrangements, the issue of debts and debt relief 
was problematic in the relationship of the two states. According to Natsios 
(2012:201), Sudan had borrowed billions of funds to finance the construction of the 
oil infrastructure (pipelines, refineries and port facilities) and since the south was a 
beneficially on its use for the exportation of its oil to the international markets, it 
wanted South Sudan to assume a portion of the debts.  Sudan advanced this 
demand due to the fact that it had lost most of its oil revenues and was struggling to 
service the debts.268  
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South Sudan, just like in the post-referendum era objected to the idea of assuming 
the portion of the debt and based its objection on the fact that the funds had been 
used to buy weapons to fund the war against it (Copnall, 2014:225).  The lines of 
arguments by both the parties were results of faulty negotiations as certain facts like 
sharing of revenues other than resources took precedence and the fact that since 
the two states had been one country at one time, a need to consider use of facilities 
like the oil industry infrastructure needed to be accorded special consideration as it 
initially was a strategic asset to the parties before the separation.   
The established facts on the debts was that they were accumulated to create 
irrigation schemes, mechanised farming and Arab breadbasket projects, road 
construction/rehabilitation, power generation stations in north Sudan as well as 
public buildings and armament factories. 269 The best approach in this case would 
have been to undertake an audit of the assets and the purposes for which the loans 
were contracted and come up with a formula of apportioning the debt between the 
two parties before the separation took place.  The positions advanced by the parties 
against a background of what really took place, was//is a signal enough that the 
relationship between the two states was/is not sound.   
This situation translates that the attitudes and the behaviour of the parties during the 
mediation and negotiations were hostile and violent and as such the conflict structure 
could not be changed as is advanced in the Galtung’s ABC triangle theory. The 
failure to address the socio-economic aspect as part of post-conflict peacebuilding 
implies that Liberal peace as is advanced in the Liberal peace theory could not take 
root especially on the area of economic interdependence. 
Young (2012-185) states that the north not only wanted the South Sudan to pay a 
price for the independence but also wanted to benefit from the USA and the 
international community particularly on debt relief either directly from the USA or 
through US influence at the World Bank or via a group of contributors. Sudan 
through the same channels wanted the removal of sanctions, the designation of a 
terrorism sponsoring nation by the USA and as is referred in chapters 3 and 4 
through the Security Council have the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) charges 
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against its president suspended in return for a smooth referendum and later 
cooperation on all the outstanding issues after the independence of South Sudan.270 
These demands by the North were viewed as problematic in the context of conflict 
resolution.   
The international community especially USA and UK found it difficult to assist due to 
requirements tied to debt relief which included human rights violations and state 
sponsorship of terrorism issues which at the time Sudan was involved with 
(Blanchard, 2012:9). The case of the indictment of President Bashir on the Darfur 
human rights issues as articulated in chapter 4 is a case in point on this. South 
Sudan viewed the demands as a ransom to be paid for its independence and as a 
block for any step in the negotiations of the outstanding issues after its 
independence. Due to the consequent failure by the international community to 
provide debt relief to Sudan, the country has been forced as a reaction to harden its 
position in the negotiation of all the other outstanding issues with South Sudan which 
is seen as a threat to peace between the two states which might eventually force 
them to return to conflict.271  
6.4.3 The North-South boundary dispute 
The 2005 Sudan CPA between the NCP and SPLM/A used the dividing line which 
was created by the British as a colonial master as it stood on 1 January 1956 to be 
the boundary between the two areas/states. According to Copnall (2014:220) at the 
separation of the two states, there was no agreement over where Sudan began as 
the border was disputed with several areas being claimed by both parties. 
Johnson (2010:15) argues that there is no single authoritative source that states 
precisely what the boundary was like on that date. Pp.211-12 and pp.227-28 in this 
study refers on this issue. Interestingly as referred in chapter 5, the border area is 
host to a wide range of natural wealth which includes mineral and oil resources, 
animal biodiversity and a human population that is ethnically divided between Arabs 
and black Africans.  
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This evidence suggests that greed for the available resources and competing 
interests of the human population created problems in the border demarcation 
exercise whose results could have enabled the equitable use and sharing of the 
available resources in the area.  In this regard it is noted that the abundance of 
resources, cultural practices of the people of the border areas and greed by parties 
of Sudan and South Sudan create problems in the relationship of the now two 
separate states.272 
There are a number of areas between Sudan and South Sudan that are either 
disputed or claimed. According to Copnall (2015:221) disputed areas are those that 
both sides agreed were in dispute while claimed areas in most cases in the case of 
Sudan are those where there should be no argument. The problem has been that 
immediately after the separation of South Sudan from Sudan; Khartoum’s position 
has been to discuss what it views as the disputed areas only and not the others. This 
explains the origins of some of the tensions and threats to a return to war and the 
dilemmas that are faced by the two states. 
The ideal position in this case is to categorise all such areas as contested. The 
contested areas in this regard include; the Abyei area, the Malwal-Reizigat boundary 
between  southern Darfur and the northern Bahr al-Ghazal states, Kafia Kingi and 
Hofrat el-Nahas area of Southern  Darfur and Western Bahr al-Ghazal states, the 
oilfields of Unity and Southern Kordofan states, the mechanised farming areas 
including the Heglig area along the Upper Nile states , the Chali el-Fil area of Blue 
Nile state which had been part of Upper Nile until just before independence, and 
northern boundary line of the Upper Nile states(Johnson,2010:28) (see figure 5.2).  
Cheeseman et al. (2015:95 and 178) state that politics of ethnicity is a source of 
neopatrimonialism which in cases of civil wars retard peaceful resolution of conflict. 
The border issue is also seen to be a major factor in the Abyei case in the context of 
the relationship of the two Sudans as a post-independence issue.  
6.4.3.1 Abyei 
The status of Abyei as articulated earlier still remains as it was after the deployment 
of the UNISFA by the UN which is a clear translation that the border between Sudan 
and South Sudan is still a problem between them. The presence of the UNISFA in 
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the area to separate the forces and to monitor the border of the two states even after 
South Sudan became independent suggests that there are still border problems 
between Sudan and South Sudan which require resolving.273  
There have been a number of attempts to resolve the stalemate on the issue which 
have not really made any difference. In May 2012, AUHIP called for a referendum in 
October 2013 in which only the Ngok Dinka and the permanent residents of Abyei 
could vote.274South Sudan welcomed the idea but Sudan rejected it. After the failure 
of the AUHIP initiative, the Ngok Dinka people on 31 October, 2013 held a one-sided 
vote to decide on the status of Abyei. The local leaders alleged that they held the poll 
because they were tired of waiting for a long-promised official plebiscite on the 
ownership of the Abyei area (Copnall, 2015:241). 
The vote was rejected by the AU, Sudan and even the South Sudan government, 
may be conscious that supporting it would simply antagonize Khartoum for little 
benefit.275 The issue of Abyei and the other border areas is not just economic but 
patriotism playing a big role. This evidence implies that the attitudes and the 
behavior of the parties in the conflict are still hostile and violent and as such the 
conflict between them cannot be transformed as is advanced in the Galtung’s ABC 
theory.  
6.4.3.2 The Heglig area conflict 
Panthou is a name for Balanites aegyptiaca’ trees in Dinka but Heglig in Arabic. The 
Panthou/Heglig area belongs to the Rueng Dinka and according to historical records 
changed to a number of administrative areas. (See table 5.1). Up through 2003 it 
was generally understood that Panthou/Heglig, was part of the Unity State 
administration in South Sudan, and the NCP appointed governor of Unity State, Dr. 
Joseph Monytuil described it as such in his 2003 annual report (Johnson, 2010:4). 
 
In mid-2004, the Sudan government transferred the area from Unity state to the 
Western Kordofan state. An accompanying map alleged to have been approved by 
the National Survey Corporation, for information and correction was included (see 
figure 6.1). 
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Figure 6.1: Map of the Panthou/Heglig area transfer from Unity State in South 
Sudan to Western Upper Nile state in North Sudan (The 2004 Alinafe Map). 
 
 
 
 
Source: Durham University Archive 
 
The two protocols of the CPA affecting the division of oil revenues – the Wealth 
Sharing Protocol (7 January 2004), and the Abyei Protocol (26 May 2004) – were 
signed before the date of the change on 14 June 2004. Placing Heglig in Western 
Kordofan would therefore have been done in full knowledge that only the revenue 
from fields within South Sudan would be shared.276 Against this background, South 
Sudan claims Panthou/Heglig as part of its territory. 
On 26 March 2012, as part of the oil focus conflict, the SPLA and Darfuri rebels had 
skirmishes with SAF troops who were being supported by the SSLA on the Unity and 
Southern Kordofan border (Young, 2012:361). The SPLA and allies managed to 
push the SAF troops up to Heglig which is an oil producing area in Sudan but 
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claimed by South Sudan as has earlier been articulated and managed to occupy it 
but with orders retreated from it.  
In response to the actions of the SPLA, on 10 April 2012, Sudanese aircraft and 
ground troops bombarded the SPLA in their area but the SPLA fought off the attack 
and chased the SAF troops up to Heglig and seized control of the area.277 The fights 
by the two armed forces of Sudan and the rebels from each other’s side manifested 
the faces of an interstate war and an intrastate war on both sides. South Sudan only 
withdrew from Heglig after international pressure on 22 April 2012 but on leaving 
severely damaged the oilfield’s infrastructure (Copnall, 2015:229). Heglig had 
previously not been claimed by South Sudan in the AUHIP mediation framework.278 
This evidence implies that South Sudan used the oil stand off to advance its other 
territorial claims.  
As part of conflict management and peacebuilding, the UN authored Resolution 2046 
under Chapter VII, Article 41 and called for a cessation of hostilities and the 
resumption of the AUHIP led negotiations.279 It can be considered in this context that 
the border issues were linked to the security issues of the two states which had a link 
to the unresolved and the untouched issues of the CPA.280 This position implies that 
the attitudes and the behaviour of the parties in the two states were still hostile and 
violent and that the conflict structure had not changed as is advanced in the 
Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory.  
These developments as can be noted are clear indicators that Sudan and South 
Sudan still have problems with each other and begins to explain the dilemmas being 
faced by the states and the tension and the threats to a return to war that exist 
between them. The incident in this case inflamed the tensions and threats to a return 
to war in the two states and did set back chances of any political agreement. 
6.4.4 The Blue Nile state  
The Blue Nile State had received special administrative status like Southern 
Kordofan under the CPA and just like Abyei is resource rich and culturally diverse 
along the north-south border (See figure 4.2).  According to Young (2012:230-231) 
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as articulated in Chapter 5, many residents of the two states (Blue Nile and Southern 
Kordofan) driven by their own grievances against the government sided and fought 
alongside the SPLM/A most specifically due to the attractiveness of Garang’s new 
Sudan vision which portrayed the SPLM/A as a national movement and not merely a 
Southern Sudan political organisation.   
This evidence suggests that the referendum and later the independence of South 
Sudan made many people of the Blue Nile state just like those of Southern Kordofan 
to feel abandoned by the SPLM/A. Copnall (2014:143) states that until separation 
the armed Units in South Kordofan and Blue Nile States comprised the 9th and 10th 
Battalions of the SPLA and that as Sudanese citizens their place was north of the 
border but integrating them into SAF which they had fought against would have been 
politically and militarily hazardous.281 It can then be contended in this regard that it 
would be unrealistic to expect all contacts to be cut after South Sudan had 
separated.  
The security situation in the Blue Nile state initially remained stable after the 
outbreak of hostilities in Southern Kordofan, but the issue of SPLM/A-N disarmament 
triggered violence in Blue Nile in early September 2011(Blanchard, 2012:15). It is 
noted that the situation prompted President Bashir to declare a state of emergency in 
Blue Nile and dismiss Governor Agar who had been elected to the governorship on 
an SPLM/A ticket before it separated from Sudan. Agar and Aziz of Southern 
Kordofan (now all part of the SPLM/A-N), along with several Darfuri rebel groups, 
subsequently formed the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), with Agar chosen as the 
alliance’s chairman. Its stated aim is to overthrow the NCP and establish a 
democratic state in Sudan (Blanchard, (2012:16).  
The breaking out of war between the SPLM-N and the SAF is indirectly translated as 
a declaration of  war by Sudan on South Sudan since SPLM-N is basically an off 
shoot of the SPLM/A.  The rebels fighting in South Kordofan and Blue Nile were 
once comrades in arms with the men now in power in South Sudan.282 This position 
is supported by the fact that Sudanese rebel leaders are regularly seen in Juba and 
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more importantly that the rebel groups have been allowed by South Sudan to use 
bases in the territory to fight Sudan.283  
Likewise Sudan supports South Sudan’s rebels mostly those disgruntled with the 
latter’s politics as its proxies and counterweights in order to keep South Sudan 
preoccupied with security concerns for an indefinite future and to press for 
agreement on a range of outstanding issues. The most significant forces currently 
fighting the south are the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA) led by Monytuil, a 
Nuer and the South Sudan Democratic Army (SSDA) led by David Yau Yau a Murle 
(Copnall, 2015:162-164).  
The reason for the SSLA’s fighting is stated as to fight the Dinka domination in South 
Sudan. Monytuil is based in Khartoum and his forces operate near the oilfields in 
Unity state and his attacks are often seen as coordinated with SAF.284 Yau Yau is a 
Murle who rebelled against the government after the April 2010 elections and has 
openly been supported by Khartoum in the Jonglei area. Many other groups are also 
believed to be fighting the GOSS supported by GOS (See appendix 6).  
The alignment of these groups to Khartoum is attached to the independence of 
South Sudan based on their grievances with the GOSS although there is also a 
general feeling that the GOSS has a governance problem specifically due to its 
being dominated by the Dinka tribe which is believed to agitate other ethnicities to 
take up arms against it. One of the respondents had this to say; the “rebellions are 
history repeating itself in Sudan and South Sudan. In 1991, the SPLM experienced a 
split and the Khartoum government was behind it”.285 This scenario suggests that 
Sudan exploits their grievances in order to settle scores with South Sudan for 
supporting their rebels.  
In the context of the Blue Nile state, one of the respondents had this to say 
“Khartoum will always be convinced that the emotional ties between the SPLM/A and 
the SPLM-N are supplemented by military aid and for that reason, the tensions 
between South Sudan and Sudan will last as long as the wars in South Kordofan and 
Blue Nile remain unresolved”.286  The conflicts in South Kordofan and Blue Nile and 
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the formation of the SRF in this case show how Sudan’s internal security is still 
affected by South Sudan.   
The fact thatSudan and South Sudan support the other’s rebels may explain the 
tensions and the threats to a return to war that exist between the states. This 
scenario suggests that the attitudes and the behaviour of the two states have not 
changed and as such the conflict cannot be transformed to achieve liberal peace as 
is advanced in the Liberal peace theory specifically in the areas of security, justice 
and reconciliation and the political framework.  
6.5 Mediation and the negotiation of the post-referendum and the post-
independence issues 
The CPA had sustainable peace, democratic transformation and making unity 
attractive as its stated objectives with a view to end a civil war that had been going 
on for a long time between north and south Sudan. The IGAD mediation/negotiation 
resulted in the CPA although other issues remained either untouched or unresolved 
(Fick, 2010:1). As the agreement was being implemented, some protocols and 
issues were left unimplemented and also that in the course of satisfying the agreed 
milestones (border demarcation, census and elections) other issues cropped up 
which required resolving before and after the referendum to avoid a return to war in 
either a united Sudan or the two separated Sudans if the south was going to vote for 
separation (Young, 2012:138).  
The CPA outstanding issues, issues that emerged during interim period, after the 
referendum and after the independence of South Sudan translates that the NCP and 
the SPLM/A had and have a laundry list of difficult tasks to accommodate in order to 
achieve peace and a better relationship without tensions and threats to a return to 
war (Fick, 2010:1).  
The problem at the time was that the parties to the conflict (NCP and SPLM/A) had 
deep mistrust of each other and as such none among them was prepared to 
constructively engage the other to negotiate the issues which then meant that the 
only option was to   go through the way of mediation.287 
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Bercovitch and Jackson (2012:37) note that mediation takes place for a number of 
reasons which include the parties’ own conflict management efforts reaching an 
impasse as was the case in Sudan at the time. Darby and MacGinty (2008:95) as in 
chapter 2 also confirm that mediation models include the great power, the multi-
government and the major international figures or eminent persons’ models. The 
state of affairs after the CPA, was that the outstanding CPA provisions and the 
issues which had emerged thereafter required to be negotiated on and due to the 
lack of trust between the concerned parties mediation was to be considered in order 
to achieve peace.288 
6.5.1 The post-referendum and the post-Independence issues mediation 
and negotiation problems 
Mediation as in chapter 2 is a third party intervention approach and one of the 
conflict resolution approaches methods (Jeong, 2010:172). Darby and MacGinty 
(2008:96) provide a basis for the selection of mediation models using the premise of 
external neutrals versus insider partials in the context of finding effective 
intermediaries.  
The mediation/negotiation of the CPA focus was the domestic level while after the 
south had voted separation and after the independence of South Sudan the focus 
took an international dimension as north and south Sudan had become two separate 
countries (Copnall, 2015:226). The mediation/negotiation which was carried out 
during the CPA process and that  carried out after the referendum and the 
independence of South Sudan was to be different and  required a shift in the 
negotiating frameworks if at all progress and peace were to be realised.289 One of 
the respondents had this to say; “Our negotiations this time around were designed to 
be between governments (GOS and the GOSS)”290.  
This position suggests that mediation/negotiation and the peacebuilding aspects of 
the post-Independence issues required careful handling in order to ensure a sound 
relationship of the two parties/states. It should be noted that before the separation, 
the SPLM/A representing South Sudan were a rebel movement while the NCP was 
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the government of the day (Natsios, 2012:215). This status quo translates that the 
relative strength of the two parties was different at the time and specifically favoured 
the north. Jumbert and Rolandsen (2013:2) state that the relative strength of the 
parties in negotiations is decisive for the turn the negotiations take and for the 
incentives the parties have in order for talks to continue. Likewise realignment of 
external actors also plays a very crucial part in the mediation/negotiation of issues 
(Ibid: 2013:3). These aspects put together played out negatively on the 
mediation/negotiation of the issues at the time. 
It can then be argued against this background that the Sudan issue after the 
referendum whereby the south voted to separate and the post-independence period, 
ceased to be a civil war and a humanitarian crisis and instead became one of the 
many uneasy bilateral relations between African states (Young, 2012:361). In 
essence it can be alleged that any clashes between Sudan and South Sudan was an 
interstate war and any conflict resolution approach had to reflect an interstate 
flavour. This scenario translated in the external actors either supporting Sudan or 
South Sudan depending on their strategic interests which in turn had an implication 
on the mediation and negotiation of the post-referendum and the post-independence 
issues.  
It should however be noted that the South Sudan is a politically contested space with 
no unified Southern Sudanese identity. The binding factor seems to be based 
primarily on the common experience of repression by, and resistance to, the 
Khartoum regime (Branch & Mampilly, 2004:5).  South Sudan in this regard is mired 
in politically motivated tensions originating from political competition, alliances and 
inter-personality clashes since April 2010 after the elections.291. This implies that 
although the situation is not much related to North Sudan interference, the insecurity 
is no doubt a huge distraction to GOSS to deal with its northern neighbour on several 
issues. 
6.5.1.1 The shift from a domestic to an international conflict  
The Sudan conflict used the IGAD framework for the mediation and the negotiation 
of the 2005 CPA led by General Lazarus Sumbeiywo (rtd), the Assessment and 
Evaluation Commission (AEC) led by Sir Derek Plumbly who was an English career 
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diplomat and the AUHIP led by the former President of South Africa and two other 
African states former Presidents for the implementation of the CPA and the 
mediation/negotiation of the post-referendum and the post-independence issues 
(Jumbert and Rolandsen, 2013:2).  
The dominant mediation model in the north-south Sudan conflict was the multi-
government model spruced with the eminent persons/figures model which mostly is 
a traditional conflict resolution approach which is state centric in its orientation292. 
This approach is problematic as at most is elitist in nature and does not 
accommodate other conflict stake holders (See table 2.2). 
AUHIP was given preference to mediate the post-referendum and the post-
independence issues as an external neutral as opposed to IGAD which had been the 
power house of the CPA process (Young, 2012:355). The reasons for the AUHIP 
preference was that IGAD’s engagement was regarded as an extension of western 
countries quest for influence in the region which the AU was not essentially happy 
with.293      
Young (2012:354-355) on the  negative perspective of IGAD by the AU, states that 
IGAD formation and its engagement in peacemaking came from western donors 
dominated by the  USA  and its allies  operating through Kenya which has a history 
of  subservience to western interests. This position seem to suggest that IGAD had 
no capacity to structure the peace process or influence its course or objectives 
hence not being permitted under the CPA to play a role in the so called post-conflict 
era. The perspective in this case is that AU had an ambition which was to find 
African solutions to African problems which then did relegate IGAD as a weak third 
world agency being used to advance the interest of the USA and its allies. It is 
however noted that the development may have originated from Sudan as it had a 
history of changing mediators to satisfy its own interests294. 
South Sudan however tended to support IGAD whose members are most directly 
affected by Sudan’s future as opposed to AU which it felt was for pro-unity while on 
the other hand, NCP had long expressed misgivings about IGAD as it thought that its 
powerful members were/are supportive of the South and in that case did not see it as 
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a forum that would secure its interest.295 The truth of the matter in this regard 
however is that IGAD was suitable for dealing with an intrastate conflict while AUHIP 
was suitable for an interstate conflict.  
The pulling and pushing on the issue of the frameworks, affected the progress of the 
mediation/negotiation of the post-referendum and the post-independence issues 
which could have assisted to achieve peace between Sudan and South Sudan. The 
best option was for the two bodies (IGAD and AUHIP) to work together with an 
understanding that the weight of the AU was important for the separated Sudans and 
that the ultimate backing of the regional body was/is crucial if an independent South 
Sudan was to secure maximum legitimacy.296  
The choice of an appropriate framework in this regard for the post-referendum and 
the post-independence mediation and negotiation framework was a dilemma that the 
parties faced which to an extent explains the tensions and the threats to a return to a 
war at the time. 
6.5.1.2 Relative strength of the two parties 
The relative strength of parties plays an important part in the mediation/negotiation 
process of any conflict and this was no different in the context of the Sudan conflict 
on the post-referendum and the post-independence issues. Before 2005, the 
incentives for pursuing the CPA talks were the prospects of ending the civil war and 
the ensuing peace dividends including the promise of the sanctions on Sudan versus 
the threat of a more confrontational relationship with the USA (Jumbert and 
Rolandsen, 2013:558).  
Considering the post-referendum and the post-independence issues, the question is 
‘what is the incentive for the mediation/negotiation of the current issues?’ After the 
referendum and the independence of South Sudan, the aspects of the military 
balance, cohesion, economy and international support played a huge part in the 
mediation/negotiation of the issues that emerged from the stated events which were 
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also important for the relationship and achievement of peace between the two 
parties/states.297  
The gap between the armies of the two parties in the context of the military balance 
has been narrowed so that a full military confrontation by any one of them would be 
costly and the outcome very unpredictable as each has now been reasonably armed 
(Copnall, 2015:215. Lack of cohesion is noted to be persistent in both states in that 
each one of them is threatened by domestic and political opposition so that as a 
result proxy warfare and support to the other party’s internal opposition emerge as 
the main tool of intervention in the other.298  
Likewise on the economic aspect, the oil revenues from the oil resource whose 
production and transportation requires joint responsibility by the two parties/states 
fuel their economies and various political patronage mechanisms translating that the 
economic interests of the two parties are intertwined in that neither of them can 
afford to be without the oil for any short period of time.299  Regarding the international 
support, due to strategic reasons (South Sudan’s control over oil production and 
Sudan as a long-time ally of some of the external actors) the two parties/states find 
willing partners to align with which in turn strengthens their sovereignty and the 
bargaining powers on the international scene which in effect creates problems in the 
event of embarking on mediation/negotiation (Belloni, 2011: 417-418). 
This position implies that South Sudan’s separation brought it more at par with 
Sudan both militarily and economically and that due to the status quo, positions on 
issues during mediation/negotiation processes are usually difficult to dislodge.300 The 
relationship of Sudan and South Sudan remains precarious up to now which in terms 
of conflict resolution is a problem.  
The positions of parties in such forums translates that the attitudes and the 
behaviour of the parties have not changed and as such the conflict structure cannot 
be transformed as is advanced in the Galtung’s ABC theory. A respondent had this 
to say on this position; whenever a Sudanese or a South Sudanese politician wants 
to advance a point about the other camp preface the statement with our brothers and 
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goes on to accuse them mostly on their negative sides301. This evidence explains the 
tensions and the threats to a return to war which exist between the two states and 
why complete negative peace has not been achieved between them.  
6.5.1.3 Realignment of the external actors 
The mediation/negotiation process as part of conflict resolution hinges on the 
influence of external actors if the conflicting parties lack trust in each other. For 
Sudan and South Sudan, the formation of IGAD and the AUHIP provide the cases in 
point (Young, 2012:182&355). The independence of South Sudan strengthened its 
position internationally but also caused the importance of the international relations 
with Sudan to be downgraded by most of the external actors. External actors either 
aligned with South Sudan or Sudan but in the case of some of Sudan’s strongest 
supporters depending on their strategic interests were forced to balance their 
patronage between the two states and that the shift from the CPA framework to that 
of AUHIP is symptomatic of the realignment factor.302 
The hard line positions of Sudan and South Sudan as separate states on most of the 
post-referendum and the post-independence issues may actually be as a result of 
the developments. Through such instances, the atmosphere for 
mediation/negotiation was/is poisoned which in turn leads to tensions or threats to a 
return to conflict.303 The positions of the parties in conflict resolution, suggest that the 
attributes of the liberal peace theory, democracy, economic interdependence and the 
international law and its institutions may not have been institutionalised as is 
advanced in the Liberal peace theory. The resulting tensions and threats to a return 
to war may be explained due to this position. 
6.5.2 The IGAD and the AUHIP conflict resolution frameworks 
Conflict resolution is basically about accepting a conflict, recognising that there are 
ways out of it and engaging in some tacit or explicit coordination. Mediation, 
negotiation and peacebuilding are some of the conflict resolution approaches 
methods which are used to resolve conflicts but require aligning to particular 
established frameworks in order for them to be effective. IGAD, a sub-regional 
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organisation supported by the Troika countries (USA, UK and Norway) provided a 
framework for the CPA mediation and negotiation processes while AUHIP provided 
the framework for the mediation and the negotiation of the post-referendum and the 
post-independence issues in regards to the relations of Sudan and South Sudan 
initially as one state and later as separate states (Jumbert and Rolandsen, 2013:2). 
 
The change of the mediation/negotiation frameworks created problems between their 
patrons and later the mediation/negotiation processes themselves with the aspects 
of continuity and procedures being the sticking problems.304 When South Sudan had 
not separated from Sudan, the conflict was an intrastate war while after it separated 
from Sudan, the status of conflict became interstate. Richmond (2002:9) articulates 
the differences in the conflict resolution approaches and methods of interstate and 
intrastate conflicts.   An appropriate conflict resolution approach should aim at 
transforming a conflict in order to achieve negative peace and positive peace. 
6.5.2.1 The IGAD framework 
The IGAD framework through its mediation/negotiation resulted in the 2005 Sudan 
CPA which was a set of agreements signed after a period of over two years. 
Mediation/negotiation of the CPA was problematic as discussed in chapter 5. 
Sulaimana and Ifeanyi Chuckwu (2013:150) state that the IGAD 
mediation/negotiation of the CPA was based on a narrow model as it had focused 
only on ending the violence (extended ceasefire) instead of laying the basis of a 
sustainable and comprehensive peace in southern Sudan and the whole country. On 
the same, it is noted that the CPA did not include the IGAD in its implementation as it 
was given to the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) and similarly in the 
cases of the post-referendum and post-independence issues which were left in the 
hands of the AUHIP.305 
This background suggests that the implementation of the agreement may have had 
problems due to the changes on the frameworks. A respondent had this to say; 
“IGAD birthed the CPA but was never there for the census and the elections. It is 
IGAD that had knowledge of most of the details which Taha and Garang had agreed 
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on. Their absence affected the whole purpose of the process”306. This position 
suggests that the parties viewed the absence of IGAD in the interim period as a 
factor which affected some of the things that went wrong during the period.  
Failure for some activities to take place was viewed to have been due to the absence 
of an active role of the IGAD mostly in the eyes of South Sudan. It is argued in this 
case that, peacebuilding activities in the areas of the political framework, security 
and justice and reconciliation which could have assisted to achieve liberal peace as 
is advanced in the Liberal peace theory were not carried out properly due to lack of 
proper oversight.  
6.5.2.2 The AUHIP framework 
AUHIP was created in 2009 following the African Union Peace and Security Council 
(PSC) adoption of the report from the African Union High Level Panel for Darfur 
chaired by the former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, the former Burundian 
President Pierre Buyoya and the former President of Nigeria Abdulsalamu 
Abubakaer (Peace and Security Council meeting report, 2010:1). The mandate 
included facilitation of the CPA and the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) which in turn 
included supporting the preparations of the April 2010 Sudan general elections, 
preparations for the South Sudan referendum in January 2011 and facilitating the 
post-referendum and the post-independence mediation/negotiations. 
It is however argued in this regard that despite taking over the mediation/negotiation 
task, the AU had not played a significant role in the multifarious processes that led to 
the CPA outcome and thus was queried on the aspects of continuity and institutional 
memory regarding the basis of the conflict issues. General Sumbeiywo noted that: 
“the change from the IGAD framework to AUHIP was a big mistake in the history of 
mediation and negotiation”.307 The AUHIP activities in the course of attempts to 
come up with a framework agreement made the parties (Sudan and South Sudan) to 
sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU) at Mekelle in Ethiopia with a view to 
commit them to the discussions of the post referendum and later the post-
independence issues.  
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According to Bercorvitch and Jackson (2012:30) participation and the modality 
aspects are key in any conflict resolution endeavour. The parties involved with the 
Mekelle MOU and the framework agreement just like the IGAD framework scenario 
only included the SPLM/A and the NCP and that while  the SPLM/A had committed a 
fixed team, the NCP did not but only had a fixed leader308. It is alleged against this 
background that issues were difficult to be agreed on due to the changes of the 
personnel specifically on the Sudan’s part. 
The NCP by not designating a fixed team for the negotiations gave out an indication 
of a lack of seriousness on their part and denying the whole process an opportunity 
to make progress towards peace and a sound relationship with South Sudan which 
could have assisted to completely resolve the conflict and achieve peace. Due to the 
lapses in the negotiations of the post-referendum and the post-independence issues, 
the concerned parties could not forge a healthy relationship either in a united Sudan 
or the separated two Sudans. The failure to make progress on the issues implies that 
the attitudes and the behaviour of the parties were still violent and the conflict 
structure not being changed as is advanced in the Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle 
theory. Thus, complete negative peace could not be achieved and likewise Liberal 
peace as is advanced in the Liberal peace theory as peacebuilding activities in the 
areas of socio-economic and political governance were/are retarded.  
6.6 Conclusion  
Conflicts are usually difficult situations to resolve and terminate. Resolving them 
requires unique skills and the use of appropriate conflict resolution approaches and 
methods. The South Sudan referendum results changed the status of the 
relationship of north Sudan and south Sudan from a domestic to an interstate status. 
Likewise the failure of the Abyei referendum created problems in the relationship of 
the two states and the chances of successful conflict resolution. This created a 
dilemma to the two states and explains the reasons for the existence of tensions and 
threats to a return to war. 
 
                                                          
308
 The SPLM team included: GoSS Minister for CPA Implementation Pagan Amum, GoSS Minister for SPLA 
Affairs Nhial Deng, GoSS Minister for Regional Cooperation Deng Alor, GoSS Minister of Legal Affairs and 
Constitutional Development John Luk, GoSS Minister for Cabinet Affairs Kosti Manibe, and GoSS Minister for 
Irrigation and Water Resources Paul Mayom. The NCP was being led by Idriss Abdel-Gadir and the members 
kept changing. 
273 
 
The clashes of the SAF and the SPLA in Abyei in May 2011 which eventually ended 
with SAF occupying the area and displacing many Ngok Dinkas into South Sudan 
before the independence of South Sudan poisoned the environment for the 
resolution of the post-referendum issues in the areas of citizenship, security, 
economics and the international treaties and legal issues. The Abyei issue is a 
dilemma that Sudan and South Sudan faced and continue to face if not resolved as it 
also involves the aspect of border demarcation between the two states.  
Despite the CPA as the settlement of the conflict, complete negative peace was not 
achieved and likewise due to a troubled implementation of the agreement, liberal 
peace as advanced in the Liberal peace theory could not be achieved. The creation 
of the SPLM-N in Southern Kordofan is a problem which was birthed during the CPA 
mediation and negotiation process and poor conflict management by the Khartoum 
government. The Nuba Mountains will be a problem that Sudan will have to prepare 
to live with for a time.   
The detention of oil tankers and diversion of oil worth millions of Dollars for South 
Sudan by Sudan for the non-payment of the services provided for the transportation 
of the oil triggered the oil production shutdown by South Sudan in January 2012. The 
shutdown created economic problems in both the two countries. This position 
suggests that the two countries are linked in their economic survival and as such 
require resolving their conflict in the interest of their economic survival. 
The seizure of the Heglig area in March and April in 2012, the failure of the Abyei 
peace initiatives and the eruption of conflict in the Blue Nile state suggest a lack of 
understanding by both Sudan and South Sudan that they are separate states and as 
such require looking at issues at an interstate level. Developments in these areas 
result in the two states facing a number of dilemmas which eventually have been the 
sources of tensions and threats to a return to war.  Heglig opened a new chapter of 
border claims by South Sudan and on the same Heglig and the Blue Nile state 
present a security challenge which gives a dimension of the use of proxies by Sudan 
and South Sudan. The aspect presents the intrastate and the interstate image of the 
conflict which complicates a simple application of the conflict resolution approaches 
and methods. This posed dilemmas to the two states and explains the origins of 
some of the tensions and the threats to a return to war. 
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Mediation and negotiation in the conflict of the two Sudans have been complicated 
by a background of the change of the conflict from a domestic to an international 
status, relative strength of the two states as a result of their economies and 
technological advancement and the realignment of the external actors. This is in 
addition to the outstanding issues of the CPA mediation and negotiation processes, 
the unimplemented protocols provisions and problems which emerged in preparation 
for the referendum.    
The IGAD and the AUHIP conflict resolution frameworks have been problematic in 
the resolution of the conflict due to a misunderstanding of the status of the two 
bodies and the management of the transition from the IGAD to the AUHIP 
framework. IGAD as a sub-regional organisation was best suited for an intrastate 
conflict while AUHIP as a regional organisation is best suited for the interstate 
conflict. It is, however, important for the organisations to harmonise their efforts in 
order to achieve complete negative peace and positive peace in the two Sudans 
other than engaging in blame games. 
The problems of the previous processes before the referendum, the referendum of 
South Sudan and the Abyei referendum failure provided the basis of the origins of 
the post-referendum and the post-independence issues which are responsible for the 
dilemmas faced by the two states and eventually the tensions and the threats to a 
return to war. The referendum, post-referendum and later the post-independence 
issues lie at the heart of the difficulties of the conflict resolution process and the 
relationship problem of Sudan and South Sudan. 
  The chapter captured the referendum, the post-referendum issues, the post-
independence issues, mediation and negotiation efforts and the IGAD and the 
AUHIP conflict resolution frameworks. The next chapter will discuss the conclusion 
of the thesis. 
 
 
 
 
275 
 
Chapter 7 
7.0 Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
The study investigates why there has been continuing tensions and threats to a 
return to war between Sudan and South Sudan since the CPA and even after the 
independence of South Sudan as its central research question.  
Secondary research questions which are: what were the causes of the Sudan-
southern Sudan conflict?; what factors influenced the conflict parties in Sudan and 
southern Sudan to engage in negotiation to arrive at the 2005 CPA?; how were the 
mediation and the negotiation for the 2005 CPA of Sudan conducted to resolve the 
conflict and achieve peace?; why was the right to self-determination for southern 
Sudan included as part of one of the CPA protocols despite its being viewed with 
ambivalence in the international community?; why was the 2005 Sudan CPA and 
some of its protocols problematic in the context of conflict resolution?; why did some 
of the protocols remain unimplemented up until the end of the interim period of the 
CPA and what were the implications of this after South Sudan opted to separate 
from the Sudan through a referendum? and what issues had emerged after the 
referendum and independence of South Sudan and why have they been difficult to 
resolve? are used to support answering the central question in the study. This is 
done by using the lens of the CPA as the settlement and how it was implemented by 
the conflicting parties as a way to achieve peace.  
The CPA was arrived at through processes of mediation and negotiation brokered by 
the IGAD led by Kenya and supported by the Troika countries (USA, UK, Norway 
and Italy) and later during the interim period, the solutions arrived at were to be 
attained through an implementation phase as part of the post-conflict peacebuilding 
process (Young, 2012:79). The mediation, negotiation and peacebuilding aspects 
can be perceived to have been parts of a conflict resolution process which aimed at 
completely resolving the conflict. Conflict resolution/transformation is perceived as a 
range of formal and informal activities undertaken by parties to a conflict or outsiders 
designed to limit and reduce the level of violence in conflict and to achieve some 
understanding on the key issues in conflict on future interactions and distribution of 
resources (Bercovitch and Jackson (2012:1).  
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This position suggests that the architects of the CPA had a strong desire to have the 
deep rooted sources of the conflict to be addressed and transformed whereby the 
behaviour would no longer be violent, attitudes no longer hostile and the conflict 
structure changing in order to achieve peace.  
The study covered; the historical perspective, the analysis of the CPA in the context 
of conflict resolution, the implications  of the mediation, negotiation and the 
implementation processes of the CPA and the referendum,  post-referendum, post-
independence issues and the conflict resolution efforts.  Methods used to obtain the 
data were interviews with key informants and archival records as primary sources 
and literature review on the part of secondary sources. All these aspects were 
covered in order to answer the central research question and its related secondary 
research questions as outlined above. 
This chapter summarises the findings in relation to the research questions; the 
theoretical consequences; comparative considerations and the suggested further 
research in the area. 
7.2 Summary of the findings in relation to the research questions 
This study concludes that reasons for the tensions and threats for a return to war 
between Sudan and South Sudan initially as one country and later as two separate 
states generally originated from a troubled political history of the country whereby 
South Sudan was always marginalised and viewed as separate from what was 
deemed to be the pure Sudan. In this regard the historical/colonial legacy, post-
independence regimes (Military and parliamentary), the international, regional and 
sub regional factors, experiences from the previous efforts to settle/resolve the 
conflict lie at the heart of the causes of the Sudan conflict.  
It is also perceived that the presence and the discovery of resources in southern 
Sudan (now South Sudan) and in the border areas of Sudan and South Sudan and 
the cultural practices of the trans-border population exacerbated the conflict at the 
time and currently are also responsible for some of the dilemmas faced /facing the 
two states and lead to tensions and threats to a return to war.  
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Likewise the mediation, negotiation, the content of the CPA, the implementation of 
the CPA and the referendum which eventually gave birth to the post-referendum and 
the post-independence issues are also viewed as additional basis of the conflict 
between Sudan and South Sudan. These factors brought about dynamics which kept 
and up to now keeps animosity between the once two areas of one state and now 
the two separate states. Below are the highlights of the findings. 
7.2.1 The causes of the conflict 
Sudan has never really had peace throughout its history of existence. This is evident 
from the number of leadership eras which it went through and the violence that each 
unleashed on the people of South Sudan. The Turkiyya, the Mahdiya and the Anglo-
Egyptian condominium eras all came into their existence through conquests and 
each one of them left a legacy of its own on how it related with the country’s subjects 
in the areas of religion, trade and politics (Collins, 2008:10, 21 &33). 
Sudan victimized southern Sudan by enslaving people and exploiting resources.  
The Sudanese state has/had many ethnicities and nationalities. The interactions in 
the areas of religion, trade and later politics appear to have created a culture of 
hostility between the people of northern Sudan and southern Sudan. Despite this 
recognition, the two areas were made to be united without a consensus on the part 
of the southerners as the country became independent in 1956.  
Independent Sudan was no different from its past as it went through three 
parliamentary regimes and three military regimes all which through a search for a 
national identity had problems with southern Sudan. The clash on the appropriate 
nomenclature of national identity by the two areas, whereby the north wanted an 
Arab-Islamic one while the south wanted it to be African resulted into an intractable 
conflict which became difficult to resolve as manifested through the first civil war of 
1955 -1972 and the second one of 1983-2005 (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006:167).  
The cleavage between Sudan and South Sudan is an outcome of a historical 
process characterised by stratification and the grading of races, ethnicities, cultures 
and religions in favour of Arabism and Islam and the marginalisation of the south in 
terms of development and resources distribution.  The national identity question was 
a dilemma which Sudan faced and eventually created challenges to the 2005 CPA. 
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Sudan was a state in a flux since it came into being. Politicization of the military and 
the militarisation of politics, the politics of running religion and the state together and 
failure to read into the history of the country led many to believe that the country 
could only be at peace if the south could be given a right to self-determination 
practiced either internally(unity) or externally (separation). The SPLA presented itself 
as a socialist movement that did not only intend to ‘liberate’ the southerners but the 
whole Sudan through its New Sudan vision concept. Although this was the case, as 
much as the SPLM/A presented itself as a national organisation, it remained at heart 
a southern movement with a very strong separatist sentiment.  
The origin of the conflict lay largely initially with a historical legacy and later the post-
independence civilian and military regimes aligned with a colonial policy that 
concentrated economic, political, and administrative development in north Sudan 
that is in cultural and religious issues and competition for political dominance, later 
perpetuated by oil resources. All these developments were absent in the south and 
thus provides the evidence of its marginalisation by the GOS.  
The issues under the causes of the conflict can then be perceived under the 
common denominators of colonialism and colonial legacy, governance, socio-
economy, cultural and ideological factors which in essence can be viewed to have 
presented dilemmas to both Sudan and South Sudan in terms of their relationship 
initially as one country and later as two separate states. The status quo at the time 
suggests that the attitudes and the behaviour of the northerners and the southerners 
were hostile and violent and the structure of the conflict could not be changed as is 
advanced in the Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory in order to resolve or 
transform the conflict between them.  
7.2.2 The mediation and the negotiation of the CPA 
The CPA was a by-product of mediation and negotiation processes. Both parties 
(Sudan and southern Sudan) had their own interests for accepting the 
mediation/negotiation process concerning their conflict. These ranged from security, 
emancipation from hard economic problems due to the war, beating regional 
isolation, battle losses and dilemmas although it appeared like the parties were not 
fully committed to the process. These inter-related issues and positions tended to 
give doubts on the seriousness of the whole peace process. 
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The  frameworks for the mediation/negotiations to take place, contradicted each 
other in that one was broad based and the other narrow based (DOPs and the 
Machakos protocol) which in turn made the comprehensiveness of the agreement to 
be questionable.  The DOPs were broader in that they covered measures to resolve 
the conflict in the whole country while the Machakos protocol only focused on 
addressing the conflict between GOS and southern Sudan (Young, 2012:95).  
IGAD as a sub-regional body although suited for resolving intrastate conflict/s, used 
a traditional/first generation state-centric conflict resolution approach (the track I 
diplomacy approach) which generally is an elite approach whereby other important 
and interested parties like the civil society, other political parties and other armed 
groups in the conflict could not be allowed to take part. The approach does not allow 
inclusivity in terms of participation of the interested parties who represent the 
grassroots who can broaden and bring about pertinent issues which can assist to 
resolve a conflict. Thus, the agreement was narrow focused and did not conform to 
the required conflict resolution approach in an intra-state conflict. 
The perception is that during the mediation and negotiation processes, some issues 
were not resolved while some were not even touched. Even though the agreement 
was designated as comprehensive, in the absence of the issues which were either 
unresolved or untouched, it could not qualify to be comprehensive. The manner, in 
which the agreement was negotiated in Naivasha, where only Osman Taha 
representing the GOS and John Garang representing the south were involved, 
leaves the community of scholars in the discipline of conflict resolution to question 
the depth of the negotiations of the whole agreement. They could not on their own 
broadly cover the issues at stake without the participation of other important actors in 
the conflict.   
The protocols which were the outcomes of the negotiations in this regard are viewed 
to have been inadequate as they missed out in addressing some of the core 
concerns while others viewed with ambivalence internationally were taken on board. 
The issues of identity (religion and language), definition of the area that is South 
Sudan and the right to self-determination are cases in point in this regard (Simmons 
and Dixon, 2006:87). 
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It noted that the mediation and the negotiation processes never included other 
political parties, never solved conflicts elsewhere in Sudan or democratisation and 
economic development in the country and the peacebuilding part (which appeared 
mostly as part of the post-conflict reconstruction not including other important 
aspects like justice and reconciliation). Likewise on the same, the content of the 
agreement missed out on some important elements. This position suggests that the 
agreement was not comprehensive but more appropriately termed as 
incomprehensive.309 
The attitudes and the behaviour of the parties remained hostile and violent rendering 
the conflict structure unchanged. Hence the Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory 
could not take root. Likewise due to this status quo, peacebuilding activities vital for 
the attainment of liberal peace as espoused in the Liberal peace theory could not be 
properly undertaken. 
7.2.3 The implications of the mediation/negotiation and the 
implementation processes of the CPA 
The implications of the mediation/negotiation and later the implementation processes 
of the agreement were that other issues remained unresolved, others untouched, 
some of the protocols and provisions selectively implemented and other issues 
emerging during the interim period from the activities (border demarcation, census 
and elections) that had been lined up to take place before the referendum of 
southern Sudan.  
This implies that there were outstanding issues from the mediation and the 
negotiation processes and later the implementation process. It can be noted in this 
regard that this posed a challenge to the agreement and likewise presented 
dilemmas to the parties in the conflict which led to the emergence of the tensions 
and the threats to a return to war between the parties then and even now.  
The perception in this context is that the issues as articulated above undermined the 
well intentioned process of conflict resolution of the GOS-southern Sudan conflict.  
Failure of such an aspiration made unity not to be attractive as had been planned 
and expected according to the CPA and eventually lead the south to separate from 
the North. This certainly challenged the CPA which had emphasised to make unity 
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attractive especially to the southerners which in turn made the parties to be in a 
dilemma as to how best they could relate with each other in the circumstances that 
had developed.    
This position suggests that the outstanding issues which developed from the 
articulated circumstances provided the basis of the post-referendum and the post-
independence issues of the two Sudans. The fact that southern Sudan was heading 
towards an important referendum vote whereby its people were to vote either for 
unity or separation as options of the right to self-determination as was given as a 
solution in the Machakos protocol and considering the developments of the 
relationship between the two areas during the interim period, there was a need to 
resolve all the outstanding issues which had developed with a view to have the 
attitudes of the of the parties not to be hostile  and the behaviour not to be violent 
and the conflict structure to be changed as is advanced in the Galtung’s ABC conflict 
triangle theory. It is noted however that this was not achieved.  
This implies that the conflict had not been transformed and as such post-conflict 
peacebuilding activities in the areas of security, politics, reconciliation and justice 
and socio-economic parameters could not take place effectively.  This position 
suggests that the parties faced dilemmas which in the process created tensions and 
threats to a return to war.  
7.2.4 The referendum, post-referendum and the post-independence issues 
and the frameworks of conflict resolution 
The southern Sudan referendum results whereby the south opted to separate in the 
determination of the right to self-determination changed the status of the relationship 
of the GOS and south Sudan that is from a domestic to an interstate status as the 
two regions were to become two separate states. The failure of the Abyei 
referendum created problems in the relationship of the two states and the chances of 
successful conflict resolution. This created a dilemma to the two states and explains 
some of the reasons for the existence of tensions and threats to a return to war and 
the challenges the CPA encountered. 
The GOS attack on Abyei before and after the referendum, the subsequent 
occupation of Abyei leading to the deployment of a peacekeeping force and the 
eruption of conflict in Southern Kordofan as a proxy for South Sudan challenged the 
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agreement and posed dilemmas to the two parties on their relationship in the post 
referendum period. These referendum and post-referendum issues emerged against 
a background of not being anticipated during the mediation/negotiation of the CPA, 
no opportunity being given to renegotiate the agreement, the lack of trust between 
the parties and principally the issue of the oil resource which drives the economies of 
the two states but which was not adequately dealt within the 2005 CPA. Failure to 
resolve properly the issues of citizenship, security and the economy was problematic 
for conflict resolution during this period. The developments in the post-referendum 
period challenged the CPA and created dilemmas for the parties. Complete negative 
peace had not been achieved and likewise post-conflict peacebuilding in the areas of 
security, political governance and the socio-economic factors failed to take root. 
 
The detention of oil tankers and diversion of oil worth millions of Dollars for South 
Sudan by the GOS leading to the shutdown of the oil production in January 2012, the 
seizure of the Heglig area in March and April in 2012 by South Sudan, the failure of 
the Abyei peace initiatives in 2013 and the eruption of conflict in the Blue Nile state 
degraded the spirit of conflict resolution in the post-independence era of South 
Sudan. These developments presented the intrastate and the interstate images of 
the conflict which complicates a simple application of the conflict resolution 
approaches and methods. These incidents posed dilemmas to the two states and 
explain the origins of some of the tensions and the threats to a return to war existing 
between the two states in the post-independence era of South Sudan. The attitudes 
and the behaviour of the parties were still hostile and violent and that the conflict 
structure had not changed as is advanced in the Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle 
theory. Thus, sustainable peace could not be attained. 
The mediation and the negotiation in the conflict of the two Sudans after the 
referendum have been made complicated by a background of the change of the 
conflict from a domestic to an international status, relative strength of the two states 
as a result of their economies and technological advancement and the realignment 
of the external actors. These factors challenge the CPA and present the two states 
with dilemmas which have resulted into tensions and threats to a return to war. 
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The IGAD and the AUHIP conflict resolution frameworks had been problematic in the 
resolution of the conflict especially in the context of how the transition was managed 
from one framework to the other. This status quo had created confusion between the 
two bodies which may have resulted from inadequate diplomatic activity. IGAD as a 
sub-regional organisation was best suited for an intrastate conflict while AUHIP as a 
regional organisation is best suited for the interstate conflict. It is important for them 
to harmonise their efforts since the conflict now wears both the intrastate and the 
interstate hats. 
The problems of the previous processes before the referendum, the referendum of 
South Sudan and the Abyei referendum failure provided the basis of the origins of 
the post-referendum and the post-independence issues which are responsible for the 
dilemmas faced by the now two states and eventually the tensions and the threats to 
a return to war.   The referendum, post-referendum and later the post-independence 
issues lie at the heart of the difficulties of the conflict resolution process and the 
relationship problem of Sudan and South Sudan. 
7.3 Theoretical consequences 
The study focuses on the CPA as conflict settlement within the conflict resolution 
process (See figure 2.3). The CPA is a bundle of six protocols and two annexures 
which was achieved through mediation and negotiation as methods of the conflict 
resolution approaches in order to end the conflict and through further initiatives and 
approaches to eventually resolve it. Wallensteen (2007:75) as articulated in chapter 
2 refers to agreements as signed treaties that regulate (resolve or find a process for) 
incompatibilities concluded between the warring parties and put an end to conflict 
behaviour. The perception in this context is that the agreements indicate what has 
been agreed, halt the fighting and what accordingly is likely to happen thereafter to 
completely resolve conflict/s and bring peace.  
The Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory and the Liberal peace theory are used in 
this case as models to guide the study on particular aspects of conflict and how the 
particular areas can assist to resolve/transform a conflict in order to achieve peace. 
This status quo suggests that the theories in this study are used to establish if they 
are suitable for purpose in relation to the findings of the study. 
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Galtung’s ABC theory posits conflict to be viewed as a triangle with contradiction (C), 
attitude (A) and behaviour (B) at its vertices (Galtung, 1996:72). (See figure 1.3).  
The triangle is based on the premise that conflicts have three major components 
which are the contradiction or the situation, the behaviour of those involved and their 
attitudes (Galtung, 1996:96). In order for the conflict to be resolved, a set of dynamic 
changes need to take place that can mean de-escalation of the conflict behaviour, a 
change in attitudes and a transformation of the relationships or clashing interests 
which are at the centre of the conflict structure (contradictions) (Galtung, 1996:97). 
Such a dynamic can only be attained through the use of the conflict resolution 
methods like negotiation, mediation and peacebuilding among others. This translates 
that if a conflict has to be resolved behaviour has to no longer be violent, attitudes no 
longer to be hostile and the structure of the conflict to be changed.  
This status quo implies that the Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory, generally 
targets at making an attempt to ensure that a conflict becomes resolved/transformed. 
It is noted that the extent of any agreement is important particularly in terms of the 
degree to which it deals with the constitutional, territorial and security issues that lie 
at the core of a conflict otherwise it can merely be concerned with the manifestations 
of the conflict (Darby and Mac Ginty, 2008: 199).  
The CPA had these aspects within it although it did not achieve complete negative 
peace which could have assisted the achievement of positive peace. The mediation 
and the negotiation frameworks, the CPA protocols and the post-referendum and the 
post-independence issues provide examples of the Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle 
model aspects which either took root or not. This is evident in the findings of the 
study that despite the tensions and threats to a return to war between the conflict 
parties, some form of peace was realised through the CPA as a settlement. Thus, 
the Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory in relation to the findings is good in the 
context of conflict resolution. 
The implementation part of the agreement during the interim period was anticipated 
that through the peacebuilding activities would assist the country or later the two 
countries to achieve the status espoused in the Liberal peace theory with its related 
thesis that democratic forms of governments tend to be more peaceful, both in their 
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domestic affairs and in their international relations, than illiberal states” (Newman, 
Paris and Richmond 2009: 11). 
Peacebuilding as a method of conflict resolution is generically understood as 
external interventions that are intended to reduce the risk of a state to erupt into or 
return to war (see figure 2.3). Sriram (2000:21) states that the presumption is 
usually that the ideal outcome of peacebuilding as a conflict resolution method after 
armed conflict is a liberal capitalist state. Liberal peace theory generally derives from 
the concept of liberalism in international relations and includes democracy, economic 
interdependence, and international institutions and international law as its most 
important pillars for a model peaceful state. MacGinty, (2010:393) in this regard 
states that Liberal peace is taken to mean the dominant form of internationally 
supported peacemaking and peacebuilding that is promoted by leading states, 
leading international organizations and international financial institutions. 
The reason for the use of the theory in this study was that through the activities of 
peacebuilding (post-war reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation; creation of 
security related, political and socio-economic mechanisms and foreign intervention), 
Sudan would become a liberal state which would be democratic, a free market 
economy which respects individual rights and the rule of law based on the western 
liberal culture.  
Some of the aspects in the theory took root whilst others did not. It is noted in this 
regard that the theory does not deal with some stages of conflict and that it is mostly 
reactive other than proactive. The establishment of the GoNU and the GOSS and 
similarly the security and the socio-economic aspects partially took form in both the 
north and the south of Sudan while justice and reconciliation did not take place. 
Democracy and the international law aspects as important parts of the Liberal peace 
theory in this case featured less.   
This status quo implies that the theory was not good enough in relation to the 
findings of the study whereby there were/are tensions and threats to a return to war 
initially in one Sudan and now in the two Sudans. It is viewed in this regard that the 
theory was very ambitious as Sudan and later the two Sudans could not over a short 
period of time become at par with the global north’s way of doing things in the areas 
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as indicated in the Utsein palette (See figure 2.3). This implies that the actors both 
local and international on the ground failed to apply them properly hence the 
tensions and the threats to a return to war still being present between the two 
Sudans.  
Considering the option of separation in the right to self-determination concept, it can 
be contended  that it was problematic as it is noted that the attitudes, the behaviour 
and conflict as articulated in the Galtung’s ABC conflict  triangle theory did not 
change in view of the actors in the north and the south of Sudan. This certainly is 
due to the reasons as have been advanced in the study findings. It is however noted 
that partial negative peace to some extent was achieved through the CPA as a 
settlement.  
Similarly as can be noted, Liberal peace failed to take root due to the one size fits all 
rigid and high aspirations approaches initially in one Sudan and later the two 
Sudans. A critical look at the two theories (Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle and the 
Liberal peace theories) it can then be stated that Liberal Peace theory is rather a 
blunt instrument while the Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory is sharper in the 
context of conflict resolution. 
7.4 Comparative considerations 
On 9 July 2011 South Sudan became the newest independent state in Africa. Given 
the importance that is accorded to the inviolability of colonial borders in African 
international relations, the process of the right to self-determination of southern 
Sudan which came through the 2005 Sudan CPA raised questions on the discourse 
about the practice of the concept under general international law. This is significantly 
in the context of African regional law whereby Africa has long observed taboos 
against changing the national boundaries given to the independent countries during 
their colonisation/decolonisation. Several entities against this background tried to 
either separate or secede from their parent states and surprisingly some were 
allowed whilst others were not. Temin (2010:2) states that history matters in cases of 
this nature, because it demonstrates the intractability of the conflict and suggests 
whether separation or unity may be the necessary options as part of the right to self-
determination.  
287 
 
 
O’Leary, (2001: 54) as in chapter 2 defines partition/separation as a fresh border cut 
through at least one community’s national homeland, creating at least two separate 
political units under different sovereigns or authorities and secession as the dividing 
of territory along a previously established line of division. Partition is either de jure 
whereby a new state formed from a separation is internationally recognised or de- 
facto whereby there is divided sovereignty over the territory of a single internationally 
recognised state (Chapman and Roeder, 2007:677-691).  
This section reflects on these incidents with other conflict areas in Africa as basis for 
comparisons to the Sudan conflict in the context of the CPA case specifically on the 
aspect of the right to self-determination with its options of separation or unity in it 
which was given to South Sudan as an important part of resolving protracted and 
intractable conflicts.      
7.5 Further research 
Peace processes require careful handling in order to achieve durable peace. As this 
study has shown in the case of the CPA, the use of appropriate conflict resolution 
approaches and methods to achieve agreements coupled with their effective 
implementation and monitoring is crucial to resolving conflicts and achieving 
sustainable peace.  
Considering the history of colonialism and artificial boundaries in Africa, the quest for 
separation and secession threatens peace and security on the continent. Given that 
claims of self-determination have been, and continue to be handled differently as 
discussed in this study, there is need for further research on another peace process 
in order to establish why other cases are accepted and others not accepted in order 
to investigate conflict resolution approaches and methods and solutions driven by 
appropriate conflict resolution theories.  
The Casamance case in Senegal in this regard provides a good test case. 
Casamance is a region in southern Senegal, which was a Portuguese region before 
but through negotiations, Portugal handed it over to France, which, at the time, was 
a colonial master of the present day Senegal. The region’s history, location, and poor 
economic condition have provided the impetus for separatism but up to the present 
no clear solution has yet been reached on the conflict. A partial peace deal was 
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reached in 2014 but there still is a hiatus on the question of the right to self-
determination.  
The final analysis in the context of this study is that the idea of the right to self-
determination with its options of separation/secession and unity should be 
considered in peace agreements but only with a number of caveats – history, proper 
consideration of the Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle theory and the causal factors.
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Appendices  
Appendix 1 
Participant Information Sheet 
(Attachment to the consent form) 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study as part of a PhD student 
research project.  Before you decide it is important for you to understand why the 
research is being done and what it will involve.  Please take time to read the 
following information carefully.  Please ask if there is anything that is not clear or if 
you would like more information.  Take time to decide whether or not you wish to 
take part. 
 
 
Who will conduct the research? 
 
Paul Velentino Phiri. 
University of Bradford, 
Peace Studies Department, 
Richmond Road, 
BD7 1DP 
United Kingdom 
Cel: +447438874715 
E-mail: paphiri1@yahoo.com  
 
Title of the Research 
 
The title of the research is “Trials of a comprehensive peace agreement: an 
investigation into the dilemmas faced by North and South Sudan”. 
 
 
What is the aim of the research? 
 
To investigate why there have been tensions between North and South Sudan since 
the CPA and even after the independence of South Sudan.  
 
Why have I been asked to participate in the study? 
I asked you to participate in this study because of your involvement/expert 
knowledge in the 2005 Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement process.  
 
What would I be asked to do if I took part? 
 
If you agree to take part, I will ask you to answer some questions.  There are no right 
or wrong answers – I just want to hear about your opinions.  The discussion will take 
about 45 minutes to an hour depending on the circumstances.  Please note that 
some of the questions will relate to your personal history and experiences.  
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 What happens to the data collected? 
 
All the information you will provide will be confidential and used only for the 
purposes of this study. The data will be collected and stored in accordance with the 
Data Protection Act 1998 of the UK and will be disposed of in a secure manner.  The 
information will be used in a way that will not allow you to be identified individually 
 
How is confidentiality maintained? 
 
Confidentiality will be assured and maintained in order to help protect the privacy of 
the participants.  It will be provided through an assurance that the information given 
will not be made available to anyone not directly involved with the study. However 
names of the participants will/can be written on the study materials, that is including 
the interview guides.  The interview guides will be kept by me and nobody else will 
be allowed access to them. Anonymity may also be offered on request. 
 
 
What happens if I do not want to take part or if I change my mind? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part.  If you do decide to take part you 
will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If 
you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time without giving a 
reason and without detriment to yourself.  
 
What is the duration of the research? 
 
The interview will take a period of about 45minutes to one hour at the most. 
 
Where will the research be conducted? 
 
The interview will take place at a place which will be agreed by you and me and 
convenient to you.. 
 
Will the outcomes of the research be published? 
 
The outcome of the research will be submitted to the University of Bradford for 
assessment purposes but thereafter will be released into the public domain (through 
publishing, conference presentations or press interviews) after appropriate 
consultations. 
 
Contact for further information 
 
Dr David Harris. 
University of Bradford 
Peace Studies Department, 
Richmond Road, 
BD7 1DP. 
United Kingdom 
Telephone: +44(0)1274236802. 
E-mail: d.harris7@bradford.ac.uk 
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Appendix 2 
Consent form 
 
Project title: Trials of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement: an investigation into the 
dilemmas faced by North and South Sudan. 
 
Name of researcher: Paul Velentino Phiri. 
 
I have read and understood the attached information sheet giving details of the 
research project. 
 
I have had the opportunity to ask the researcher any questions that I had about the 
project and my involvement in it and understand my role in the project. 
 
My decision to consent is entirely voluntary and I understand that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without giving a reason. 
 
I understand that data gathered in this project may form the basis of a report or other 
form of publication or presentation. 
 
I understand that my name will not be used in any report, publication or presentation, 
and that every effort will be made to protect my confidentiality. 
 
 
 
Participant’s signature: …………………………………………..        Date: …………….. 
Participant’s name (in capitals)……………………………………. 
 
Researcher’s signature: ………………………………………….        Date: ……………. 
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Appendix 3 
The interview guide 
Introduction 
Salutation: (Good morning/Afternoon Sir/Madam). Thank you very much for agreeing 
to talk to me. I am Paul Velentino Phiri, a PhD research student from the Department 
of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford in the United Kingdom. I am from 
Malawi and in the academic circles, I am a lecturer in peace studies at Mzuzu 
University hence my interest in the area I am pursuing. I hope that you are agreeable 
to the contents of the letter I sent to you or my brief as regards the issues of consent 
and confidentiality. My study aims at investigating why there have been tensions 
between North and South Sudan since the CPA and even after the independence of 
South Sudan.  
The topic of my study however is “Trials of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement: an 
investigation into the dilemmas faced by North and South Sudan”.  I asked you to 
participate in this study because of your involvement/expert knowledge in the 2005 
Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement process. The interview will take about 45 
minutes to one hour. There is no right or wrong answer in this interview as I am only 
interested in your experiences and opinions. Feel free to interrupt, ask for 
clarifications and even to criticize at any point during the interview. I wish to assure 
you confidentiality in that your responses will be treated with the strictest confidence 
and that no any third person will have access to the interview documents.   This far, I 
would like to ask for your permission if it is possible for me to audio record and take 
notes during this interview. The reasons for my request to record and take notes are 
for me to be able to have an accurate account of your responses and opinions. If this 
is not a problem with you, I kindly ask that we start the interview. 
Many thanks for your understanding. 
The main interview guide 
Apart from the preliminaries, the interview will be divided into nine (9) parts. The first 
part will be a warm up, parts 2 to 7 will explore the research questions while the last 
two parts (8 and 9) conclude the interview. Specific questions will be asked but these 
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will in certain circumstances be followed up by prompts or probes generally to 
expand the depth and scope of understanding of particular issues. The interview will 
come from the topics listed below: 
 Causes of the conflict and the perception of national/political identity in North 
Sudan and South Sudan and how it changed over time. 
 Factors that influenced the parties in North Sudan and South Sudan who were 
in conflict to engage in mediation/negotiation to arrive at the various 
agreements and specifically the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
 Emergence of the right to self-determination as part of one of the protocols in 
the 2005 CPA and reasons why there were and are still significant problems 
between North Sudan and South Sudan. 
 The problems of the 2005 Sudan CPA and some of its protocols in the context 
of peacebuilding among the parties concerned. 
 Implications of the referendum, post-referendum and the post-independence 
issues as key underlying factors of the tensions between the two states.  
 The linkages between the contested formation, the troubled implementation of 
the CPA, the post-referendum and the post-independence issues.  
 
Part 1: Establishing the rapport (Warm up part). 
Researcher: Can you tell me a little bit about yourself and how you got involved in 
the 2005 CPA process?/your expertise on the 2005 Sudan CPA? 
Probe: Glad to know about this, tell me more about it. 
 
Part 2: Causes and the perception of national/political identity in North Sudan 
and South Sudan and how it changed over time. 
What might have been the origins and the causes of the conflict between the North 
and South Sudan? (Origins of the North-South divide in relation to Sudanese 
politics). 
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What factors do you think exacerbated the problems and hindered the North and the 
South to consider resolving them? 
How did the divide eventually create a national/political identity problem and how 
was this problem perceived in North and South Sudan? 
How did the divide create and affect national/political identity?  
Probe fully 
Was this a problem if so in what ways? 
 
Part 3: Factors that influenced the parties in North Sudan and South Sudan 
who were in conflict to engage in mediation/negotiation to arrive at the various 
agreements and specifically the 2005 CPA.  
In your opinion, what were the factors that were influencing the conflicting parties in 
the North and the South to engage in mediation/negotiation to arrive at the 
agreements? 
What do you think were the internal or external factors that contributed to the 
mediation/negotiation of the various agreements that might have been reached in 
Sudan? 
Many scholars suggest that as much as they were many agreements, only the 1972 
Addis Ababa, the Khartoum and the 2005 CPA were critical. What is your view on 
this with regards to the factors that necessitated their mediation/negotiation? 
What made the mediation/negotiation of the 2005 peace agreement to be a 
compelling case in the international community? 
Probe: Anything else on this? 
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Part 4: Emergence of the right to self-determination as part of one of the 
protocols in the 2005 CPA and reasons why there were/are still significant 
problems before and after its implementation between North and South Sudan. 
How did the right to self-determination come to be considered as an option during 
the CPA mediation/negotiation against a background of being viewed with 
ambivalence in the international community? 
Scholars believe that the right to self-determination had turbulent origins. In your 
opinion, can it be said that it was negotiated, taken on-board in good faith and owned 
by the North and South Sudan delegates? 
How was the presence of USA and its allies viewed during the mediation/negation of 
the CPA? Can it be assumed that they imposed the options especially the right to 
self-determination even if they appeared opposed to the concept initially? 
What characterizes the right to self-determination and can you tell me why it was 
included as part of the Machakos protocol of the CPA and as a major issue of the 
referendum? 
Overall, what can you say were the basis for the suggestion of the right to self-
determination in the context of South Sudan as historically part of Sudan? 
 
Part 5: The problems of the 2005 Sudan CPA and some of its protocols in the 
context of peacebuilding among the parties concerned. 
Can you tell me if you were aware of the CPA protocols? If so what do you think 
about them- (Were they adequate or appropriate?), how were they perceived and 
what is your opinion on them? 
Why was it that the option for the South to separate from the north (two-state 
solution) was not a stand-alone protocol while power sharing (both as options of the 
right to self-determination) was a protocol on its own? 
What should have been included as components of peacebuilding in the CPA if there 
is any? Anything else on this? 
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Why is it that some protocols and issues went unresolved up until the CPA period 
ended?  Can the death of Dr Garang be linked to this scenario? 
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states and Abyei were and are part of North Sudan 
while the status of Abyei is contested. What can you say about their being included 
in the CPA as protocols? 
How best could/can the issue of cross border populations, water and pasture-
concerns which are linked with the border between Sudan and South Sudan be 
managed and resolved?   
 
Power sharing protocol established the Government of the agreement in the form of 
a unity Government comprising north Sudan and south Sudan in the interest of trying 
to embrace the ‘New Sudan concept’. Why did this system of Government not work 
well for both South and North Sudan as it is evident that in the process South Sudan 
opted to separate from North Sudan? 
 
Part 6: The referendum, post-referendum and the post-referendum issues.  
What factors may have contributed to southern Sudan opting to separate from 
Sudan after their being offered the attractive power sharing deal? 
What issues had emerged after the referendum which required to be resolved to 
prevent tensions and a return to war by the two states? 
Why has the border demarcation issue been problematic between north and south 
Sudan? 
It is a fact that parts of the north and south Sudan populations are nomads and 
pastoralists and that some northerners and southerners are still either in North 
Sudan or in South Sudan after the separation of South Sudan from North Sudan. If 
this is the status quo, why is it that their status was not given urgent due recognition? 
How has the mediation and the negotiation of the post-referendum and the post-
independence issues been conducted in the context of conflict resolution? 
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Why has it been problematic to resolve the post-referendum and the post-
independence issues between the two Sudans? 
 
Part 7: The linkages between the contested formation, the troubled 
implementation of the CPA, the post-referendum and the post-independence 
issues. 
How do you see the current situation between north and south Sudan? Are the tense 
formation process, the troubled implementation of the CPA and the post referendum 
and post-independence issues contributory factors? 
Why is it problematic for north Sudan and south Sudan to accept most of the issues 
that came with the right to self-determination and its options of power sharing and 
separation?  
How are the Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile protocols and the security 
arrangements which were part of CPA linked to the post referendum and post-
independence issues? 
How can the problems that link the different stages (the contested formation, the 
troubled implementation of the CPA, the post referendum and the post- 
independence issues) be collapsed to pacify the tensions and prevent the two states 
to return to war? 
Who should be blamed (north Sudan or south Sudan) for the stalemate in the 
resolution of the current tensions?  
Part 8: Cool down part. 
Researcher: I thank you for your patience Sir/Madam. Looking back at the 
emergence of the right to self-determination (which includes the options of power 
sharing and separation) and its significant implications between North and South 
Sudan, is there anything else you think you want me to know about in relation to 
these issues which I have not covered? If you have, please fill me in during these 
last few minutes.        
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You have been wonderful with all your responses, what message or advice can you 
give or leave to and for the people of north and south Sudan? 
Part 9: Closing.  
Well, it has been a pleasure to have you for this interview. You have really given out 
a lot on why there have been tensions between north and south Sudan since the 
CPA and even after the independence of South Sudan. 
I appreciate the time you gave me for this interview despite your busy schedule. 
Would it be alright for me to contact/call you later at any time if I will have any more 
questions or certain aspects to verify or clarify with you? If this is fine with you, may 
you please provide me with your telephone number and/or e-mail? Is there anybody 
who you think I should contact on this issue? If that is the case can I have his/her 
contact details? Thank you very much once again. I look forward to meeting you 
again in future. 
 
END OF THE INTERVIEW  
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Appendix 4 
List of participants 
North Sudan 
Dr Abdelwahab EL-Affendi, 14 October, 2013, London: United Kingdom. 
Dr Khalid, 2 December 2013, London-UK 
Senior NCP negotiator, 10 October, 2013, United Kingdom  (Idris Mohamed Abd al 
Kader). 
Said al Khatib, 27 October 2013, London-UK 
Mutrif Sadiq 
 
South Sudan 
Anna Ito, 8 July 2013, Juba- South Sudan 
Bona Malwal, 22 October 2013, Oxford-UK 
Leben Moro, South Sudan, 5 July 2013, Juba –South Sudan 
Nhial Deng Nhial, 05 July 2013, South Sudan 
Pagan Amum, 5 July 2013, Juba-South Sudan 
SPLM/A negotiator, 27 October 2013, Bradford -UK  (Salih Kaki). 
IGAD Secretariat 
General Lazarus Sumbeiywo, 12 September 2013, Nairobi-Kenya 
Susan Page, 04 October 2013, South Sudan 
Professor Adams Oloo, 12 September 2013, Nairobi- Kenya 
Professor Muriuki, 13 September 2013, Nairobi – Kenya 
Dr Douglas Johnson, 27 November 2013, Oxford-UK 
The TROIKA 
Alan Goultry, 5 November 2013, London –UK 
Hilde Johnson, 22 August 2013, Juba-South Sudan 
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Appendix 5 
The 1994 IGAD Declaration of Principles (DOPs) 
We, Representatives of the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (hereinafter 
referred to as the GOS). The Sudan People’ s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’ s 
Liberation Army and the Sudan People’ s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’ s 
Liberation Army-United (hereinafter referred to as the SPLM/SPLA and SPLM/SPLA-
United respectively). Recalling the previous peace talks between the Government of 
the Sudan on the one hand, the SPLM/SPLA and SPLM/SPLA-United on the other, 
namely Addis Ababa in August 1989, Nairobi in December 1989, Abuja in May/July 
1992, Abuja in April/May 1993, Nairobi in May 1993, and Frankfurt in January 1992. 
Cognizant of the importance of the unique opportunity by the IGAD peace initiative to 
reach a negotiated peaceful solution to the conflict in the Sudan; Concerned by the 
continued human suffering and misery in the war-affected areas; Hereby agree in the 
following Declaration of Principles (DOP) that would constitute the basis for resolving 
the conflict in the Sudan:- 
1. Any comprehensive resolution of the Sudan conflict requires that all parties to the 
conflict fully accept and commit themselves to that 
position that:- 
1.1 The history and nature of the Sudan conflict demonstrate that a military 
solution can not bring lasting peace and stability to the country. 
1.2 A peaceful and just political solution must be the common objective of the 
parties to the conflict. 
2. The rights of self-determination of the people of South Sudan to determine their 
future status through a referendum must be affirmed; and 
3. Maintaining unity of the Sudan must be given priority by all the parties provided 
that the following principles are established in the political, legal, economic and 
social framework of the country: 
3.1 Sudan is a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural 
society. Full recognition and accommodation of these diversities must be 
affirmed. 
3.2 Complete political and social equalities of all people in the Sudan must be 
guaranteed by law.  
3.3 Extensive rights of self-administration on the basis of federation, 
autonomy, etc., to the various people of the Sudan must be affirmed. 
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3.4 A secular and democratic state must be established in the Sudan. 
Freedom of belief and worship and religious practice shall be guaranteed in 
full to all the Sudanese citizens. State and religion shall be separated. The 
basis of personal and family laws can be religion and customs. 
3.5 Appropriate and fair sharing of wealth among the various peoples of the 
Sudan must be realized. 
3.6 Human rights as internationally recognized shall form part and parcel of 
this arrangement and shall be embodied in Constitution. 
3.7 The independence of the Judiciary shall be enshrined in the Constitution 
and laws of the Sudan. 
4. In the absence of agreement on the above principles referred to in 3.1 – 3.7 the 
respective people will have the option to determine their future including 
independence, through a referendum. 
5. An interim arrangement shall be agreed upon, the duration and the tasks of which 
should be negotiated by the parties. 
6. The parties shall negotiate a cease-fire agreement to enter into force as part of the 
overall settlement of the conflict in the Sudan. 
Nairobi, 20 May 1994. 
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Appendix 6 
Rebel leaders in South Sudan since April 2010  
 Person(s) 
Involved  
Tribe  Date of 
rebellion  
Reasons Area of 
operation 
1 George Athor 
Deng  
Dinka April 2010  Alleged rigging of 
gubernatorial 
elections  
Jonglei  
2 Bapiny Monituel  Nuer  Did not 
integrate 
after the 2006 
Juba 
Declaration  
Tribal grievances 
about the current 
SPLA 
leadership  
Unity  
3 Gabriel 
Tanginye  
Nuer  Did not 
integrate 
after the 2006 
Juba 
Declaration  
Long-standing 
Differences  
Upper Nile  
4 Peter Gatdet Yak  Nuer  April 2011  Accusations of 
corruption and 
marginalisation  
Unity  
5 Gatluak Gai  Nuer  After April 
2010  
Politically motivated  Unity  
6 Abdel Bagi Agyii  Dinka  March 2011  Politically motivated; 
accusations of the 
marginalisation of the 
Muslim minority  
Northern 
Bahr el 
Ghazal  
7 David Yau Yau  Murle  April 2010  Politically motivated 
and linked to internal 
Murle politics  
Jonglei  
8 Uluak Oliny  Shilluk  After April 
2010  
Unknown  Upper Nile  
 
Source: South Sudan: origins and implications of emerging (in) security dynamics-ISS 
Situation report July, 2011. 
 
 
  
 
 
